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JEWS AND SLAVS
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PROF. WOLF MOSKOVICH

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VOLUME 12

JEWS AND ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE BALKANS

EDITED BY
WOLF MOSKOVICH, OTO LUTHAR, IRENA ŠUMI

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FOREWORD

This volume contains papers delivered at the International Conference on Jews and anti-Semitism in the Balkans that took place in Bled, Slovenia, on October 20 – 24, 2003.

The conference was sponsored by the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Art, the Austrian Institute of Eastern and Southeastern European Studies (the Ljubljana office), the Vidal Sasson International Center for the Study of anti-Semitism of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Research Center for Slavic Languages and Literatures of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Institute of Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana.

Discussed were the following issues:

– local Balkan traditions of inter-ethnic tolerance/intolerance and their relevance to contemporary attitudes towards Jews;
– new forms of anti-Semitism (e.g., 'anti-Semitism without Jews');
– radical politics in the Balkans and anti-Semitism;
– anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Balkan public discourse;
– survival and perpetuation of ubiquitous anti-Jewish stereotypes in Balkan folklore, literature and art.

These questions are the main foci of examination in the volume.

The Balkan peninsula is one of the most ancient areas of the Jewish Diaspora. Jewish experience extending over two thousand years in the Balkans went through periods of persecution and banishment. Looking at the Balkans (where three monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – are represented), as a specific geographical and cultural area, we included in this volume articles on both Slavic and non-Slavic Balkan countries – Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia (particularly Croatia and Slovenia), but also Romania and Greece. An article on Hungary, neighboring the Balkans, was also included, for the purpose of comparison with the situation in the Balkans proper.

The papers of the volume are different as far as their historical scope is concerned – from comprehensive descriptions of Jewish-Gentile relations in a country through its history (e.g., Bulgaria and Slovenia), to specific periods of the last century (the former Yugoslavia, Hungary), or of the time since the beginning of the Second World War (Greece, Romania).

All the papers contain a discussion of the Holocaust period and the post-Holocaust events, often up to the present moment. The description of contemporary historical revisionism, with its negation of the Holocaust and glorification of the names of the Nazi collaborators and pro-Nazi political figures is of particular relevance. The phenomenon of anti-Semitism without Jews characteristic in some Balkan countries is given proper consideration. The legislation concerning the restitution of Jewish property in Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, is analyzed in Mariana Karadjeva's article. The demands for restitution are one of the factors that are conducive to the rise of anti-Semitism in contemporary Eastern Europe.

The connection between anti-Zionism, the criticism of Israel's policies and anti-Semitism during the Communist and post-Communist periods is discussed in several papers.

In publishing this collection of articles that is, as far as we know, the first comprehensive presentation of problems connected with Jews and anti-Semitism in most of the Balkan area, we hope that it will contribute to the advancement of research in this field.

This is the second volume published jointly in the series of "Jews and Slavs" by the Center for Slavic Languages and Literatures of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Art. The previous one under the title "Jerusalem and Slavic Culture" appeared as volume 6 of the series in 1999.

The Editors

Ivo Goldstein (Zagreb)

Types of Anti-Semitism in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, 1918-2000

Not much is known about anti-Semitism in the territory of former Yugoslavia.[1] Basically, this is because Jewish history in this area was very poorly investigated. For decades mainstream history found it an uninteresting and unimportant subject, with the sometime exception of the Jewish role in the economy. In the thirties some distinguished individuals, primarily in Zagreb, such as Lavoslav Schick (Šik),[2] Gavro Schwarz,[3] and Lavoslav Glesinger,[4] made important contributions to Jewish history. Their efforts would certainly have led to the foundation of an institution devoted to research had the Holocaust not occurred.

The Jewish History Museum (*Jevrejski istorijski muzej*) was founded in Belgrade in the fifties as a central institution for preserving traces of Jewish history and presence in the territory of former Yugoslavia; although it encouraged significant research activities,[5] it never created scholars whose basic interest was Jewish history. Only a few scholars, such as Jorjo Tadić,[6] Slavko Gavrilović,[7] Duško Kečkemet,[8] Miroslava Despot-Blis,[9] and Bernard Stulli,[10] had any great interest in Jewish themes. It is characteristic that Jaša Romano, who was not a professional historian, wrote the most important contribution to the history of Holocaust in socialistic Yugoslavia.[11]

At the beginning of 21st century the situation is completely different. From the papers in this volume, and even more from the bibliography that will be published in the endnotes, it will be obvious that in last two decades, particularly after the huge exhibition *Jews in Yugoslavia* in Zagreb in 1988, interest in Jewish history increased significantly.[12]

The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, or (from 1929) the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was a very complex state: it stretched from the Alps almost to the Aegean Sea, covering an area that had not been under a single administration since the fourth century. It was a territory of different cultures, as well as different political and economic traditions. The Jews who found themselves in the new state were different too – in terms of language, education, occupation and culture. About 70,000 Jews lived in Yugoslavia, about 60 % of them were relatively newly migrated Ashkenazim, and about 40 % were Sephardim who had been living in the area for centuries. Most of the Jews lived in towns, and made up approximately 0.5 % of the population. Anti-Semitism was never very strong; it was of a 'Central European' type and there were no pogroms like in Poland and Russia. Neverthe-

less, the internal situation and the position of Yugoslavia in the international community both in the interwar years and in the Communist period strongly affected the position of the Jews. The number of Jews has since decreased radically – after the horrors of the Holocaust and emigration to Israel in 1948/9, only 6,000 Jews remained in Yugoslavia.

Unsolved national and social questions were permanently in the centre of public life. Therefore, as the war approached the strength of political groups that were proposing radical solutions kept growing. During the seventy-three years of the existence of Yugoslavia, liberal democratic values, which would have been the best barrier to anti-Semitism, were always put aside.

In the first years of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the authorities applied two sets of criteria to the Jews. The loyalty of the Serbian Jews, many of whom had bravely fought in the ranks of the Serbian army during the First World War, was never questioned. The Bosnian Sephardim, particularly those in Sarajevo, were regarded as an autochthonous and indigenous element that had, thanks to four centuries of life in the region, gained special rights.[13] None of this was true of the Ashkenazim (living mostly in northern Croatia and Vojvodina). The Serbian Jews were 'ours', and they spoke Serbian (Ladino had mostly been forgotten), whereas the mother tongue of some 'foreign' Jews, most of whom were Ashkenazim, was German or Hungarian (especially in Vojvodina). Then the problem of deporting Jews appeared - deportation began, but was stopped after the intervention of Chief Rabbi Isak Alkalaj to Prime Minister Stojan Protić.[14]

In the 1920s there were anti-Semitic incidents in every major Yugoslav town, including Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Ljubljana. Often used as a tool in internal political strife, Jews were accused of disloyalty to the new state and of economically exploiting the Croats and Serbs.

One of the formulas for spreading anti-Semitism after the formation of the new state was creating the impression that the basic interests of the Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats (the nations who created the state) was uniform, but eternally opposed to the Jewish interest. This thesis was to help build up national identity and patriotism in the new state, and was based on the argument that the Jews are closer to the Germans and Hungarians who had ruled much of the state earlier. For example, in March/April 1921 a 'pamphlet' (obviously in the form of a leaflet) was published in Belgrade, which 'spreads hatred against the Jews and incites the boycott of Jewish stores'. It was allegedly signed by the 'Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes'.[15]

Pravda, the paper of the Yugoslav Moslem Organization (the leading political party of the Moslems in Yugoslavia), ardently supported the opposition before the elections in February 1925.[16] When it became clear that the Radicals would remain in power, it began to print articles about election fraud. Among other things, the Jews from Sarajevo and from the surrounding regions were accused of voting for the ruling Radical Party. 'Among Moslems, this has caused unanimous indignation and disgust and they seek revenge'. Moslem merchants were called on to boycott Jewish merchants.[17] *Pravda* also published the text 'They are All the Same', saying that 'the Jews in Jerusalem asked the

British authorities to pull down the Dome on the Rock',[18] which was, of course, completely untrue. This text shows the general aversion and intolerance of Jews that existed among the editors of *Pravda*.

Narod, a Sarajevo journal close to one of the wings of the Democratic Party, also accused the Jews of voting for the Radicals. It wrote, 'the Jews did not vote as citizens of this country [...] but made a trade-off,' and concluded, 'we have no word strong enough to stigmatise this effrontery on the part of the Jews of Sarajevo'.[19] It is very characteristic that 'Jews' were written about as a group; no name was ever mentioned.

It must be said that some Jews wanted to create the impression that they were very cooperative with the authorities – thus in *Zastava* from Novi Sad, a paper of the ruling Radicals, an anonymous 'Jewish Radical' wrote about the articles in the Jewish paper *Jüdisches Volksblatt* from Novi Sad. This newspaper (*Volksblatt),* published in German, had allegedly suggested to its Jewish readers that 'they should not vote for any of our large political parties'.[20] The 'Radical' claimed that *Volksblatt* 'had no right to speak in the name of all Vojvodina Jews,' and that,

> the Jews want to be good patriots and loyal sons of this country […] we politically conscious and loyal Jews will vote for the Radical Party, which is the most freedom-minded, strongest and most faithful guard of unity, happiness, and prosperity of this country, our common homeland.

In this way it was easy to form the conviction that all Jews would vote for the Radicals, and this became one of the reasons for anti-Semitic outbursts. It is enough to analyse the writing of *Hrvatska sloga,* the 'paper of the Croatian Peasant Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina', which wrote very acceptably, 'the Jews are negotiating with the Radicals and the Democrats,' and, 'the Democrats offered them two sure mandates in the entire country if they vote for them';[21] it then reported the pre-election quarrels in Subotica, where a group of voters were demanding a Jewish candidate.[22]

The paper wrote further that 'Šabetaj Džaen, delegate of the main Jewish Committee in Belgrade, held a large rally in a town in Macedonia at which 'he urged all the Jews to support the Radicals'.[23] Džaen was Rabbi in Bitola (in Macedonia) but was rather unimportant in the Federation of Jewish Communities in Belgrade; most people in these circles did not consider him a very serious man. Even if he was a Radical supporter and promoted that party, his views did not represent even a significant number of Jews, let alone the entire community. However, because of all this an anonymous writer in *Hrvatska sloga* was prompted to write the commentary, 'Election Currents Among the Jews'. In it he claimed, 'we have been informed that our Jews, especially those in Sarajevo, mostly voted for the Serbian Radical Party.' He then noted correctly (as the paper *Židov* also brought) that in so doing the Jews 'were not led by political conviction, national consciousness, political and party affiliation, nor the fine words of the Radical leaders, but only by fear and self-interest'.[24] However, the article ends in an indirect threat to the effect that if the Jews continue to vote for the Radicals, the 'Croatian Catholics and Moslems' will be called on to boycott Jewish merchants. 'We know that this will hurt them where they are

the most vulnerable, but even our patience has boundaries and the glass may overflow.'

Finally, it is very interesting that the Sarajevo journal *Domovina*, which supported the Radicals, was full of anti-Semitic accusations in 1921. As *Židov* lucidly concluded, 'in our community the attitude to Jews, both official and non-official, is elastic, and the approach and tactic to Jews are arranged according to interest and the momentary situation.'[25]

When the Zionist movement became stronger Jews were accused of neglecting Yugoslavia and only promoting emigration to Palestine. Important events organized by Zagreb Jews in April 1925, to mark the opening of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, were mostly greeted with favour and great sympathy. An obscure paper, *Otpor* - paper for promoting the national language and national economy, wrote about celebrations to mark the foundation of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and added that on that occasion 'the Zionist-Jews sent twenty million dinars to Jerusalem'.[26] 'These Zionists collect the money here […] these fluctuating patriots are a real social syphilis on our national body.'[27] *Otpor,* whose first issue came out in May 1925, and which called itself a 'noble movement of young people who do not belong to any political party',[28] championed a struggle of the 'Yugoslavs' against 'foreigners' and claimed 'the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes are slaves in their own home'. It printed letters of support in Cyrillic from Slovenia (Novo Mesto), and from Belgrade: 'we are following your activities with enthusiasm and hope that you will be victorious. Long live *Otpor.* Comrades from Belgrade.'[29]

In about 1900 Stjepan Radić (1871-1928), the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, the strongest Croatian party, was one of the main promoters of the idea of a society 'without Jews'. Towards the end of his life he became a moderate and very liberal politician who wanted the sins of his youth to be forgotten.[30]

Nevertheless, none of this party's programs contained anti-Semitism, nor was this kind of anti-Semitism a constant element in the activities of circles around it. In the twenties the main preoccupation of the Jewish community was to reach full equality in public life, not to fight against anti-Semitism.[31]

A new wave of anti-Semitic propaganda started in 1933, mostly under the influence of growing Nazi propaganda. In March 1937 the MP Života Milanović (from the National Peasant Club) demanded the prevention of the growing Hitler propaganda in Yugoslavia because, 'our Fascists threaten everyone in their papers […] let the Minister of the Interior also take account of this other side, as much as he does of the Communist danger.' Saying, 'today this Fascism is centred in Vojvodina and in Zagreb,' and, 'this group of people have several papers in Cyrillic today, two in Latin script and two papers in German, that all these papers are printed and handed out for free and sent to cooperatives, coffee houses and everyone who wants to read them.' Milanović further asked, 'Where is all this being paid from? Who is paying the various agitators, agents, district secretaries, entire trains, etc.?'[32]

The Executive Board of the Federation of Jewish Communities indirectly answered Milanović, 'There is no doubt that these journals work under instructions and follow recipes from abroad.'[33] The money certainly came from a foreign source, obviously from

Nazi Germany.

