

FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE TIME TO THE EXPERIENCE OF MATERNAL EMPATHY

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From the Experience of Intersubjective Time to the Experience of Maternal Empathy

The paper draws on Husserl's description of primordial intersubjective temporality, which I present as consistent with and integral to his understanding of the continuum between empathy and instinct. Because Husserl presents the mother-child relation as the foundational relation which constitutes *the most primordial site of intersubjective temporal continuity*, I focus my attention on the role that the mother-child relation plays as an original source of empathetic and instinctual experience and as the original source of an *awakening* to the past and to the future. Although Husserl did not pursue an extended account of maternal empathy and instinct, I demonstrate how Husserl's account of the *merging* of empathy and instinct reflects his account of the intermingling of heteronomous temporalities and thereby bolsters his account of the intersubjective experience while anticipating the possibility of a generative empathetic ethics of continuity. By reading Husserl in this way, I show that he provides us with the theoretic foundation of the maternal temporal experience, which provides the necessary support for an empathetic ethics of engagement.

Key words: phenomenology, maternal, intersubjective time, instinct, empathy

Od izkušnje intersubjektivnega časa do izkušnje materinske empatije

Prispevek se opira na Husserlov opis izvirne intersubjektivne časovnosti, za katero pokažem, da je povsem skladna z njegovim razumevanjem kontinuuma med empatijo in instinktom ter je tudi ključna za njegovo razumevanje. Husserl prikaže odnos med materjo in otrokom kot temeljni odnos, ki predstavlja *najbolj izvorno mesto intersubjektivne časovne kontinuitete*, zato se v tekstu osredotočim na vlogo, ki jo ima odnos med materjo in otrokom kot prvotni vir empatične in instinktivne izkušnje in kot prvotni vir *prebuditve* v preteklost in prihodnost. Čeprav se Husserl ni ukvarjal z razširjenim prikazom materinske empatije in instinkta, pokažem, kako Husserlov prikaz *spajanja* empatije in instinkta odraža njegovo dožemanje prepletanja različnih časovnosti. S slednjim Husserl okrepi svoj prikaz intersubjektivne izkušnje in hkrati anticipira možnost generativne empatične etike kontinuitete. S takšnim branjem Husserla pokažem, da nam daje teoretične temelje materinske časovne izkušnje, ki zagotavlja potrebno podporo za empatično etiko angažiranosti.

Ključne besede: fenomenologija, materinsko, intersubjektivni čas, nagon, empatija

INTRODUCTION

The paper draws on Edmund Husserl's description of primordial intersubjective temporality and demonstrates that it is consistent with and integral to his formulation of the relation between empathy and instinct. Because Husserl presents the mother-child relation as the paradigmatic relation which constitutes *the most primordial site of intersubjective temporal continuity*, I focus my attention on the role which the mother-child relation plays as the original source of empathetic and instinctual experience and as the original source of an awakening to the past and to the future. Although Husserl did not pursue an extended account of maternal empathy and instinct, I demonstrate how Husserl's account of the merging of empathy and instinct reflects his account of the intermingling of heteronomous primordial temporalities and thereby bolsters his account of the intersubjective ethical experience by anticipating the possibility of a generative experience of the relationship between empathy and instinct.

I show that insofar as Husserl presents the maternal as the most primordial site of temporal and genetic continuity and insofar as he claims that the maternal is the originary site of the onset of both empathy and instinct, his account of the mother-child relation provides us with an example of an intersubjective relation in which the seemingly incompatible relation between instinct and empathy is addressed. By suggesting that we read the relation between instinct and empathy according to its generative temporal features – as manifest in the mother-child relation – Husserl provides us with a paradigm for a new social ethics, one which is consistent with his account of the *streaming living present* and one which helps articulate the ethical tension between the instinct for self-preservation and the empathetic responsibility for the other. Because Husserl's discussion of the maternal reflects the temporal complexity of intersubjective relations which additionally supports a model for empathetic/instinctual relations, I contend that Husserl's description of the mother-child relation provides us with a new way to make sense of the world – as *opened to* and *awakened by* the other.

