

BUILDING PEACE FOR A LIVING

Expatriate Development Workers in Kosovo

Mojca Vah Jevšnik

MIGRACIJE

Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo ZRC SAZU
Slovenian Migration Institute SRC SASA

Digitalna verzija (pdf) je pod pogoji licence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
prosto dostopna: https://doi.org/10.3986/9789610502845.

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji
Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana

316.343-058.14-058.14-054.72(497.115)

VAH, Mojca
Building peace for a living : expatriate development workers in Kosovo / Mojca Vah Jevšnik. - Ljubljana : ZRC Publishing, 2009. - (Migracije / Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, ISSN 1580-7401 ; 18)

ISBN 978-961-254-156-9

248037632

BUILDING PEACE FOR A LIVING

Expatriate Development Workers in Kosovo

Mojca Vah Jevšnik

Ljubljana 2009

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
9

CHAPTER 1
A NOTE ON DEFINITIONS: TERMINOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS, INTERRELATEDNESS OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS AND THE LIMITS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM
17

CHAPTER 2
NOTES FROM THE FIELD: JOURNEY TO THE CENTRE OF DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
29

CHAPTER 3
PEACEBUILDING AND NATION-STATE BUILDING
39

CHAPTER 4
THE AGENTS OF NATION-STATE BUILDING THEN AND NOW: THE MULTIPLICITY OF ELITES
67

CHAPTER 5
NOTES FROM THE FIELD: THE VOICE OF THE LOCALS
79

CHAPTER 6
PRIVILEGED MIGRANTS AND FORMATION OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL SPACES
85

CHAPTER 7
NOTES FROM THE FIELD: THE PARALLEL REALITY OF EXPATRIATES' TRANSNATIONAL SPACES
93

CONCLUSION
DOING WELL WHILE DOING GOOD
101

REFERENCES
105



INTRODUCTION

Helping poor people in disadvantaged parts of the world to survive and improve their living conditions is considered an act of goodness. Becoming a humanitarian or development worker in war-torn states and devoting your life to helping the local population out of intolerable situations, is considered goodness at its best, a morally undisputed act of altruism. But why do people do good for strangers, especially when *doing good* entails risking their own lives? Answering this question is difficult without diving into the studies of altruism and even then, the answer remains disputed and ambiguous.[1] Socialisation obviously plays an important role in the development of empathy but it remains unclear whether humans are willing to help strangers without having an alternative motive, even if they are themselves not aware of what exactly that motive is. Benefits from *doing good* come in a variety of forms. Rewards range from feeling good and improving one's self-esteem to financial benefits and a good reputation. In this respect, *doing good* for others means simultaneously *doing good* for oneself. While this realisation could burst the bubble of idealists, I argue that having alternative motives does not necessarily lessen the impact of *doing good* and should therefore not be *a priori* condemned. However, when the alternative motives, whether personal or political, overshadow and jeopardise the act of doing good for others, the agency of humanitarian and development workers becomes disputed.

In the book, I will address both variants of *doing good*: for others and for oneself. The subjects of the research are the expatriate development workers[2]

1 Lee Alan Dugatkin's book *The Altruism Equation: Seven Scientists Search for the Origin of Goodness* (2006), presents the research of seven scientists who have been searching for the origin of goodness. They had each been asking themselves the same question: in a world supposedly governed by ruthless survival of the fittest, why do we see acts of goodness in humans? One of them, biologist George Price, even fell into poverty and succumbed to suicide as he obsessed over the problem. Today, there are still several different theories on the nature of the impetus to do good to strangers and no common consensus has yet been reached.

2 For a detailed definition of the term see chapter 2.

who are among the agents of peacebuilding in Kosovo, which at the time of my fieldwork was still a province of the former Yugoslavia under UN administration, awaiting final status resolution. Peacebuilding activities were chosen over relief and aid activities because they are significantly more controversial and complicate the notion of *doing good* even further. Humanitarian intervention, coupled with peacebuilding that entails nation-state building elements and is in most cases linked with imperialistic agendas, potentially places the *doing good* for others component under question. Similarly, *doing good* for oneself becomes more evident in the case of expatriate development workers in Prishtina, who have migrated to help the local population and ended up creating a deterritorialised transnational social space, existing as a privileged parallel reality to the one experienced by the locals. The main purpose of the book is to reveal the complex nature of *doing good*, especially when development efforts are serving the political and economic interests of capitalist donor countries and when the social status attained by the expatriate development workers improves significantly upon migrating to poor countries. Regardless of the controversy of these relatively hidden agendas, I argue in the book that *the* evaluation criterion of *doing good* remains the benefit to the local population.

The structure of the book will not follow the usual line of reasoning from the theory to empirical findings or vice versa, but will instead alternate between the two. Sociological accounts of the themes discussed will be "interrupted" by ethnographic contributions as Notes from the field. Thus, the book will start with an outline of the research framework, the methodology, and a note on definitions. It will continue with the first Notes from the field, discussing my arrival in Kosovo - the centre of development activities and the site of nation-state building, the social, ethnic, and economic profile of Kosovo, and a short overview of the war following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Next, the four nation-state building types will be presented as defined by Anthony D. Smith (1995, 2000, see also Rizman 1991) and a new type will be introduced, which is being implemented through the peacebuilding activities of the international community, usually following the act of humanitarian intervention. In the same chapter, the man behind transformations of humanitarianism, Bernard Kouchner, will be presented, who turned the notion of humanitarian assistance upside down and is considered to be the father of humanitarian intervention. The theory will be complemented with a case study of nation-state building in Kosovo. It will be argued that large numbers of international staff were imported and entrusted with a mandate for nation-state building according to the Western European civic-territorial type.

In the next chapter, the multiplicity of elites involved in nation-state building will be introduced, with the focus on the elites involved in the most recently defined nation-state building type: peacebuilding in war-torn states. With their agency, the expatriate development workers become members of such elites. It will be argued that development workers migrate to failed states for a variety of reasons which mostly exclude the goal of creating favourable grounds for capitalism to develop, as argued by Jackson (2007) in his book on development workers as globalizers. Therefore, it is safe to assume that becoming globalisation missionaries is a collateral effect of their agency rather than an intended consequence.

Before moving on to a discussion of the expatriates' transnational social space as an externally bounded entity that forms a parallel reality to the social reality experienced by the local population, another Notes from the field will address the attitude of the local population towards the international community that has been present in high numbers since 1999. The final chapter will address the expatriates' transnational space as I experienced it during fieldwork. It will move from the theory to address the parallelism as observed in practice. It will be argued that double remoteness, defined by Meike Fechter (2007) as geographical distance from the home country and social and cultural distance from the society of employment, coupled with a specific way of life that pertains to development professionals, is what joins them together in a parallel, transnational social space.

Research outline and methodology

The four-week long ethnographic research[3] was conducted in September 2007 in Prishtina, the capital of the Kosovo province, which was under international administration at that time. The location was chosen because it is the site of a previously unprecedented case of a humanitarian intervention followed by peacebuilding under the auspices of the international community. Thus international development workers are a significant presence there. It

3 The role of the ethnographer is to participate "overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions; in fact collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues with which he or she is concerned" (Hammersley and Atkinson in Flick 2002: 146). It should be noted that the ethnographic fieldwork is a mechanism which "creates the other as a distinct form of peoplehood in a dialogue with the self". This means that the fieldwork, at least in its outcome if not its intent, is as much about the autobiography of the researcher as it is the investigation of the other (Knowles 2000: 61). The observations offered in the book are my own and thus subjectively interpreted. The views and opinions discussed are not based on generalisations but individual stories and observations that are a product of the qualitative research techniques.

was also chosen because I am closely related to and familiar with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, once a country of my own residence. The primary data collected in the field provided material for a subsequent sociological analysis of the agency of development workers and their nation-state building activities in Kosovo.

Qualitative methods were used in the process of inductive reasoning, including participant observation and semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted in the field and via skype upon returning home from the field.[4] The information that was most useful, however, was not obtained through the interviews but at social gatherings that I took part in. Informal conversations with more than thirty expatriate development workers and participant observation provided the basis for further analysis of the themes I was particularly interested in. Throughout the fieldwork, a journal was kept, containing observations, experiences, ideas, confusions, and breakthroughs.

In order to better integrate myself into the social space of development workers, I took an internship at the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, a local NGO with an international board of directors. It would not, however, have been possible to become part of the exclusive, externally bounded parallel social space of development workers were it not for my acquaintances in Prishtina who were already a part of that space and my previous experience with international development workers. Having this "history" I could share with the others proved crucial in my efforts to integrate.[5] During the fieldwork, I became especially interested in development workers who are part of the international governance structure in Kosovo: the employees of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) missions, as those are the ones who are the principle constructors of the

4 Twenty-five in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with expatriate development workers of different ethnic backgrounds who are part of the peacebuilding activities. Nineteen of the twenty-five interviewees are employed at the multilateral organisations considered to be pillars of the international administration in Kosovo: UN, EU, and OSCE, and the remaining six interviewees are employees of the bilateral and multilateral non-governmental organisations. Interviewees were encouraged to speak about their lives before deciding to become expatriates, their professional career as development workers, and their adopted lifestyle in Kosovo. Transcripts and notes from the interviewees are in the possession of the author and available on request.

5 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following disintegration of Yugoslavia, resulted in high numbers of refugees arriving in Slovenia. At that time, I became a volunteer with the British and Belgian humanitarian and development workers in refugee centres (1994–1997). Years later, in 2000/2001, I did a year-long internship at the UNHCR branch office in Ljubljana, working alongside the international staff.

parallel social reality that I experienced in Kosovo. The scope of the research, however, included other profiles of expatriate development workers regardless of their agency or employment, insofar as they were included in the peace-building activities.

CHAPTER 1

A NOTE ON DEFINITIONS: TERMINOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS, INTERRELATEDNESS OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS AND THE LIMITS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM

It takes some time to disentangle the multiplicity of concepts in the ethnic studies literature, especially when one of the main focuses of the research is on nation-state building. The inconsistency of the use of this term cannot and will not be overlooked in this book, as it is of the utmost importance to approach with clearly defined concepts the complex phenomena under discussion. Similarly, when the research crosses disciplines it is important to acknowledge that different words of phrases are sometimes used to describe a similar concept or an idea. The purpose of this short chapter is to provide clear definitions of problematic concepts and terms that will be used throughout the book, explain their interrelatedness and address the limitations of methodological nationalism, which fails to provide a necessary framework for the research of transnational themes.

State formation and nation building as two separate objects of inquiry?

It is now widely accepted that the term nation refers to people who share common origins and history as indicated by their shared culture, language, and identity, while a certain amount of political self-organisation is required in order to distinguish the nation from the ethnic group (Smith 2000). The nation is not *a priori* a nation-state forming entity but it has the potential to become a nation-state.[6] As history tells us, several nations were more often joined into the boundaries of one state, although nation-state formation has taken different routes. In this respect, speaking of *nation*-states is misleading, as only a few states exist that are congruent with the nation.[7]

6 A nation-state is "a complex array of modern institutions involved in governance over a spatially bounded territory which enjoys monopolistic control over the means of violence" (*The Dictionary of Human Geography* 2000: 532).

7 "Nation is a community of people whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity rooted in an historic attachment to a homeland and a common culture, and by consciousness of being different from other nations. The term is frequently but misleadingly used interchangeably with both state and nation-state on the assumption that every state is a nation and

In most cases, nations were mobilised with the help of nationalistic movements that encouraged the creation of new bureaucratic entities with all the necessary institutions of government, to stand united under one flag and one anthem as fellow citizens. In some types of nation-state creation, most notably but not exclusively the immigrant type, which will be discussed in some detail later, this meant inventing mechanisms that would join people of different nationalities under one nation, in the sense of sharing the territory, common myths, and memories, but also in the sense of sharing a single economy, public culture, and common rights and duties (Smith 2000). In this respect, speaking of *nation*-states is justifiable. It all comes down to how we define the nation.

The dilemma discussed above also applies to the use of nation building vs. state building in contemporary times. While the type of nation building that will be discussed in this book refers more to state building, understood as the construction of democratic and efficient institutions of a national government in post-conflict or failed states,[8] the former concept cannot simply be dismissed as inappropriate. Prior to independence, the Kosovo Albanians were a formed nation, but lacked their own state that would make them a *sovereign nation* with applicable citizen (national) identities. Therefore, the efforts of the international administration can be defined as either nation building or state building, depending on the angle of analysis. The interrelatedness of the two concepts is explained well in *The Dictionary of Human Geography*:

> There are two central components to nation-state formation. First, the process of *state-building* is bound up with the territorialisation of state power, a set of centralising processes, which, to paraphrase Mann (1984), can be defined as the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout its territory. Second, there is *nation-building,* which in classic nation-states was facilitated by state-building and the development of industrial capitalism. Nation-state building involves, in particular, the utilisation of the nation by state elites in which a sense of territorial or homeland

vice versa, although nationalist writings generally hold that they are destined for each other because neither is complete without the other" (*The Dictionary of Human Geography* 2000: 532). Similarly, Smith argues that strictly speaking we may use the term nation-state only when a single ethnic population inhabits the boundaries of a state. In this sense, only a few nation-states exist on today's geopolitical map. The examples include Portugal, Island, and Japan. As a result of such widespread use of the term, the state has become perceived merely as a political extension of the nation (1995).

8 The term failed state, as much as the adjective may be controversial and inappropriate, refers to "a state that no longer possesses a monopoly of the legitimate means of violence, thus no longer meeting the classic definition of the state that we associate with Max Weber" (Ignatieff 2003: 305).

identity and belonging to a national culture is important, aided by the spread of a common vernacular and national educational system. Nation-building is therefore also bound up with creating citizens and citizen identities (*The Dictionary of Human Geography* 2000: 534-535).

The most elegant solution to this terminological confusion is to simply speak of nation-state building when addressing the processes that resulted in the creation of the political entities that currently constitute the geopolitical map. In the book, however, the terms nation building and nation-state building will be used interchangeably, as most cited authors use the term nation building to address what is in fact the nation-state building process.

Expatriate development workers

The research on expatriate development workers, who are also referred to as travelling consultants (Amit 2007), privileged mobile professionals (Fechter 2007), professional transients (Castells 2000), and peripatetic professionals (Amit 2006) has not been abundant. The literature that does exist on this population of educated professionals who regularly cross borders as part of their employment obligations, however, has been recently produced by anthropologists or by ethnographically inclined sociologists. In the book, I will use the term expatriate development workers to refer to the professionals, consultants, and supporting staff, i.e. secretaries, technical support employees, and public relations officers, who migrate to failed, poor, or developing countries as part of their professional career. The agencies they are employed by include bilateral and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organisations that are involved in a variety of different development and nation-state building projects, such as helping establish the institutions of governance,[9] building democracy, building efficient infrastructure, offering education and training, helping create policies to protect the environment, raising the literacy levels, and similar endeavours.

The nation-state building projects that are of special importance in the book are usually in the domain of large multilateral governmental institutions through which the agendas of the donor countries are implemented. The smaller projects, deemed less important by the international community, i.e. raising the literacy levels or promoting equality between genders, are usually left to non-governmental organisations. In Kosovo, expatriate development

9 According to the World Bank, governance is defined as "the means in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resource for development" and good governance as "synonymous with sound development management" (Potter 2000: 378).

workers roughly fall into two groups: those employed by non-governmental organisations and those employed by governmental development organisations (either bilateral or multilateral). While I came in contact with both groups of development workers, I focused on those who came to Kosovo to conduct nation-state building as part of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and its partners: the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As these organisations were, in fact, entrusted with governance over the province after the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, their employees were awarded an exclusively elite status. It is *their* formation of transnational social space, a parallel reality to the living conditions of the rest of the population, that is more closely examined in the book.

Migrating or moving?

The term expatriate or simply expat has been used to address the population in question by scholars (e.g. Jackson 2007, Fechter 2007), media, and the expats themselves. The predominantly anthropological literature analysing expats and related themes has been reluctant to use the term migration to refer to the moving patterns of these privileged professionals and moving or travelling has been used instead. No explanation is offered by those authors as to the usage of these terms, but I would guess this is because the use of the term migration has over the years gained the negative connotation of the spatial movement to Western countries by low-skilled, low paid, working class persons, or a one-way movement with the intention of settlement in the host country. Migration patterns of the more privileged migrants[10] who regularly move from one territory to another as part of their lifestyle are therefore not put in the same category as the previously mentioned migrations. Using different words for admittedly significantly different types of movement is justifiable and legitimate, but at the same time it brings the issue of class into the analysis. The term travelling, especially, relates to an elite status of spatial movement. As I agree that the category of class is an immense, perhaps even *the key* factor in any attempt to explain the complex agency of development expatriates, my starting point of the analysis will be an individual person, initially stripped of all labels. Therefore, I will use the terms migration and migrants, albeit acknowledging the different type of migration that pertains to this category of

10 Privilege is a relative category and thus invokes an open-ended set of analytical complications (Amit 2007). In this book, privilege is understood as a special advantage, opportunity, or honour possessed by a person or a group (*Cambridge International Dictionary of English* 1995).

migrants. When building upon the works of pioneers in the research on expats and their transnational space, I will, of course, use their terminology.

(Doing) Development

The understanding of development in this book parts from its pejorative use as a concept relating to the ranging of societies from less to more developed and as a synonym for the concept of progress.[11] It also goes beyond, but does not entirely exclude, the economic understanding of development in terms of growth of the gross national product, the rise in personal incomes, and technological advance. It is rather understood as a process of moving towards the fulfilment of a potential (Thomas 2000) and as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy (Sen 1999). In line with the latter definition, development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: "poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states" (ibid.: 3). In the words of Amartya Sen, the winner of the Nobel Prize for economics:

> Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger or to achieve sufficient nutrition or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities. In other cases, the unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, such as the absence of epidemiological programmes or of organised arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or of effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In still other cases, the violation of freedom results directly from a denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community (Amartya Sen 1999: 4).

It is important to distinguish between immanent development, which means the spontaneous and unconscious process of development from within, and intentional development, which implies deliberate efforts to achieve higher levels of set objectives. Having this distinction in mind, Thomas categorised the concept of development as: (1) a vision, description or measure of the state of being of a desirable society; (2) an historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods; and (3) deliberate efforts

11 The unilinear, hierarchical view of development in anthropology perceived societies as gradually developing from primitive to more developed, and equated the culture of Western civilisation with progress. See for example *Ancient Society* by Morgan H. Lewis (1985).

aimed at improvement on the part of various agencies, including governments, all kinds of organisations, and social movements (2000: 29). The latter definition refers to *doing development* and can therefore be linked to the concept of intentional development, which entails the processes of nation-state building in failed states.

Doing development is largely perceived as a controversial set of actions conducted by foreign agents due to its undertones of colonialism and imperialism (Thomas 2000). The position taken in this book is that doing development is not necessarily a negative agenda, if – and only if – it aims to empower people to become their own agents of development. In this sense, the development projects that are being implemented in the field by development workers are considered useful and necessary when they aim to help expand the freedoms that local people enjoy, help them to fulfil their own potential, and to empower them.[12] Let us take a look at it this way: there is nothing controversial in the idea of implementing development projects in one's own nation-state (the so-called community development work aimed at empowering people and improving human rights). In fact, this is a highly desirable initiative. Doing development only becomes controversial when the agents of development are "imported" from other nation-states and when the principle of culture blurs the boundaries between *doing development* (in the sense as described above) and *doing colonialism*.