The arguments were now different from those in the twenties or earlier; there were no more allegations that the Jews were Austrian and Hungarian allies, almost nobody mentioned, even on the level of folk narrative, that they had killed Jesus. This wave of anti-Semitic propaganda belonged to Nazi-type totalitarian ideology, although there were local variations.

In Zagreb, *Nezavisnost* and *Mlada Hrvatska* probably represent this type of publication best, although there were others as well – *Senzacija, Zagrebačka senzacija, Savremena senzacija, Hrvatski slobodan narod, Istina, Glas opozicije, Grudobran,* and so on.[34] The last brought illustrations from *Stürmer,* or illustrations that were very similar to the ones in that notorious anti-Semitic journal.[35] Journals with an obvious anti-Semitic slant were also published elsewhere in Croatia, in Split and Dubrovnik.

The authors and the editors were ideologically close to the Ustasha movement but were not formally its members. Although most of them did not hold important positions in the Independent State of Croatia, their pre-war activities contributed greatly to the development of extreme anti-Semitic attitudes in part of the population. These writers were, in the first place, Stjepan Buć (1888-1975) and Kerubin Šegvić (1867-1945). The former developed the 'racist theory of the National Socialist movement', while the latter expressed sympathy for Hitlerism and anti-Semitism in various journals.[36]

There are few issues of *Mlada Hrvatska* or *Nezavisnost* in which the Jews are not attacked, in many cases this was their central, almost their only subject (alongside the inevitable attacks on Communists and Masons). A feuilleton in instalments entitled 'Germany and the Jewish Question', which came out in August 1939, said, Jewish political activities of this kind fan hatred and encourage anti-Semitism among the German people and only the kind of radical solution offered by the National Socialists can give some kind of satisfaction to the outraged honour of the Germans [...].'[37] There was nothing more ridiculous or unbelievable than some of the accusations against the Jews: 'international in capital, international in Communism, because they are on the one hand the greatest capitalists, and on the other the greatest Communists [...].'[38]

In Belgrade's *Balkan* and *Novi Balkan* anti-Communism was the basis for most of the anti-Semitic attacks because the Jews were seen as the core organizers of the Soviet Communist regime. Some of the issues were advertised with the slogan *Grobari Rusije* (= Grave-diggers of Russia). The headlines are also often very characteristic: *Zašto Židovi uspevaju da im se smanjuje porez? – dok se Srbima penje, njima se skida porez* (= Why do Jews Manage to have Their Tax Decreased? While Serbs Pay More, they Pay Less), *Evo zašto su omrznuti Židovi* (= Here is why People Hate the Jews), *Zar ovo nije Čifutski bezobrazluk – Terajmo Čifutariju iz naših javnih ustanova* (= Is This not Kike Impudence – Drive the Kikes out of State Institutions).[39]

Nazi sympathizer Dimitrije Ljotić had relatively few followers in Serbia ('*ljotićevci*') but they grew increasingly aggressive. In 1937 the journal *Erwache* was published in Petrovgrad (today Zrenjanin). Its anti-Semitic program was obvious, mostly mirroring

well-known German anti-Semitic journals, and the printed slogan was in German: '*Die Juden sind unser Unglück*' (= The Jews are Our Misfortune).[40]

Anti-Semitic outbursts also took place in some other journals in Vojvodina – for example in *Sloga* from Senta (near the Hungarian border).[41] Almost at the same time the journal *Dan slobode* was published in Sombor, also in northern Vojvodina. In the first and only issue the editorial article was entitled 'Drop Dead Judas!' After that the editor was banished.[42]

The strong German minority (about half a million) in Vojvodina and Slavonia became a stronghold of Nazi and anti-Semitic propaganda. At a meeting of the Main Board of the Federation of Jewish Communities Julije Frank, a distinguished Jewish activist from Novi Sad, said, 'not all Germans in Vojvodina are unanimous in their sympathy for events such as the Anschluss and the spread of Nazi ideology', and showed 'some examples that indicate friendly relations between the Germans in Vojvodina and the Jews'.[43]

From the middle of the nineteenth century there were always important social forces that opposed anti-Semitic propaganda. These were, in Belgrade, the most important daily *Politika,* and in Zagreb, *Obzor, Nova riječ,* and others. *Nova riječ* called *Nezavisnost, Nova Hrvatska,* and others 'papers that practice the worst kind of extortion'.[44]

Anti-Semitic propaganda also came from all the religious communities, and this kind of anti-Semitism was both separate from and, in a way, also part of the anti-Semitism linked with Hitlerism.

Until the Second Vatican Council in 1961-65 the prevailing Roman Catholic opinion had been that the Advent of Christ had actually terminated the historical role of Judaism as a religion, since the religious teaching based on the Old Testament had become integrated into the Christian religious idea and, therefore, the Jewish religion, which had once had the mission of upholding the idea of the one God and of announcing the advent of the Messiah, had actually lost its reason for existence. As a result, God is punishing those who persistently cling to that obsolete religion, because they are collectively guilty of the death of Jesus. In practice, this meant that whenever Jews were persecuted they could not be defended as members of a religion, however, if one wanted to respect God's fundamental commandments one could and had to defend a Jew as a human being. Of course, this was an extremely vague position because the Jewish religion is an important part of the Jewish identity; how can one separate a person's Jewish religion from his or her entire physical and mental existence?

Anti-Semitic propaganda from ecclesiastical circles got new dimensions around the year 1930. At the time of the Eucharistic Congress of that year *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* appeared in bookshops in Zagreb, the first editions in Croatia and Yugoslavia. From 1925 to 1928 the text of *The Protocols* had been published in Makarska near Split as a serial in the unimportant journal *Nova Revija Vjeri i Nauci,* edited by Petar Grabić, professor of Catholic theology.[45] A certain M. Tomić and M. Butmi edited *The Protocols* in book form. Butmi was a Russian writer and polemicist who had published *The Protocols* in 1907. Tomić's commentary leaves no doubt as to the authenticity of *The*

Protocols; he wrote of their 'terrible historical verity' and in the conclusion 'cries out to all', 'Important! – Attention!', with the addition, 'read it and pass it on'.[46] Tomić was a vehement anti-Semite – for example, he reviewed a French book about Jewish names: in it, among other things, there is a description of how these names changed and Tomić concluded 'this little book is necessary, so that people many know who is hiding behind various names'.[47] *Nova Revija* also had other articles that were either openly anti-Semitic or in which Jews were attacked indirectly,[48] but there were also articles that give objective information about Jews and Jewry.[49] *Nova Revija* represented clerical and conservative views, and it opposed liberal ideas and individuals.[50] In the case of Jews, it upheld the general views of the Vatican: informing the public with great satisfaction that a Central Committee of the Society for Aiding and Converting Jews had been established in Rome, whose task it was 'through prayer, acts of charity, apostolate among the Jews themselves pave the way for conversion to the real faith of Christ '.[51]

When *The Protocols* appeared as a booklet, the Jewish press reacted.[52] Tomić, who had published *The Protocols,* answered in *Nova Revija* in a text entitled 'Impudent Provocation', in which he declared that *The Protocols* were authentic and that they had been 'published not in revenge or to persecute the Jews, but for the necessary self-defence of states and peoples confronted with the evil Jewish idea of bringing the whole world under the sceptre of a ruler of Jewish blood'. He added that 'Kerensky, the leader of Russian revolution, was Jewish, and that most of the commissars in the Soviet revolution were Jews'.[53]

Grabić and Tomić were not alone in anti-Semitic attitudes within Roman Catholic circles. In 1932 the monthly *Hrvatska prosvjeta,* which was put out by 'writers of a Catholic orientation',[54] published a review of the novel *Gog* (Florence 1931) by the Italian writer Giovanni Papini (1881-1956). *Gog* is a lesser-known book by Papini, who generally 'demolished many established reputations'.[55] The review was written by 'M. S.'; with great approval he repeated the basic stand in the book – an attack on the cosmopolitan civilization that cannot find happiness. The anonymous author asked himself how the 'downtrodden and dishonoured Jew could revenge himself on his enemies? He needed to humiliate, shame, unmask and tear down the ideals of the Gentiles, and demolish the values that underpin Christianity'. Then he attacked Heine, Marx, Nordau, and Freud ('he finds corruption in the most virtuous man and excellent gentleman, calling him a man who commits incest and a thief'), Einstein (he claims that 'space and time are one'), Lassalle, Disraeli and other Jews. In this way the author of the review concluded,

> modern intellectual Europe is under the influence of the Jews. Born among various peoples, they have devoted themselves to various fields of research... nevertheless, they have a unique character and a sole goal: to stir doubt in recognized truths, to pull down what is high, to blacken what is clean, to shake what is stable, and to stone what people appreciate.

The Jew is 'a despot in the realm of the material, an anarchist in the realm of the spirit'.[56]

Nonetheless, the Catholic Church fought against racism. Even Grabić himself, at the

time when his journal was vigorously defending the authenticity of *The Protocols*, was very critical of the Fascist theory. He argued that it had a 'pagan basis', that Mussolini was 'deathly selfish' and that his omnipotence in Italy was 'a perilous concentration of all physical and spiritual might in one man'.[57]

Katolički list, the journal of the Zagreb Archbishopric, condemned racism from the biological, ideological, moral and political aspect.[58] On New Year's Eve in 1938, Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac once more condemned racism in his sermon, as recorded by a local Jewish weekly.[59] But Stepinac himself, in his diary that was not published until 1990, wrote about the Jews in a different way. On 5 November 1940 he wrote about the war that was already raging. 'If Germany wins there will be horrible oppression and destruction for small peoples. If England wins the Masons, the Jews, will retain power, and thus immorality and corruption will ensue in our countries. If the USSR wins then the devil has gained power over the world as well as over hell. Where, then, can we raise our eyes but to You, O Lord?'[60]

There is no detailed research about the attitude and behaviour of the Islamic religious community. Therefore, I can present only sparse information.

The above-mentioned writing in *Pravda* is a good example. I could not find any anti-Semitic attacks in *Slobodna Riječ*, 'the journal of public thought of the Moslems in Yugoslavia',[61] although a Jewish weekly of Zionist orientation accused it of spreading 'fanaticism and religious intolerance'.[62] The attitude of *Slobodna Riječ* can be called strongly anti-Zionist, because the journal reported very one-sidedly about conditions in Palestine where, allegedly, only 'innocent Arab blood' was being shed in 1929.[63] The paper claimed 'the Zionists are preparing a new civil war in Palestine'. Then the one-sided view grew into threats: 'If necessary, the Arabs of other countries will defend in blood and wealth the right of the Arab people in Palestine.'[64] Still, in April 1932 about ninety businessmen wished the readers all the best for the Bairam holiday on the pages of the paper, at least fifteen of them were Jewish.[65]

In May 1937, Patriarch Varnava of Serbia was interviewed by the German paper *Völkischer Beobachter* and expressed his admiration for Hitler and his 'policy of defence from Bolshevism'. The patriarch parted from the German journalist with the words, 'take good care of Adolf Hitler!'[66] The statements of some other Orthodox priests show that their admiration for Hitler stemmed mostly from their hatred of Bolshevism and the Soviet state, which they regarded as having been created and governed by the Jews.

In Belgrade the journal *Novi Balkan* and its publisher Krsto Cicvarić posed a rhetorical question, 'Is Hitler Charlemagne revived?' In the same issue the Orthodox priest Vaso Vujović spoke about the 'Jewish wedge in the heart of Slavic Mother Russia', which had caused:

> the Mother's agony and her death in martyrdom. Some European lands, frightened by the catastrophe of the old Slavic oak felled by the Semitic worm, became most seriously concerned for their own destiny […] due to the Judaism in Europe, today her culture is Christian only in name without anything in it

> of the Spirit of Jesus, without anything purely humane – today everything is in the spirit of dull law and animal egoism. After killing Christ physically, the Jews have systematically been killing the spirit of his exalted doctrine. In the Roman Catholic, so-called Western culture, they have succeeded in this one hundred percent.[67]

It is interesting that the Catholic journal *Hrvatska straža* published this text without a single word of commentary. The editors were pleased when *Novi Balkan* attacked the Jews, but on the other hand, if it attacked the Catholic Church, then that was unacceptable.[68]

The Ljubljana paper *Jutro*, put out by politicians grouped around the Yugoslav National Party, suggested that it would be better for the Croats if they threw the Jews out of all positions.[69] The daily *Slovenec*, the paper of the former Slovenian People's Party, had ongoing polemics with *Jutro* but both papers mostly agreed about the Jews – *Slovenec* considered:

> The Free-Mason spirit, which has become Jewish, has infiltrated the Croatian peasant movement where it has developed an anti-clerical hue and cry [...] in short, the Jews are to blame for all evil in the world. Not only in Croatia. They were now penetrating Slovenia, the Slovenian industry.[70]

At the beginning of 1939 there were also various anti-Semitic outbreaks in Slovenia; among others, some circles tried to organize a boycott of Jewish stores.[71]

Even *Radničko jedinstvo*, the 'independent workers' journal' from Belgrade 'often publishes excellent jokes about the Jews'.[72] Intensely engaged in disputes within the workers' movement, the editorial board opposed the representatives of the workers' chambers. Someone from *Radničko jedinstvo* was a very successful poet and penned the epigram,

> The valiant leader of the workers' chambers rushes to join the Jewish bosses: there he offers them new brotherhood – placing Marx alongside Judas. All the Zion chiefs, admirers of millions of dinars, accept the new brother and embrace him. And thus the new brotherhood grows and the new empire advances: one sun now warms the Chamber Men and the Jews' [in the original: '*Komoraški vođa vrli među jevrejske gazde hrli: tu im novo bratstvo nudi – Marksa stavlja prama Judi. I sve gazde od Ciona, poklonici miliona, dočekuju novog brata i grle ga oko vrata. Tako raste novo bratstvo i sprema se novo carstvo: Komoraše i Jevreje sada jedno sunce greje*'].