Accordingly, the paper explores the intersubjective ramifications of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts regarding the single streaming present. I show

below how the mother-child relation provides us with a special case of the merging of heterogeneous temporalities insofar as it paradigmatically illustrates the interface between the empathetic and instinctual experience. I begin by describing Husserl's account of the originating experience (or *presence*) of time that, according to Husserl in his late unpublished manuscripts, opens up the experience of intersubjectivity. Following this, I explore the role of empathy, instinct, and the mother-child relation that Husserl locates within this primordial theater of intersubjective temporal experience. I argue that the originary experience of the relation of empathy and instinct is a consistent extension of Husserl's account of primordial temporality. Where Husserl's theory of primordial temporality explains the opening of temporal alterity, his description of the mother-child relation illustrates the awakening of empathy and instinct. I conclude that Husserl's account of the streaming living present read in conjunction with his description of the empathetic/instinctual relation – as illustrated by the originary lived maternal experience – provides us with a theoretic foundation for an experiential empathetic ethics of engagement.

THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE TIME

In Husserl's later unpublished manuscripts,¹ temporality becomes that which primordially founds and creates the continuity of apperceptive experiences, including the experience of others:

The original source-point of time constitution is, for each individual, the experience of his present in an original mode and is, as well, the capacity

- 1 Husserl, Edmund, Unpublished manuscripts in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium: Lettering in citations below corresponds to the following index:
 - A. *Mundane Phänomenologie* (Mundane Phenomenology)
 - B. *Die Reduktion* (The Reduction)
 - C. *Zeitkonstitution als formale Konstitution* (Time Constitution as Formal Constitution)
 - E. *Konstitution der Intersubjektivität* (Constitution of Intersubjectivity)
 - F. *Vorlesung und Vorträge* (Lectures).

of each to experience Others... i.e., the capacity of each, within his own living present, to experience Others in an original manner and which this, indeed, to experience the original coincidence between his own and the Other's being.²

Husserl's assertion of coincidence between the *original source point of time* and the *experience of the Other's being* is quite significant. Yet in what way does Husserl conceive of the originating point or *presence* of time which grounds both intersubjectivity and temporal experience?

According to Husserl:

This streaming living-present is not what we otherwise... designate as the stream of consciousness or stream of lived experiences. It is not a 'stream' at all in accordance with the image of what is a properly temporal (or even spatial-temporal) whole, which within the unity of a temporal extension has a continual-successive individual factual existence... The streaming living-present is 'continuously' streaming-being and yet not in an apartness of being; not in spatio-temporal (worldly-spatial) being, not in a being of 'immanent temporal' extension. Thus, not in an apartness of being which is called succession.³

For Husserl, the original source point of temporality, the streaming living present, is the pre-being which *bears* all being, much like the now-instant, which can be said to bear both its retentions and protentions or like the determinate-X, which bears the *noematic Sinn's* multiple attributes. The primordial "streaming living present" appears to function as "the pre-time and the being of the stream of consciousness as a being."⁴ At this primordial level, the absolute living present functions not as a point in a line of successive moments, but as a nodal point at the intersection of both ipseity and alterity, of both the ego and the non-ego. This nodal point is formed by "the ego-structure and the constant substratum of the egoless stream which

² Husserl, C17, I, 4–5, as translated by James Mensch, *Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism* (Albany, 1988), 20 (my emphasis).

³ Husserl, C3, 4, as translated by Janet Donohue, *Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: from Static to Genetic Phenomenology*, (Toronto, 2016), 58.

⁴ Op. Cit., Mensch, *Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism*, 214; Husserl, C17 I, 4.

finds it.”⁵ Accordingly, as the source of all temporalization, the streaming living present is considered by Husserl to be the temporal source of both the *I* as well as that which is *other*, the *non-I*.