Development projects include a broad range of programmes of universal concern: building democracy and establishing efficient governmental institutions is in the domain of nation-state building, while other programmes may include defending children's rights, protecting the environment, enhancing the rights of women, quelling the spread of diseases, improving adult literacy, and similar goals (Jackson 2007). It is important to note that badly planned development projects can sometimes do more harm than good. This is especially likely if they create dependency.

A thin line between humanitarian and development assistance

smilie and Minear (2004: 7) describe the humanitarian idea as elegant in its simplicity. It is advocating the right of every person on the globe to life-saving assistance in times of natural or man-made disasters, without

12 According to the people-centred view of development, the conditions for development include: (1) low levels of material poverty; (2) low level of unemployment; (3) relative equality; (4) democratisation of political life; (5) 'true' national independence; (6) good literacy and educational levels; (7) relatively equal status for women and participation by women; (8) sustainable ability to meet future needs; (9) human security (Thomas 2000).

taking into account political, economic, or other considerations. While the concept of helping people in need very much predates the establishment of modern nation-states, it was in the second half of the nineteenth century that the humanitarian imperative began to morally oblige governments to take action. The unconditional humanitarian aid advocated by Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross, is based on the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. But after the post-Cold War period, with the realisation that humanitarian crises were largely political events, the approach towards humanitarian action became more integrated and began to include elements of political action in the form of humanitarian interventions, peacebuilding, and development agendas.[13] This transformation of "Dunantist" humanitarian assistance was partly possible due to a change in the understanding of sovereignty, which is no longer considered to be strictly unconditional. According to UN Resolution 46/182, the sovereign, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the UN and therefore, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected countries, and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. But as Macrae and Leader (2000: 16) note, the inclusion of the terms "should" and "in principle" indicates the willingness of the international community to intrude upon sovereignty on humanitarian grounds.

Another reason for transformations of the humanitarian imperative was the sharp criticism of the temporary effect of humanitarian assistance. By offering only short-term emergency assistance to people in need, humanitarian assistance often creates new dependencies and does little to reduce the vulnerability of those receiving assistance. Thus, a more complex approach was called for, including poverty reduction, environmental protection, human rights promotion, and peacebuilding efforts – all of which fit into the sphere of developmental assistance (Curtis 2001). The humanitarian imperative was further attacked for its impartiality, providing assistance to both sides involved in a conflict, possibly prolonging it. Therefore, instead of being a tool for conflict reduction (Macrae 2004: 31) it was accused of prolonging war.

Yet another line of critique comes from Smilie and Minear (2004: 182), among others, who claim that humanitarianism has been much usurped by the needs of the giver and that the cause has become confused by image and ego as well as by factors that have nothing to do with saving lives and protecting livelihoods. They emphasise the need for clearer policies and mandates inside the humanitarian enterprise structure and suggest that "if it is to deal

13 For another line of discussion on the transformations of humanitarianism see chapter 4.

more effectively with the causes and the results of human calamity, [it] requires a housecleaning of enormous proportions" (ibid.).

While humanitarian assistance was initially not subject to political conditionality, development assistance has always been more or less political – if not overtly, then at least latently. Versluys argues:

> Starting in 1973, the US congress passed legislation outlawing aid to countries committing gross human rights violations. For the EU using aid to punish human rights abuses was at first unacceptable. Development aid was supposed to be non-political and the relations with the 'Third-World' free of the vestiges of colonialism, and distinct from the superpowers (Smith 2003: 103). However, this 'neutral' position towards the human rights record of third countries was not maintained. Since 1995 all agreements with third countries include a human rights clause which allows the EU to reduce aid, or suspend an agreement if the third country has violated human rights or democratic principles. Through such conditionality the EU tries to modulate the behaviour of the governments of third countries (Versluys 2007: 7).

Development assistance inevitably involves the implementation of long-term agendas that in most cases serve the interests of the donor countries. Also, the principle of neutrality that initially guided humanitarian workers cannot be applicable to development work, as development activities inevitably require political judgements on issues such as democracy, human rights, institution building, and so on.

Methodological nationalism

The main subject of the book is the agency[14] of expatriate development workers who are involved in peacebuilding operations in failed states. By migrating from one state to another as a way of living, their identity and space they create become significantly deterritorialised and transnational. At this point, the limitations of the methodological nationalism that has been prevalent ever since the discipline of sociology came into existence become obvious.

Methodological nationalism refers to the naturalization of the global regime of nation-states by the social sciences, meaning that the boundaries of the nation-state define the unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). This territorial limitation stands in the way when the primary units of analysis are subjects whose lifestyle is shaped by transgressing the borders of nation-

14 Agency refers to the actions of individuals or groups and their capacities to influence events (Thomas and Allen 2000).

states and creating a deterritorialised transnational social space. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller argue:

> Naturalisation produced the container model of society that encompasses a culture, a polity, an economy and a bounded social group (*cf.* Taylor, 1996). To cast this in an image borrowed from Giddens (1995), the web of social life was spun within the container of the national society, and everything extending over its borders was cut off analytically. Assuming that processes within nation-state boundaries were different from those outside, the social sciences left no room for transnational and global processes that connected national territories (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003: 579).

In an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of methodological nationalism when discussing the social space that expatriate development workers form in Kosovo, I will follow the examples of Ludger Pries (2001), Meike Fechter (2007), one of the pioneers in researching expatriates' transnational spaces, and Jeffrey T. Jackson (2007), who offers a well-written account of development workers as globalizers.

CHAPTER 2

NOTES FROM THE FIELD: JOURNEY TO THE CENTRE OF DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Arrival

Prishtina airport is situated about thirty kilometres from the capital, in the marshes of the infamous Kosovo Polje. It is a small airport that lacks the appropriate infrastructure to handle the commercial air traffic that has been on the increase ever since the United Nations made the province its protectorate. Today it is one of the busiest airports in South Eastern Europe, with 14 foreign airlines operating flights to Prishtina on a daily basis (ESI 2006). I was told by the flight attendant on my September flight from Ljubljana that the airport runway is built on damp, unstable ground and is in need of reconstruction if it is to continue receiving high numbers of scheduled flights. As it soon became obvious, the airport infrastructure is only one of the many problems Kosovo is facing and one that I perceived as quite minor when struggling to cope with frequent electricity cuts and water shortages.

Upon arrival, my passport was stamped with the UNMIK stamp. No one bothered to tell me that I might have problems travelling to Serbia with the UN stamp: according to Serbian authorities, Prishtina airport was not approved as a legal entrance to the state of Serbia. Kosovo, although only months away from independence and under the UNMIK administration for nearly nine years, was nevertheless still a part of the Republic of Serbia. I found out later that international staff usually fly to Belgrade and then travel south to Kosovo, in order to avoid conflicts with Serbian authorities. From the airport I took a taxi to the centre of town, where I was picked up by a friend and former colleague from the UNHCR branch office in Ljubljana, where I had interned several years earlier. She came to Kosovo as a member of the UNHCR international staff and was stationed at the headquarters. My first advice on living in Kosovo came from her: I should always look down when walking on the streets in order not to trip on the holes or fall into the open sewers; I should always start a conversation with the locals in English, not Serbian; and I should always take a candle with me to the bathroom in case of electricity cuts. I spent

my first week in Prishtina with her and later moved to a guesthouse in a significantly dodgier neighbourhood. Despite my initial reluctance I was later pleased to have chosen that place as it offered me endless stories that fit well into the focus of my research. It was living in that place that made me aware of the two parallel social realities in Kosovo.

The next day I reported to work at the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, a local non-governmental organisation with an international board of directors, located in the area of the town called Sunny Hill. I joined their team of researchers at a busy time, as they were preparing a project to monitor the elections scheduled for November. I learned from a sarcastic member of the staff that Kosovo is a land of no electricity and no water. He informed me that there are zones in the town that have electricity most of the time and those that have frequent and longer cuts. Needless to say, there are fewer cuts in areas such as Dragodan, the diplomatic core of Prishtina and home to the top elites of the international staff than in other places. Another problem that I noticed, especially when leaving the office on hot afternoons, was heavy pollution. The air felt especially dense and there was a bad smell coming from trash dumped on the streets of Prishtina.

Kosovo profile: Demography, economic development, rural character, remittances, and ethnic composition

The days passed and I became more familiar with Kosovo and its society. According to the OSCE estimate, the population of Kosovo came close to 2.4 million in 2000. The area is the most densely populated in the region, with 220 inhabitants per square kilometre. The growth rate is a staggering 1.3 percent. Over an 82-year period (1921–2003) the population multiplied 4.6 times. If growth continues at such a pace, the population will rise, based on some estimates, to 4.5 million by 2050. Half of the population is younger than twenty years of age, with children up to 14 years old representing 37.4 percent of the population (PISG 2004).

The major problem that Kosovo faces is a low rate of economic development. The economy, in fact, is barely existent and as a result the poverty rate in Kosovo is the highest in the region, with an unemployment rate reaching 49 percent in 2004 (PISG 2004).[15] The great variety of natural resources provides a good basis for economic development but also requires greater human

15 It is estimated that the total number of people employed in Kosovo is about 260,000, out of which 61,000 are employed in SOEs, while about 125,000 are employed in private enterprises, approximately 65,000 in the governmental sector and about 18,000 in foreign organisations and NGOs (PISG 2004).

and financial input. The state of the infrastructure, that is, to the assets that support the economy, such as roadways, water supply, and power supply, is worrisome. Only 9 percent of the villages are connected to the water supply system. Similarly, although Kosovo has great potential for electric power production, the existing capacity and relatively high cost of a kWh do not enable a regular and uninterrupted supply. Production is still low and only 3 percent of the products made in Kosovo are exported. UNMIK somewhat improved the economic situation after it took over administration of the territory, but since 2004, the IMF has been sounding an alarm. Kosovo's economy has in fact been shrinking, despite the continuous international presence (ESI 2006).[16] One of Kosovo's major problems is its largely rural character:

> The basic dilemma of rural Kosovo is not new. In 1979, the World Bank wrote that poverty in Yugoslavia is "basically rural." While it held out hopes for employment growth in most of the less developed regions, it did not see much prospect of change in Kosovo: "The exception is Kosovo, which cannot, even under optimistic assumptions and even if the plan's growth targets are achieved, be expected to absorb the increments to its labour force." Since then, Kosovo's population has continued to grow rapidly, but neither the number of jobs nor the availability of agricultural land has kept pace (ESI 2006:1).

According to the Statistical Institute Kosovo, 1,397,333 people live in rural areas today (over 73 percent of the entire population). Since 1981, the urban population has grown by 100,000 and the rural population by 220,000. It is in rural areas that Kosovo's population continues to grow fastest. In 2004, Kosovo had 117,967 agricultural households[17] with only 115,000 hectares of land under cultivation. Almost 90,000 of their farms are smaller than 2 hectares (the average is 0.88 hectares). Population growth has forced households to build new houses and divide land (ESI 2006). Land fragmentation is further contributing to a growing poverty rate in Kosovo and frustration[18] among

16 Researchers at the European Stability Initiative (ESI) argue that: "After some years of celebrating the successes of UNMIK's economic policies, its most recent reports are increasingly blunt in their presentation of Kosovo's economic situation: Kosovo 'could fall into a vicious circle'; it has 'deeply rooted problems'; the situation is 'fragile'; 'vulnerable'; and 'the near term outlook, even under a more benign scenario, does not look promising' "(2006: 28).

17 An agricultural household is one that possesses and cultivates more than 0.10 ha of arable land or less than 0.10 ha of arable land but at least some livestock.

18 By 'frustration' I am referring to the feelings of discouragement stemming from difficulties or problems that they are unable to deal with (*Cambridge International Dictionary of English* 1995).

the young rural population, which is increasingly moving to the overcrowded urban areas in search of employment.

The households, however, remain large, a common feature of developing countries. The average number of members in a Kosovo family is 6.5 (PISG 2004).[19] Kosovo's patriarchal family structure has survived fifty years of communism, decades of massive migration to Western European countries, as well as the disappearance of a pastoral economy. In relative terms, Kosovo has the largest rural population but, at the same time, the lowest per capita spending on agriculture and rural areas in the Western Balkans (Boese, Erjavec, and Radnak in ESI 2006).[20] Despite the telling data, agricultural policy remains marginal to the domestic political debate. Apart from large households, the traditional strategy for survival has been emigration of family members, especially to Western Europe, who send home remittances. Since the conflict, the assistance received from family members in the diaspora has constituted half of Kosovo families' budgets (PISG 2004). Currently, however, labour migration to EU member states has been restricted and therefore social stability is further endangered.[21]

The majority ethnic group is the Kosovo Albanians, comprising around 90 percent of the population. The second largest ethnic community is the Serbs with 5.3 percent, followed by four other ethnic minority communities: RAE (Roma-Ashkali-Egyptians), Turks, Bosnians, and Goranis. The last reliable census was conducted in 1981, but is now completely outdated. Thus the numbers and percentages above are only an estimate. Another census was conducted in 1991, but was largely boycotted by Kosovo Albanians and is therefore not credible.

---

19 ESI researchers conducted a study on Kosovo families in two villages: Cerrce and Lubishte. In their report they state that the average household in the village of Cerrce has 6.6 members, and the average household in Lubishte has 9.5 members. "The largest household in Cerrce is that of Sadik Haskaj, with 24 persons living in one large house. The household includes Sadik's mother (71), Sadik and his six brothers (one of whom lives in Switzerland), who between them have four wives and twelve children. The largest household in Lubishte is that of Nure Nura and his wife Ramize (both in their 70s). It has 32 members: 6 sons and their 6 wives, one unmarried daughter and 17 grandchildren. The household shares two houses, but remains a single economic unit. Two of Nure's sons, Nefali (46) and Faruk (42), are in Austria, but their wives remain in Lubishte" (ESI 2006: 12).

20 Rural population tends to be less educated, with illiteracy rate among women as high as 14 percent and among men 4 percent (PISG 2004).

21 As a direct consequence of EU member states shutting their doors, fewer than 15 percent of Kosovo families now receive regular remittances. ESI researchers argue that "the lifeline that kept rural Kosovo afloat for the past generation is being cut" (2006: II).

The war

In her excellent article on obstacles to and perspectives on post-conflict peacebuilding in multicultural societies, Bliesemann de Guevara (2004) argues that cultural factors like ethnicity or religion do play a role in legitimising the actions, but the idea of ethnicity as a *cause* of internal wars has been disproved by the results of various case studies. Indeed, differences between nations were not a cause of the war that followed disintegration of Yugoslavia, which was waged largely for political and economic reasons, but they were used as an ideational war resource. Nevertheless, the situation needs to be grasped as it presents itself to us in this specific period of time. Even if we are aware that the wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia were not fought in the name of ethnicity or nationality, the fact remains that, *post festum*, ethnic and national differences have become a driving force in claims for independence and the creation of nation-states according to ethnic genealogy. The changing minorities and majorities in the Western Balkans and their discontents, seemingly irreconcilable differences between ethnic minority communities stemming from the wars, secessionist tendencies, and irredentist movements all pose threats to the stability of the region. But let us take a closer look at the situation in Kosovo.

Prior to the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was a province within that state, with its status upgraded to an autonomous federal entity in 1974. Serbs have always had a possessive relationship with the Kosovo province. This was not primarily due to economic reasons, as Kosovo has been an impoverished, mainly rural area, with few prospects for future development. The reason for possessiveness lies in one particular historical event that occurred in the late fourteenth century: the battle on the Field of Blackbirds (Kosovo polje) in which the Turks defeated the Orthodox Christian Serbs, ushering in five centuries of Ottoman rule.[22] In the second half of the twentieth century, Serbs and Albanians competed for land, jobs, and political privileges in the province. By the 1980s, due to an explosive Albanian birth rate and a Serbian exodus, the remaining Serbian population began feeling outnumbered and endangered. With 1.7 million Albanians inhabiting the province, constituting 90 percent of the total population, Serbs were indeed in the minority. They began complaining of persecution and received moral support from nationalists in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and from politicians who favoured nationalistic claims over peaceful coexistence.

22 Although the Serbs were defeated in the battle of Kosovo, they managed to kill Sultan Murad I, an act that itself became a reason for celebration and source of pride for the Serbian people. Murad I was the only Ottoman sultan who died in the battle.

In the late eighties, Kosovo's autonomy was revoked by the Republic of Serbia and it remained under a repressive Serbian security regime until the precedent-setting humanitarian intervention by NATO. Albanians were fired from their jobs, schools were closed, and the Serb police presence expanded (Power 2002). In the meantime, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the site of a horrifying war that included mass killings of the Bosnian population.

The Dayton agreement that eventually ended the war in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, however, did not restore Kosovo's autonomy as Kosovo Albanians had expected and hoped. This gave way to the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which raised money from the Albanian diaspora to aid in protection against Serbs and winning independence. In her book on the age of genocide, Samantha Power argues that "with every KLA attack on a Serbian official, Serbian reprisals intensified, as Serb gunmen torched whole villages suspected of housing KLA loyalists. In the following year, some 3,000 Albanians were killed and some 300,000 others were expelled from their homes, their property burned and their livelihoods extinguished" (Power 2002: 444).

Beginning on 24 March 1999, NATO jets began bombing Serbia under the command of General Clark. For the first time in history, the United States and its European allies had intervened to prevent a potential genocide. The planned intervention excluded the deployment of troops, anticipating that air attacks would suffice. In the following months, during the air attacks, Serbian regular military units teamed up with police and militia to do something unprecedented: "They expelled virtually the entire Albanian population at gunpoint" (Power 2002: 449).

> In a carefully coordinated campaign, armed Serbs launched operation Horseshoe. Practiced in ethnic cleansing from their days in Bosnia, Yugoslav National Army units surrounded Kosovo towns and villages and used massive artillery barrages to frighten the local inhabitants into flight. In many areas the Serb police separated the women, children, and old men from the men of fighting age. The Serbs executed some of the men in order to eliminate resistance and to demonstrate the costs of remaining in Kosovo. They systematically shredded the Albanians' identification papers, birth certificates, and property deeds, and they looted everything in sight (Power 2002: 449).

As the bombing of Serbia continued, so did the atrocities committed against the Kosovo Albanians by the Serbs. In addition, the NATO air strikes were initially unsuccessful. Jets flew at 15,000 feet so as to elude Serbian air defences, pilots were no match for paramilitaries, and weather and visibility

were poor early on. Targets were not hit and on occasion civilian infrastructure was damaged.[23] On 3 June 1999, however, the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević surrendered and after seventy-eight days of bombing, on 9 June he signed an agreement that forced Serbian police and troops to leave Kosovo and permitted 50,000 NATO peacekeepers to enter the territory (Power 2002). With time, internally displaced Kosovo Albanians and those scattered around neighbouring countries and elsewhere began returning to their homes, or what was left of them. With the final status of the territory unclear, a virtually non-existent economy, the majority of the population rural and strongly dependent on remittances sent from the diaspora, the infrastructure old, badly maintained and hardly functioning, and lack of ethnic reconciliation between the majority Kosovo Albanians and other ethnic minority communities, the state was proclaimed as failed and the project of nation-state building conducted by the international community[24] was prepared for implementation.

Days in Prishtina

Development agencies in Kosovo are in abundance. The number of civilian staff is measured in hundreds and a walk through the town centre reveals that most of the office buildings are being rented by foreign development and humanitarian organisations. Due to high numbers of civilian staff, the real estate business is booming and the rent prices in "electricity-friendly" zones have skyrocketed. The restaurants and coffee places in the centre are also expensive, especially for the locals who only earn on average a couple of hundred Euros per month. Kosovo Albanians, however, enjoy spending time in coffee places where they can smoke and chat for hours. In the summer, I was told, it was impossible to get a table in the evenings, as young men would return from diaspora in search of a bride and flirting would occur during long nights spent in bars.