In the text 'The Jewish Question and Socialism' they attacked Zionism, calling it a 'capitalistic-reactionary speculation', saying that a ' particularly energetic and decisive fight should be waged against socialistic Zionism', as it is 'stupidity and nonsense'. The journal accepted Karl Marx's idea that 'the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of humanity from Jewishness'.[73]

The Ustasha ideology took over elements of Nazism, including racist anti-Jewish stands, already in the second half of the thirties. When they seized power they passed with great expedience from virulent anti-Semitic propaganda to mass deportations and killings.[74]

In September-October 1940 the Yugoslav government issued 'two decrees limiting

the rights of Jews'. The first was called the *Decree on Measures Concerning Jews and the Performance of Activities with Items of Human Nutrition,* which in fact banned the work of all wholesale enterprises dealing in foodstuffs whose owners or co-owners were Jews. The second was called the *Decree on the Enrolment of Persons of Jewish Descent at University, Senior, Secondary, Teacher Training and Other Vocational Schools,* which introduced a *numerus clausus* for Jews, meaning the number of Jewish students and pupils had to be reduced to equal the percentage of Jews in the total population.[75]

After the war anti-Semitism practically did not exist.[76] As Albert Vajs, President of the Federation of Yugoslav Jewish Communities, said in 1958, 'today anti-Semitism does not exist. If there are – rarely – statements of some individuals, which have a minimal ring of anti-Semitism, those cases are always prosecuted by the Yugoslav judicial system, according to the law. Every manifestation of national and racial hatred is a criminal act. What is more important, public and social life in Yugoslavia are orientated to the cultivation of brotherhood and unity […].'[77] Or as Lavoslav Kadelburg, Vice-President of the Federation, said at the plenary session of the Executive Board of the World Jewish Congress, 'anti-Semitism neither exists nor it can exist [...].' Furthermore, in Yugoslavia, 'the national question has been solved and this constitutes one of the corner-stones of society.'[78] There was always a possibility for certain anti-Semitic incidents to occur from time to time, but this was neither registered nor punished. Certainly, in the ranks of the Communist Party anti-Semitism did not exist.

The distinguished Jewish journal from London, *The Jewish Echo*, similarly wrote,

In opposition to the sad picture of Jewish life behind the Iron Curtain, in the brave country of Communist Yugoslavia the Jews enjoy full religious and national freedom. The small Jewish community is very active. It reflects credit on Yugoslavia and her leader Tito, one of the big statesmen of our time [...].'[79]

Although these statements have an accompanying ring of propaganda, generally speaking they reflect reality. From time to time certain anti-Semitic incidents took place; Laslo Sekelj states that in northern Serbia, in Vojvodina (near the Hungarian border), there were twelve minor verbal assaults on Jews between 1945 and 1967.[80]

Finally, the attitude of the Yugoslav Communist authorities to the Jewish community was profoundly different than in other socialist (or Communist) countries. The civic equality of Jews was never an issue. Moreover, one could often feel certain sympathy, which helped in everyday contacts. Some Jews were accused of being a 'bourgeois element' or being 'capitalistic', but this was never seen as an accusation against the whole Jewish community. Many of those 'bourgeois elements' left the country in 1948 and after, emigrating to Israel and elsewhere, so there was even less opposition to government measures. The Jewish Federation of Yugoslavia or any Yugoslav Jewish Community was never suspected of having anything to do with these elements. In the whole post-war period contacts with Jewish organisations from abroad were stable. JOINT was awarded a high Yugoslav decoration in 1950. The Yugoslav anti-Zionist policy began as a reaction to the Sinai-Suez War in 1956. Outbursts of 'anti-Zionism', which easily evolved into a

specific kind of anti-Semitism, did not begin to happen until after Yugoslavia broke off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 after the Six-Days War, due to its own strong ties with many Arab countries in the non-aligned movement. At least half of the highest Yugoslav officials were against such a drastic step, but nothing could be done as it was Tito's personal decision.[81]

For example, Ivan Šibl, a highly-placed Communist official, hero of the antifascist struggle, who never denied that some of his ancestors were Jewish, at some time after the Six-Days War called on about ten distinguished Zagreb Jews who worked in the media to condemn Israeli air attacks on neighbouring Arab countries. They refused, saying that in such a statement Arab terrorism should be condemned as well. Šibl did not want to accept this, and no statement was issued. On the other hand, those Jews did not have any problems.[82]

Anti-Zionism became a semi-official term for a completely pro-Arab Yugoslav foreign policy. Because of this, only a little step was needed for this attitude to evolve into anti-Semitism. In 1968 the leading Party journal *Borba* brought a text published in *Krasnaja zvezda*, journal of the Soviet army. The basic thesis was:

> The Jews who live in socialist lands are being used for anti-Communist activities; in other words, they serve in the Israeli intelligence, and through it the American intelligence. Some Jewish humanitarian organizations, some distinguished Jewish scientists and artists, are being used to collect information of a delicate nature [...].'[83]

One should take into account that this was the time, for example, of Gomulka in Poland.

This kind of thinking was not isolated and the accusation that Jews, wherever they are, were functioning as a fifth column for Israel became very well established in rigid party circles. The writing of the army paper *Front* shows this. In an article by 'N.D.' entitled, 'How to Give up your Great-Great Grandfather', there was detailed information about the Israeli intelligence service and its allegedly unscrupulous methods, with the basic premise that every Jew in any country was a potential Israeli spy, and in some cases they were even forced to spy.[84] From time to time similar accusations appeared even in the eighties. In *Vjesnik* from Zagreb, Miroslav Lazanski claimed in the article 'The Second Ear of Tel Aviv', 'intelligence activities are a priority task for all Israeli citizens of Jewish nationality, all state bodies and the army, and all Jewish organisations worldwide.'[85] When the editor received protests, an unconvincing 'Correction' was published:

> the 'imprecise formulations' had been written 'while the text was being prepared for print, this is why they might be understood as stating untruths about our compatriots of Jewish nationality. We regret this and apologise for the serious oversights, which are the only reason why formulations of this kind were published in our paper'.[86]

Lazanski represented a new type of journalist, a 'military analyst and commentator' close to the authorities and the JNA, a person who deeply felt 'all the righteousness of the

Palestinian case' and was uncompromising in attacking the 'imperialism' of Israel, all this, allegedly, on a higher level than mere propaganda.[87]

Improper and offensive generalisations also appeared in 1985, when the Israeli government moved about 20,000 Ethiopian Jews into Israel. Again insulting invective against the Jews as a people appeared. This came most drastically to expression in *Svijet* from Sarajevo, where Zlatko Dizdarević, ambassador of Bosnia and Hercegovina in Zagreb at the beginning of the 21st century, wrote an article entitled 'Ethiopian Jews on the Path of No Return'. He wrote, among other things, 'still, when we move everything aside only two black facts remain on the surface – human hopelessness, hunger and poverty on one side, and the basest and barest interests of the vultures of this planet on the other.' It is not clear how saving thousands of people from hunger can be 'the basest and barest interests', even less why in this context the Jews become 'the vultures of this planet'. [88]

I have limited this survey of anti-Semitic outbursts and invective to Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Serbia, where the Croatian and Serbian languages are used, but there was also more or less open anti-Semitism in Macedonia and Slovenia.[89]

In middle-class circles contempt for the official Yugoslav policy, especially its foreign policy symbolised by non-alignment, grew as time passed, and then began to be openly expressed. This meant that the anti-Israeli policy in fact had a counter-effect, and that in middle-class circles sympathy for Israel and the Jews kept growing. As the media opened up significantly in the sixties, various articles began to appear – in *Izbor* from Zagreb an interview was published in 1970 with Nahum Goldman, President of the World Jewish Congress.[90] In the same year the Zagreb Comedy Theatre put on the musical *Fiddler on the Roof* for the first time. Reviews were very good, but the best proof of acceptance was attendance – *Fiddler* was in repertoire for years.[91]

Other kinds of attacks came from Moslem circles: the Yugoslav ulema Husein Džozo participated at the congress of ulemas from all over the world in Cairo in 1968, where Haji Emin el Huseini played one of the main roles. During the Second World War el Huseini had been a close collaborator of Hitler. He visited Sarajevo in 1943 and blessed the foundation of the elite Moslem division that fought alongside the Nazis against Tito's Partisans and in so doing, committed numerous war crimes.[92] Džozo expressed support for the conference declaration in which Jihad was proclaimed against all members of the tribe of Israel, wherever they lived. He also expressed his readiness to join that war. [93]

Despite negative reactions even in Moslem circles, Džozo continued to spread his ideas. As editor of the fortnightly *Preporod* he published a letter saying, 'the Qur'an says that if the Jews were to achieve power, their justice would not suffice to cover a grain of wheat. Today, fourteen centuries after, we have the possibility of verifying the truth of this statement.'[94]

In May 1969 the Union of Arab Students in Zagreb published the booklet *Palestina - zemlja palestinskih Arapa* (= Palestine – Country of the Palestinian Arabs)

in which they give the history of Palestine and of the local Arab population. There are obvious anti-Semitic stands in the text, for example, 'in every country in which the Jews have lived they have created a state within the state, and this is why they were always hated and persecuted [...].'[95] Similar ideas were presented in the student journal *Index* in Novi Sad, in a text written by Arab students.[96]

The official policy and its rhetoric were far from the tones used in 'anti-Zionist outbursts'. However, it never clearly distanced itself from such writings. The paper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, *Komunist*, wrote about conditions in the Near East under the title 'Wave of Class Repression'. The author, not expressing sympathy for either side, focused his analysis on 'class' tension in Israeli and Arab societies.[97]

Immediately after the massacres in Sabra and Shatila a protest rally was organised in Belgrade – at it an effigy with a yellow six-pointed star and the inscription *Juden* was burnt. A banner appeared saying 'Sons of Judas – We will Avenge Beirut'.[98] In those months the press and public gatherings began to ascribe responsibility and foresee consequences for events in the Near East to all Jews For example, *Politika*, which always had a middle-class orientation, claimed 'the people who had several decades ago been the victims of merciless extermination were now zealously doing the same to new victims'.[99] In a report from Nicosia, *Politika* claimed 'in the broader view, the fate of Jewry' was coming into question.[100] Much more serious than the act of burning an effigy, showing an anti-Semitic slogan or publishing anti-Semitic invective is the fact that although a photograph exists clearly showing the persons burning the effigy, official bodies did nothing, nor did the journalists who published such stands suffer any consequences. At the same time Kosovo Albanians were sentenced to several years of prison for the most ordinary verbal offence.

The ascendance of democratic but authoritarian and nationalistic regimes, and particularly the war that started in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1992, raised new questions. Although a small and quite unimportant community, the Jews became one of the main topics in the propaganda of all the warring sides, i.e. Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian. Serbian and Croatian propaganda was particularly intensified after the bomb attack on the Jewish Community Centre in Zagreb in August 1991. The perpetrators were never found, nor are their motives known. Nevertheless, Serbian propaganda called the Croatian regime an Ustasha regime, saying that this attack revealed its true Nazi and anti-Semitic nature. The Croatian side stated that the Serbs had organised the attack and that this revealed the true aggressive nature of the war against all the citizens of Croatia, including Jews. Although the case was often mentioned in the media, including during the trial against Slobodan Milošević in The Hague, no clear answer has been reached about its perpetrators and their motifs.

In the meantime there were many anti-Semitic incidents. I will just give one example from Croatia. In the town of Vinkovci, *Hrvatski list,* which came out in the early nineties, was largely subsidized by state-owned companies. After more then

a half a century, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was published again, both in Zagreb and in Belgrade.[101] Whereas anti-Semitism during the Communist era cannot be linked with any pre-Second World War group, this time it is not so. These groups generally belonged to the traditional or extreme right wing, most of them even defining themselves as keepers of Second World War traditions.[102]

Revisionism is a specific version of anti-Semitism, and it appeared in Croatia in 1989–90. In contrast to the norm in Western countries, the new post-1990 political authorities in Croatia encouraged it, and to some degree incorporated it in their political programme.[103] Croatian revisionists were obsessed with the idea of Croatian statehood. Anything that had historically contributed to Croatian statehood was overemphasized, and any weaknesses or culpability minimized. Croatia's revisionists suppressed or evaded facts and sometimes went as far as outright fabrication. In this context, the Ustashas' Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH*), which from 1941 to 1945 incorporated Croatia as well as Bosnia and Hercegovina, was shown in a relatively positive light despite its Nazi bais and the genocidal crimes committed under its wing. At the same time, the weaknesses and culpability of both royalist (1918-1941) and socialist (1945-1991) Yugoslavia, and especially crimes committed in their name, were stressed to the degree that they became arguments for an ultra-nationalist policy and, where possible, justification of Ustasha crimes. With regard to Jews, Croatian revisionists developed a number of theses, either manipulating facts or expressing outright lies. Thus, it was true, they said, that the NDH *had* adopted racial legislation under Nazi pressure, but the legislation had never been implemented: Jasenovac was not a *death* camp but a *work* camp to which only legally sentenced opponents of the regime were sent; proportionately the largest number of Jews in all European countries were saved in the NDH; and the Ustasha movement was never anti-Semitic. The revisionists' lies cast doubt on whether any genocide of Jews had taken place in the NDH at all.[104]

One of the best-known cases of manipulation with revisionist ideas was Tuđman's policy of 'reconciliation'. This would mean that the sons and grandsons of Ustashas and Partisans should forget their former clashes and unite for the holy Croatian case. Following the main idea, in 1995 Tuđman promoted an idea that the Jasenovac Concentration Camp should become the place for the reconciliation of all Croatian victims of all wars fought for the freedom of the country. This meant that the bones of Ustasha and other Nazi collaborators should be transferred to Jasenovac and buried along with the bones of their victims. This idea found strong opposition in the country and abroad, and the initiative was stopped.