Husserl’s account of the primordial level of temporality is not a rejection of his earlier notion of the relation between the *noema* and inner time consciousness, but rather a reformulation of this position. While in Husserl’s earlier writings, the *noematic Sinn* functioned as the nodal source point of both meaning and temporal change, the streaming living present of the later manuscripts functions as the primal *node* which not only bears the meaning and sense of subjective intentional constitutionality, but bears both intersubjectivity and the constitution of time itself. For Husserl, the primal temporal structure of the streaming present is foundational to the continuous experience of the shared world as well as the generation of time itself.

In the late C-manuscripts, Husserl develops and modifies his distinction between the *primal ego* and the *ego*, which in the earlier *Ideas*⁶ *I* remains within the reflective stream of self-consciousness. While the *ego* of Husserl’s early works appears as a locus point within the stream of internal time consciousness, the primal *ego* of his later works provides the necessary foundation which is both prior to and makes possible the generation of the identity of the lived *ego*. It is the pre-reflective, self-awareness of the *ego*. As such, the primal *ego* makes possible the reflective consciousness that actively constitutes temporal objects. “On the one side we have the temporal stream of consciousness and the transcendental *ego* of acts which is related to this temporality.... on the other side we have the primal *ego* as the primal ground of this temporalization.”⁷

For Husserl, the primal *ego* must be conceived of as the self-constituting source through which temporality is constituted – it is the site where the streaming living present is constituted. Thus, “[the primal *ego*] bears the streaming, purely associative, sub-egological temporalization in its founding

5 Op. Cit., Donohue, *Husserl on Ethics*, 58; Husserl Archives - Leuven (*Hua XV*, 598).

6 Edmund Husserl. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (The Hague, 1967).

7 Op. Cit., *Ibid.*, 60; Husserl, C2, 8b.

construction, in its essential form that begins *without* the participation of the ego.”⁸ Husserl further explains that “in the stream of the living present is the identical persisting pole in the changes of the immanent temporal occurrences... this pure ‘I’ is abstract, it is only concrete through the content of the streaming present.”⁹ Husserl concludes that the purely abstract primal ego is thus that which grounds the temporal self-awareness of the living ego.

In Husserl’s words, “the primal-ego carries in itself, the counterpart, the existing, having-become ego and its surroundings, what is there for this and for me as anonymous ego, as non-ego.”¹⁰ Accordingly, the primal ego carries within itself – or *bears* – the *not-I* or the non-ego. Yet what exactly does Husserl mean by the *non-ego* that belongs to the streaming living present? According to Husserl: “The primally streaming and primally constituted non-ego is the *hyletic* universe [of actual experiential contents] which, in itself, is constituting and which already has constantly constituted; it is a temporalizing-temporal primal occurring, which does not occur from ego-logical sources; it therefore occurs without the participation of the ego.”¹¹ From this Husserl concludes that “The primordial streaming present... is throughout already non-ego and everything that is constituted in it and will be constituted in it is non-ego in different levels.”¹² Thus, in contrast to Husserl’s early work, the primordial temporal stream is depicted as an event of pre-consciousness which acts as both the source of identity and the source of the non-ego.

According to Husserl, there is an “all-inclusive unity, which temporalizes ... the absolute as an absolute ‘human’ totality...”¹³ This shared totality reveals “my coincidence with Others on an original level of constitution, my coincidence, so to speak, *before* there is constituted a world for myself

8 *Ibid.*; Husserl, E III 9, 7a (my emphasis).

9 *Ibid.*; Husserl, C3, 42a.

10 *Ibid.*; Husserl, C2, 3a/3b.