---

23 "Despite NATO's incremental approach, the intense legal scrutiny, and the unprecedented precision of the new weaponry, some missiles strayed, and even those that stayed on target provoked controversy. NATO jets struck an Albanian refugee column, a Serb passenger train and other civilian convoys. Perhaps most notorious, on May 7, 1999, relying on an old map, U.S. B-2 bombers hit the Chinese embassy, killing three Chinese citizens and injuring at least twenty others. General Clark received a deluge of mocking faxes to his European command headquarters. "Dear General Clark", the faxes began, "We've moved. Our new address is _____" (Power 2002: 458).

24 By the term "international community in Kosovo" I am referring to the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union Mission in Kosovo (EUMIK), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and foreign diplomatic and liaison offices.

I enjoyed the social scene in Kosovo. I was spending time with the locals whom I met at work, with development workers from non-governmental organisations, local journalists, and the staff of the UNMIK, OSCE, and EU missions in Kosovo. My days started with an early breakfast that was usually a chance to conduct interviews with development workers, who, like me, had to rush to work at nine. Then, I took a bus to the office, worked until five and used the late lunch or early supper as another chance to meet with development workers. I soon realised that the most relevant and useful information was obtained during informal meetings in the evenings over a glass of wine or at home parties. I fitted into the clique of development workers well, as I was myself an expatriate who had done development work at one of the agencies and was introduced to their group by an insider. It was to my advantage that I was not employed at one of the multilaterals as most of them were, because they could be sure I would not take the gossip to other members of staff and bosses. It was during these informal gatherings that I learned the most about the nature of their profession and their lifestyle.

After a couple of weeks I decided to visit Mitrovica, a town divided by the Ibar River into two parts, Albanian and Serbian. I had an appointment with an NGO employee in charge of the community development projects in the Mitrovica area and a member of the UN staff to discuss their activities. I was surprised to see how parallel structures in Kosovo, of which I heard so much, function in practice. The northern part of Mitrovica is populated almost entirely by Serbs and some Roma people. Serbs have their own schools, medical facilities, currency, and licence plates, and they enjoy full support, moral and financial, from the Serbian government. Visiting Mitrovica was also a wakeup call, because staying in Prishtina, surrounded by the international staff, visiting the restaurants and bars that flourish due to their demand, and finding clothes in shops that are certainly not affordable to most of the locals, I was living in a parallel reality. Moving from the capital to the rural areas of Kosovo, however, made me realise that the reality of the locals is overwhelmingly different from the one in the space created and maintained by development workers, especially those who are in the country with a mandate for nation-state building.

CHAPTER 3

PEACEBUILDING AND NATION-STATE BUILDING

In this book, peacebuilding activities are understood as a contemporary form of nation-state building in war-torn or failed states, conducted by international actors. Peacebuilding operations usually follow humanitarian interventions, include the elements of humanitarian and development assistance, and are politically managed and motivated.[25] In this sense, they are often referred to as a post-colonial construct (Black 2007). In order to delineate the relation between the two concepts, peacebuilding and nation-state building, it is important to separately address each of them before moving on to reveal their inextricable link.

It goes without saying that nations and nation-building processes existed before the project of modernity[26] came into existence. The institutionalisation of citizenship, however, differentiated post-eighteenth century nations from earlier ethnic and national populations. Four nation-building types or patterns were identified by Anthony D. Smith to categorise a variety of processes that had resulted in the creation of nation-states throughout the world. After the end of the Cold War, however, another type of nation-state building came into existence that is inextricably linked to peacebuilding efforts in failed states. This chapter will focus on the dynamics of nation-state building since the nineteenth century on and move on to particularly address the significant change in the meaning of the term in more recent times.

25 See chapters 3 and 5 for a discussion on the political character of humanitarianism and development assistance.

26 "At its simplest, modernity is a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilisation. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transformation and human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy" (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 94).

The origins and evolution of nation-state building:
Nineteenth century types as defined by Anthony D. Smith

Nation-states are essentially a phenomenon of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although the roots of the idea and the creation of grounds to implement it significantly predate this period. Anthony D. Smith (1989) argues that two types of *ethnie* (ethnic communities) existed in the pre-modern period: lateral or aristocratic, which was territorially extensive but lacked social penetration; and vertical or demotic, which was more popularly based and tied to ethnic identities. Accordingly, the modern European nation-state was built under two distinctive forms, concepts, and understandings of the nation: territorial or civic, and ethnic. In the case of the latter, the nation-state was developed by transforming the ethnic ties of a group of settlers sharing the same culture into national ties. This type was used in Central and Eastern Europe, whereas the former type was predominant in Western Europe, including France, Spain, England, and the Netherlands.

In contrast to the ethnic type, the civic type used territory as the starting point for establishing the nation-state. Ethnic groups, settled in an area that was to become a state, were joined through unification of the economy, education, and rights, and through territorial centralisation. The state's core *ethnie* led this process due to its historical predominance and cultural-political domination, and it imposed its lifestyles, myths, and symbols on the state and traditions of the entire population (Smith 1989, 1995). Larger sections of population were drawn into public life and the awareness of forming a community spread downwards into the population. The creation of a modern, bureaucratic nation-state in Western Europe went hand in hand with the processes of assimilation, one of the most important principles for achieving the civic or republican organisation of states (Šabec 2006). The "social contract" theorists, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, claimed that individuals submitted willingly to the state in return for the (economic) protection it provided, putting the ethnic component in the background. As Ksenija Šabec also argues, the economic gains and educational opportunities offered to the citizens are what made them *willing* to become a part of the nation-state (ibid.). Benefits included social development, growing trade, specialised manufactures, the rise of cities, and the enrichment of merchants (Seton-Watson 1994).

Indeed, the promise of social mobility is a strong factor of motivation and mobilisation, but as we have been constantly reminded throughout the history of humankind, ethnicity continues to emerge and reassert itself. The ethnic nationalisms that the implementation of the type was supposed to suppress are far from being a thing of the past, as is evident from their emergence

in some Western European countries. The mechanisms of assimilation that the western type of nation-building had been using since the eighteenth century were therefore replaced after the Second World War by the concept of multiculturalism.[27]

Two other types of nation building are not directly applicable to the European context, but they do, however, strongly involve the agency of the European population. The first nation building type includes those states that were developed by immigrant ethnic populations who first arrived and settled in new environments. Ethnic populations that arrived in later periods were continuously absorbed or assimilated into the newly-formed territorial and political nation-state with its freshly developed national identity. Examples of the immigrant type of nation building include the United States of America, Argentina, and Australia.

The second type refers to nation building that was imposed on local ethnic populations by colonial rule. The modern state, according to the western nation-building strategy, was created without regard to ethnic populations who inhabited the territory and borders were conveniently set to serve the interests of the ruling powers. As a result, states were created before nations even came to exist. Understanding this latter type is crucial to creating an informed opinion about the nature of contemporary forms of nation building that I will discuss further on, although a heated debate is still open on the suitability and appropriateness of using the concept of colonial nation building in the context of contemporary nation-building efforts. Admittedly, the parallels are rather far-fetched but nevertheless, there are certain similarities that I intend to bring attention to.

In the early twentieth century, Western European countries were convinced that the process of nation-state creation had been completed because the rural population had already been assimilated and the Paris Peace Conferences (1919–1920) confirmed the territorial divisions desired by the Western European states (Šabec 2006). However, the independence movements that emerged after the infamous year of 1989 and the fall of communist regimes in the eastern parts of Europe triggered a new wave of nation building

27 While multiculturalism can potentially be an exemplary model, it can in practice also be used in a way that becomes unfavourable to individuals belonging to ethnic and national communities within nation-states. By granting them rights to preserve their ethnic and national identities, they may be discouraged to assimilate or even integrate into the majority society, making their social mobility difficult. Again, the question is whether such concept of multiculturalism is a successful formula for avoiding the emergence of ethno-nationalist movements. Nevertheless, it is the model that is currently being implemented in Kosovo by the international community. For a detailed account of multiculturalism see Lukšič- Hacin, 1999.

according to the ethnic type. It soon became clear that the process of creating nation-states in Europe is far from completed and a number of newly formed states have emerged on the geopolitical map of Europe. After the communist regimes in Europe failed and the Cold War came to an end, nationalistic movements that emerged in eastern parts of Europe were inevitable and fairly predictable. Not all declarations of independence and subsequent secessions, however, were conducted peacefully and without the need for intervention by the international community. Those countries that managed to secede without the outburst of a civil war could focus on nation-state building relatively independently from interventions by international agents. The collapse of political order in Yugoslavia and the wars that followed, however, were so brutal and the atrocities committed so unimaginable that international humanitarian intervention became necessary. The humanitarian intervention that stopped the war in Kosovo and subsequent peacebuilding efforts by the international community paved the way for what I define as a new type of nation-state building.

A new type of nation-state building:
Peacebuilding coupled with humanitarian intervention

> Saying 'humanitarian intervention' in a room full of philosophers, legal scholars and political scientists is a little bit like crying 'fire' in a crowded theatre: it can create a clear and present danger to everyone within earshot. Arguments burn fiercely – although fortunately not literally – on the subject (Keohane 2003: 1).

This subchapter will provide a debate on humanitarian intervention that abuses the concept of humanitarianism in order to justify the right to intervene when states grossly oppress the human rights of their citizens. It will be argued that humanitarian intervention coupled with peacebuilding activities can be perceived as a new type of nation-state building. Theoretical accounts will be complemented by a case study on nation-state building conducted by the international community in Kosovo, and examples will be provided to better grasp the complexity and ambiguity of this process. First, however, let me present the controversy surrounding the concept of humanitarian intervention.

Although no common consensus exists that humanitarian intervention is justification for compromising the right to sovereignty of any nation-state, the position taken in this book is that humanitarian intervention can be justified and is in certain circumstances necessary in order to restore order and prevent gross violations of human rights. The problem of creating order in an anarchic

society is, as Keohane argues, a Hobbesian one. He shares a belief with Hobbes that people who are in endemic conflict with one another are unable to solve the problem of order by themselves: "The key point with respect to humanitarian intervention is that, in the absence of an external authority structure, people in troubled societies may lack the capacity to act collectively, even if they should want to do so. The necessary trust and credibility just do not exist" (Keohane 2003: 280–281). Keohane explains how Hannah Arendt similarly argues that in troubled societies, the debilitating problem is that people are unable to act in concert and are therefore powerless. She believes that "introducing an external authority structure can actually increase the power of people in a troubled society by making it possible for them to act in concert" (ibid.: 281). In line with their thinking I believe that the problem is not the principle of humanitarian intervention *per se*, but the political agendas that lie behind it and, in some cases, specific actions that are deployed in its name.

According to J. L. Holzgrefe (2003: 18), humanitarian intervention refers to "the use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied". The green light for intervention is given by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), following Chapter VII of the Charter.[28] Failure of the Security Council to come to an agreement means that the intervention in question would be unauthorised. A prominent example of an unauthorised humanitarian intervention is NATO's military action in Kosovo, setting – some would argue – a dangerous precedent for the future of the world order. If interventions that are unauthorised by the UNSC can be carried out without any consequences, democratic decision-making on a global level will be seriously jeopardised. However, taking into consideration the fact that states who occupy positions inside the UNSC have their own political agendas and tend to put humanitarian urgency second to political interests, not authorising the interventions does not necessarily mean that the need for such operations is not urgent and the imperative of morality needs to be brought into the equation. Ignatieff (2003) suggests that ad hoc intervention without the approval and authorisation of the UNSC should be deployed especially in areas where a cluster of human rights catastrophes are identified, such as forced population displacement, ethnic or religious massacre, genocide, enslavement of captured populations, and the like.

28 UN humanitarian interventions, referred to as peace operations, are authorised by the UNSC, and as such require support from nine of the fifteen members of the Council, and no opposition from the permanent five members (Diehl 2008).

In an article about humanitarian intervention without the approval of the Security Council, Rytter similarly argues:

> …that unauthorised humanitarian intervention has no legal basis in current international law: it is incompatible with Article 2(4) of the Charter, the defence of a state of necessity is not applicable and no doctrine of unauthorised humanitarian intervention has been established under customary international law. From a legal-political perspective, the crucial question is whether to develop a doctrine of humanitarian intervention without the Security Council if necessary, or stick to the existing legal order, maintaining the Security Council as the sole authoritative organ for decision-making on humanitarian intervention, while working to make it more effective. The author favours the latter alternative. However, in the short term, an ad hoc "emergency exit" may be needed. The special circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as state necessity, it is argued, are not a conceptually suitable framework for justifying humanitarian intervention. But unauthorised humanitarian intervention could be undertaken ad hoc, as a deviation from international law justified solely on moral grounds. This leaves open an option for intervention in extreme cases of human suffering, but at the same time avoids jeopardising the existing, hard-earned, international legal order and the central role of the Security Council. NATO's war over Kosovo, it is argued, was such a case of ad hoc intervention on moral grounds (Rytter 2001: 121).

Transformations of humanitarianism: The man behind humanitarian intervention

> To be a humanitarian was to rise above the parochialism and moral provincialism of national politics and state interest. It meant a cosmopolitan solidarity, individual by individual, for the poor and suffering of other societies. To be a humanitarian was to be disinterested, and to be disinterested you had to keep a necessary distance from political powers, whether exercised by donors, soldiers or diplomats. Humanitarian actors are always talking about a 'humanitarian space', by which they mean a zone in which they can do their work free of political interference from local warlords and from governments back home. Kouchner was one of those who argued that this attempt to disinfest humanitarianism of politics and state power was an illusion (Ignatieff 2003: 56).

The name Bernard Kouchner is well-known to everyone concerned with humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. Kouchner has argued fiercely against the doctrine of silent neutrality that humanitarian organisations had been practicing and has begun promoting a more active approach to stopping the violations of human rights in failed states. Today, he is popularly

referred to as the father of humanitarian intervention. The road he has travelled needs some attention, as it led him to become the first Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo. Since then, however, he has become more and more involved in politics, currently occupying the post of the minister of foreign affairs in the right-wing French government. Needless to say, taking the job resulted in his expulsion from the Socialist Party.

Kouchner started out as a young doctor working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during the civil war between the Biafran secessionists and the Nigerian government. The International Committee of the Red Cross was established almost single-handedly by Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman and social activist responsible for the formulation of the Geneva Convention in 1864. The principle upon which the organisation was founded was, and still is, one of neutrality and a code of silence – never publicly commenting on the crimes or abuses witnessed during their work. In regard to the latter, the ICRC was heavily criticised for not disclosing what they had seen in Auschwitz during the Second World War (Rieff 2002). The ICRC came to believe that its wartime delegates were mistaken, yet in the Biafran war that lasted from 1969 to 1970, its delegates were ordered to keep silent about evidence that the Nigerians were deliberately using a naval and land blockade of the Biafran region to starve its population into submission.

When Kouchner and a number of other French doctors entered the scene they were appalled to be asked to be silent witnesses to genocide – at least this is how they interpreted the situation at the time. Kouchner, still under the influence of the memory of the Holocaust and the May 1968 demonstrations in Paris,[29] strongly rejected the politics of humanitarian neutrality and discretion. With his talent for dramatisation, he ripped off his Red Cross armband, denounced the Nigerian attempt to starve out the Biafrans, and began his rebellion against silent neutrality that has continued for decades. To begin with, he, together with close doctor-friends, went on to found Medécins Sans Frontières (Ignatieff 2003).

Medécins Sans Frontières (MSF) would not work according to the code of silent discretion and they would publicly denounce what they saw. Ignatieff argues that this was indeed a noble sentiment, but it came with a cost: "it privileged the conscience of the organisation above the claims of victims, and while this might be justified where complicity would compromise the entire integrity of humanitarian action, it might also mean that victims would die because

29 The May 1968 demonstrations in Paris were a series of student protests and a general strike that caused the eventual collapse of the conservative de Gaulle government.

NGOs would not make the political compromises necessary to reach them" (2003: 55). But it was Kuchner's increasing advocacy for the politicisation of humanitarianism that resulted in an argument within the organisation, leading Kouchner and his loyalists to separate from MSF in 1979 and found a new organisation, Medécins du Monde (MDM). Yet the Nobel Prize that was later awarded to MSF was in fact honouring the new style of politically engaged humanitarian action that Kouchner had been advocating. MDM never reached the same heights as MSF, owing, perhaps to the "founder's allergy to bureaucracy" (Traub 2008). As for Kouchner, he has moved on to occupy new high-profile positions, including ministerial posts in the French government.

After entering politics as President Mitterand's minister for humanitarian action, Kouchner began strongly advocating for *le droit d'ingérance humanitaire,* the right of states to intervene when other states oppress their own citizens. The term was coined after the so-called Kurdish operation in 1991, when Sadam Hussein chased the Kurds into the mountains of northern Iraq and murdered as many as he could find with helicopter gunships. Kouchner argued that the resulting disaster was not a humanitarian crisis, but "a crime, that could only be answered by creating safe havens for civilians, through the use of Allied air power" (Ignatieff 2003: 57). As the UN is a club of states, the interference in their domestic affairs has always been considered off limits. That is why it came as a surprise when years later, with the Balkans and Rwanda in mind, Kofi Anan, the secretary general of the UN, began talking about a right of humanitarian intervention in the case of atrocities. In 2005, the General Assembly adopted what came to be known as "the responsibility to protect" (Traub 2008). The doctrine of intervention – *ingérence* in French – capped decades of thinking and acting that had begun with the team of young doctors in Biafra, though ultimately it drew on a far wider range of actors. This "grand-scale alternative view of world politics," as Paul Berman calls it, held out the possibility that Western power, the bane of the left, "could do a world of good for the most oppressed of the oppressed" (in Traub 2008: 16). For Kouchner, *ingérence* was the answer to the terrible question raised by the Holocaust (ibid.).

Kouchner continued his career as French minister of health and was elected in 1994 to the European Parliament. He again served as French minister of health from 1997 until 1999, when Kofi Annan made him Special Representative for Kosovo. James Traub, in an article in *The New York Times*, built upon his long term cooperation with Kouchner, presenting Kouchner's Kosovo experience as follows:

> For the one and only time in his life, Kouchner got to be head of a country, albeit one that didn't exist, with rampant crime and violence, no social services and a multinational army that wasn't supposed to fight. Kouchner, as always, managed to make the whole enterprise feel exhilarating. He surrounded himself with dashing French buddies and a few reformed '68ers, and the besieged little group drank bad Macedonian wine until late in the night. Less debonair people took a decidedly negative view of Kouchner's tenure. An American consultant who worked with Kouchner found him "wildly disorganised" and unequal to the demands of running even a rump state. A French journalist then quartered in Prishtina says, "once the international media went away, he became bored by Kosovo" (Traub 2008).

But others who expected to find a preening media star say they were struck by Kouchner's seriousness of purpose.[30]

After Kosovo, Kouchner hoped for another high-profile UN job. He was a candidate to become the leading man of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees but was not chosen. Later, he campaigned for the leading position in the World Health Organisation. This, too, failed. And then a surprising offer for a job came that Kouchner eventually accepted, causing his expulsion from the Socialist Party. He joined Sarkozy as foreign minister. By increasingly emphasising the need of states to intervene in cases of civil conflicts that grossly violate the human rights of civilian populations, he went as far as supporting the "war on terror," invented and promoted by the United States. By this gesture, Kouchner seemed to have embraced the logic of imperialism intertwined with humanitarian intervention. Admittedly, as I also learned in Kosovo, there is a fine line between advocating for human rights and fully embracing the principles of humanitarian action, and supporting military interventions that have become significantly imperial in their character.