A less obvious but nevertheless dangerous aspect of anti-Semitism is insincere philo-Semitism. The last war in former Yugoslavia is probably the first war in history in which all the warring sides wanted to present themselves friends of the Jewish. Frequently using distorted historical evidence, these alleged philo-Semites have an obvious political goal. One of their arguments is that the Jews are, for example, gen-

erally more capable and smarter than others; one has only to turn their arguments upside down to see a variant of classical anti-Semitism.

At the beginning of the 21st century the Jewish community in Croatia and in other former Yugoslav republics is not endangered by anti-Semitism. Their greater enemy is the low standard of living, insincere philo-Semitism and the constant threat that the local Jewish population may be manipulated and used for propaganda goals.

Notes

[1] See general overview for Croatia: I. Goldstein, Anti-Semitism in Croatia, IN: *Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Anti-Fascism*, N. Lengel-Krizman and I. Goldstein, (eds.), Zagreb, 1997, pp. 12-52; L. Vincetić, Anti-Semitism in the Croatian Catholic Press before the Second World War*,* IN: *Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Anti-Fascism*, IN: Lengel-Krizma and I. Goldstein, (eds.), Zagreb, 1997, pp. 54-63; J. Pecnik, Anti-Semitism in the Central-European Context, IN: *Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Anti-Fascism*, N. Lengel-Krizman and I. Goldstein, (eds), Zagreb, 1997, pp. 64-79.

[2] L. Šik (Schick), Sedam generacija zagrebačke jevrejske porodice (= Seven Generations of a Jewish Family from Zagreb), *Židov* 5, 6, Zagreb, 1934.

[3] G. Schwarz, *Povijest zagrebačke židovske općine od osnutka do 50-ih godina 19. vijeka* (= History of the Jewish Community of Zagreb from its Foundation till the Fifties of the 19th century), Zagreb, 1939.

[4] Among many contributions: Glaessinger (Glesinger), L., *Ilirski pokret i Jevreji* (= The Illyrian Movement and the Jews), Zagreb, 1936.

[5] See, for example, *Zbornik Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja* (= Collection of the Jewish History Museum), whose volume no. 1 was published in 1971.

[6] J. Tadić, *Jevreji u Dubrovniku do polovine 17. stoljeća* (= Jews in Dubrovnik to the Mid-17th c.), Sarajevo, 1937.

[7] S. Gavrilović, 'O Jevrejima u Ugarskoj XVIII. i XIX. veka' (= On the Jerws in Hungary in the 18th and 19th c.), *Jevrejski almanah* 1971-1996, Belgrade, 2000, pp. 123-136.

[8] D. Kečkemet, *Židovi u povijesti Splita* (= Jews in the History of Split), Split, 1971.

[9] Among many contributions: M. Despot, 'Protužidovski izgredi u Zagorju i Zagrebu godine 1883' (= Anti-Semitic Incidents in Zagorje and Zagreb in 1883), *Jevrejski almanah* 1957/8, Belgrade, 1958, pp. 75-85; M. Despot, Jacques Epstein - život i rad (= Jacques Epstein – Life and Work), *Jevrejski almanah* 1963 - 1964, Belgrade, 1965, pp. 82-91.

[10] B. Stulli, *Židovi u Dubrovniku* (= Jews in Dubrovnik), Zagreb, 1989.

[11] J. Romano, *Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941-1945, Žrtve genocida i učesnici narodnooslobodilačkog rata* (= Jews of Yugoslavia 1941-1945, Victims of Genocide and Participants of the Liberation Movement), Belgrade, 1980.

[12] See, *Židovi na tlu Jugoslavije* (= Jews in Yugoslavia), exhibition catalogue, Zagreb, 1988; *Jews in Yugoslavia*, exhibition catalogue, Zagreb, 1989; I give only a brief overview, mentioning only books: publications in Belgrade (*Jevrejski pregled, Zbornik Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja*) and in Zagreb (*Bilten Židovske općine Zagreb, Ha-Kol, Novi Omanut*) give abundant information about the various aspects of Jewish history. See, also, M. Mihajlović, *Jevreji na jugoslovenskom tlu* (= The Jews on Yugoslav Soil), Podgorica, 2000, with extensive bibliography; I. Goldstein, Die Forschung uber die Juden in Kroatien - Überblick über Forschungsstand und Zukunftige Aufgaben, IN: *Juden in Grenzraum*, Eisenstadt, 1993, pp. 143-157 with extensive bibliography; J. Peršič, *Židje in kreditno poslovanje v srednjeveškem Piranu* (= The Jews and Loans in Medieval

Piran), Ljubljana, 1999; On the Holocaust and other Second World War themes: I. Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu* (= Holocaust in Zagreb), Zagreb, 2001; Ž. Lebl, *Do 'Konačnog rešenja' – Jevreji u Beogradu 1521-1942* (= Until 'Final Solution' – the Jews in Belgrade 1521-1942), Belgrade, 2001; Ž. Lebl, *Do 'Konačnog rešenja' – Jevreji u Srbiji* (= Until 'Final Solution' – the Jews in Serbia), Belgrade, 2002; *Jevreji iz Jugoslavije ratni vojni zarobljenici u Nemačkoj* (= A Memorial of Yugoslavian Jewish Prisoners of War), Ž. Lebl, (ed.), Tel Aviv, 1995. - Books of memoirs are also important: *Mi smo preživeli, Jevreji u Holokaustu* (= We Survived, the Jews in the Holocaust) A. Gaon (ed.), Belgrade, 2001; *Obitelj – Mishpaha* (= Family), J. Domaš, (ed.), Zagreb, 1996; C. Danon, *Sasečeno stablo Danonovih – Sećanje na Jasenovac* (= Cut Tree of the Danons – Memories of Jasenovac), Belgrade, 2000; I. Jakovljević, *Konclogor na Savi* (= Concentration Camp on the Sava river), Zagreb, 1999 (most likely the best text of a Jasenovac survivor). - See on different themes: M. Švob, *Židovi u Hrvatskoj, Migracije i promjene u židovskoj populaciji* (= Jews in Croatia, Migrations and Changes in Jewish Population), Zagreb, 1997; M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Prvo zagrebačko dobrotvorno društvo - Društvo čovječnosti 1846-1946* (= The First Philanthropic Society in Zagreb – Humanitätsverein 1846-1946), Zagreb, 1998; M. Mihajlović, *Jevrejska omladinska društva na tlu Jugoslavije 1919-1941* (= Jewish Youth Societies in Yugoslavia 1919-1941), Belgrade, 1995; M. Frejdenberg, *Jewish Life in the Balkans, 15th to 17th centuries*, Tel Aviv, 1999. - Various themes in the volumes *Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Anti-fascism*, Zagreb, 1997 (in English); *Dva stoljeća povijesti i kulture Židova u Zagrebu i Hrvatskoj* (= Two Centuries of History and Culture of the Jews in Zagreb and in Croatia), Zagreb, 1998 (in Croatian). - Local Jewish history also developed significantly: V. Žugaj, *Židovi novogradiškog kraja, Povijesni prilozi* (= The Jews on the Territory of Nova Gradiška, Historiographic Contributions), Zagreb, 2001; Z. Maričić, *Luka spasa, Židovi u Veloj Luci od 1937. do 1943* (= The Harbour of Salvation, the Jews in Vela Luka from 1937 to 1943), Vela Luka, 2002; T. Šalić, *Židovi u Vinkovcima i okolici* (= The Jews in Vinkovci and its Surroundings), Osijek-Zagreb, 2002. - There were efforts to investigate various aspects of art history, e.g.: Z. Karač, *Arhitektura sinagoga u Hrvatskoj u doba historicizma* (= The Architecture of Synagogues in Croatia in the Time of Historicism), Zagreb, 2000.

[13] C. Loker, 'Sarajevski spor i sefardski pokret u Jugoslaviji' (= The Sarajevo Dispute and the Sephardi Movement in Yugoslavia), IN: *Zbornik Jevrejskog istorijskog muzeja* 7, Belgrade, 1997, pp. 72–79.

[14] H. P. Freidenreich, *The Jews of Yugoslavia. A Quest for Community,* Philadelphia, 1979, pp. 182–83; *Židov* 13/1931; see, in detail, I. Goldstein, *The Jews in Yugoslavia 1918-1941: Antisemitism and the Struggle for Equality*, Jewish Studies at the Central European University, II, Budapest 1999-2001, IN: A. Kovács and E. Andor (eds.), pp. 51-64. See, also, other examples in: I. Goldstein, 'Zionismus und jüdische Identität in Kroatien', IN: *Jüdische Identitäten in Mitteleuropa*, *Literarische Modelle der Identitätskontruktion*, hrsg. von Armin A. Wallas, Tübingen, 2002, pp. 243-260.

[15] *Židov* 12, Zagreb, 1921.

[16] *Pravda* 32, Sarajevo, 8 Feb. 1925.

[17] *Pravda* 34, Sarajevo, 12 Feb. 1925; see also *Pravda* 35, Sarajevo, 13 Feb. 1925; p. 36; 14 Feb. 1935, p. 37; 15 Feb. 1935.

[18] *Pravda* 37, Sarajevo, 15 Feb. 1925.

[19] *Narod* 12, Sarajevo, 12 Feb. 1925.

[20] *Zastava*, Novi Sad, no. 3, 4 Jan. 1923.

[21] *Hrvatska sloga* 18, Sarajevo, 24 Jan. 1923.

[22] *Hrvatska sloga* 22, Sarajevo, 28 Jan. 1923.

[23] *Hrvatska sloga* 23, Sarajevo, 29 Jan 1923.

[24] *Hrvatska sloga* 14, Sarajevo, 19 Jan. 1923; *Židov* 5, Zagreb 1923.

[25] *Židov* 8/1925.

[26] *Otpor* 2/1925; this is a completely unbelievable sum because, for example, it was a great problem for all Yugoslav Jews to collect one million dinars for the Yugoslav Halutzim farm – see, I. Goldstein and S. Goldstein, 'Farma jugoslavenskih židovskih naseljenika u Palestini 1926-1928' (=The Farm of Yugoslav Jewish Settlers in Palestine 1926-1928), IN: *Zbornik Mirjane Gross*, Zagreb, 1999, 371-387.
[27] See also *Židov* 19, 42/1925.
[28] *Vatra* 1/1925.
[29] *Otpor* 2, 9/1925.
[30] I. Goldstein, 'Stjepan Radić i Židovi' (= Stjepan Radić and the Jews), *Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest* 29, Zagreb 1996, pp. 208-216. A less detailed account about Radić in I. Goldstein, 'Anti-Semitism in Croatia', IN: *Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Antifascism*, Zagreb, 1997, p. 34ff.
[31] See, Goldstein, *The Jews in Yugoslavia, op. cit*.
[32] *Židov* 10, Zagreb, 1937.
[33] *Record of the 12th Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 11 Feb. 1937, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 6.
[34] Goldstein, *Holokaust*, pp. 31-65.
[35] Goldstein, 'Anti-Semitism in Croatia', p. 34ff.
[36] Goldstein, *Holokaust,* pp. 90-93.
[37] *Nezavisnost* 28/1939.
[38] *Mlada Hrvatska* 3/1937.
[39] *Record of the 5th Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 13 Jul. 1936, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 2; *Balkan* 286, 287, 331, 332, 333, Belgrade 1938.
[40] *Record of the 5th Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 13 Jul. 1936, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 1-2; *Record of the 9th Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 23 and 24 Nov. 1936, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 6; *Record of the Extraordinary Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 2 Feb. 1937, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 2; *Record of the 12th Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 11 Feb. 1937, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 6.
[41] *Sloga*, no. 18, *Senta* 3 May 1936; *Record of the 3rd Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 4 Jun. 1936, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 9.
[42] *Record of the 6th Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* of 26 and 31 Aug. 1936, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 3.
[43] *Record of the Extraordinary Session of the Executive Committee SVJOJ* 31 Mar. 1938, Jevrejski istorijski muzej, Belgrade, 46.
[44] *Nova riječ 2,* Zagreb 1936.
[45] *Židov* 33, 34/1930; Butmi – Tomić, *Protokoli.*
[46] J. Butmi – M. Tomić, 'Krvave osnove ili Protokoli sionskih mudraca' (=Bloody Plans or The Protocols of the Elders of Zion)*, Nova revija vjeri i nauci* 1, y. IV, Makarska 1925, pp. 70-81.
[47] M. Tomić, Massoutié*,* G., *Les Noms Juifs,* 2. ed., Paris 1925, *Nova revija vjeri i nauci* 4, year IV, Makarska 1925, pp. 430-431.
[48] See, for example, *Nova revija vjeri i nauci* 2/1925, 218; 1/1926, p.77; 2/1926, pp. 173-174; 1/1927, p. 97; 2/1927, p. 188, 215.
[49] *Nova revija vjeri i nauci* 1, year XI, Makarska 1932, p. 90.
[50] About the beginning of the Catholic political movement - M. Strecha, *Katoličko hrvatstvo* (Catholic Croatianhood), Zagreb 1997.
[51] *Nova revija vjeri i nauci* 2, y. V, Makarska 1926, p. 187.
[52] *Židov* 19, Zagreb 1931.
[53] *Nova Revija Vjeri i Nauci* 1/1931, pp.75-78.
[54] *Hrvatski leksikon* I (Croatian Lexicon), Zagreb 1996, p. 470.
[55] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, London 1967, vol. 17, p. 289.