11 Op. Cit., Mensch, *Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism*, 150; Husserl, C10, 25.

12 Husserl Archives - Leuven (*Hua XV*, 669).

13 *Ibid.*

and Others.”¹⁴ Because this foundational streaming presence is primordial, that is, pre-egological, the other can be said to be present to the self on a primordial level. It is only on this deepest level of the formation of an ego’s identity that the otherness of the other can be generated. The intersubjectivity that coincides with the primordial streaming living present is a continuously constituting and generating intersubjectivity. It is an intersubjectivity that occurs at the primal level of passive association which pre-conditions self-reflection. Since self-reflection takes place at a higher level in the ego, not as the foundation of temporality, self-reflection can never successfully take up its streaming present as fully present, but can only take it up as past. On account of this temporal non-self-coincidence, the ego will always be distanced from itself. Thus, according to Husserl’s later manuscripts, primal temporal intersubjectivity points to and announces the temporal opening of the ego to that which is foreign to it, namely, the other. And it is this “opening” which makes possible an ethical relation to another ego that is *passively* co-present within the streaming present of the ego pole.¹⁵

THE EXPERIENCE OF MATERNAL EMPATHY

Below, I develop a reading of the relation between instinct and empathy as is reflected in Husserl’s description of the mother-child relation. I focus on this relation insofar as it makes manifest the *opening* of the streaming living presence as described by Husserl in his discussion of primordial intersubjective temporality. I contend that a comparable awakening within the instinctual/empathetic mother-child relation extends Husserl’s description of the opening of presence and is critical to his account of intersubjective ethics. For Husserl, instinctual striving is necessarily motivated by the affections of *hyletic* content.¹⁶ Yet for the *hyletic* content to be recognized as content by the ego, that is, to count as *hyle*, the data must affect the ego,

¹⁴ Op. Cit., Mensch, *Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism*, 187; Husserl. C17 V, 30.

¹⁵ Op. Cit., Donohue, *Husserl on Ethics*, 63 (my emphasis).

¹⁶ Husserl, E III 9, 16a, as translated by James Mensch, “Instincts - A Husserlian Account”, *Husserl Studies* 14, no. 3 (1997), 219–237.

which in turn awakens the ego's striving.¹⁷ The striving of the primal ego depends on the complementary relationship between the passive affect by the *hyle* and its instinctive action. For Husserl, we have "determined ways of striving that are originally, instinctively one with [their] *hyletic* complement." Due to the primal association between the two, "[t]he ego is awakened by affection from the non-egological because the non-egological is [that which is instinctively] 'of interest;...'."¹⁸ Thus, for Husserl, the ego is not simply awakened by just any *hyletic* stimulus; rather, the *awakening* presupposes an *interest* for that which is other. According to Husserl:

[there] is an excellent [example in the case] where the other is interpreted as related to my 'I' and to that which pertains to my 'I' and [where] I actually experience this.... In any case if *we think of the most primordial genetic continuity between mother and child* and of the importance of the social I-Thou-Life [*Ich-Du-Leben*] [it becomes clear that] this mode of fulfillment plays a *special role*.¹⁹

Thus, for Husserl, the mother-child relationship figures as a special case and as the most fundamental intersubjective relationship of the life-world. Yet why should the mother-child relation warrant such a paradigmatic role? I suggest that Husserl directs our attention to the exceptional relation of natality because of its inherent challenge to the presumed boundaries between self and other, the ego and non-ego. On account of the ambiguous boundaries between the mother/fetus/infant/child Husserl claims that the fulfillment of the child's interests is not necessarily separate from that of the (m)other and, accordingly, the distinction between the instincts for self-preservation and empathy for the other is likewise indeterminate. Because Husserl believes that the other is encountered on a primordial level through empathy, and because he describes this fundamental relation as *the most primordial genetic continuity between mother and child*, it is fair to say that, for Husserl, the primary social *I-Thou-Life* connection

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Husserl, B III 9,70a–70b.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Husserl, B III 3, 5a.