In his book, *A Bed for the Night*, David Rieff argues sharply against humanitarianism as a guide to political action. He describes how humanitarian

30 "Kouchner's strongest defender may be Jack Covey, a U.N. official who was his deputy, responsible for making Kosovo actually function. Working with Kouchner, Covey says, was thrilling. At one point a Serb leader, enraged by continuous attacks from the Albanian majority, was threatening to wreck the agreements that preserved a tenuous peace between them. "The more threatening he got," Covey recalls, "the more Kouchner leaned forward." Finally Kouchner leaned all the way across the table and shouted: "Who do you think you are, threatening us? Pretending to be radical? I am radical! I was on the barricades before you were born. And I have never left the barricades!" The Serb was unnerved and backed down.... When I visited Kosovo in 2004, the only U.N. representative whom the Albanians seemed to remember fondly, and viewed as their advocate, was Kouchner" (Traub 2008).

organisations tend to move from the principal of political neutrality toward encouraging states to intervene in order to stop civil wars and ethnic cleansing. By doing this, humanitarian organisations inevitably take sides in a conflict and therefore jeopardise their access to the victims of war. If the mission of humanitarianism is indeed to alleviate suffering, then humanitarians need to distance themselves from major powers in order to protect their independence and humanitarian space. If not, they will become an extremely valuable medium through which imperial forces can enforce their interests in specific areas. Therefore, while trying to do good, humanitarian efforts may also cause harm. And while humanitarianism is still regarded as a highly praised and moral action, it has begun losing its coherence by supporting humanitarian interventions (2002).

Humanitarian intervention is carried out in the form of peace operations, which have become one of the primary mechanisms of conflict management in failed states after the Cold War (Diehl 2008). Insight into the industry of peace operations is necessary for further discussion of the dynamics of contemporary nation-state building, because it is in the framework of peace operations, especially - although not exclusively - peacebuilding, that nation-state building in failed states occurs. It is important to note that humanitarian intervention and nation-state building should not be conflated. Ignatieff (2003: 306) argues that where chaos and state collapse occur: "the test of a successful intervention is no longer whether it defeats an enemy or stops a human right abuse, but whether it sets in train the nation-building process that will prevent the area from becoming a security threat once again". It is in this respect that the two concepts become inextricably linked. After discussing the framework of peace operations, the discussion will further address the dilemmas and concerns that arise when considering the act of humanitarian intervention.

Peace operations[31]

> Whereas war and other organised violence have a long history, actions by the international community to promote peace are far more recent (Diehl 2008: 28).

In the most recent book published on peace operations, Paul F. Diehl (2008: 3) states that discussions of peace operations are notorious for their conceptual muddles. Terms such as "peacekeeping", "peacebuilding", "peacemaking",

31 According to the list of operations compiled by the Henry Stimson Center, 125 peace operations were launched between 1948 and 2006, with 35 operations still in existence at the end of 2006 (Diehl 2008).

and "peace enforcement" are often used interchangeably, although each term refers to significantly different tasks that are to be carried out in an operation. The United Nations itself started to label a broad set of operations over time as "peacekeeping", implying similar characteristics of certain operations that have been joined under the umbrella term "peacekeeping generation". As a result, three peacekeeping generations have been identified and some authors have implied that fourth generation peacekeeping has been underway in more recent times (see e.g. Kühne 2005). Peacekeeping generations differ according to the level of involvement of international agents in both civilian and military engagement. While first generation peacekeeping refers to the so-called traditional peacekeeping that is popularly associated with the blue helmets, subsequent generations increase their involvement in conflict resolution, including peacebuilding, the use of force, and nation-state building.

Generations of peacekeeping have developed parallel to the development of international organisations after the Second World War, especially the United Nations. This does not mean, however, that no earlier international efforts were made to promote peace. The League of Nations, established after World War I, was involved in peace observation and inquiry about disputes and in making recommendations on how those disputes might be settled peacefully.[32] Throughout the 1920s, the League was involved in a number of disputes, with the typical process being to create fact-finding commissions and report back to the Council. Before the Council authorised any missions, however, it insisted that there be a cease-fire. This became a fundamental prerequisite to authorising a traditional peacekeeping operation that was developed decades later.[33]

---

32 The League of Nations was the first general purpose, universal membership organisation established after World War I. Although the organisation also had economic and social functions, its primary concern was to ensure international peace and security through collective consultation, negotiation, and diplomacy (Diehl 2008).

33 "The closest analogue to peace operations before the establishment of the League of Nations occurred in China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. An allied force of several nations was constituted to rescue the foreign legations in Beijing during the height of the violence, but it did not operate under a unified command. Early international efforts at collective military action shared a number of characteristics. First, they operated on an *ad hoc* basis, organising and disbanding as the need arose and according to the crisis at hand. This attribute persists in international peace operations to this day. Second, beyond the *ad hoc* arrangements, these early actions had little precedent to follow. Thus, they operated without specific guidelines, often with little coordination between national units. This circumstance would change in the twentieth century, when peace operations relied heavily on guidelines established by previous operations in terms of personnel, deployment, and conduct. Finally, early efforts went forward largely without the approval of the direction of an international body in most cases, because

First generation peacekeeping or traditional peacekeeping

The doctrinal pillars of traditional peacekeeping included consent, neutrality, and the non-use of force, except in cases of self-defence (Kühne 2005). In that sense, they resembled the earlier efforts by the League of Nations to achieve peaceful settlement of disputes. The UN Charter, however, provided legal grounds for greater involvement of international agents, including the use of force should the course of action suggested in Chapter VI of the Charter fail. Diehl explains:

> The Charter provides a number of dispute resolution alternatives to the use of military force (Chapter I). Beyond such options as mediation and judicial settlement, the United Nations, through the Security Council, is empowered to investigate the dispute (Article 34) and recommend means (Article 36) or terms (Articles 37 and 38) of settlement. This was largely the mode of operation for the League of Nations – inquiry and conciliation. Yet, when it came to the use of force, the United Nations had both the rationale and the mechanisms to take collective actions. Chapter VII of the UN Charter lists some courses of action for UN members to take should peaceful methods of settlement outlined in Chapter VI fail. Reliance on sanctions, the tack taken against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait, might fail, and the Security Council might need to authorise the use of military force. Article 42 directly identifies the collective security option: "[the Security Council] may take such actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Diehl 2008: 36).

Although the Charter allows the use of force, traditional peacekeeping was limited to stationing neutral, lightly armed troops with the permission of the host state, prior to a peace settlement but following a cease-fire. The duties of peacekeeping forces were limited to separating combatants in order to deter military engagements, monitoring cease-fires, and helping to resolve disputes over the terms of the cease-fire. Other activities, such as clearing transportation routes and providing medical assistance to local populations, occurred, but they were incidental and not part of the mandate granted to them by the UN Security Council. Traditional peacekeeping was also deployed almost exclusively in interstate conflicts. That was to change significantly in the decades after the Cold War, when new mandates were granted (Diehl 2008).

---

international organisations as we know them today did not exist. The protection of international peace and security was largely indistinguishable from the interests of the major powers in the world, a condition that would change, at least organisationally, with the creation of an appropriate international mechanism for authorising and coordinating global security actions" (Diehl 2008: 29).

The golden age of peacekeeping lasted from 1956 to 1978, when the greatest number of peacekeeping operations were authorised. During this time, traditional peacekeeping and observation was the predominant method by which the international community responded to threats to peace and security. Its major advantage was conceptual clarity and strictness in following the three principles: host state consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. The most significant exception to the principles of traditional peacekeeping was the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC), from 1960 to 1964. ONUC set a precedent because it established that the UN could intervene in civil conflicts and that UN peacekeepers could be mandated to perform functions far beyond those connected with cease-fire monitoring.[34]

Subsequent peacekeeping generations: Peacebuilding as nation-state building

After the golden period of peacekeeping, no new peace operations were deployed for an entire decade.[35] That was to change, however, with the end of the Cold War and the deployment of peace operations in Namibia (United Nations Transitional Assistance Group - UNTAG), Nicaragua (United Nations Observer Group in Central America - ONUCA) and Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia - UNTAC). Especially in the case of the latter, certain deviations from traditional peacekeeping became apparent, as the operation included repatriating refugees, maintaining law and order, and conducting some governmental functions. The first peace operation that presented a significant break from the previous patterns, however, is considered to be the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).[36] UNOSOM and several

34 The Congo Operation was as a proto-peacebuilding operation that included the use of military action and was helping to establish a local order until the central government was strong enough to take over. The UN did not, however, operate governmental machinery or provide services, as it would in later peacebuilding operations (Diehl 2008).

35 Diehl argues that this could be due to a number of different factors. "First, much of the so-called demand for peace operation came from conflicts in which it was least likely to be authorised. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Panama, Grenada, and the like directly involved the superpowers, and traditional peacekeeping was generally excluded from conflicts within the superpowers' spheres of influence. Second, ongoing hotspots (e.g. India-Pakistan, Arab-Israeli) were already covered by one or more UN peacekeeping and observation missions. Third, renewed cold war tensions in the early 1980s and dissatisfaction with extant operations made peacekeeping a less attractive option during this period" (Diehl 2008: 48).

36 Four factors can be identified to support this claim: First, the Somalia crisis was entirely internal and not regional, as was the case in Cambodia and Namibia, or interstate as was the case of previous crises during the traditional peacekeeping period. Second, it was primarily humanitarian because it was motivated more by concerns for human security in the failed state than it

operations that followed present a significant break from traditional peacekeeping because they were mandated for implementation of significantly different tasks, including:

- providing emergency aid;
- ensuring basic public security, infrastructure, and administration as well as the rule of law;
- protecting human rights;
- repatriation of refugees;
- disarmament;
- demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups;
- preparing and conducting elections on local and national levels; and
- economic reconstruction and other non-military issues.

A new generation of peacekeeping was thus born that included elements of peacebuilding (Diehl 2008; Kühne 2005).

The baseline conceptualisation of all peacekeeping-related definitions, including peacebuilding, is offered by Boutros Boutros-Gali, a former UN Secretary-General. Boutros-Gali considered peacebuilding to be the *creation of a new environment* and not merely the cessation of hostilities facilitated by traditional peacekeeping. Peacebuilding usually starts after the fighting between parties in conflict is finished and external actors can enter the country. It can occur following the interstate or intrastate conflict, but "*de facto*… [it is] assumed that it would be employed in a civil context, following an intrastate war, significant ethnic conflict, or even a failed state" (Diehl 2008: 10).

Therefore, if peacebuilding refers to the creation of a new environment after an intrastate conflict, including economic reconstruction and other non-military issues, then it is sensible to assume that it is through peacebuilding activities that nation-state building occurs. As elements of peacebuilding are identifiable in every peace operation following the end of the Cold War, it is also safe to claim that this new type of nation-state building coincides with the emergence of new generations of peacekeeping, some of which also allow for the use of force.

If second generation peacekeeping tended to exclude the use of force and resort to traditional peacekeeping coupled with peacebuilding in order to manage or even resolve the conflict, the third generation allowed for the light use of force. This change becomes obvious when analysing the differences

was by traditional security matters. Third, the operations lacked host state consent. And forth, it involved emergency relief, as well as an attempt to establish law and order. The operation cooperated and coordinated their activities with those of the NGOs, which was until then more typical of pure humanitarian assistance activities (Diehl 2008).

between operations such as UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) or UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda), and IFOR (Implementation Force) or SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The need for a more "robust" peacekeeping stemmed from the problem of maintaining order in the civil war contexts and was due to the new mandate of second and subsequent generations of peacekeeping that allowed intervention in intrastate conflicts. As a result, the international civilian police (CIVPOL) was established, whose initial mandate to monitor the performance of local security forces, report incidents to authorities, and provide training to the police of the host government was gradually expanded to allow units full authority to make arrests and use deadly force. Soldiers were also gradually allowed to use force if necessary – and not only in self-defence, were equipped with better weaponry than traditional peacekeepers, and were given looser terms of engagement (Diehl 2008).

Traditional peacekeeping's "holy trinity": host state consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force, was being stretched to its limits (Diehl 2008). Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is a primary, unprecedented example and as such could be a candidate for inclusion into fourth generation peacekeeping that includes the mandate to govern. Making a simple comparison, one can easily recognise similarities with trusteeships, although in the case of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the international community, and not individual states, is involved in administration. Mosegaard Søbjerg explains:

> Both within international law and international relations theory, there is continually a significant difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the one hand and trusteeships on the other in terms of the amount of responsibility and authority placed with the UN. In a peacekeeping operation, the UN works *with* the existing government in a territory or a state, while the role of the UN in a trusteeship is *to be* the government (Mosegaard Søbjerg 2006: 60).

Protectorates and the question of sovereignty

> Despite all the denials by Western governments that humanitarian intervention is becoming the new imperialism, Kosovo does set a precedent. It establishes the principle that states can lose sovereignty over a portion of their territory if they so oppress the majority population there that they rise in revolt and successfully enlist international support for their rebellion. This is not, one would hasten to add, a universal principle. Double standards apply here. America did support

> the Kosovar struggle for self-determination. It will never support the Chechens against the Russians or the Muslim Uighurs against the Chinese government (Ignatieff 2003: 70).

The use of the term protectorate for the situation in Kosovo has been widespread, as trusteeship is considered to be an outdated agenda that officially ended with the independence of the state of Palau. A protectorate is an entity that has neither domestic sovereignty nor international independence, and is usually a formerly war-torn society placed under international supervision. The societies in question are being guided to a status under international law that will presumably grant them domestic sovereignty without the "full trappings of Westphalian international personality" (Ignatieff 2003: 308).[37] Westphalian sovereignty, the concept of a nation-state sovereignty based on the principle of territoriality and the exclusion of external factors from domestic authority structures, was reinforced during the rise of nationalisms in the 19th Century. However, with the deployment of peacebuilding, especially when following a humanitarian intervention, the international norms vis-à-vis state sovereignty have been transformed. Recently, exceptions to the rule have been carved out, most notably in the event of humanitarian disasters and widespread human rights violations (Weiss in Diehl 2008). Accordingly, humanitarian interventions and peace operations have been sent into areas without the full cooperation of the legally sovereign state (an example is deployment of KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo) or where no functioning government existed (for example, UNOSOM I in Somalia). As sovereignty, coupled with the sole use of force over the territory, has historically been perceived as an integral element of the (Westphalian) state, the interventions by external forces lay the cornerstone for a potential new order. Moreover, as the act of humanitarian intervention refers not only to the use of force but also to the creation of political structures in which external actors exercise substantial authority, this further heats the debate on legitimacy of intervention. For the intervention to be efficacious, as Keohane (2003) argues, subsequent nation-state building by external actors becomes crucial for achieving long-term stability.

37 One such example, Ignatieff explains, is the Kurdish safe haven in Iraq, mandated by the Security Council after 1991, and policed by American and British over-flights. The nominal sovereignty of the region remains with Baghdad. A Kurdish parliament and the chief Kurdish political factions exercise domestic sovereignty on the ground. Another example is East Timor, administered from 1999 to 2002 by the UN, which was the transitional holder of its sovereignty. Needless to say, Kosovo also falls into the category of protectorates (Ignatieff: 2003).

It is in the framework of the intervention imperative that two strong concepts, sovereignty and the universality of human rights,[38] compete and, indeed, clash. The major dilemma and controversy, as I see it, lie in the assumption that human rights frequently become a pretext for carrying out alternative agendas of powerful global forces. Most worrying in this respect is that those agendas are being shaped by the neoliberalistic forces that are driven by the maximisation of profit. Or worse yet, as argued by Bricmont (2006), that defence of human rights became the theme and principal argument of the new political offensive against both the socialist block and Third World countries emerging from colonialism.

Nation-state building as an exercise in humanitarian intervention

The strategies for enforcing and keeping the peace in war-torn countries that have failed to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner differ from one country to another, but the primary goal – leaving conspiracy theories behind – is achieving reconciliation between the ethnic populations involved in the conflict and assisting in creating stable, democratic institutions and the rule of law in order to achieve future stability and peace.[39] In this sense, as Michael Ignatieff also argues, an exercise in humanitarian intervention is nothing but nation-building by a fiction called the international community (Ignatieff 2003: 2). The context in which the term nation-building has been used in recent times obviously significantly differs from the nineteenth-century types.

Nation-building dynamics in failed states inevitably entails the values and beliefs of the western world. Efforts toward reconstruction of failed states are based on "common elements of rhetoric and self-belief: the idea, if not the practice, of democracy; the idea, if not the practice, of human rights; the idea, if not the practice, of equality before the law" (Ignatieff 2003: 17). Moreover, to impose those values on future governments of failed states and underpin the transition to democracy, the presence of international (military and civilian) forces is required. In the case of Kosovo, when the entire political and economic infrastructure needed to be developed practically from scratch in order for the nation to secede successfully, a UN mission with the mandate to

38 For a debate on the controversy of the 'universality' of human rights, especially when realising that the concept stems from the Eurocentric system of values, see Lukšič-Hacin 1999: 75–82.

39 Differences between nations and ethnicities are rarely the cause of civil wars, but admittedly most often become a driving force in claims for independence and the creation of nation-states according to ethnic genealogy. Bliesemann De Guevara (2004: 69) similarly argues that "in their function as identity generating symbolic resources, ethnicity or other cultural characteristics of differentiation are very important for the maintenance of warfare".

govern was established. This unprecedented case contributed to the arguments of those who equated humanitarian interventions and nation-building efforts with colonisation and imperialism. Ignatieff summed up those voices when he wrote: "Kosovo is a laboratory in which a new imperium is taking shape, in which American military power, European money and humanitarian motive have combined to produce a form of imperial rule for a post-imperial age" (Ignatieff 2003: 20).

Ignatieff perceives nation building as an imperial project because it requires imperial means: military troops and foreign civilian administrators, because it serves imperial interests,[40] and because while nominal power may return to the local capital, real power will continue to be exercised from the centres of imperial forces. He argues that while the motive for nation-building may seem to be humanitarian, the real principle is imperial: the maintenance of order over barbarian threat. Nation-building is also a colonial project, despite its manifested intentions. Although nation-building is not supposed to be an exercise in colonialism, he argues, the relationship between the locals and the internationals is inherently colonial. There is however, a significant difference between the colonial and contemporary type of nation-building, as the goal of the latter is neither annexation of the territory nor interference with territorial integrity.

The accusation that nation-state building in failed states conducted by the international community is a new form of imperialism deserves closer scrutiny. Although Ignatieff argues that reconstruction of Kosovo has not been an exercise in humanitarian social work but an imperial project, driven by the clear imperative to replace the collapsed communist regime with a new, preferred political order, he admits that imperialism is not necessarily an "evil agenda". Moreover, he argues that mechanisms of imperialism are necessary to create stable, democratic institutions and the rule of law: "Self-government in failed states is unattainable without some exercise of imperial power" (2003: 24). For the joint empire of Europe and the USA[41] to achieve ethnic reconciliation and create grounds for further democratic development of failed states and then leave would be "doing something creditable, useful to American and

40 Imperial interests may include: "the creation of long-term political stability, the containment of refugee flows into western states, and the control of crime, drugs and human trafficking" (Ignatieff 2003: 59–60).