[56] *Hrvatska prosvjeta* 1, 2/1932*; Hanoar* 5-6/1932.
[57] *Nova revija vjeri i nauci* 6, year XI, Makarska 1932, pp. 530-532.
[58] *Katolički list*, 25th August 1938.
[59] *Židov* 1, Zagreb, 1939.
[60] 'Dnevnik A. Stepinca' (= The Diary of A. Stepinac), *Danas,* Zagreb 7 Jul 1990.
[61] At least in numbers 1-14/1931 and 31-64/1932, which were available from the National and University Library in Zagreb.
[62] *Židov* 5, Zagreb, 1932.
[63] *Slobodna riječ* 4, Sarajevo, 1931.
[64] *Slobodna riječ* 5, 6/1931; 61/1932.
[65] *Slobodna riječ* 38, Sarajevo, 1932.
[66] See, *Spomenica Saveza jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije* 1919-1969, Belgrade, 1969, pp. 59-60.
[67] *Novi Balkan* 8*,* Belgrade, 7 Jul. 1940.
[68] *Hrvatska straža,* Zagreb, 6 Jul. 1940.
[69] *Jutro,* Ljubljana 1 Dec. 1936.
[70] *Židov* 11, Zagreb, 1937.
[71] *Židov* 3, 5, Zagreb, 1939.
[72] Židov 5, Zagreb, 1932.
[73] *Židov* 5, Zagreb, 1932*; Radničko jedinstvo 3,* Belgrade*,* 27 Jan. 1932. Obviously the writing of *Radničko jedinstvo* is not characteristic of all the left-wing press. For example, in 1930 *Radničke novine* from Zagreb wrote with great sympathy about the film *Afera Dreyfuss* that showed how Zolà and Jaures rose against the rest of the world and the migty General Staff to defend justice from violence, IN: *Radničke novine* 44, 31 Oct. 1930.
[74] Goldstein, 'Anti-Semitism in Croatia', pp. 43-44; Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu,* p. 103ff; I. Goldstein, 'Genocide upon Jews in NDH', IN: *Voice of the Jewish Community* 1, Zgreb 1995.
[75] Goldstein, 'Anti-Semitism in Croatia', pp. 43-44; Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, pp. 68-77.
[76] For various aspects of the post-war history of the Jews in Yugoslavia see: A. Kerkkänen, *Yugoslav Jewry (Aspects of Post-World War II and Post-Yugoslav Developments*), Helsinki, 2001.
[77] *Bilten Saveza jevrejskih općina*, Belgrade, 1958/6-7.
[78] *Jevrejski pregled* 7-8, Belgrade, 1964.
[79] *The Jewish Echo*, December 1958 (as I could not find *The Jewish Echo*, I quote the statement as it was published in *Jevrejski pregled* 11-12, Belgrade, 1958).
[80] See, L. Sekelj, *Vreme beščašća. Ogledalo o vladavini nacionalizma* (= Time of Dishonour. A Mirror of the Rule of Nationalism), Belgrade, 1995, p. 37.
[81] A. Lebl, 'Prekid diplomatskih odnosa SFRJ – Izrael 1967. godine' (= Break of Diplomatic Relations Between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Israel in 1967*),* IN: *Tokovi istorije* 1-4, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 39-74; particularly p. 50.
[82] Statement by Slavko Goldstein; see also examples in Lebl, 'Prekid diplomatskih odnosa', pp. 69-71.
[83] *Borba*, Belgrade, 18 Aug. 1968; *Jevrejski pregled* 1-2, Belgrade, 1969.
[84] *Front*, Belgrade, 27 Oct. 1968.
[85] *Vjesnik*, Zagreb, 18 Oct. 1985.
[86] *Vjesnik*, Zagreb, 20 Oct. 1985; *Jevrejski pregled* 9-12, Belgrade 1985.
[87] *Vjesnik*, Zagreb, 18 and 24 Oct. 1986.
[88] *Jevrejski pregled* 1-2, Belgrade, 1985. For the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see more in, H. Čaušević, 'Sociološki presjek pojave antisemitizma u BiH' (= A Sociological View of the appearance of Anti-Semitism in Bosnia and Hercegovina), IN: Sefarad 92, Sarajevo, 1995, pp. 119-131.
[89] See, *Jevrejski pregled* 1-2, Belgrade, 1985.
[90] *Izbor*, Zagreb 5/1970; *Jevrejski pregled* 5-6, Belgrade, 1970.

[91] See *Vjesnik*, Zagreb, 15 Jun. 1970, *Večernji list*, Zagreb, 15 Jun. 1970.
[92] E. Redžić, *Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu* (= Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War), Sarajevo, 1997, p. 215ff.
[93] *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo, 13 Oct. 1968.
[94] *Preporod* 11, 15 Feb. 1971; *Jevrejski pregled* 1-2, Belgrade, 1971.
[95] *Vjesnik u srijedu*, Zagreb, 21 May 1969; *Jevrejski pregled* 5-6, Belgrade, 1969.
[96] *Jevrejski pregled* 3-4, Belgrade, 1971.
[97] *Komunist*, Belgrade, 16 Sep. 1971.
[98] *Jevrejski pregled* 5-7, Belgrade, 1982.
[99] *Politika*, Belgrade, 20 Jun. 1982.
[100] *Politika*, Belgrade, 17 Jul. 1982.
[101] *Protokoli sionskih mudraca* (= The Protocols of the Elders of Zion), Zagreb, 1996.
[102] On this problem: Ž. Gruden, *Peračі crnih košulja, Kronika novopovijesti 1990-2000* (= The Cleaners of Black Shirts, The Chronicle of the New History 1990-2000), Zagreb, 2001.
[103] I. Goldstein, 'The Treatment of Jewish History in Schools in Central and Eastern Europe', IN: Christina Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History Education*, Thessalonica, 2002, pp. 350-358.
[104] I. Goldstein - S. Goldstein, 'Revisionism in Croatia: The Case of Franjo Tuđman', IN: *Eastern European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 32, no. 1, London, summer 2002, pp. 52-64.

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Living in Metaphor: Jews and Anti-Semitism in Slovenia

Introduction

'The trouble with the usurious immigrants',[1] as a typical Slovenian bureaucrat of the nineteenth century, J. K. Podgorjanski (1905:134), named the Jews, has deep historic roots in Slovenia. Despite the fact that hardly any Jews live in Slovenia nowadays, contemporary Slovenian anti-Semitism is founded on a long history. It is a result of long-standing collective representation of 'the Jew'[2] akin to, but perhaps slightly differently organised than the stereotype, as a means of providing a simplifying, commonsensical scheme of interpretation. The essence of stereotyping is the mental operation that reduces a living, real, heterogeneous group of people into a homogeneous category whose members are by definition 'all alike'.

As in other parts of Central and South-Eastern Europe, in Slovenian lands the ideas on a radical reordering of the society stemming from early to mid-nineteenth century was persistently premised, among other things, on the exclusion of the Jews. The conceptual roots were in the historic Christian anti-Semitism, translated into what Hertzberg (1968:274) called a secular notion of Jewishness as 'culturally and spiritually inferior' (cf. Berger 2002:5). Later in the nineteenth century, these views were 'modernised' through contemporary pseudo-scientific theories of race. In the first part of the twentieth century, and particularly in the period between 1941 and 1945, the ideation on Jews was heavily influenced by Nazi propaganda and the militant Catholic anti-liberalism claiming that the partisans, the local formation of pro-Communist resistance, were part of Jewish Communist conspiracy. In the age of socialism, anti-Semitic orientation in large parts of the public was part of the ideologically informed anti-Zionism that accompanied the formation of the state of Israel and the ensuing conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis.

After 'the fall of Communism', the situation again changed. During the first years of 'the liberation from the Communist regime', two major anti-Semitic incidents occurred. One was the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Ljubljana; the other was threat left on the telephone answering machine of the Jewish Community of Slovenia. The president of the Community, Andrej Kožar Beck, believes that the messages were left by the Slovenian skinheads who, much like adherents of the movement in other parts of Europe, not only

have distinct musical tastes and preferences, but follow a radical political ideology best embodied in the renown graffito: 'Wenn Man so viel Verstand wie eine Billiardkugell hat sollte auch so aussehen sagte Gott und schuff Skinhead' ('If a man has no more intelligence than a billiard ball, he should also look like one, said God and created a Skinhead').

What followed after the so-called break with Communism was, and still is, a specific reinvention of anti-Semitism without Jews in which the Jews remain categorically alien, a threat. According to one systematic opinion poll conducted in Slovenia which, incidentally, employs a very questionable methodology (more on that bellow), between twenty-four and thirty-seven odd percent of all respondents would not have a Jew for a neighbour; however, a negligible percentage (around four) of these respondents confess to ever having met an actual Jew in person, or to knowing a person in their vicinity to be a Jew (cf. Toš et al., 1998).

History: A Brief Outline

The exact dates of the earliest migrations of Jews to the territory of present-day Slovenia remain inexact. According to Janez Vajkard Valvasor (1641–1693, one of the first Slovenian polyhistorians and a member of the British Royal Society), the earliest migrations occurred in the twelfth century at the latest; he is, in his work entitled *Die Ehre des Herzogthums Crain* (1689), reporting on a re-fitting of the Ljubljana synagogue in 1213. The earliest reliable datum on Jews in Maribor, the second medieval centre of Jewish settlement, originates from 1317. Another early document from 1327 testifies to the then Duke of Carinthia, Henry, allowing the migration of a group of Jews from Cividale, presently in Friuli, Italy, to Ljubljana. The immigrants were given the privilege of defining that their loans be returned to them 'in the moneys it was lent, or in other goods only with their consent'. Furthermore, no person was to take loans from them in the absence of 'a guarantee such as they wish to have' to secure the loan. In any eventual dispute, one Christian and one Jew were required to testify against them (Vilfan 1992:170). Despite these protection measures, it can be inferred, chiefly on the basis of historic sources from the seventeenth through nineteenth century, that anti-Semitism was quick to follow Jewish settlement; the aforementioned Podgorjanski, for instance, reports that the Jews had, 'shortly after their arrival, taken possession of all commerce' and were in the process of 'ripping off the people […] something terrible'. Podgorjanski goes on to state that the Jews were, 'as a consequence of their trade with Venetians, Hungarians, and Croats, enormously rich', for which reason 'the tension between them and their Christian neighbours […] climbed dramatically'. This enmity, Podgorjanski thinks, was the result of the fact that the Jews lived 'strictly secluded […] on their own, prohibited to socialise with the Christians' (*ibid*., pp.130-131). Similar interpretations were given by the Slovenian historian August Dimitz[3] who, nearly forty years before Podgorjanski, in one of his contributions to the *Leibacher Zeitung,* reported on strict prohibitions regarding the socialising of Jews and

Christians. He recounts cases of prohibited sexual relations wherein the female perpetrators were punished by having their nose cut off, while male transgressors were put to death.

The Slovenian medievalist historian Janez Peršič, in his work on money lending in the medieval town of Piran, reports of a similar, if perhaps slightly less dramatic state of affairs. It is his contention that upon their arrival in the 1380', the Jews were granted fewer rights in comparison to other city inhabitants (Peršič 1999:133).[4] Valvasor (1977) testifies to comparable tensions at the end of the seventeenth century. In one instance, he reports of Jews being accused of the abduction (in 1290) and rape ('dishonouring', in 1408) of Christian maidens. In the 1290 case, he says, 'there erupted a great hostility between the citizens and the Jews', in which 'many Jews were killed'; the 1408 case caused a fight in which 'three Jews were taken out'. The citizens of Ljubljana at that time also accused the Jews of poisoning the water wells, but, reports Valvasor, 'it is unknown whether any bloodshed ensued, such as occurred in other parts of Austria' (*ibid*, p.131). These and similar incidents involving envy and hatred towards 'the usury of Jewish haberdashers frequently led the citizens of Ljubljana to turn to their feudal lords, asking them to rid the city of these leeches, if need be by eradicating them totally and evicting them form the country […]'. Up to the end of the fifteenth century, these pleas were not granted; in 1496, however, Kaiser Maximillian issued an order to the effect that all Jews, 'any that there are in Carniola, must leave the country until the Holiday of Three Kings. The citizens were reported to have added to their plea the inducement of four thousand tolars; however, nothing actually happened until 1515. On the very first day of that year, on the twenty-ninth anniversary of his reign, the Kaiser issued a privilege to the Mayor of Ljubljana that granted the city ordinance the right to evict all Jews. The concluding paragraphs extended this right to all vice-governors, governors and custodians of the province of Carniola; this triggered the process of actual evictions. After that, the Jews continued to live for another three hundred years on the margins of the central Slovenian lands. They moved into Trieste, Gorizia, and the Istrian towns; some of them, however, moved to the northernmost parts of present-day Slovenia, to the cities of Lendava and Murska Sobota where, during the eighteenth century, their descendants formed the strongest Jewish community that ever lived in Slovenian lands.