¹⁹ Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology* (Evanston, 1993), 163.

is found in the mother-child relation. Let us explore Husserl's discussion of the temporality of empathy in its relation to instinct in order to gain a better understanding of this inference.

According to Husserl, the function of the relation between instinct and empathy is to facilitate making sense of experience by connecting our temporal experiences into a unity and by drawing on the stability of past experiences in order to anticipate the future.²⁰ Instincts have a kind of directedness that Husserl characterizes as *primal* or *proto-intentional*, which, when directed towards an other, provides an empathetic foundation for intersubjectivity. Because the mother and child experience is in fact a temporally generative one, Husserl claims that within the mother-child relation, instinct generates empathy. It follows then for Husserl that the onset of empathy in childhood, as *originally developing instinctively*, is consistent with the experience of the mother-child relation. Husserl, therefore, concludes that empathy is an expression of an originary and innate instinct.²¹

Because the infant is instinctively related to the mother; and because the mother perceives the child as both belonging to herself and as other, the infant's instinct for self-preservation elicits a response of empathy by the mother for her child, thereby generating a continuum of instinct and empathy within the mother – child relation.²²

Empathy, on the other hand, has its roots in the primordial structure of association (or “pairing”, as Husserl sometimes refers to it). The empathetic relation is founded on a shared experience of the *primal now* (or what Husserl refers to as the “streaming living present”). Empathy, for Husserl, does not imply a shared recollected experience or shared reflections; rather, empathetic pairing refers to a form of synthesis where the primal ego is passively connected to or linked with an experience of another ego on the primal level. Accordingly, empathy is founded on a passive association of retained experiences, while instinct manifests itself in a striving or having-in-advance. Consistent with Husserl's earlier characterizations

20 Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen, *Husserl's Dictionary* (New York, 2016), 94–102.

21 Husserl Archives – Leuven (Hua XV, 582).

22 *Ibid.*, 604.

of temporal continuity, empathy reflects a non-recuperative retention of earlier experiences, while instinct reflects a form of streaming protention of anticipated experiences. What moves us forward is the fact that we are instinctively driven to and awakened by that which is other in order to make sense of our world. We are moved by the striving that appears as “instinctively directed towards what in the future will first be disclosed as worldly unities constituting themselves.”²³ As for the past, we are linked through our empathetic engagement to a unity of *the retained with the ongoing present*, yet this ongoing present finds itself pregnant with and open to the *non-I*. The resulting temporalization is what can be described as “the thickness of experienced time.”²⁴

In Husserl’s words, “Ultimately, the whole hyle is united in passive temporalization including the heterogeneous [contents.] Everything homogeneous, however, is united in the special mode of merging; within the total merging, [there is a merging] into fields and then particular mergings into unities that stand out.”²⁵ In this merging, similar qualities reinforce each other, while heterogeneous qualities provide openings for new direction. For example, when we grasp a melody as “primarily merging, the temporalizations unite together and thereby produce a unity of a temporalization for all the tones and their temporalizations and times. Here, however, the homogeneity of the tones plays its part. The unities merge their contents and times according to the constant, homogeneous temporal form arising from the homogeneous temporalization.”²⁶

Husserl suggests that it is in the process of such merging that we should locate instinct and empathy. Accordingly, I suggest we conceive of instinct and empathy as two sides of the same coin, where *the thickness of time* informs the stream of enduring past experience as it bears its particular indeterminate future. Constantly situated between the past and future, the

23 James Mensch, *Postfoundational Phenomenology* (Pennsylvania, 2010), 46; Husserl, A VI, 34b.

24 *Ibid.*, 47.

25 *Ibid.*; Husserl, E III 9, 16a.

26 *Ibid.*; Husserl, C 15, 4b.

thickness of time is experienced as *a lasting and remaining primal now*, i.e., as the point through which time streams and in which its content appears to well up as present and actual.