41 According to Ignatieff, Americans operate the global empire with European diplomatic and economic cooperation. "European cooperation in peacekeeping, nation-building and humanitarian reconstruction is so important that the Americans are required, even when they are unwilling to do so, to include Europeans in the governance of their evolving imperial project" (Ignatieff 2003: 16).

European interests to be sure, but also useful to the local population" (ibid.). The emphasis is on *leave,* as the only legitimate purpose of humanitarian intervention and nation-building is to prepare the local population to rule by themselves and then allow them to do so.

Humanitarian intervention and reconstruction conveniently open a door to a development mission to take place in the form of nation-state building. The problem with such intervention, however, is not the fact that foreign military forces, diplomats, development professionals, humanitarian workers, and other experts of all sorts enter the country in order to help with reconstruction. At least not *per se*. The problem arises when these privileged migrants intentionally or unintentionally impose their own pattern of governance, values, and right/wrong judgements on the local population. Ignatieff argues:

> What help local people need from their temporary imperial rulers should be up to them. They should be the ones who decide what kinds of democracy, rule of law and stability of property can be successfully absorbed in their culture and context. There is nothing odious and invidious about helping local people find their way to the right institutional mixture, provided that they have a say in their own institutional design. The problem with the new imperialism is not that it is imperial, i.e. it uses force and power to reorder the world. The problem is that those who believe in the use of imperial means do not practice what they preach. We say we believe in self-determination, and we confiscate all power into our own hands; we say we respect local cultures and traditions, and yet we are often as contemptuous, behind the locals' backs, as the imperialists of old. Finally, we say we are going to stay the course when we are always looking for the exit (Ignatieff: 2003: 24).

According to Ignatieff, nation-building is an imperial project run by wealthy nations that use humanitarian intervention as a pretext to enter the war-torn country and begin the multi-billion dollar business of reconstruction. The benefits of their agendas, however, are not reserved only for their own states but, when carried out in cooperation with the locals, benefits may accrue to the failed state as well. To what extent they are indeed carried out in accordance with the ethnic and cultural background of the locals is a question that needs detailed analysis through case studies. Jeffrey T. Jackson, who spent several years researching development workers in Honduras, noted that local needs and preferred patterns of nation-building are rarely respected. The donor countries set agendas according to their own interests and with intentions that are limited to maximising their profits (Jackson 2007). Another author, Jean Bricmont, is similarly sceptical about who really benefits from humanitarian intervention. He claims that with time, the criteria for intervention have

become more arbitrary and self-serving for the world's leading economic and military powers, especially for the United States. In addition, "…to call on *army* to wage a *war* for human rights implies a naïve vision of what armies are and do, as well as a magical belief in the myth of short, clean, "surgical" wars" (Bricmont 2006: 67).

Let us take a closer look at how nation-state building agendas are being implemented in practice.

Case study: A mandate for nation-state building in Kosovo

> As the air strikes approached the closing stages, it was evident that there was a pressing need to reconstruct Kosovo as a democratic and multi-ethnic community in order to avoid future relapses into war and ethnic cleansing. The need to prevent future conflicts was obvious, but the question was how to ensure the democratic development envisaged and desired by international society (Mosegaard Søbjerg 2006: 57).

> Mechanisms of nation-building that include establishing the rule of law, fire walls against corruption, democracy, free press, and possibly multiculturalism, have become "the cure of choice for the epidemic of ethnic civil war and state failure" (Ignatieff 2003: 93).

Before and during the NATO air campaign (from 24 March to 10 June 1999) diplomatic efforts were made to create a UN-supported resolution that would allow an international presence in the province. These efforts resulted in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which enabled the UN to take over full administration of Kosovo. In accordance with the resolution, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established as "a peacekeeping mission to provide an interim administration for Kosovo, pending a political process and settlement in regards to the final status of Kosovo" (KIPRED 2005).[42] The operation is divided into four pillars:
(1) Civil Administration – implemented by the UNMIK;
(2) Institution Building – implemented by the OSCE;
(3) Reconstruction and Economic Development – implemented by the EU;
(4) Police and Justice – under the direct leadership of the UN.

42 The tasks that UNMIK has been entrusted with are not the tasks covered by traditional peacekeeping. As UNMIK and partners (OSCE and EU) were sent to Kosovo with a mandate to administer the entire territory, Kosovo became a protectorate. A protectorate, as discussed above, is an entity that has neither domestic sovereignty nor international independence, and is usually a formerly war-torn society placed under international supervision (Ignatieff 2003).

Initially, one of the four pillars was humanitarian assistance led by UNHCR, but it was phased out in 2000 and replaced by the Police and Justice pillar. So far, six heads of mission have been appointed, the current Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) being Joachim Rücker.[43] The responsibilities and tasks of the mission include:
(1) carrying out basic civilian administration;
(2) organising the establishment of democratic institutions;
(3) supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure;
(4) supporting provision of humanitarian aid;
(5) maintaining law and order;
(6) protecting and promoting human rights;
(7) assuring the safe return of refugees;
(8) promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government (KIPRED 2005; Mosegaard Søbjerg 2006).

All these officially and publicly declared tasks and responsibilities reveal the agenda of nation-state building according to western preferences. Although this particular type of nation-state building is new and coincides with the emergence of the most recent peacekeeping generation, reaching its peak with the implementation of humanitarian interventions, the strategies for nation-state building in Kosovo include those promoted by the civil territorial type of nineteenth-century nation building: first comes state, then comes nation. The challenges this poses to the nation-state building agents are immense as they include achieving reconciliation between different ethnic groups settled in the territory. To make it worse, reconciliation needs to be achieved between ethnic groups that were until recently at war with each other and that were not capable of resolving the conflict themselves.

The eight identified responsibilities and tasks stated above are inextricably linked with efforts to achieve reconciliation between different ethnic groups settled in the Kosovo territory. This is the major and most important challenge for the international community, as the success of the mission and subsequent operations lies in its ability to provide a safe and stabile environment for the implementation of future agendas. Achieving reconciliation between the two main ethnic groups, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, is also a necessary prerequisite to successful implementation of the civic nation-building type

43 Bernard Kouchner was the first SRSG and served as the head of UNMIK from July 1999 to January 2001. Other SRSGs that followed Kouchner were: Hans Haekkerup (February 2001 to December 2001); Michael Steiner (January 2002 to July 2003); Harri Holkeri (August 2003 to June 2004); and Søren Jessen-Petersen (August 2004 to June 2006) (UNMIK online, 15. 5. 2008).

and therefore a top priority of UNMIK and other international organisations involved in post-war reconstruction.

Managing ethnic communities: some confusing propositions

The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, enacted through UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, outlines a comprehensive catalogue of human rights, prohibits discrimination, and names the relevant international documents to be observed and ensured by the PISG as domestically applicable legislation. The main documents in question are:

- The Universal Declaration on Human Rights;
- The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols;
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols thereto;
- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child;
- The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages;
- The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (KIPRED 2006).

The Constitutional Framework does not refer to minorities, which is the commonly accepted terminology in international documents, but uses the term community to denote members of the same ethnic, religious, or linguistic group. It is worth pointing out, however, that "the use of the term 'community' instead of 'minority' does not have any impact on obligations of the PISG to observe and ensure internationally recognised documents pertaining to 'minorities'" (ibid.: 5). As already mentioned, no credible census has been conducted since 1981 and therefore no statistical data exist on any of the abovementioned communities living in Kosovo. There are, however, certain estimates of their numbers according to UNHCR and OSCE reports.

The Serb community is the largest ethnic minority community in Kosovo. As the Republic of Serbia does not recognise the UNMIK administration or PISG, parallel Serbian institutions operate in almost every Serbian enclave within Kosovo. "So far, parallelisms have been most salient in health and education (approved by UNMIK and paid by both UNMIK and often paid double by Belgrade structures) and courts (not approved by UNMIK but tacitly allowed to operate)" (KIPRED 2005). Other parallelisms include security structures and administrative structures related to property issues. Two

reports on parallel structures have been issued so far by the OSCE mission in Kosovo (2007), stating that in Kosovo Serb inhabited areas parallel structures continue to answer directly to Belgrade, which thus exerts its control over parts of Kosovo.

Relations with other communities are significantly better than with Serbs, although Roma are also experiencing discriminatory treatment on many levels. The Roma have been joined by the Ashkali and Egyptians in a single ethnic grouping called the RAE community, due to the commonality of their problems.[44] They have been stigmatised and kept away from well-paid jobs due to historical discrimination resulting in low qualifications and due to prejudices. The major difference is that the Ashkali and Egyptians speak Albanian as their native language, are fairly well integrated into the Albanian community, and have traditionally lived in Albanian neighbourhoods, whereas the Roma have preserved their own language and are living in separate neighbourhoods. An additional factor in the Albanian population's resentment of the Roma is the Roma's alleged collaboration with the Milošević regime during the war. Therefore, the Roma refugees who returned to Kosovo after the war were not welcome in predominantly Albanian regions; ironically they were also unwelcome in Serbian enclaves.

The Turkish community is, on the contrary, very well integrated, and their economic situation is good even in comparison to the Kosovo Albanians. They speak the Albanian language, have the same religious affiliation and have traditionally had good relations with Kosovo Albanians. The Bosnians also have good relations with the majority community, mainly due to the common sense of victimhood as a result of the war and to a shared religion. Divisions remain, however, and indirect discrimination has been reported several times, together with fear of using the Bosnian language in public. Another minority community are the Goranis, who live almost exclusively in the hills of the most southern and one of the least developed municipalities. They are of Slavic origin, practice Islam, and are reportedly siding politically with the Serbs.

44 As noted by KIPRED, the use of the RAE formula denoting the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities as a single political grouping is a deviation from progressive guarantees of the Constitutional Framework: "In spite of probable noble motives aiming to amplify their voice by the creation of a larger grouping, the perceived attempt for the creation of a new identity has created serious identity and political troubles for these communities. As such, it goes against the basic rights of members of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities to preserve and promote their individual identity and to declare themselves as members of the same. Hence, the use of RAE formula may be seen as being in collision with the institutional right of every person to declare himself a member of any community" (KIPRED 2006: 6).

Due to their geographic isolation, however, they are currently not facing any security threats (KIPRED 2005).

The first step towards the implementation of the civic nation-building type in Kosovo was and still is the promotion of the right to return "through a return planning strategy which emphasises a return to multiple geographic areas in an incremental, low-profile and orderly fashion" (KIPRED 2005: 24). Other tasks of UNMIK & Co. include addressing and managing problematic ethnic diversity in fields that became UNHCR and OSCE focal points in preparing assessments of the situation of ethnic minorities: security and freedom of movement for minorities; access to justice; discrimination in or access to essential services (education, employment, social services, health care); housing and property rights; and access to public, civil, and political structures (UNHCR and OSCE 2003). Needless to say, the rules that were set and the measures demanded to be taken regarding each of those issues by far exceed the standards that most European countries have adopted (and implemented) for the protection of ethnic or national minorities. Due to limited space, I will not offer a detailed analysis of all the measures taken for establishing a peaceful multiethnic society in Kosovo. I will, however, offer a few examples to show that the international community has been trying to achieve reconciliation between ethnic communities through demanding and often confusing measures, in order to enforce its preferred nation-building strategy.

Promoting ethnic minority overrepresentation in governmental institutions is one important example:

> In elected bodies representation of minority communities is guaranteed by the Constitutional Framework. Apart from the seats that political entities of each community win in the proportional system, out of 120 seats, the Kosovo assembly allocates 20 additional seats for members of minority communities, according to the following distribution: 10 Serbs, 4 RAE, 3 Bosnians, 2 Turks, 1 Gorani.…We could think of no minorities in Europe that are overrepresented to this degree. … Minority communities enjoy guaranteed representation in the government too. According to the formula established by the Constitutional Framework, the Kosovo Government should have at least one minister representing the Serb community and one representing other communities (KIPRED 2006: 8).

There are two official languages in Kosovo: Albanian and Serbian. Other ethnic minority communities that constitute a substantial part of the population in a municipality, however, are enjoying special rights regarding language

use too. According to the UNMIK Regulation,[45] meetings of the Municipal Assembly and its committees as well as public meetings are to be conducted in both the Albanian and Serbian languages. In municipalities where a community lives whose language is neither Albanian nor Serbian they are also to be translated, when necessary, into the language of that community. The same goes for official documents and official signs indicating or including the names of cities, towns, villages, roads, streets and other public places. Upon analysing the existing data, OSCE researchers realised, however, that there have been very few instances of RAE, Turkish, or Bosnian communities making specific requests for additional language usage in any form (OSCE 2006). All ethnic communities in Kosovo also have the right to education in their own language and pupils and students of most communities tend to exercise that right. In addition, they have the right to study the history and culture of their ethnic community with different curricula designed in Prishtina, Belgrade, Sarajevo, or Ankara (KIPRED 2006).[46] Another example is establishment of the Human Rights Cells in every ministry of PISG, with protection of ethnic minority rights being one of the priority tasks.[47]

Along with attempts to implement integration and multiculturalism in Kosovo, there is another concept that the international community has been trying out: the process of decentralisation. Through the decentralisation process "the international community is trying to ensure that the rights of the Serb community will be constitutionally guaranteed and their competences will be significantly empowered in the municipalities where they constitute the majority" (KIPRED 2007). The process of decentralisation is primarily aimed at pacifying the Serbian community, and to a lesser degree other non-Albanian communities, and is perceived as such by the Albanian public.[48]

> A substantial number of Kosovars consider the process of decentralisation as controversial and ethnically motivated. As an earlier study indicated 50-60 per cent of Kosovo Albanians find the following issues as "unacceptable": (a) increasing

45 UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo.

46 In this regard, the situation of the RAE community is least favourable, as they have no mother country that can assist them in carrying out education. The available curriculum contains almost nothing about their history and culture (KIPRED 2006). Needless to say, there are significant problems in implementing the right to education in different languages across Kosovo. This, however, is not a subject of discussion in this book. The objective is to provide examples of demands set by the international community that PISG needs to meet. For a more detailed discussion on minority language use in municipalities see OSCE 2006.

47 See, for example, the PISG Report on Activities in the areas of anti-discrimination, anti-corruption, anti-trafficking in human beings, and human rights (2007).

48 The Kosovo decentralisation plan was adopted by the Kosovo Government in March 2005.

> the powers of Serb-majority municipalities more than in other regions, and (b) allowing these municipalities to receive direct financial and other support from the government of Serbia (KIPRED 2007:7).

Fears have been expressed by some interest groups that the decentralisation process will endanger the territorial integrity of Kosovo and widen Belgrade's power over the Kosovo Serb enclaves, "which will vanish because they will be unified" (Kurti in KIPRED 2007:10). And although the international community has been promoting decentralisation to bring Kosovo closer to becoming a multiethnic society, it is frequently argued that new municipalities are being formed along ethnic lines. Therefore, the ethnic component is actually being strengthened. There is another unwelcome consequence stemming from the decentralisation plan. As KIPRED argues:

> Once these municipalities are up and running, their sustainability will be put to the test. Henceforth we can safely predict that once the immediate threat that Serbs currently perceive is gone, hardship realities will kick in, and some Serbs will seek to be incorporated back into bigger municipalities. In the future, more and more services will depend on "own revenues", and those municipalities that do not have a solid tax-base will be unable to raise funds and will offer less services to their citizens (KIPRED 2007: 15).

The purpose of this chapter was to present the mechanisms through which the contemporary type of nation-state building is being implemented. I argued that humanitarian intervention, followed by peacebuilding operations conducted by foreign agents, conveniently lay the groundwork for a development mission to take place in the form of the nation-state building. Nation-state building is an imperial project and a multi-billion dollar business of reconstruction that operates under the pretext of humanitarian agency, thus abusing the basic principles of humanitarianism and politicising humanitarian work. Being fully aware of those facts, however, I also argued that wealthy donor countries may not be the only beneficiaries of the nation-state building agendas. The failed state may benefit a great deal also, especially when the local needs, values, and preferred patterns of nation-state building are taken into consideration and respected. Finally, I presented a textbook case of the contemporary nation-state building that is taking place in Kosovo, a protectorate under international administration. The next chapter will discuss in more detail the agents of nation-state building from the nineteenth century to the present.

CHAPTER 4

THE AGENTS OF NATION-STATE BUILDING THEN AND NOW: THE MULTIPLICITY OF ELITES

Elite is a small group within the state or other organisation which has disproportionate power over important decisions.
(Potter 2000: 275)

The goals of nationalist movements that emerged after the French revolution in the late eighteenth century were to create and develop autonomy and self-government, unity, and authentic identity.[49] In this sense, nationalism was a doctrine of freedom and sovereignty. People were to be liberated and freed from any external constraints, they were to determine their own destiny and control their own resources. That entailed fraternity and people needed to be unified and gathered together in a single historic territory, a homeland (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994). Although the nationalist movements that have resulted in the creation of nation-states are often interpreted and understood as populist movements, the position taken in this book is that the initial agents of nation-state building come from the rank of elites – a term embracing a variety of privileged statuses. In opposition to primordialism, this view is perceived as instrumentalist.

Admittedly, the exaggerated belief in the powers of elite manipulation of the masses and blindness to the powers of ethnicity make the instrumentalist approach less appealing. Even if nation-building efforts are understood as an agenda of the elites, the sentiments used to achieve mobilisation are drawn

49 In an introduction to selected essays on nationalism, Hutchinson and Smith argue that many historians would agree that, as an ideology and discourse, nationalism became prevalent in North America and Western Europe in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and shortly thereafter in Latin America. The dates that are considered as signalling the advent of nationalism include 1775 (the first partition of Poland), 1776 (the American Declaration of Independence), 1789 and 1792 (commencement and second phase of the French Revolution), and 1807 (Fichte's Address to the German Nation). Nationalism as an ideological movement, however, did not emerge without antecedents. More on the issue in Hutchinson and Smith (1994).

from the belief in common ancestry and culture. Also, different types of nation-building use different mixtures of strategies to construct a nation-state and no nationalism can be seen as purely voluntarist or organic, civic or ethnic, primordial and instrumental.[50] But explanations offered by instrumentalists nevertheless prove to be useful in making sense of the nation-state building processes of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is especially the case with the civic-territorial type of nation building, where the establishment of a nation-state was promoted by political elites of the core *ethnie* in order to legitimise their power in a century of revolution and democratisation (Hobsbawm 1994). In the case of nation building according to the ethnic type, political elites played an important role, although especially in Eastern Europe notable efforts were also made by the intellectual elite (Hroch in Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Political elites in possession of money, power, and prestige were also agents of nation building in the immigrant type. Powerful individuals within ethnic groups who first settled in new environments were the ones who were primary actors in the respective process.[51] This does not mean, however, that the elites were solely responsible for the creation of nation-states, but they can be, in many respects, regarded as primary initiators.

The case of colonial nation-building provides a different example. Again, the economic, political, and military elites of colonial powers were responsible for the creation of states, with significant help from missionaries and local bourgeoisie. But those elites were an external power, foreign agents, imperial representatives. They were creating states in territories that were inhabited by different ethnic groups and cultures different from their own according to political and capitalist agendas. Selected individuals were chosen to settle in the colonised areas, where they would exercise the colonial powers.

The European civilian elites were trusted agents of the metropolitan power placed in posts specially reserved for them in the districts and policy-making secretariats at a provincial headquarters (if there was one) and national headquarters of the colonial states. In the policy-making secretariats they were responsible for handling questions of policy arising in the colony

50 Fundamental debates about ethnicity and nationalism can be classified in three groups: the organicist versus the voluntarist understanding of the nation and the contemporary debates between primordialists and instrumentalists that stem from these understandings; the perennialist versus the modernist approaches and the contemporary debates about the antiquity or modernity of nations; and the social constructionist versus the ethnosymbolic approaches and the contemporary debates about the relationship of the past and present in the formation and future of nations. Detailed presentation of these various views is presented by Smith (2000).