In the provinces of Carinthia and Styria, the Jews arrived during the thirteenth century, mostly to the two economically central towns, Maribor and Ptuj. The existence of a Jewish ghetto in Maribor is first documented in 1277. It was located within the southeast portion of the town walls and, during its years of prosperity, encompassed several main streets in the town nucleus together with a part of the main square. The synagogue, the cemetery, and presumably, the Talmudic school were in the ghetto centre. During the years 1455-1460, the taxation records testify that Jewish real estate, houses, lands, vineyards, and other property were growing outside the ghetto, reaching into the town centre and beyond the town's vicinity. On these estates, obtained largely as compensation for loans past their due, kosher food was produced that was widely known in the region, supplying nearby Jewish communities as well.

The Maribor Jewish community was at its most numerous around 1410, after the eviction of Jews by Herman II of Celje from the lower-Styria region. The chief economic enterprise was money lending. Their debtors came from the better-suited strata of local society, and the most prominent among them were the provincial nobility who hired extremely hefty loans; these included, among others, Kaiser Frederick III (1452-1493) himself. This business reached its peak in the second half of the fourteenth century. The most successful among the Jewish bankers stemmed from the Isserlein family. The first Isserlein moved to Maribor from Ptuj, leaving behind his representative in a flourishing business. The Maribor Jews were also prominent traders. A peak period lasted up till 1445 when Frederick III prohibited their trade with Venetian goods, with the exception of wine. 'Aside from wine, they exported wood, livestock, horses, cheese and other goods; their imports were chiefly fabrics, silk, books, spices, goldwares, precious stones and other luxury items' (Travner 1935:158). Testifying to the wide outreach of their trading connections is a 1931 find of Florentine and Czech golden coins originating from the period between 1312-1329, which surfaced when a house in the former ghetto was rebuilt.

That the Maribor Jews '[…] frequented such distant spaces as Italy, Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia, and especially Dubrovnik', and that their enterprises were, 'according to contemporary criteria […] world-wide' (*ibid.*) can be deduced from other sources as well. They also dealt in crafts, although such professions were forbidden to them. They were quite renown for their goldsmith skills, and the poorer among them sought employment as manual workers or craftsmen. Above all, Jews were recognised as superb healers. Sources mention one healer, Hayamb, who practiced medicine in the Flower alley in Maribor (*ibid.*).[5]

The situation of the Maribor Jews deteriorated dramatically around 1450. The underlying reasons may be the economic development of the Christian population, and the overall economic crisis. Jewish bankers faced Christian competition in their trade, which reduced their clientele to small craftsmen and peasants, the people that were particularly affected by poverty and could not repay their loans. The situation further deteriorated until in January 1496, when Kaiser Maximillian I appeased the nobility of Styria and Carinthia and evicted the Jews. The edict itself quotes justifications such as were quite characteristic of the day: desecration of the Host; ritual murders of Christian children; usury and fraud in business. A temporary relocation of all Jews to Neukirchen and Wienner Neustadt was ordered; there, the Jews indeed settled despite the protests of the locals. Many went to live in the territory of present-day Burgenland, and later spread from there to Poland, and to Czech lands, but also to Dalmatia, Istria, Trieste, Gorizia and the entire Friuli.

Tracing these migrations of the Maribor Jews is at least in part facilitated because of the typical family name Marburg (and its variants, e.g. Marpurg, Morpurck, Marburger, Morpurghi and Morpurgo). History shows that many offspring of the Maribor Jewish families made successful careers as medical doctors, tradesmen, and suppliers to imperial houses and armadas. One of the families even ascended to nobility with its own family shield (depicting the whale that exudes Jonah the Prophet). Of the Marpurgo line, history

remembers one Semar Morpurch in Padua, and the Cracovian medical doctors, David and Aaron Morpurgo. In the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, Vid Morpurgo from Split, Dalmatia, established a renown printing shop and bookshop that in 1862 printed the first national newspaper in Dalmatia, *Narodni list*. Aside from the Marpurgs and the Isserleins, historic documents preserved other names and titbits from the life of the Maribor Jews: the Mawels,[6] the Nassans,[7] and the Judls.[8] It is worth mentioning that several historic documents mention Jewish women as well; some of them give us an insight, however brief, into their status and lives. In the preserved legal documents, they appear predominantly as widows and heirs to their husbands' wealth, obligations, and trade.[9]

The period between the early sixteenth century and the end of eighteenth century brought about no major events for the remaining Jewish population in Slovenian lands. In the time of the reign of Kaiser Joseph II, the Jews were even granted citizenship – but with restrictions as to the right of settlement untouched, as was explicated in the imperial decree of October 20, 1781. Following his emperor's intent, Count Adam Lamberg assured the provincial nobility in the same year that 'the Kaiser's indulgence in the matter of Jews' does not pertain to Ljubljana and the province of Carniola, 'because the ancient privileges of the town of Ljubljana remain in force'. Jews were thereby banned from entering the core of Slovenian lands. This situation was altered only in the times of the French occupation of Carinthia, Görz, Crain, Dalmatia, and the Military border, and by the establishment of the Illyrian provinces (1809-1813). As Ljubljana was made into the administrative centre of the new political entity, a large operative centre for provisions was established which enhanced commerce and trade and brought Jewish tradesmen with it – who were met with considerable antagonism. Abraham Heimann and his brother Moses for example, who came to Ljubljana as the provider of the French armada, only obtained permission for permanent settlement with an explicit order by the French superintendent, Count Fargues. In time, says Podgorjanski (alias Kessler), the 'cold hearts of the Ljubljana people softened' to the extent that Heimann and Brothers, Co. was allowed to purchase a house. Unfortunately, with the retreat of the French, those hearts hardened again; a years-long dispute was launched that was partially solved by the decision of the imperial Viennese authorities which allowed 'the family of Heimann to retain all rights obtained under the protection of law'; however, 'its further branching out must be prevented' (*ibid.*, p. 137). The city council adhered to this decision literally, although the Heimann firm 'played an important role in servicing the debts of various noblemen and dignitaries' during the Ljubljana congress in 1821.[10]

Despite all efforts of Moses Heimann's son Simon, Jews were prohibited to settle in Ljubljana up to 1855. The city council maintained that Jewish immigrants would, because of their 'blood-sucking system, in but a few years destroy the people in the country and in the city with their financial power, and would fill their pockets with the calluses of the people' *(ibid.,* p. 143). They would not yield even in the face of the state imperial law issued in 1860 that annulled the city's privilege dating from the sixteenth century. Thus, the Jews were formally allowed to settle in Carniola only three hundred and fifty years

after their eviction, and even then with many difficulties. Documented is the case of one Josip Schwarz, dressmaker from Zagreb, who wanted to settle in Ljubljana and establish a ladies' tailoring salon; the many formal obstacles he faced made him give up the plan and return to Zagreb. It was not until 1867 that the state law of the newly formed Dual Monarchy granted formal equality to all nations and religions of the empire. Only then did the Ljubljana city council give in, having voiced their rejection of Jewish immigrations only two years prior to the law's enforcement.

It is therefore hardly surprising that twenty odd years after the formal equality law, in 1890, only seventy-six Jewish persons were living in Ljubljana; by the turn of the century, this figure amounted to no more than ninety-five. The figures themselves, however, are hardly of central importance in themselves; of greater interest is the reconstruction of the attitudes of non-Jews in Slovenian lands seen in the above briefly sketched history. This attitude, so we would like to suggest, comprises the historical basis for the state of affairs in the past several decades. The prevalent antagonist and exclusivist attitude is evident from the above narrative. Of special importance in this evolution is the fact that formal negative attitudes were, upon their dismissal, immediately replaced by an equally authoritative social agent – the 'science' that purported to follow social Darwinism. This was not a local invention: local 'intellectuals' closely followed the anti-Semitic and racist 'science' spawning in contemporary Paris, Berlin and Vienna. Its local version held that despite all efforts to include the Jews into the 'national body', 'Jewry remains […] alien' (Apih 1886: 5-6).

After 1870, explicit calls for eviction or extermination are no longer to be found in historical records; instead, Slovenian writers, scientists and publicists invent or re-cycle a host of arguments as to why Jewry would be, even for a Slovenian 'historian or natural scientist, … a formidable problem': This 'problem' has at least two specific, interesting features; one is *anti-Semitism without Jews*; the other, perhaps universal to smaller Central and East European nations, is the *equating of the Jews with the Germans*. The Germans are in the historic experience of the people in this part of the world the paradigmatic, superiorist aliens – the political, economic and cultural masters of long centuries. In this view, the presence of the Jews is interpreted as one of the consequences of this supreme mastery, a complication or side-effect of an unquestionable domination. Both these decisive connotations of the anti-Semitism of the time sprang from a specific collision of nationalist awakening, the aggressive political stance of the Catholic church of the time, and the corroboration of contemporary pseudo-science.

'Science', Morals, and Duty to the Nation: Josip Apih (1853 – 1911)

This particular ideological collision found its most faithful adherent in the Slovenian historian Josip Apih. His essay entitled *Židovstvo* (The Jewry) was published in the most prestigious serial of the time, *Letopis Matice Slovenske*; this was the central publication

of an institution, *Slovenska Matica*, which was the formal predecessor of the Slovenian Academy of Science and Arts. This series had a unique and enormous influence on even the most politically adept public in Slovenian lands in the period from 1864 – 1918.

The phenomenon of anti-Semitism without Jews calls for some elucidation. The Apih text offers a very plastic example: the question arises, 'why would one want to concern oneself with Jews in a social space where hardly any lived; and why would one want to see the Jews as a problem?' Apih's response is paradigmatic for this kind of argument: one needs to concern oneself with the welfare of one's own nation. To this end, one needs to observe the situation in the 'neighbouring and fraternal nations' where 'Jewry' had already 'taken control'. Only by this vigilance can one contribute to our nation's 'independence in the mental and material fields'; only so will we, our nation, not be forced to 'seek help from alien peoples, least of all from the Jews' (Apih 1886:6).

According to Apih, historians and natural scientists were best placed to deal with the 'difference between Jewry and non-Jewry […]'. Those people at least should be acutely aware that as a small, but independent nation, we should know intimately all the mishaps of the 'alien neighbours, the Germans, Italians, and Hungarians'. Special attention should be given to the '(non)-agitatorial anti-Semitism of those nations to which we are chained by a thousand years of history' (*ibid.*). While Apih is positive that Slovenian anti-Semitism should be devoid of vengeance, he says in the same breath that all relations between Jews and non-Jews are 'unhealthy', threatening the nation's independence and Christian traditions, as 'the emancipation of the Jews' can only be 'attained at the expense of positive Christianity' (*ibid.*, p. 12). He goes on to say that Jewry is aggressive, haughty, selfish, and inconsistent, for which reasons it triggers in non-Jews '[…] the antipathy that is the core of anti-Semitism'.

Apih seeks to prove these notions by a series of common stereotypes that depict Jews as extravagantly bearded, vigorously gesticulating, rattling, filthy creatures of darkish faces – creatures whose veins pound in an excessive beat and whose noses are of record lengths. These stereotypes function as a prelude to the 'scientific' evidence of the pathological morphology of the Jews: cited are comparative data on the morphology of the 'extremities' and 'trunk make-up'. These dysfunctions and malformations, in turn, are underlined by statistics of proportional under-representation of Jews in the Austro-Hungarian army: a datum that purportedly testifies to the cowardice of the Jews and their uselessness in any physical work. Apih concludes that the Jews at the end of the nineteenth century in Central Europe were champions in the league of the mentally disturbed, delusional, and delinquent; he does not, however, neglect to stress that Jews excel especially in those types of criminal activities that do not require physical stamina (*ibid.*, p.60). He also employs this situational paradox between criminality and physical weakness when explaining 'typical' Jewish neuroticism and a disposition towards ceaseless doubt and criticism, which leads him to polemicise with no less a personality than Charles Darwin, whose alleged postulates he thinks ignore 'the historical and statistical truths' (*ibid.*, p.59).

Both Apih's 'scientific' arguments and those from other, predominantly journalist

texts, nevertheless maintained an atmosphere of conditional tolerance up to the onset of the Nazi era. This led some commentators to believe that the interwar period in Slovenia was no less than 'a rosy time for the Jews' (Puc, Steinbuch, Šurla 1997). While it is true that Jews were present in some Slovenian banks, insurance companies, and other enterprises of the time, there is little evidence in support of their 'pivotal role in the society'. Instead, they were held well away of any public arenas by an omnipresent, categorical, 'cultural anti-Semitism': a form of anti-Semitism that re-cycled through literature and other voices of elitist national culture and politics, and disciplined the public image of Jews.[11] On the margins of the Slovenian national space, Jewish social life remained limited to their own communities. It is therefore extremely difficult to justify the statement that between the two wars, Jews in Slovenia 'lived fairly well' (Pintarič 2000:20). One could say that Slovenian anti-Semitisim was, during this time, covert; but so were the Jews in every aspect of their social existence. In the two cases where the Jews of the time lived in socially ramified, profiled communities in Lendava and Murska Sobota, there existed institutions like a women's society, a Gremium of commerce, a public school, a print-shop, a library, and a hotel casino,[12] but these are exceptions that cannot invalidate the thesis that belief in a world-wide Jewish conspiracy was widely accepted among Slovenians; it vitally informed and determined all public discourse of consequence.