According to Husserl, the primal ego is situated as

a fixed form for a content which streams through it and as the source point for all constituted modifications. In union with [the constitution of] the fixed form of the primally welling primal now, there is constituted a two-sided continuity of forms that are just as fixed. Thus, *in toto*, there is constituted a fixed continuum of form in which the primal now is a primal welling middle point for two continua ...: the continuum of what is just past and that of futurities.²⁷

For Husserl, the primal ego functions as a source point and opening for two continua. The empathetic affections associated with its streaming content form one continuum, and the instinctual strivings that engender the future appear as a second continuum. The ego thus appears as *the center of affections and actions*, as the *pole of the as yet undetermined instincts*, as the place of merging of the two continua.

Let us turn here to Husserl's mention of the maternal experience which he claims provides us with a special paradigm for the *fixed two-sided continuity of forms*. According to Husserl, the mother-child relation is unique insofar as it is both the place of merging temporalities and the welling site of the origin of empathy and instinct. Below, I cite several fragmentary texts that focus on the maternal experience of the mother-child relation and which highlight the interrelated empathetic and instinctive proclivities of the mother, the unborn child and the newborn infant:

The child inside the womb ... [t]he child inside the mother. Do we not here have to do with an intermingling of primordialities that does not depend on empathy? Does the mother amongst her own, inner sensory fields [...] also have those of the child, its sensibility of movement, its kinesthesia?

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 49; Husserl, C 2 I, 11a.

But if that is not the case, then what kind of community is it? How does the mother suffer when the child feels unwell?²⁸

Husserl's remarks on the mother-child relation and on gestation are, unfortunately, brief, but nevertheless point to an embodied, temporal intertwining which exists between the mother and the child. Husserl begins the fragment cited above by asking whether the intermingling between the mother and the unborn child depends on an experience of empathy. He further questions whether the mother shares her inner sensory fields (i.e. her embodied kinesthetic experience) with that of her unborn child. Husserl's response suggests an affirmative answer to both questions. By arguing *a posteriori* from the assumption that there are in fact communities and that mothers do in fact suffer when their children feel unwell, Husserl implies that the *intermingling of primordialities* is in fact due to the empathetic relation that the mother bears to the unborn child. Curiously, Husserl does not suggest that there is a temporally shared primordial experience; rather, he gives examples of shared sensible feelings. We will have to look at a different fragment to gain insight into the temporal underpinnings of the mother-child relation.

In a text from 1935, Husserl addresses the question of instinct and, indirectly, the question of the temporal experience of the child. He begins by comparing the limited kinesthetic experience of the unborn child to that of the more fully developed experience of newborn infants:

[The] originary child – in what sense is it like an “I,” directed towards its first sensory data like an early ego-pole, what does its “*instinctive*” habituality consist of? The child in the womb already has kinesthesia and kinesthetically moves its “things” – already a primordiality at an originary level developing itself. [...] [Whereas] the infant, the newly born. [...] It is already an experiencing I at a higher level, it already has its acquisition of experience from its existence in the mother's womb, it already has its perceptions with perceptual horizons.... [I]t is already an I of higher habitualities, but without self-reflection, without developed temporality, without recollections

²⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana XLII* (Dordrecht, 2013), 27.

at its disposition, [nevertheless, with] streaming presence with retention and protention.²⁹

In this fragment, Husserl addresses the question as to what the instinctive habitualities of the unborn child are. Although he concedes that the unborn child has independent kinesthetic movements that indicate an originary primordially, he refrains from providing a definitive description of the formation of instincts within the womb. Instead, Husserl proceeds to compare the unborn child's sensory experience with that of a newborn infant. He points out that unlike the unborn child, the infant has acquired experience – from the womb – and that the newborn is, accordingly, a *higher level experiencing I* than the unborn child. Finally, Husserl comments that even if the temporal experience of the newborn cannot be considered as fully developed, it nevertheless can be attributed with a primordial sense of streaming living presence along with retention and protention.