51 I understand 'powerful' in this context to refer to those who are able to realise their will, even if others resist it. The definition is taken from Mills (1956).

in a manner loosely consistent with the economic and strategic interests of the metropolitan power. In the districts, even while overseeing the routine work of subordinates, they were inevitably engaged in political work with local collaborators, chiefs and others, nursing support structures and moving for advantage in fluid situations while never loosing sight of imperial aims and requirements (Potter 1986). Each year a few young men (women were not allowed) were recruited in Europe to these superior civil services and sent out to the colony - only they had a clear career run to the key positions at the top of the colonial bureaucracy, commanding exceedingly handsome salaries most of the way (Potter 2000: 275).

Similarly, elites who are involved in the contemporary nation-state building of failed states and development activities come primarily from *foreign* political and capitalist circles. In more abstract terms, however, the main donors are nation-states. The donor countries set up their own development agencies with the aim of providing official development assistance (ODA)[52] to developing states. Generally speaking, ODA is financial assistance by official agencies and developed countries usually for the purposes of economic development and welfare. ODA given by national governments is referred to as bilateral aid and that provided by international organisations like the World Bank or the United Nations is referred to as multilateral aid.[53] A large percentage of ODA goes to the agencies employing development professionals and local staff in order to carry out the development projects in failed states and conduct the nation-state building. Jackson argues:

> The overarching globalisation agenda is determined mainly by the wealthiest nations. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom make up the Group of Seven nations (G7). Their representatives meet regularly to discuss various common interests, including how to administer ODA to developing countries. The G7 accounts for 75 percent of all bilateral (country-to-country) aid to the developing world. These same seven countries provide

52 "The term is used by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It refers to grants and soft loans (with a grant element of at least 25 percent) which are provided by OECD members, with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 'developing countries' as 'the main objective'" (OECD in Thomas and Allen 2000: 199).

53 Multilateral institutions can be divided into development banks and financial organisations (e.g. World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund, and International Fund for Agricultural Development); United Nations organisations (e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, United Nations Development Programme); and other multilaterals (e.g. European Union, Pan American Health Organisation, Nordic Development Fund) (Jackson 2007).

> the overwhelming majority of funds to finance multilateral aid through organizations such as the WB and the UN. In addition, the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, Paris) recognizes a total of twenty-two donor countries that provide economic assistance to the developing world. Often referred to as the Group of Twenty-two (G 22), this body of large, industrialized nations, which includes the G7, dominates the decision-making process within the WB, International Monetary Fund, and the WTO. Most important, these donor countries set the priorities and make important policy decisions regarding which agendas to pursue within the globalisation effort (Jackson 2007: 11).

It is clear that the political and economic elites set and enforce agendas through the mechanisms of nation-states and their (bilateral and multilateral) organisations and thus are the agents of development and, in our case, the agents of post-war reconstruction and nation-state building. But the question remains of who implements nation-state building projects in the field. Who is responsible for putting the abstraction into practice? I will argue that the elites who are mandated with the task are development workers, involved in implementation of the nation-state building and development projects.

Development workers as globalisation missionaries?

> Globalisation is about advancing the economic and political interests of the TCC resident mainly in wealthy countries of the world. To achieve this, these wealthy nations provide incentives to poorer nations to go along with their agenda. The incentives are called development assistance, and the agenda is called opening up to the international free-market system. The wealthy nations promote this agenda using their globalisation missionaries: development workers. These globalizers create the conditions under which capitalist globalisation can proceed (Jackson 2007: 8).[54]

In his highly praised book on development workers as globalizers, Jackson takes a firm stand in claiming that development workers lay the groundwork on which global capitalism can expand and develop. He claims that development workers travel regularly across international borders to implement policies designed by donor countries to foster trade and build the world economy. His definition of globalizers excludes entrepreneurs, soldiers, and religious missionaries:

54 Jackson's definition of globalisation refers to what can in fact be understood under the term globalism. TCC stands for the transnational capitalist class.

> Although all these groups engage in extensive international travel and promote global agendas similar to the development professionals … they are not … agents of globalization as much as they are agents acting globally. Entrepreneurs are not globalizers according to this definition because, although they may advise or consult with development professionals in making economic policy in various settings, they are employed by institutions whose primary mission is to make a profit for a limited group of shareholders (not the globe as a whole).… Entrepreneurs are not, however, primarily concerned with building the political institutions of globalization (they leave that to globalizers)… Soldiers are not globalizers because, although they are occasionally involved in humanitarian assistance projects, they are employed by institutions whose primary mission is to advance the military interest of one government (rather than the entire globe) over another. Similarly, although religious missionaries might carry out extensive development projects as part of their work, they are employed by institutions advancing the beliefs and practices of their members (not the globe as a whole) and so are not globalizers (Jackson 2007: 316).

The main task of globalizers is to link the developing country into the world system and help it to adopt the same political and economic strategies as those promoted by the wealthier nation-states. Jackson argues that: "the dominant agendas are largely determined by the donor countries and, benefiting from greater financial support for their implementation, achieve hegemonic status with the development profession" (Jackson 2007: 11). He believes that the overarching agenda of the donors is to advance global capitalism while promoting other universally accepted principles. In this sense, development organisations are the main promoters of global scripts in the developing world as they carry out a broad range of programs pertaining to issues of universal control:

> Everything from protecting the environment, to enhancing the rights of women, quelling the spread of AIDS, defending children's rights, building democracy, and improving adult literacy (not to mention promoting global capitalism) falls into the globalizers' domain. It is as if to say, "If a country has a problem – any problem – there is a global script that can provide the solution. And we are the ones who know the recipe." Taken as a whole, the multiplicity of agendas that the globalizers pursue in the developing world involve them in every facet of human life; no issue of human control is beyond their reach. The overarching agenda of the globalizers is to advance global capitalism while promoting other "universally" accepted principles throughout the world. In this way, principle by principle, piece by piece, the globalizers put into place the numerous components of a global society (Jackson 2007: 10).

Thus, development workers are the ones creating grounds for the process of globalisation to take place. By bringing money and politics into the equation, however, the active agency is not *a priori* taken from the development workers. As Jackson (2007) also argues, it is important to realise that they have the power to actively negotiate, reinforce, and resist these agendas as they carry out their work.

As much as I would like to dismiss his findings, I agree that such agendas currently exist in Kosovo. As argued in the subchapter "Case study: A mandate for nation-state building in Kosovo," the nation-state building through peacebuilding activities is being conducted according to the civic nation-state building type, promoted as appropriate by the Western states. Similarly, the economic policies and laws that are being created are oriented towards fostering a better environment for foreign investment, thus promoting neoliberal agendas. But at least two lines of argument can be developed in response to Jackson's observations.

In previous chapters I argued that nation-state building in failed and/or developing states is indeed an imperial project, resembling European colonialism and serving the agendas of the wealthier states. But I also implied that in the long term, the survival of failed states depends on their capability to adjust to and take an active part in the current capitalist system. A friend who worked at the UN headquarters in New York for years recently said to me that he does not question whether there is a certain amount of evil in the development agendas of wealthy and hungry-for-more nations, but that we should ask ourselves what is the lesser evil: leaving the failed, war-torn countries on their own in the midst of hard-core capitalism or providing them the means to "play along"? The complexity of this fundamental question is still fuelling contemporary debates on nation-building and development.

The second line of argument addresses the development workers' own understanding of the development profession. Without any intent to generalise, I would argue that at least in the case of development workers in Kosovo, the reasons for choosing the development profession exclude promoting globalism (capitalism). Most of the development workers I spoke with mentioned the sense of adventure that the overseas work entails, the sense of being useful, and doing the right thing by helping the locals raise the quality of their lives. Jackson (2007) got similar results when talking with development workers in Honduras. He writes that many of them expressed a commitment to alleviating poverty, but also a desire to see and experience different places and

cultures throughout their working lives. The same reasons can be found on the web forums where development workers from around the world meet to chat, and blog spots, where they share their stories.[55]

The (auto)biographical accounts of development and humanitarian workers that I analysed as part of the research confirmed my assumptions that, although reasons differ from one individual to another, they do not include the goal of bringing capitalism to the developing country.[56] In fact, many of the development workers I spoke with are politically left-wing-oriented and openly critical of the economic dimensions of globalisation. Once I asked a development NGO employee, a proud socialist, about the current nature of her work in Kosovo's rural areas. She explained that what they are doing is helping the farmers better understand how they can, after independence, apply for funds from Europe. While this, to me, seemed a clear indication of promoting capitalism, she responded that what she is doing is nothing other than helping people survive. Capitalism, for her, was a dirty business and she would have nothing to do with it.[57]

Again, without generalising but drawing from my experience in the field, I argue that development workers tend to choose their profession to (a) help others, and (b) help themselves, but not to promote globalism *per se*. Could it therefore be argued that helping to improve the living standards of individuals in developing states is an intended agency, while becoming globalizers is a collateral effect of that agency? It appears to be so. When development workers come to this realisation, especially those employed at the multilateral organi-

55 One of the popular blog spots is called The Road to the Horizon. It is an e-book with short stories, news items, and reflections on life by aid workers, development workers, travellers, and adventurers, published in blog form.

56 An autobiographical book that was recommended to me at least a dozen times during my stay in Kosovo is written by the three employees of the Red Cross and UN who worked as humanitarian and development agents in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Liberia. *Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures: True Stories from a War Zone* (2004) became an international bestseller and raised a lot of dust at the UN due to its bluntness. Another good book is *Another Day in Paradise: International Development Workers Tell Their Stories*, edited by Carol Bergman (2003).

57 Jackson (2007: 94) believes that this kind of denial is typical for development workers. While working in less-developed states they are the beneficiaries of a vast system of financial and social rewards, and are thus less likely to demand radical changes in the system. Therefore, when a particular globalisation project comes under attack, they, as the beneficiaries of the system, are likely to come to its defence. "In other words, they stand to lose their career opportunities – and nice houses, maids and the adventures of international work and travel – should the legitimacy of their work come into question"(ibid.).

sations that require their presence in the field for longer periods of time and that work with the poorest populations, it can be overwhelming.[58]

Development workers going first class while doing good[59]

Peacebuilders and contemporary nation-state builders initially do not necessarily belong to elites but tend to take the fast track in becoming members of the more privileged social groups in poor or failed states where they pursue their career. Admittedly, as mentioned before, the goals of colonial elites and elites formed by the development professionals remain significantly different. While colonial nation-state builders were primarily after the prestige and wealth to be obtained by exploiting colonised territories, the goals of the majority of expatriate development workers remain providing aid and assistance, promoting democracy and economic and social development, and assuring the respect of human rights. This does not mean, however, that wealth and prestige that come with the job are not a strong stimulus to join the clique. Those employed at bilateral or multilateral governmental organisations are benefiting the most in terms of climbing the social ladder, as they become the most actively involved in the peacebuilding agendas.

58 In *Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures*, Heidi Postlewait writes that her two friends, Kenneth and Andrew, employed at the UN and working as expats in various countries around the world, need to grow up: "They were both looking for trouble and they both found it, and now they need to shut up and stop crying. What did they expect? What were they trying to prove? No one cares except them that they had a plan to save the world and it didn't work." When Heidi, herself into the development business, met Kenneth in Cambodia, he was "a missionary for the American Way. Export democracy, the New World Order, never again, the bullshit was endless." She found it funny at the time, because she thought it was just naive Harvard drivel, but, she writes, "now it's not so funny and it's tearing him apart" (2004: 174).

59 By using the term *first class* I am consciously distancing myself from using the concept of transnational or global class, which would need an extensive argumentation and justification. For more on that issue see Sklair 2001. The notion of first class as I use it in the book refers to the money, power, and prestige that accrue to social elites in national as well as global settings, and the ways of life to which these lead. Otherwise, *class* refers to socially produced inequality in terms of income, education and qualifications, ownership of material goods, and family background. As Marx argued, it is important that members of a particular class feel subjectively part of that class and defend, advance, or maintain their class interests. Marx, however, was too narrow in his views on stratification, which were structured only around economic factors. Weber insisted that social (status groups, which defined the social honour accorded to a particular group or occupation) and political (power) aspects had to be added to round out the picture (Cohen and Kennedy 2000). It should be noted however that the classical definitions are in a domain of methodological nationalism and thus address the class structure *within* a nation-state.
Going First Class? is also the title of a collection of essays on privileged travel and movement edited by Vered Amit (2007).

The job is admittedly stressful and demanding, especially psychologically, but there is limited space to discuss this aspect in this book. This is not to say that the psychological well-being of development workers is of marginal importance, but, on the contrary, that it is of such immense importance that it deserves a primary focus on its own. This book will therefore focus more on the sociological analysis of the acquired social statuses of the expatriate development workers.

The point that upward mobility is one of the primary benefits of the profession is made by Ignatieff, who offers an example of the lifestyle of development workers in Kabul:

> Kabul is the Klondike of the new century, a place where a young person can make, if not a fortune, then a stellar career riding with the tide of international money that is flooding in with every United Nations flight from Islamabad. It's one of the few places where a bright spark just out of college can end up in a job that comes with a servant and a driver. So Kabul has the social attractions of a colonial outpost joined to the feverish excitement of a boom town. But unlike Klondike, this gold rush is being paid for not by speculators and panhandlers but by rich Western governments (Ignatieff 2003: 94).

In Honduras, Jackson tells us, the situation is quite the same. The development expats are prominent on the Honduran social scene. "They hobnob with the president and his ministers; they consult with the elite bankers and entrepreneurs from Honduras and abroad. Their faces often appear as part of front-page news" (Jackson 2007: 62).

In Kosovo, the situation resembles the ones described above, especially when observing the employees of UNMIK and partners. Those are the people who are making things happen at the highest level and they also take credit for it. They develop an elite lifestyle and mainly socialise with the other expatriates or local elites. But on the other hand, they spend their working hours finding solutions for people in desperate situations. Looking at it from this point of view, their profession is one of the most morally undisputed professions existing today. Jackson makes a similar observation, writing that the development workers are "…real movers and shakers in the country. But they can also be found in the humblest areas of Honduran society. They work alongside community leaders in the poorest urban slums and in the most remote rural areas" (Jackson 2007: 63).

When *doing good* is coupled with climbing the social ladder it becomes a one-of-a-kind career opportunity. In addition to *doing good* the job comes with the excitement of travelling, meeting colleagues from all over the world,

and – especially for those who occupy positions with the UN missions – being involved in political decisions that will shape the future of the failed state. Co-shaping the future of a state that is not your own, using international funds and imperial means, and holding an evacuation pass in your hands, however, make decision-making less stressful and more exciting than in other situations. This is not to say, however, that efforts of development workers may not improve situations in several failed states, for a lot of people. As indicated above, I am also not implying that the decision to choose the development profession excludes strong emphatic and altruistic motives. In fact, I would argue that striving to *do good* is one of the principle reasons for choosing the development profession. The fact that individuals who benefit from *doing good* include both the populations of failed states as well as the development workers themselves does not necessarily make their actions less significant or praiseworthy.

CHAPTER 5

NOTES FROM THE FIELD: THE VOICE OF THE LOCALS

The international community is setting norms, imposing values, writing laws on every imaginable matter, Europeanising the rural areas, and providing security through imported military and civilian staff. It is moulding the vulnerable post-war territory of Kosovo according to the principles promoted by a supposedly successful civic nation-building type. The similarity to the city-building computer simulation game SimCity is obvious. Players of the computer game can establish, shape, build, and manage a territory while not being personally affected by the choices they make, which bears a strong resemblance to the UNMIK and KFOR staff, who only reside temporarily in Kosovo. Moreover, their associated property, funds, and assets are immune to any legal proceedings, and UNMIK has also been reluctant to accept the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsperson. KFOR, on the other hand, falls entirely beyond its jurisdiction. As argued by KIPRED: "Considerable progress has been made in clarifying applicable international standards, however, protection from legal proceedings of KFOR and UNMIK officials sets a bad example in the eyes of Kosovo authorities and citizens at large" (2006: 5).

Nevertheless, regardless of sharp criticisms of the UNMIK administration, especially its confusion about the role it should play in Kosovo, I am reluctant to stigmatise the mission merely as a failing, illegal, neo-colonial intervention by the international community. It is a popular opinion in Kosovo that peace and progress could not be imagined without the international presence. The atrocities that were committed by Serbs on the Kosovo Albanians during the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia were, according to the public opinion, regrettable and could have been avoided. But locals are nevertheless grateful that the international community finally stopped the killings and made Kosovo a UN protectorate, pending the final status decision. Bill Clinton, especially, is the hero responsible for stopping the Serbs. One of the main streets in Prishtina was named after him and his photograph, several metres long, greets the population from the facade of a high block of flats. The initial euphoric reaction

that accompanied the arrival of the international community, however, has after a few years been replaced by a growing indifference, but only a few isolated oppositions.[60]

In rural areas, especially where the population is of mixed ethnic origin, KFOR soldiers are particularly welcome. Their presence gives people a sense of security and assurance that conflict will not re-emerge. Similarly, humanitarian workers who work in the field on projects like assisting the internally displaced or helping rebuild houses have good relations with the locals. When I was trying to find out how the locals feel about development workers, however, I discovered that they and their work are relatively hidden from the eyes of the public. Those development workers who are deployed in the field are usually regarded as humanitarian workers, although their projects are focused on sustainable development and not humanitarian relief. And those who work as policy makers at the UN, OSCE, or EU offices are regarded as politicians and clerks. The public opinion about them is therefore difficult to grasp as they rarely come in contact with the locals.

I came across another interesting aspect of development assistance during my stay in Kosovo. Once I had a chance to speak to a local researcher employed at the European Stability Initiative, whose work is focused mainly on Kosovo rural areas. She and her colleagues conduct research based exclusively on primary data obtained in the field. She told me that the welcome by the locals in villages is extended to research activities by Western and local organisations and institutes, as long as they do not touch the subject of religion. It has been a known fact that problems in the rural areas of Kosovo were largely overlooked by the foreign policy-makers and development organisations and the rural population was left on their own. This gave way to "humanitarian" Muslim NGOs that entered the scene with the promotion of the Saudi Wahabbism. They provided financial assistance and simultaneously infiltrated their religious activities into rural communities through new mosques, schools, kindergartens, and community activities. There is indeed much discussion about radical Islam making its way to Kosovo, where religious activities have remained moderate for centuries. Even Rexhep Boja, the Mufti of Kosovo at the time when UNMIK took over the administration of the province, argued that "Albanians have been Muslims for more than 500 years

60 The most influential is a pro-independence movement led by Albin Kurti. Kurti is an activist and founder of the Kosovo Albanian organisation called Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), whose slogan "No negotiation" can be seen written on walls throughout Kosovo. Kurti is a strong critic of the UNMIK administration and has supporters mainly in the student population. He is currently under house arrest, facing charges for a call to resistance.

and they do not need outsiders [Arabs] to tell them what is the proper way to practice Islam" (in Blumi 2005: 1). But it seems that many people in rural areas refuse to speak about the help they received from Islamic organisations. The ESI researcher shared with me that researching the Islamic influence in the rural areas is not only impossible due to refusal of people to speak about it, but it is also dangerous. And she gave me a warning look with a clearly recognisable undertone of conspiracy.