Anti-Semitism in Slovenian Literature

If we set aside translations of biblical stories, Jews first appear in Slovenian literature in the first half of the nineteenth century, namely in the work of the great Slovenian poet France Prešeren. Prešeren, who is mostly known to the wider public as the author of the text to the Slovenian national anthem and less for his sonnets and ballads, mentioned Jews and Judaism occasionally in his poetry. In his ballad, *The Jewish Girl,* a Jew is first mentioned as the protagonist in a relationship of unrequited love, although Prešeren later resorts to the typical Slovenian folk image of Jews as wealthy, stingy and dangerous. Already here we come across a Jewess as sly as Satan, to whom a young man will propose marriage, should a local girl prove too trying. In this case we already find the fantasized image of Jews with whom it is best not to have dealings; since they bring misfortune to all who become involved with them. Apart from this, with Prešeren Jews do not yet occupy their later stereotypical roles; thus with Prešeren we do not encounter Jews as suspicious foreigners without a true God or homeland. Jews as a metaphor for foreignness are here just a shadow of what we come across later; by the second half of the same century the Jew is already a foreigner who by lending money to farmers deprives them of their possessions. The closer we come to the end of the nineteenth century, the more the Jew becomes black, stingy, dishonest, useless, and evil.

By far the worst representation of Jews exists in the lowbrow literature of Slovenian politicians of the nineteenth century. Like their Austrian colleagues they also pictured

the Jews as the tribe that crucified Christ, and who intrude among other peoples whom they exploit and drain. These politicians often warned their co-nationals against the usury, audacity and unpleasant bodily and spiritual characteristics of the Jews. Even the more serious authors placed them in similar roles; on the one hand the Jews were accused of spoiling the culture of the Slovenian people by their journalistic approaches, and on the other, they saw in the contemporary Jew the symbol of a restless humanist who with his criticism erodes the 'century of reason and optimism'. Not until the middle of the 20th century (at the time of the Second World War) do we see the kind of anti-Semitism among real poets and writers that is possible to find among politicians with literary ambitions prior to that time; yet even these authors feature typical Jewish capitalists that have some kind of 'extra sense'. We find them as literary figures that sow decay, as people who have taken over the whole world but who have not managed to find a homeland. We find them as representatives of a 'haughty chosen people […], who alone can judge themselves'. Miško Kranjec, the most typical representative of Slovenian socialist realism, painted the Jews as victims of their own history and folly; as people who had long lived among Slovenians, but had nevertheless isolated themselves, and finally as people who were unneeded and did not know the value of honest work.

That stance began to change only just before the war when the Catholic (Stanko Majcen) as well as the liberal (Vladimir Bartol) sides even managed some pro-Semitism, and began sporadically to give Slovenians the example of the endurance of the Israelites. Certainly at the peak of this type of emancipative literature belongs Zlata Vokač Medič, who created among Slovenians a rare 'work of ethical fervour and depth' with her novel *The Marpurgs*, and who drew attention to the uncertainty of the apparently self-sufficient small peripheral groups in Central Europe through her recognition that 'intolerance and hatred derive from stupidity.'

The Lendava and Murska Sobota Jews: Two Communities on the Eve of WWII

The Lendava and Murska Sobota communities were the most numerous and best organised of the interwar period in Slovenia. The Lendava community was also the formal heir of the medieval Jewish community in the Slovenian lands. The Murska Sobota community was the only other formally recognised Jewish community of the time; it is believed that historically it was closely linked not only to the town, but to its very name as well.[13] The two communities shared a rabbinical office.

Their predecessors settled in the two towns by the end of the fourteenth century; concurring with the accelerated growth of commerce and traffic in the region, and the expulsions from other Slovenian lands. The largest immigration, however, occurred in the second half of the eighteenth century; the majority are believed to have originated from the Hungarian town of Zalaegerszeg where Jews at the time comprised about seven percent of total population. Their first target location was Lendava, where there were fourteen

Jews in 1778; soon afterwards, they spread towards the village of Beltinci, around twenty kilometres outside Lendava, and then to Murska Sobota (Orešnik, Janež 1984:5). Below are the statistics of the number of Jews in the two towns and their vicinities in the period from 1778 to 1921 (after: Zelko 1972):

Figure 1: Numbers of Jews in the broader region of Lendava and Murska Sobota, 1778 - 1921

YEAR	LENDAVA	MURSKA SOBOTA	BELTINCI	NEARBY VILLAGES	TOTAL
1778	15	24	2	24	65
1793	19	14	21	6	60
1831	62	98	36	11	207
1853	120	180	42	41	383
1859	162	180	50	103	495
1880	420	180	146	293	1039
1889	293	311	152	322	1107
1910	383	234	61	322	1000
1921	259	179	4	200	642

Jewish colonisation of the Prekmurje region was thus at its peak in 1889. Register books of the Murska Sobota commune testify that in the second half of the nineteenth century Jewish immigrants also originated from the neighbouring Styria and beyond. It is interesting to note that they settled in the villages as well, not only in the urban centres, so that the two towns themselves were populated by a mere half of the total of all Jews in the region (Zelko 1972: 437).

The Prekmurje communities shrank during and after WWI, as a consequence of frequent attacks on Jewish commerce and inn-keeping, especially in the Lendava region. The Jewish population in 1921 was half what it was in the 1880s. Those who remained amounted to six percent of the total population in the Murska Sobota region, and 8.6 percent in the Lendava region. The two towns themselves did not witness a major decline in Jewish population, which testifies to the fact that people fled into the towns from the nearby villages; however, many emigrated to Hungary, Croatia, and other parts of the then newly established Yugoslav state. Within this new state, the administrative organisation of the Jewish population changed: both the Lendava and Murska Sobota communities remained independent, while Jews in the Ljubljana region first adhered to the Israelite community of Zagreb. The Jews of Slovenian Styria adhered to the Varaždin community, and later, together with the Jews of the Ljubljana region, and with the support of the Murska Sobota Israelite community, to the Murska Sobota community. Following WWI, the Prekmurje region thus became the population and administrative heart of Slovenian Jewry.

Anti-Semitism without Jews Gone Genocidal: 1933 - 1945

Following the German occupation of Prekmurje on April 6, 1941, the German soldiers and armed Kulturbund members made it their first concern to utterly rob the local Jewish families. The Hungarian occupation ensued; mass arrests of Jews occurred in the late phase of this occupation, between April 2 and 27, 1944. The occupiers assembled the Jews in the synagogue and then transported them by train to Čakovec; there, the Jews were turned over to the Gestapo and transported to Nagykanizs, and from there to Birkenau, a dislocated unit of the Auschwitz concentration camp (Orešnik, Janež 1984:5). After the capitulation of the Horthy government, the Hungarian Fascists proceeded to capture those few Jews that had managed to escape the spring deportations. Jews who had converted and been baptised were also arrested and deported to Auschwitz. Very few individuals who were concealed by their neighbours or friends managed to escape the arrest. In Nazi concentration camps, three hundred and eighty-seven Prekmurje Jews were murdered; only sixty-five women and men survived the Holocaust. After returning briefly to their homes, they all decided to emigrate to the United States or Israel.

Very soon, both Jewish communities of Prekmurje were all but forgotten. In 1954, the then Socialist authorities levelled the Murska Sobota synagogue and left the cemetery to decay. The Jewish cemetery in Beltinci vanished. For forty years, the ex-Jewish school and synagogue in Lendava, and the cemetery in Dolga vas were the only reminders of the once flourishing Jewish community in the region. In 1988, the Murska Sobota commune salvaged the Jewish cemetery monuments and arranged them in a memorial park.

In other parts of Slovenia, the dispersed members of the Jewish community and its converts the Christianity were sought out and deported immediately after the occupation. In the Italian occupation zone, the apprehended Jews were interned in Italy; some survived. Before the actual deportations, a group of Jews in Ljubljana submitted a petition to the city authorities asking them to protect their rights (Puc, Steinbuch, Šurla, 1997). Somewhat surprisingly, the Ljubljana Bishop Rožman pleaded for the Jews; however, to no avail. In early 1942, there were no Jews left in the heartlands of what is now Slovenia.

Resistance Denial, Holocaust Denial: Topical and Structural Similarities

The Fascist and Nazi occupation forces were, much as in other occupied parts of Europe (i.e., Poland, Ukraine, Croatia, and Lithuania), assisted by local collaborators. In such situations, genocidal anti-Semitism and the denial of Holocaust were typically coupled with the denial of the existence, nature and the role played by the local resistance and liberation movements. The mutually enforcing character of anti-Semitism and anti-liberationism or anti-Communism is clearly evident in Slovenian history of the period; current revisionist interpretations that came to the fore especially after 1989, however, started out as political revisionism and evolved into historical re-interpretation of resistance against

Nazism and Fascism, and the collaboration of the Slovenian Homeguard units[14] with the occupation forces. The argument most frequently heard in apologia of the collaboration was aptly voiced by Zdešar (1990:56-64): 'the resistance to the revolutionary terror was [...] morally justified and did not, despite a liaison with the occupier, betray or jeopardise the vital interests of the Slovenian nation.' This interpretation falls short of historic facts: at least up to 1943, it is impossible to speak of a decisive or exclusive Communist role in the Slovenian resistance movement which was formed as early as in 1941 as a wide political coalition under the name *Osvobodilna fronta* (The Liberation Front). However, the resistance deniers promote the idea of a 'civil war' in Slovenia during WWII, a clash between Communists and anti-Communists.[15] The advocates of this position are not concerned with the fact that the Catholic-oriented political right during the nineteen-thirties, in its 'fear of Communism', promulgated a re-Catholisation of public and private life in Slovenia which, among other, abundantly exploited the imagery of anti-Semitism and other types of radically essentialising ideologies. Finally, current historic revisionism in Slovenia also fails to take into account the combined Italian, German, and Hungarian occupation of Slovenia as well as the fact that the ensuing conflict established a front line between the aggressors and the defenders, and that the existence of Slovenians was indeed at stake in the conflict.[16] It also fails to explain the political involvement of the Catholic church of the period, which may have, to a large degree, made it possible for the Communist ideas to gain ground. There is little doubt that the Slovenian Communist movement was doctrinaire in nature and obviously contaminated by Stalinist exclusivism; however, this is hardly a justification for equating 'functional collaboration' and the liberation movement.

What remains overlooked or concealed in the present revisionist debates is the distinct pro-Nazi character of the Slovenian Homeguard movement whose main diagnostic sign was explicit anti-Semitism. Homeguard literature is replete with Nazi key words such as 'order', 'work', 'combat', 'ancestry', 'people', 'fatherland', etc. From the point of view of textual critique, the only difference between 'original' and Slovenian Nazism is that the Slovenian Homeguard, instead of glorifying The Leader,[17] emphasised commitment to Christianity and a belief in God. Where Nazism employed the term 'Führer', the Slovenian Homeguard typically used 'God' as substitute (for example, in slogans like 'For the faith, God, hearth, and ancestry' or 'Homeland, God, etc.). God was even featured in the official greeting of the Homeguard, certainly a sanctimonious, holier-than-Führer variant of the Nazi Hails.

The Homeguard anti-Semitism found its best expression in slogans that were rehearsed ad nauseam. Nazi slogans like 'Jews are out to enslave the world'[18] developed into local mantras such as that of Leon Rupnik who was constantly reiterating his belief that 'the [Communist] partisans were drugged and sold to Jews in order to […] destroy the Slovenian nation'; therefore, 'it is the duty of the Slovenian Homeguard fighter to stand shoulder by shoulder with the German soldier in the struggle against world-wide Jewry.' (in: Tomc, Lešnik 1995:127). Rupnik's collaborators claimed as late as in 1945 that they 'honestly fight side by side with Germany against the greatest enemy of hu-

manity – Communism', or more precisely, 'Jewish Communism'.[19] In building their arguments, the defenders of Slovenian collaboration tend to downplay this anti-Semitic element to the point of denial. Similarly, they would deny also the explicit adherence of the collaboration to the ideologies of the Reich. Thus, for instance, it is difficult for them to deny the fact that in 1944, the Homeguard troops, led by General Rupnik, publicly pledged alliance to the Reich, swearing to fight side by side with the Germans against the resistance as well as against any common enemy, in this case, against the Allied Forces. This inconvenient fact is interpreted as a pledge made with (unvoiced) reservations, in an effort to form a functional or opportune alliance to obtain help in their fight against 'Communist revolutionary terror' (cf., e.g., Zdešar, 1990). By saying that resistance was in fact Communist terror, but omitting the then key explanation that as such, resistance was a part of world-wide Jewish conspiracy, the recent revisionist interpretations show, albeit in reverse logic, that resistance denial operates within the same discursive formation as Holocaust denial. Structurally similar is also the way in which those themes first pervade the political sphere and then sink into both popular culture and public opinion.

Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that cases of radical, classical negation of the Holocaust are not detectable in Slovenian public discourses. According to Mr. Kožar Beck, Slovenian public school textbooks represent the Holocaust adequately – but not so the period after WWII; the period we already designated as one that was prone to a very swift and thorough public oblivion. For reasons as yet unexplored in detail, this history remains severely under-represented – it is a history forgotten.