Husserl seems to be suggesting that the instinctual capabilities of an unborn child exist on a lower level than those of the newborn. Accordingly, Husserl suggests that the (instinctive) habitualities of the newborn can exist without requiring a sense of fully developed reflection and recollection and that the primordial experience of a streaming living presence is adequate for instinctual behavior. Husserl further elaborates on the instinctive behavior of the newborn by examining the newborn's instinctive drive to nourish itself with its mother's milk:

When the smell of the mother's breast and the sensations of moving one's lips occur, an instinctive directedness towards drinking awakens, and an originally paired kinesthesia comes into play. . . . If drinking does not immediately occur, how does it happen? Perhaps the smell alone awakens something else, an empty apperception, so to speak, which has no 'conscious' goal. If touching occurs, then the way to fulfillment is first properly an ongoing

29 Edmund Husserl, *Collected Works*, vol. 9. *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic* (Dordrecht, 2001), 466–469.

instinctive drive which is an unfulfilled intention. This, in fulfillment, disclosing the instinctive drive.³⁰

Although Husserl ascribes instinctive drives to both the unborn and the newborn child, neither the unborn nor the newborn child's instinctive act is described by Husserl as fully conscious or undertaken with a fully developed sense of temporality. Husserl does, however, credit the infant with already having an *originally paired kinesthesia* that is retained from its experience of the womb, which is consistent with Husserl's account of empathetic, paired habitualities and which supports the idea that, for Husserl, the infant has empathetic as well as instinctual proclivities.

Concerning the pregnant mother's experience, Husserl, interestingly, attributes a residual primordial experience from the mother's womb to her as well. Not only does Husserl imply that she has the potential for an empathetic experience in relation to her own child, but also that she would demonstrate instinctive drives in response to the suffering of her child. Husserl's observation that a mother already has "the experience of being a child," the experience of herself as a "child-of-a-mother"³¹ within herself is especially interesting insofar as it problematizes the mother's sense of temporal experience during gestation. According to Husserl, although a mother (as any other human being) cannot recollect her own primordial experience of natality, this experience, nevertheless, figures into and complicates her temporal experience of becoming a mother. I suggest that the complex temporal experience of the mother is due to the retention of the experience of a primordial streaming present (inherited from her shared experience with her own mother), which is then doubled through a new experience of natality. The pregnant woman not only has a fully conscious emergent experience of temporality, which includes a primordial shared experience with her own unborn child, she also has the retention of the

³⁰ Kelly Oliver, *Family Values: Subjects Between Nature and Culture* (New York, 1997); Husserl, C 16 IV, 36b.

³¹ Christoph Durt, Thomas Fuchs and Christian Tewes (eds.), *Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture: Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World* (Cambridge, 2017), 36; Husserl, *Hua XV*, 582.

prior shared primordial experience with her own mother, namely, a shared source point of temporality.

Accordingly, for Husserl, not only would a pregnant mother experience a sense of intersubjective primordial living presence along with conscious recollections and anticipations, she would also inherit a prior level of retention of the source of primordial experience. From Husserl's observation, it would follow that on the level of intersubjectively shared primordial temporal experience, the expectant mother lives with a doubled primordial sense of intersubjective experience. We can therefore understand Husserl's sense of the doubling of the mother-child relation not only in terms of the lived temporal continuum between heterogeneous temporalities, but also as an originary site of the opening critical to the ethical experience of empathy and instinct. In conclusion, I suggest that we understand the doubling of the mother-child relation as a unique site where the continuity of heterogeneous temporal experience between the mother and child becomes manifest in the intermingling of empathetic and instinctive experience. As such, the originary experience of the doubled temporality obtaining to the mother-child relation elicits an ethical openness necessary for an empathetic engagement with the world, while retaining the instinctive attributes of the self, thereby awakening and enabling us to make sense of the world.

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