CHAPTER 6

PRIVILEGED MIGRANTS AND FORMATION OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL SPACES

The migrants of concern to this book are high-skilled, high-wage professionals who regularly cross borders as part of their employment obligations, usually migrating from first world countries to less developed countries to take part in various development activities. In comparison to much discussed low-skilled migration from less developed countries to Western industrialised countries, their migration dynamics remain somewhat overlooked in contemporary migration research, especially in the context of globalisation scholarship. However, it is precisely their (trans)migratory patterns and professional agency that play a key part in globalisation processes (Jackson 2007). In the midst of global flows, those privileged migrants regularly transgress the borders of their nation-states and become members of the so-called transnational elite, leading supposedly fluid lifestyles in deterritorialised social spaces.

When discussing the emergence and dynamics of such specific social spaces, the limits of methodological nationalism become particularly obvious. Some authors have moved forward to address this deficiency and argue that the observed phenomena can be explained by employing the concept of transnational social space (e.g. Appadurai, Basch et al, Pries). Transnationalism is not a new concept, but its dynamics have changed in contemporary times due to the overwhelming development of communications technology and transportation, offering unprecedented opportunities to transgress the borders of one's nation-state in terms of both territory and culture. The first wave of transnational studies, especially, produced a set of problematic assumptions and misconceptions. Early scholars tended to see modern communications technology as the motor of change, dismissing the impact of past technologies (including the steamship, telegraph, telephone, and radio). Next, these studies tended to speak of globalisation in terms of an epochal turn, perceiving it as a new phenomenon that would eventually erode the powers of nation-states. It was only the second wave of global (transnational) studies that responded to these misconceptions (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003).

While there are several definitions of transnationalism, Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (in Jackson 2007) provide the one most appropriate for addressing the issues discussed in this book. According to these authors, transnationalism refers to the recent growth of "activities that require continuous cross-border travel" and is defined as "the occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for implementation" (2007: 60). While the definition is admittedly narrow, it is sufficient and precise enough for our further discussion. Although offering different definitions, scholars in general share the assumption that the mobility of people's lives may create transnational spaces that embody the very essence of transnationalism (Fechter 2007).[61] The definition of transnational spaces as formulated by Pries is of special importance to this discussion.[62] He argues that "transnational social spaces can be understood as pluri-local frames of reference which structure everyday practices, social positions, biographical employment prospects, and human identities, and simultaneously exist above and beyond the social contexts of national societies" (Pries 2001: 23). They are "configurations of social practices, artifacts and symbol systems that span different geographic spaces in at least two nation-states without constituting a new "deterritorialised" nation-state or being the prolongation of one of those nation-states" (ibid.: 18).

Transnational social space created by privileged migrants in a globalising world does, indeed, have pluri-local frames of reference, but it should also be stressed that it is not borderless and is not solely configured by flows. Moreover, as Fechter (2007: 35) argues, "in the context of expatriates, boundaries rather than flows become the analytically relevant concept". She builds her argument on Meyer and Geschiere's suggestion that individuals tend to erect boundaries because they feel immersed in global flow:

> The fact that borders and boundaries continue to matter in a globalising world has been discussed comprehensively in relation to non-privileged groups (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Kearney 2004; Cunningham 2004). While their continuing relevance for these groups may be self-evident, the question arises as to why boundaries should matter for privileged migrants. A tentative rationale is provided by Meyer and Geschiere in their observation that, given the interrelatedness of flows and boundaries, "people's awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows seems to trigger … determined efforts to affirm old and construct

61 Most importantly: Appadurai speaks of "global ethnoscapes," Basch et al. of "transnational social fields," and Ong of "transnational spatial processes" (Fechter 2007).

62 I cannot attempt to discuss a range of other definitions of transnational spaces here. For an overview see Pries (2001).

new boundaries" (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 2). Significantly, this statement emphasises the active role of individuals in producing such boundaries" (Fechter 2007: 34-35).

Thus, according to Fechter (2007), the transnational space expatriate development workers live in is not entirely fluid but rather externally bounded and internally divided. She complicates the notion of transnational spaces as conventionally understood in current discourses of globalisation and transnationalism, and argues that spaces created by transnational migrants are not always transnational – as in fluid, malleable, and progressive – but that they can be bounded, rigid, and conservative.[63] By joining Fechter's argument and Pries' concept of transnational social spaces, one can rather satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of specific deterritorialised social spaces created by the community of expatriate development workers. They are indeed embodying the boundlessness of global flows but are at the same time members of a specific community with strongly erect boundaries.

Transnational spaces of expatriate development workers

Expatriate development workers are employed at different agencies, including UN institutions, government development agencies, international nongovernmental organisations, and other (foreign) civil society institutions, and they implement different development projects and agendas. However, they do not live in isolation from the rest of their colleagues, residing and working in one geographic space, but rather they form a relatively close-knit community distinct from the local population, including the local staff employed by the same agencies and organisations. This community is externally bounded and includes expatriates, therefore foreigners, who are united by *doing good* and are leading similar lifestyles, differing significantly from the ones led by most of the local population.

Among the first social scientists who argued that international development workers constitute a global community with its own customs, values, and practices were anthropologists Elizabeth Colson (1982) and A. F. Robertson (1984). Colson claimed that development has its own culture and argued, "we are dealing with a close-knit international network that transcends the

63 Furthermore, she argues, "the emphasis of ethnic, racial or national boundaries among Europeans living abroad is not a recent phenomenon, but links to practices such as those of colonial populations. It is a reminder not only that "transnationalism" has a history, but also that, despite the rhetoric of social theorists, transnational spaces have probably comprised such contradictory meanings and practices all along" (Fechter 2007: 51).

boundaries of the voluntary, bilateral and multilateral agencies" (1982: 20). She proposed a multinational nature of the development community, the self-interest of development personnel in maintaining their jobs, and the tendency for development workers to travel to the third world at opportune times of the year to take advantage of the so-called development tourism (ibid.). Her observations were similar to those recently published by Jackson (2007: 74) regarding international development workers as a community in Honduras. He argues that the moniker expat expresses the kinds of activities that a whole group of individuals engages in when living and working in the developing world. While they indeed come from different countries and work for different agencies, they travel in the same social circles and are a cohesive group, a community of sorts. Jackson thinks of them as "the development set" (ibid.).

Excellent research on the expatriate communities in Jakarta was conducted by Meike Fechter, although her focus was on the European and North American corporate expatriates and their families who are posted to Indonesia by multinational companies. Nevertheless, the theoretical insights she offers into the issues of expatriates as transnational migrants and their formation of transnational spaces are equally applicable to expatriate development workers. She writes about privileged mobile professionals who create and inhabit "peculiar spaces" (Fechter 2007: 33) during their time abroad, expressed in metaphors like the "cocoon" or "bubble" (ibid.). This is exactly how I would describe the communities of development workers in Kosovo, where those social spaces exist parallel to the ones inhabited and experienced by the local population.

Communities that are being created by expatriate development workers resemble a ghetto, defined by Fechter (2007: 43) as "a social world that generates its own "cultures" and specific rules of behaviour". This externally bounded social space, however, is also marked by internal divisions. Certainly, the employees of non-governmental organisations implementing seemingly less important development projects on a community level are not "in the same league" as the expatriate power elite[64] involved in creating policies on the state level or even following mandates to govern over a territory. Also, the development workers from less influential donor countries may potentially have a more limited access to these powerful social networks. These divisions are particularly visible in the new generations of peace operations that

64 The power elite is defined by the late C. Wright Mills (1956) as composed of individuals whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women and who are in a position to make decisions having major consequences.

include peacebuilding activities.[65] But the fact remains that many development workers have access to elite social circles. What is more, the social prestige associated with being a foreigner and a professional enables them to establish contacts, networks, and even friendships with elites (Jackson 2007: 318).

In his book, Jackson (2007: 318–319) offers the example of Willis, a European volunteer in Honduras, making only $1,000 a month. In the development profession, Willis was not among those at the highest level, but his everyday experience included participation in elite social circles. "His prestige seemed to be based primarily on his European identity and relatively high salary (by Honduran standards). He was able to afford to travel throughout the country and visit Tegucigalpa on weekends, where he would "hang out" with his international friends (including the German ambassador)" (ibid.). Willis is only a volunteer; development professionals earn significantly more, at least a first world salary, which allows them to experience a more luxurious way of life in developing countries than they would in their own country.[66] The social and financial status gained abroad during their deployment usually diminishes upon returning home, which is one of the more significant reasons for repeatedly accepting posts abroad in less-developed countries.

One of the key characteristics of the social space in question is that its creators come from different ethnic backgrounds and nation-states. The social space can therefore be labelled as multi-ethnic in character, bringing a variety of ethnicities together into one deterritorialised space. While individuals undoubtedly preserve their ethnic and national identity while living inside such a space, they also (especially in terms of lifestyle and life philosophy) come to resemble their colleagues more than they do most of their fellow citizens in the country of origin. In the end, as is usually the case, it all comes

65 Jackson (2007: 10–11) argues that some agendas become prominent and influential, while others meet with resistance, fall out of fashion, or sink into the background. Also, not all agendas are equal in terms of the agents (donor countries) who support them. "Within the international development profession there is a hierarchy of agendas in which some global scripts matter more than others. The dominant agendas are largely determined by the donor countries and, benefiting from greater financial support for their implementation, achieve hegemonic status within the development profession." (ibid.)

66 Even employees of NGOs, who usually earn less than development professionals in international or foreign governmental organisations, manage to lead a luxury lifestyle in less-developed countries. One of Jackson's interviewees explained: "I'll tell you, people working in foreign aid are living really, really well here. I mean, look at me. I'm making a relatively low salary [around thirty thousand dollars], but I can afford hired help – cooking, keeping the yard, cleaning the house. And who can say that it isn't really, really nice? It's great. I can't imagine how nice it must be for someone making seventy thousand dollars a year here. It would be a complete luxury" (Jackson 2007: 93).

down to a question of social class rather than culture. Therefore, the elite status gained in the developing country connects development workers into a community that is not based on nationality but rather on a specific lifestyle. Let us take a closer look at the dynamics of such transnational social space in Kosovo, in order to illuminate the theoretical insights with my own experience in the field.

CHAPTER 7

NOTES FROM THE FIELD: THE PARALLEL REALITY OF EXPATRIATES' TRANSNATIONAL SPACES

The popularity of the destination

> Sure, it is in the middle of nowhere, but there are so many of us here that we can shape it a bit to meet most of our needs (French development worker in Prishtina).

Since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed, the area has become a magnet for international development workers, diplomats, researchers, journalists, and other privileged and high-skilled labour migrants fascinated by the character of Balkan societies. I became aware of the popularity of the area after being engaged in several conversations with international development workers in Prishtina. According to their narratives, employment in the development profession has become most desirable in the countries of the Western Balkans[67]. "[The] Orient is passé, [the] Western Balkans is in," I was accustomed to hearing during my stay in Kosovo. Indeed, the Balkans have a reputation of being chaotic, barbaric, primitive, uncivilised, cruel, untamed, even tribal on the one hand (Todorova 1997; Green 2005), but also exotic, primal, unspoiled by capitalism, passionate, picturesque, and romantic (Debeljak 2004) on the other. They provide a one-of-a-kind work and research opportunity for the international staff due their ambiguity, impulsive nature, and stubborn posture. In addition, they are currently relatively stable and therefore provide a safe environment to conduct research, provide assistance to the locals in war-torn countries, or contribute to their development and modernisation.

What makes the countries of the Western Balkans even more intriguing and challenging is the undisputable fact that they are geographically a part of Europe, a supposedly exemplary type of civilisation and modernity, a role type that should be followed and obeyed. And yet, as a Kosovo Albanian

67 The countries of the Western Balkans include Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania.

political analyst and journalist that I spoke with put it sarcastically, somehow the countries of the Balkans do not seem to understand and respect that type, making the mission of Europeanisation of the Balkans increasingly difficult and thus endangering the peace and stability of the region. The Balkans are creating mixed feelings of exciting uneasiness due to their illusive status as a fractal that fails to comply entirely with the modern invention of a Western European nation-state. Again, this makes it fascinating for international staff and the professional public and offers a convenient case study on the implementation of nation-building according to the Western European civic type. Kosovo seems to be the most interesting destination on the peninsula, due to the unprecedented case of international governance over the territory.

The creators

On day I was invited to join a large group of UNMIK employees for dinner at a prestigious restaurant. As it is the case with most up-market restaurants, this one was kept in business only because of the demand by the international staff. The menu and wine list were impressive and the waiters were over-attentive, setting the mood of a glamorous fairytale that we were a part of. Later in the evening when I returned to the guesthouse, a development worker who stayed at the same place asked me whether it felt colonial. I had to admit that it did.

I was sitting in-between two young American women who were willing to share their life stories with me after a few glasses of chardonnay. They told me that, unlike their bosses who are principle specimens of "gauche caviar," they are themselves proud "hipsters". The French term "gauche caviar" (caviar left) indeed describes the top-elite of the international development staff in Kosovo, referring to upper class individuals who claim to be socialist but do not feel the need to lead a corresponding lifestyle. Instead, they indulge in prestige while *doing good* for the developing, poor, and disadvantaged populations. But "hipster" was a new term for me. They explained that it is a 1940s term for a subculture that worshipped jazz music and adopted the lifestyle of jazz musicians: specific dress code, relaxed attitude towards sexuality, sarcastic humour, and use of drugs, especially cannabis. In contemporary times, however, the term is used to describe young, well-educated, urban, upper class individuals with leftist views. They are usually raised in well-off families in the suburbs but then move to gentrified neighbourhoods in the city centres. Dressed in expensive, but vintage clothes, they hang in coffee places reading books on Che Guevara and other revolutionaries, preparing to change the world. The two women explained that *doing good* in failed states is as close to changing

the world as they would ever get. And besides, travelling around the world and meeting exciting people from different cultures with similar backgrounds is the ultimate adventure. Many young members of the international staff in multilateral organisations share these characteristics. Most UN development workers in Kosovo are also single, either because they want to focus solely on their career or because they got divorced while pursuing it. The divorce rate of the expat UN staff has reached high percentages and affairs are common during the missions.

Another character can be identified among the development workers that I came into contact with: the "adrenaline junkies". I encountered a typical representative in one of the UN field offices in the Mitrovica region. He defined himself as addicted to "the action" and always ready to move to the most dangerous regions of the world. In his case, money, prestige, and status are less desirable and he strongly believes that whoever is after those attributes is not cut out for the job. He is after adventure, adrenaline, and tough challenges and believes that this is what it takes to be efficient in *doing good*. Not being afraid to get your hands dirty. It was interesting to hear his side of the story, especially because I was warned by a British OSCE employee that I should keep away from the adrenaline junkies, as they are "nutters". This does not mean, however, that they are not a part of the parallel space, although they do deviate somewhat from an average inhabitant. In fact, due to their "free spirit" reputation, partying wildly and telling the most interesting stories, they are the soul of the expats' social gatherings. And the prestige that they tend to hypocritically reject is often a constituent part of their lifestyle. According to the two Americans who sat by my side in the restaurant, one can always count on the adrenaline junkies to provide a case of expensive champagne for the party. As Kosovo is today a peaceful area, I was told that this profile of development worker is rather scarce in the province.

Double remoteness

Development workers' transnational space is an externally bounded space that holds a privileged status within the Kosovo society. Its creators are expatriate development workers who are mandated with post-war reconstruction and nation-state building. Apart from being joined by the nature of their profession and the fact that they are all expatriates in a failed state, most of them embrace a common lifestyle while in Kosovo. This does not mean in any way that they are a homogeneous group of individuals, as every individual has his or her own identity, reasons for becoming a development worker, culture of origin, and life philosophy. Nevertheless, they are joined by what Fechter

(2007) calls double remoteness: they are geographically distant from their home countries and socially and culturally different from the Kosovar society.

How is parallelism evident in practice?[68] It starts with the living conditions and accommodations, which are significantly more up-market than those of the majority of the local population. The expats' apartments or houses present their own microcosms, decorated according to their tastes and usually differing significantly from locals' styles. They are mostly situated in zones that experience fewer electricity and water cuts and come with functioning generators. In the morning, when they leave their microcosms, they tend to drive to work in company cars or take a taxi, avoiding the use of public transport and thus not coming in contact with the locals while commuting. In most cases, the workspace is indeed shared with local staff, but socialising is confined to the other expats. During lunch breaks, the locals, who cannot afford to eat out every day, especially not in the expensive restaurants reserved for the expats, are also excluded from the party of their co-workers. After long working hours, the local staff return home to their families, while expatriates who are in Kosovo on their own and mostly single, tend to get together for dinner or drinks, before going back home to their microcosms. Sexual partners are sought among the rest of the expats, rarely among Kosovo Albanians, and the stories of their sexual encounters are a popular subject of discussion over drinks. During fieldwork, I came across an article by Michael Ignatieff (2000) that was published in The New York Times, claiming that Kosovo is crawling with undercover agents from a dozen countries, so I asked a couple of expatriate women whether they believe that was true. They told me that there are indeed agents among them and the rumour has it that they charm you into bed in order to get the information they need through pillow talk. I got the impression that they were not upset by that fact but rather pleasantly excited.

An important factor that keeps the expatriate space as externally bounded structure functioning as described above is the absence of integration. As expatriates are usually deployed to one location for a relatively short period of time, they do not feel the need to integrate into the majority society, especially because it is significantly easier to integrate into the parallel reality of the expats' space. Trying to integrate into the society of every mission they are deployed to would cause unnecessary stress, I was told. But simply taking the local population out of the equation would be a mistake, as they are the ones who help construct the expatriates' parallel space in at least two respects:

68 The following paragraph is not a generalisation, but merely an interpretation of the parallel reality as I experienced it during the fieldwork.

by being "the other" and thus enabling the development of a specific identity alongside theirs and by regarding the constructed parallel reality as a privileged, elite, prestigious, and respectable space, thus making it so. All in all, in Kosovar society, development workers are treated with respect and admiration, placed in the unreachable social elite circles, and made to feel, as one of them described, very special.

CONCLUSION

DOING WELL WHILE DOING GOOD

> My life has never been more exciting than it is now. I have an opportunity to really make a difference for the poor people here in Kosovo. I strongly believe in the mission statement of our organisation and in activities we developed to help the people. So every night before I fall asleep I feel satisfied and fulfilled and quite special as a person. I never felt like that in my entire life. The job I do is never boring or meaningless and people I work with are so exciting, so cosmopolitan, so open-minded. They understand how the world turns. Honestly, I don't know if I can have another interesting conversation with people back home. Not after being a part of this group of people who share my thoughts on what really matters in life. We come from different parts of the world but somehow fit together so well. We hang around nearly every day after work in a bar or a restaurant and share stories ... it's great! And then there are the locals. I am just so fond of them. I have a cleaning lady who comes every two days and sometimes brings me cakes she bakes for her grandchildren. She is so sweet. We are privileged, I am aware of that, financially and in many other ways. We are certainly doing well here. But we're also doing a lot of good (British development worker in Prishtina).

> I like it here. I feel more respected, more important than back home. I am somebody here … not just anybody, not just some easily replaceable lawyer. I am respected by the locals and I know I am being admired by my friends and family for leaving everything behind and moving to Kosovo to help people. It feels really good. Really good (French development worker in Prishtina).

At a recent conference I attended, a fellow delegate presented a paper on the contemporary nomad, arguing that only privileged, wealthy, highly skilled migrants are considered expatriates, while the others forever remain merely migrants, regardless of the time spent abroad.[69] I was struck by the exactness of her observation. When I spoke with foreign international development

69 The *Cultures in Transit* international conference took place in Liverpool, July 2008. The paper in question was presented by Audrey Small from the University of Sheffield, UK, and is entitled *Always the immigrant, never the expatriate?*

workers in Kosovo I realised they predominantly consider themselves expatriates or simply travelling professionals and few identified themselves as migrants, as if the word has a negative connotation and they were therefore reluctant to use it. The elite status awarded when migrating to a failed, war-torn state under the auspices of some powerful multilateral organisation, like the United Nations, to *do development* and help reconstruct the state is a task of tremendous importance. It is a mandate awarded to *expatriates*. Visiting Prishtina to spend some time in the closed circle of expatriate development workers indeed revealed their specific characteristic as a group that forms a particular social space: the expatriate transnational parallel space that exists separated from the social space of the local population. The ability to live in a parallel reality made possible by the nature of their profession indeed makes them feel special, not as migrants but as members of an elite with a unique status that entails prestige, high reputation, generous system of awards and often public admiration for *doing good* for others.

The debate on expatriate development workers mandated with peacebuilding in failed states is a red thread of this book. Revealing the complex nature of expatriate development workers' efforts for *doing good*, especially when development and peacebuilding efforts may serve the political and economic purposes of wealthy donor countries on one hand, and when the development profession may offer significant social and economic benefits on the other, was the main aim of the research. The debate turned to a macro level first, addressing the agendas of the donor countries who are the agents behind nation-state building and the imperial interests that accompany the reconstruction of failed states.

But what exactly is contemporary nation-state building? In the book I understand it as humanitarian intervention coupled with peacebuilding activities conducted by the multiplicity of foreign elites. After the humanitarian intervention, which abuses the concept of humanitarianism to serve political agendas, the international development workers are "imported" into the failed state in order to build peace, do development, and help create a functioning nation-state. At the macro level, the wealthy, powerful states are therefore *doing good* for themselves as the multi-billion dollar business of reconstruction undoubtedly serves their imperial interests, but, as I argue, their agendas may also *do good* for the local population. This is especially so when the development projects are harmonised with the needs and requests of the local population and therefore recognised as useful by the locals.

The next logical step in the debate was to move further into a discussion of *doing good* on another level, from the viewpoint of those who actually

implement the nation-state building agendas in the field, namely the specific elites defined as the expatriate development workers, whose lifestyle consists of migrating from one developing country to another in order to *do development*. After conducting the research it again became evident that the concept of *doing good* is one of mutuality. While the locals may benefit a great deal from the development projects or policy making, significant benefits are also experienced by the development workers themselves. By *doing good* in failed states they tend to climb the social ladder as a result of being treated as members of the elite. Therefore, in one sense, they are going first class while *doing good*.

It is further argued that the expatriate development workers form a deterritorialised transnational social space that is externally bounded and presents a parallel reality to the one experienced by the local population. Expatriate development workers are joined into this space due to the experience of double remoteness – geographical distance from their country of origin and social and cultural distance from the society where they are employed – and the specific lifestyle they develop and lead.

Throughout the book, the theoretical accounts were complemented by stories from the field, providing examples of peacebuilding activities in Kosovo and the characteristics of transnational social space formed by expatriate development workers. Experiencing the parallel social spaces myself during the time spent in Kosovo made me think about the appropriateness and moral legitimacy of building a nation-state without being integrated into the population of the state. I learned from the expatriate development workers that it is next to impossible to integrate into the local population, as in a few years' or even months' time they would move on to another post in a different country, with a different culture. For them, it is much easier to integrate into the parallel reality of the expats' social space, which requires significantly less effort. In addition, living in such space guarantees them a privileged, prestigious, respectable, first-class status, which tends to be fully embraced without any feelings of bad conscience, as they tend to feel that the morally undisputed act of *doing good* legitimises their special position as members of the elite.

Weeks of observing the parallel social space in Kosovo made me think of Zygmunt Bauman's argument that the world population is roughly divided into the globalised wealthy and the localised poor. The former are constantly overcoming space and lack time, while the latter are in possession of time but are forced to remain rooted in one space (in Beck 1997). When applying this argument to the themes covered in this book it becomes clear that expatriate development workers fall into the category of the globalised wealthy, migrating

around the world without being considered as migrants and going first class while *doing good* for the localised poor. Those, in turn, stay rooted while living with the results of the multiple development projects, be they good or bad, long after their planners have gone.

REFERENCES

Amit, Vered (2006). Claiming Individuality through "Flexibility": Career Choices and Constraints among Travelling Consultants. *Claiming Individuality. The Cultural Politics of Distinction* (eds. Vered Amit and Noel Dyck). London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 90– 109.

Bergman, Carol (ed.) (2003). *Another Day in Paradise. International Humanitarian Workers Tell Their Stories.* Maryknoll: Orbis Books.

Beck, Ulrich (2003). *Kaj je globalizacija? Zmote globalizma – odgovori na globalizacijo.* Ljubljana: Krtina.

Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit (2004). Obstacles and perspectives of Post-Conflict Peace-Building in Multicultural Societies. A View from Peace and Conflict Studies. *Perspectives of Multiculturalism: Western and Transitional Countries* (ed. Milan Mesić). Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta, Hrvatsko povjerenstvo za UNESCO, 67–83.

Blumi, Isa (2005). *Political Islam among the Albanians. Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans?* Prishtina: KIPRED.

Bricmont, Jean (2006). *Humanitarian Imperialism. Using Human Rights to Sell War.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Cain, Kenneth, Postlewait, Heidi and Thomson, Andrew (2006). *Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures. True Stories from a War Zone.* London: Ebury Press.

Cambridge International Dictionary of English (1995). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Castells, Manuel (2000). *The Rise of the Network Society.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Cohen, Robin and Kennedy, Paul (eds.) (2000). *Global Sociology.* Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillian.

Colson, Elisabeth (1982). *Planned Change: The Creation of a New Community.* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

Curtis, Devon (2001). *Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Debeljak, Aleš (2004). *Evropa brez Evropejcev.* Ljubljana: Sophia.

Diehl, Paul F. (2008). *Peace Operations. War and Conflict in the Modern World.* Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.

Dugatkin, Lee Alan (2006). *The Altruism Equation. Seven Scientists Search for the Origins of Goodness.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

ESI (2006). Cutting the lifeline: Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo, http://www.esiweb.org (25. 6. 2007).

Fechter, Meike (2007). Living in a Bubble. Expatriates' Social Spaces. *Going First Class? New Approaches to Privileged Travel and Movement* (ed. Vered Amit). New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 33–52.

Giddens, Anthony and Pierson, Christopher (1998). *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity.* Cambridge: Polity.

Green, Sarah F. (2005). *Notes from the Balkans. Locating Marginality and Ambiguity on the Greek-Albanian border.* Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Flick, Uwe (2002). *An Introduction to Qualitative Research.* London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1994). The Nation as Invented Tradition. *Nationalism.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 76–82.

Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D. (eds.) (1994). *Nationalism*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Holzgrefe, Jeff L. (2003): The humanitarian intervention debate. *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas.* (eds. Jeff L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane). Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 15–52.

Ignatieff, Michael (2003). *Empire Lite. Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afganistan*. London: Vintage.

Ignatieff, Michael (2003a). State Failure and Nation-Building. *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (eds. Jeff L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane). Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 299–321.

Jackson, Jeffrey T. (2007). *The Globalizers. Development Workers in Action.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. (2003). Introduction. *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (eds. Jeff L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane). Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 1–11.

Keohane, Robert O. (2003a). Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty. *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*

(eds. Jeff L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane). Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 275–298.

KIPRED (2005). *Administration and Governance in Kosovo. Lessons learned and lessons to be learned.* Prishtina: KIPRED.

KIPRED (2006). *Integration of Minority Communities in the Post Status Kosovo.* Prishtina: KIPRED.

KIPRED (2007). *Ethnic Centralisation and the Perils of Confusing Solutions*. Prishtina: KIPRED

Knowles, Caroline (2000). Here and There. Doing transnational fieldwork. *Constructing the Field. Ethnographic Fieldwork in the Contemporary World* (ed. Vered Amit). London and New York: Routledge, 54–70.

Kühne, Winrich (2005). Peace Operations and Governance: Lessons learned and perspectives. *Peace Operations after 11 September 2001* (ed. Thierry Tardy). London, New York: F. Cass.

Lukšič-Hacin, Marina (1999). *Multikulturalizem in Migracije.* Ljubljana: Založba ZRC.

Macrae, Joanna and Nicholas, Leader (2000). *Shifting Sands: The search for 'coherence' between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Macrae, Joanna (2004). Understanding Integration from Rwanda to Iraq. *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 18 (2), 29–35.

Mills, Wright C. (1956). *The Power Elite.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Morgan, Lewis H. (1985). *Ancient Society.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Mosegaard Søysberg, Lene (2006). The Kosovo Experiment: Peacebuilding through an international trusteeship. *Kosovo between War and Peace. Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship* (eds. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen). London, New York: Routledge, 57–75.

OSCE (2007). Parallel Structures in Kosovo 2006-2007, http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/04/23925_en.pdf (15. 1. 2008).

PISG, Institute for Spatial Planning (2004). Kosovo Profile, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/kosovo/8/2+.pdf (12. 3. 2008).

PISG, Office on Good Governance (2007). Report on Activities in the Areas of Anti-Discrimination, Anti-Corruption, Anti-Trafficking in Human Beings and Human Rights, No.7. Prishtina: PISG.

Potter, David (2000). The Power of Colonial States. *Poverty and Development into*

the 21st Century (eds. Tim Allen and Alan Thomas). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 271–288.

Potter, David (2000a). Democratization, 'Good Governance' and Development. *Poverty and Development into the 21st Century* (eds. Tim Allen and Alan Thomas). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 365–382.

Power, Samantha (2003). *"A Problem from Hell." America and the Age of Genocide.* London: Flamingo.

Pries, Ludger (2001). *New Transnational Social Spaces: International Migration and Transnational Companies in the Early Twenty-First Century.* London and New York: Routledge.

Rieff, David (2002). *A Bed for the Night. Humanitarianism in Crisis.* London, Vintage.

Robertson, A. F. (1984). *People and the State: An Anthropology of Planned Development.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rytter, Jens E. (2001). Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond. *Nordic Journal of International Law*, 70 (1–2), 121–160.

Sen, Amartya (1999). *Development as Freedom.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Setton-Watson, Hugh (1994). Old and New Nations. *Nationalism* (eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 134–136.

Sklair, Leslie (2001). *The Transnationalist Capitalist Class.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Smillie, Ian and Minear, Larry (2004). *The Charity of Nations. Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World.* Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc.

Smith, Anthony D. (1989). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford, New York: B. Blackwell.

Smith, Anthony D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (2000). *The Nation in History. Historiographical debates about ethnicity and nationalism.* Hanover: Brandeis University Press: Historical society of Israel.

Šabec, Ksenija (2006). *Homo europeus. Nacionalni stereotipi in kulturna identiteta Evrope.* Ljubljana: FDV.

The Dictionary of Human Geography (2000). Oxford, Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Thomas, Alan (2000). Meanings and Views of Development. *Poverty and*

Development into the 21st Century (eds. Tim Allen and Alan Thomas). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 23–48.

Thomas, Alan and Allen, Tim (2000). Agencies of Development. *Poverty and Development into the 21st Century* (eds. Tim Allen and Alan Thomas). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 189–216.

Todorova, Maria (1997). *Imagining the Balkans.* New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Traub, James (2008). *A Statesman Without Borders*. The New York Times, February 3.

UNHCR and OSCE (2003). Tenth Assessment of the situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/MinorityAssessmentReport10ENG.pdf (15. 1. 2008).

UNMIK/REG/2001/9, http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm (15. 1. 2008).

UNMIK Online. http://www.unmikonline.org (15. 5. 2008).

Versluys, Helen (2007). Coherence in EU external action: the case of humanitarian aid. Paper presented at the 10th Biennial EUSA Conference, Montreal.

Wimmer, Andrea and Glick-Schiller, Nina (2003): Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An essay in Historical Epistemology. *International Migration Review,* 37 (3), 576–610.

PHOTOGRAPHS

Introduction: Prishtina

Chapter 1: Mitrovica, the Albanian side

Chapter 2: Kosovar refugees from Prizren and Podujevo in Kukes, Albania

Chapter 3: Distributing humanitarian aid to refugees from Prizren and Podujevo in Kukes, Albania

Chapter 4: Posters of national war heroes in Klina

Chapter 5: Celebrating independence, Prishtina

Chapter 6: Building affected by NATO bombing, Prishtina

Chapter 7: Kosovar refugees from Prizren and Podujevo in Kukes, Albania

Conclusion: Prishtina

All photographs were taken by Tomaž Skale, photo editor at the *Dnevnik* newspaper, in Kosovo and Albania, from 1999 to 2008.

INDEX

A
Anan, Kofi 46
Arendt, Hannah 43

B
Bauman, Zygmunt 103
Bricmont, Jean 55, 57–58

C
colonialism 22, 24, 55, 56, 72

D
Diehl, Paul, F. 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
development
  assistance 22, 24, 39, 69, 70, 80
  doing 21– 22
  immanent 21
  intentional 21– 22
  organisations 20, 71, 80
development workers (see also expatriates)
  lifestyle of 12, 20, 24, 36, 75, 85, 87, 89, 90, 93–97, 103
  social mobility of 10, 74–76
  transnational (social) spaces of 11, 21, 25, 87–90, 93–97
donor countries 10, 19, 24, 57, 64, 69, 70, 71, 88, 93, 102
double remoteness 11, 95–97, 103
Dunant, Henry 23, 45

E
elites 11, 20, 30, 67–70, 74, 75, 85, 88, 89, 90, 94, 97
expatriates 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19–20, 24, 25, 74, 75, 86, 87, 88, 95–97, 101–103

F
Fechter, Meike 11, 19, 20, 25, 86, 87, 88, 95

G
gauche caviar 94
globalisation 69, 70, 72, 73, 85
  missionaries 11, 70–74, 87
globalism 70, 72, 73
globalizers 11, 25, 70–73

H
hipster 94
Holzgrefe, Jeff L. 43
human rights 22–24, 42–44, 47, 52, 54–55, 58–60, 63, 72, 74
humanitarian
  assistance 10, 22–24, 39, 52, 59, 71
  imperative 23
  intervention 10, 11, 23, 34, 39, 42–48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 64, 102
  transformations of 10, 23, 44–48

I
Ignatieff, Michael 18, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 54, 55, 56–57, 58, 75, 96

imperialism 22, 47, 53, 56–57
International Committee of the Red Cross 23, 45, 73
international community 10, 11, 19, 23, 35, 41, 42, 48, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 62, 63, 64, 79, 80

J
Jackson, Jeffrey T. 11, 20, 22, 25, 57, 69, 70–72, 73, 75, 85, 86, 88, 89

K
Keohane, Robert, O. 42, 43
KFOR 54, 79, 80
Kosovo
  demography 30
  economic development 30–31, 58
  ethnic communities 32, 60–63
  international community in 35, 42
  nation-state building in 58–64
  PISG 60, 63
  remittances 30, 32, 35
  rural character of 30–33, 35, 73, 79–81
  war in 10, 33–35, 42, 44, 61, 93
Kouchner, Bernard 10, 44–47, 59
Kühne, Winrich 49, 50, 52

L
League of Nations 49, 50

M
Medécins Sans Frontières 45–46
migrants, privileged 19, 20, 57, 85–89, 93, 101
methodological nationalism 17, 24–25, 74, 85

N
nation 17–19, 39
nation-state 17–18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 39–42, 55, 67, 68, 69, 70, 85, 86, 89, 94, 95, 102
nation-state building
  agents 59, 64, 67–76
  territorial (civic) 10, 40, 41, 59, 68
  ethnic 40, 42, 68
  immigrant 18, 41, 68
  colonial 41, 56, 68, 74
  contemporary (see peacebuilding)
NATO 20, 34, 35, 43, 44, 58

P
peace operations 43, 48–54, 88
  peacebuilding 10, 11, 12, 13, 23, 24, 33, 39, 42, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 64, 72, 74, 89, 102, 103
  peacekeeping
    traditional 49, 50–51
    subsequent generations 51–53
Pries, Ludger 25, 85, 86, 87
Prishtina 10, 11, 12, 29, 30, 35, 36, 47, 63, 79, 93, 101, 102
protectorate 29, 53–54, 58, 64, 79

R
Rieff, David 45, 47
Rücker, Joachim 59

S
Sen, Amartya 21
Smith, Anthony D. 10, 17, 18, 24, 39, 40, 67, 68, 86
sovereignty 23, 42, 53–55, 58, 67
state, failed 11, 18, 19, 22, 24, 35, 39, 44, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 64, 69, 72, 74, 76, 94, 95, 102, 103

T
transnational (social) spaces 10, 11, 20, 21, 25, 85–90, 93, 103

transnationalism 85, 86, 87
trusteeship 53–54

U
UN 10, 12, 29, 49, 50, 58, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 87, 102
  Charter 43, 50
  field office 95
  operations 43, 51–53
  protectorate 29, 54, 58, 79
  Security Council 43, 44, 50, 54, 58
UNHCR 12, 29, 35, 59, 60, 62
UNMIK 12, 20, 29, 31, 35, 36, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 75, 79, 80, 94
  pillars 58–59

MIGRACIJE 18

Mojca Vah Jevšnik
BUILDING PEACE FOR A LIVING
Expatriate Development Workers in Kosovo

Series Editor
Jernej Mlekuž
Expert Reviewers
Marina Lukšič Hacin, Claudia Morsut
English Language Editing
Kelly Lenox

Published by
Slovenian Migration Institute
Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana
and
ABB University, Prishtina, Kosovo

Publisher
ZRC Publishing / Založba ZRC, Ljubljana
For the Publisher
Oto Luthar

Printed by
Collegium Graphicum, d. o. o., Ljubljana
Print run
400 copies

Cover photograph
Prishtina, September 2008 (*photo by Mojca Vah Jevšnik*)

The book was financially supported by the Slovenian Book Agency *and the* University of Stavanger*, Norway.*
The book is based on the research conducted in the framework of the MA study program Migration and Intercultural Relations*, jointly organised by* University of Stavanger*, Norway;* University of Oldenburg*, Germany;* University of Nova Gorica*, Slovenia; and* Portuguese Open University*, Portugal.*

© 2009, All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.



I learned from the expatriate development workers that it is next to impossible to integrate into the local population, as in a few years' or even months' time they would move on to another post in a different country, with a different culture. For them, it is much easier to integrate into the parallel reality of the expats' social space, which requires significantly less effort. In addition, living in such space guarantees them a privileged, prestigious, respectable, first-class status, which tends to be fully embraced without any feelings of bad conscience, as they tend to feel that the morally undisputed act of doing good legitimises their special position as members of the elite.

Weeks of observing the parallel social space in Kosovo made me think of Zygmunt Bauman's argument that the world population is roughly divided into the globalised wealthy and the localised poor. The former are constantly overcoming space and lack time, while the latter are in possession of time but are forced to remain rooted in one space (in Beck 1997). When applying this argument to the themes covered in this book it becomes clear that expatriate development workers fall into the category of the globalised wealthy, migrating around the world without being considered as migrants and going first class while doing good for the localised poor. Those, in turn, stay rooted while living with the results of the multiple development projects, be they good or bad, long after their planners have gone.

ISBN 978-961-254-156-9
9 789612 541569
http://zalozba.zrc-sazu.si 9,40 €