Finally: The Nineteen-Nineties

As the members of the present-day Jewish Community of Slovenia themselves assert, Jews in Slovenia are first of all very few, numbering no more than about 300 persons, many of them are old, and a large majority are thoroughly secularised. They gather in relatively large numbers for the major holidays, such as Passover and Hanukah, and some celebrate Yom Kippur in the Trieste synagogue where the Chief Rabbi of Slovenia, Ariel Haddad, lives and works. Their major financial support comes from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. [20] Outright anti-Semitism is something they rarely encounter. We might add another dimension to the rather secluded, well-away-from-public-eye life of the Jewish Community in present-day Slovenia: despite the fact that Jews were virtually exterminated in Slovenia during WWII, there were always prominent individuals in science, arts, and political life who were of Jewish ancestry. However unspoken, Slovenia discourages public display of Jewish ancestry for such public figures. A small illustration is due: Slovenia held Presidential elections on 10 November 2002; among the candidates for this high office were at least two persons of Jewish ancestry – there are also a handful of prominent diplomats, scientists, artists, government officials, and other intellectuals and politicians on the Slovenian public scene of Jewish origin. It is not that these people

would not publicly acknowledge this fact; several indeed have. Yet, in all public discourses, especially in formative ones like the media, they remain unrecognised or overheard on this point – and when declared, the declaration ignored or censured from public discourses as either meaningless or irrelevant. The few Jews in Slovenia can therefore be said to lead a doubly secretive life: as a group, they are small and insignificant; as individuals, their Jewishness is consistently overlooked.

To attempt a meaningful initial hypothesis that would allow for systematic research of this situation, one must ponder the empirical – and admittedly, sometimes commonsensical – data such as exists. To begin with, given that the Jews are so invisible/unrecognised in Slovenia, the question arises: where do Slovenians nowadays find the sources for their ideation of Jews and Jewry? While there is, for the average inhabitant, little every-day real-life contact with Jews and things Jewish, one certainly cannot say that there is a lack of public information on all aspects of Jewry; the media in Slovenia in fact abound with them.[21] So do the public polemics,[22] to the point that one could diagnose a specific fascination with the theme, all the way down to various types of phylo-Semitic ideation. Additionally, while the history and present situation of the Jews in Slovenia cannot be said to be systematically covered either in academia or the public educational system, there is a proliferation of academic texts, from student level to professional, that likewise testify to a specific fascination with the subject. Consequently, one could ask, is Slovenian anti-Semitism, as Michael Shafir (2002) explains in the case of Hungary, of the deflective type; and is it, as Shafir says for Hungary, an 'imported or re-imported anti-Semitism'?

This question we attempted to tackle with an opinion survey that was intended primarily to de-categorize Jews, and to find out in a random, non-representational (in statistical sense) sample whether the respondents would react in an informed way to the mention of Jews – in the context of guilt for the events of WWII, the Marpurgos, and the conflict in Middle East. These innuendos were hidden among banal questions pertaining to minorities, employment policies, and ideation on home and neighbouring political spaces in categorical, essentialising and specific questions and statements (e.g. 'Balkan nations will never comprehend the notion of hard work', or 'children nowadays lack respect for adults'); additionally, there were questions on immigrants, the use of the Internet, and party preferences in elections. These thematic contexts gave the questions on Jews and Jewishness a 'surprise' quality that rendered the following results:

As to the name Marpurgo, only 2.4 percent of the respondents were anywhere near an informed opinion ('Maribor', 'Maribor Jews'). As to their view of the Middle Eastern situation, categorical pessimists amounted to 14 odd percent, while others are hopeful (categorically hopeful; denying the statement that 'the Jews […] will never learn to live in peace' are nearly 9 percent). A resounding 42.4 percent totally disagree with the notion that 'Jews are responsible, because of their way of life, for what happened to them during WWII'; only 5.4 percent find themselves in total

agreement with this statement.

Although the survey was not representative and rendered results that are statistically insignificant, it nevertheless offered numerous possibilities for further research. The one variable that was clearly enough exposed by crossing the results is a general disposition of the respondents towards xenophobia. 'Jews' were generally recognised as an 'alien' entity on a 'national' level, and a xenophobic attitude was clearly demonstrated in the form of affirmative ethnocentric nationalism (thus, for example, 44 percent of the respondents totally agree with the statement 'it would be better if only Slovenians lived in Slovenia' – while at the same time, significantly, 41 percent of respondents feel that 'all nations should remain opened to the influence of other cultures').[23] This seemingly paradoxical result points precisely to the basic ideational organisation, and close interdependence, of Slovenian nationalism and xenophobia: aliens and foreigners are all right as long as they do not live among 'Us', not on 'Our' territory; and furthermore, the 'Us' category is distinctly pseudo-biologically, not sociologically or civilly informed. In other words, Slovenians do not see the differences on a 'national' level and therefore as cultural and changeable, but rather as differences of origin that are therefore 'natural' and unalterable.[24] This ideation places Slovenian ethnocentric nationalism among the purest forms of folk ideation of radical, ethnic difference.[25]

These results also induce us to believe that certain research methodologies exploring Slovenian anti-Semitism and xenophobia in general may prove upon close inspection, although offering dramatically promising starting points, severely lacking, and the evidence of (re)imported racisms may prove to be the effect of these very methodologies. The results of the aforementioned representative, yearly survey (since 1968) conducted by the Faculty of Social Sciences' opinion poll research centre are exemplary. The questions on anti-Semitism entered their agenda only in 1992, when the centre began cooperating with the World Value Survey. While the researchers of the Centre offered the opinion that in Slovenia anti-Semitism is a clear case of an 'extra-experiental opinioning', and they offered an explanation for the rather startlingly high results to the effect that Slovenians form their opinion on the Jews 'according to their following the oscillations of the opinions on this question in the nearby Western European neighbourhood where, naturally [sic!], there are many instigations for the activation of anti-Semitism' (Štamcar, Sever 1994). While such interpretation of rather surprisingly strong and profiled anti-Semitic feelings among the respondents[26] is clearly shooting in the dark, it remains questionable exactly what the poll was purportedly measuring; the insertion of this particular category, Jews, may be read as a suggestion that forms a prejudice rather than informs about an existent one. The basic inconsistency – to reiterate the data given above – is in the 20 odd to nearly 40 percent of people who would not have a Jew for their neighbour, while at the same time, only 4 odd percent of these respondents confessed to ever having any sort of contact with, or knowledge of, a Jew.

The main failure of this methodology, and its interpretation, is in the total neglect of the relation between purportedly deflective anti-Semitism and the aggressive, commonsensical, 'natural' ethnocentrism. It is our contention that the latter is in every statistically significant correlation with the former. In other words: one of the main indicators of anti-Semitism in Slovenia nowadays is probably at the same time the indicator of xenophobic and racist attitudes in general. These, in turn, may also prove correlated to the 'revisionist' interpretations of the history of the second half of the 20th century.

Having said that, it remains a question as to what precisely is the role of the 'historic experience' of Slovenians with the Jews that the opinion polls tend to exclude from their surveys and that we have tried to outline above. To what degree, and in what forms, does collective memory inform the present attitudes – and what the contents of this memory really are? There is little doubt that there exists a specific, 'autochthonous' anti-Semitism in Slovenia; its seeming 'absence' in its 'classical' forms, and the 'secretive' nature of Jewish existence in Slovenia both testify to that.

Notes

[1] Podgorjanski's real name was Janko Kessler (1874 – 1926). He was a bureaucrat at the Town House of Ljubljana, the author of various statistical reports, daily news and historic essays.

[2] Recall, following Emile Durkheim, that collective representations refer to culturally shared symbols, systems of meaning, or categorization systems used by individuals to make sense of themselves and society in which they live (Berger, 2002:23).

[3] His most renowned work is *Geschichte Krains I –IV* (1874-1876).

[4] This inequality, states Peršič, was instituted despite the fact that Jewish bankers offered 'more or less the same' loan conditions as the Florentine bankers (p. 137). They did, however, enjoy religious freedom: 'They had the right to conduct their rituals, institute rabbinical office, enjoy their Sabbath holiday, the right to give oath according to their custom, and to practicing animal butchery according to their law'; they did not, however, have the right to carry weapons during the night as the Florentinians had […]'. Unlike the Florentinians who could become citizens based on their contract with the city of Piran, they did not have this privilege up to the end of the 19th century.

[5] This historic personality later inspired the Maribor writer Zlata Volkač who, in her historic novel *Marpurgi* (*The Marpurgos*), described the time before the eviction of Jews from Maribor. Her novel is one of the rare works of literary art in Slovenian that is utterly devoid of anti-Semitic tones. – More on that IN: J. Rotar, 1999, in Moskovich, Luthar, Schwarzband (eds.); and in Grdina, 1989.

[6] The earliest mention of a Mawel is of a Maribor Jew, father of four children by the names Jona, Leser, Musche and Abraham. Jona Mawel is mentioned in no less than eleven subsequent documents between the years 1467-1493, in various capacities and contexts.

[7] The Nassan family is mentioned in various historic documents from the period between 1478-1493. One of the Nassans is recorded to have demanded not only money from his debtors, but retributions in naturals as well, which goes down as a rare practice for Jewish money loaners of that time.

[8] One of the Judls, son of Jožef from Maribor, is first mentioned in historic documents in the year 1474; the last mention dates into 1488. Among his debtors were powerful people, for instance the prior of the Žiče monastery.

[9] One of the documents from 1333 mentions a woman Schyfra, widow to one Welklein. The document testifies that Schyfra sold a field, a quarter of a house, and half a vineyard to a Catholic priest. All this estate her husband acquired as compensation for debts unpaid. Several other women are mentioned in other documents and in various capacities; perhaps their names as were written down are of some interest: Shongiet; Jana; Elnina; Dyna; Miraš; Plumen; Briba; Milka; Melkchl.

[10] The Ljubljana Congress is an established name for the summit of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, Austria, Great Britain, France), hosted by the Austrian state and attended by representatives of 10 European states, which took place between January 1 and May 22, 1821. This prime political event, instigated by the then revolutionary events in the Kingdom of Naples, temporarily made Ljubljana into the diplomatic centre of the contemporary world.

[11] Another of the more prominent anti-Semitists of the time was Anton Mahnič (1850 – 1920), a Catholic theologian, writer and bishop, who warned against the 'corruptive influence of Jewry in economy, school, politics [...]', compared Jews to leeches and openly advocated anti-Semitism as a necessary thing for Slovenians. Another prominent figure was the Christian Socialist Janez Evangelist Krek (1865 – 1917) who wrote that 'the Jews are the destructive element in a Christian society'; last but not least, one should mention the very popular Slovenian writer Ivan Tavčar (1851 – 1928) who, as president of the Yugoslav democratic party in Slovenia and Mayor of Ljubljana at the turn of the century, played a pivotal role in the adoption of a special resolution against Jews.

[12] This casino was part of the Lendava hotel Krona, owned by the Eppinger family.

[13] Some local historians think that Murska Sobota was named after the Saturday fair thanks to which the settlement developed into a town. The fair (established in 1366 at the latest) was held on Saturday in order to prevent the Jews partaking and competing with the local's goods and crafts.

[14] The Homeguard ('domobranci' in the Slovenian language), established in 1944, was made up of different Slovenian combat groups that collaborated with the occupying forces.

[15] Contemporary revisionism also fails to acknowledge the diplomatic and ideological offensive conducted between 1924-1937 by the Vatican whose politics were, and still appear to be, highly influential in Slovenia. At least five circular letters by Pope Pius XI during that period called for a struggle against godless Communism, and prohibited any collaboration with Communists even for humanitarian purposes (Ahačič, 1992). That the Pope's proclamations were taken seriously by Slovenian clerics is revealed in the discourse by then-Bishop Gregorij Rožman. He had in 1939 attempted to convince the Slovenian Catholic youth that they were to heed the Pope's words even in cases when the Pope's infallibility is not expressly referred to (*ibid*, p. 30). Slovenian Catholicism has gone as far as propaganting, in a renewed context, the ideas of *Ecclesia militans* and *Ecclesia triumphans* (military and triumphant Church). By so doing, the Catholic Church in Slovenia lost the support of its most creative group of intellectuals and cultural writers. Among them, the most prominent was Edvard Kocbek (1904-1981), poet, essayist, and fiction writer, the editor of *Dejanje* (*The Action*), and one of the most versatile Slovenian journalists between the two wars. Kocbek was a member of the *Liberation Front* and after the World War II assumed the position of a Minister in the Yugoslav government, only to later fall out of favour with the authorities because of his critical attitude towards the regime. Kocbek was subsequently forced into 'internal exile'.

[16] Draga Ahačič, 1992:15. This book is paradigmatic for the initial stages of the revisionist debate. Not unlike most responses to the revisionist re-writing of the Slovenian national history, this book was penned by a non-historian. Professional historians themselves at first remained cautiously silent. Some of those historians that possessed comprehensive knowledge about the said period have kept their distance largely because their past writings tended to over-emphasize certain aspects of the war and the Communist movement, while cautiously remaining silent about the others.

[17] The formal leader of Slovenian Homeguard units, General Leon Rupnik, made efforts to fill this role by imitating the Führer's public performances, giving great importance to propaganda and support to the mass rallies of his sympathisers.

[18] Consider the following example: '[...] the most commited followers of the Jews' orders are the Communists and Liberal Democracy; both ideas were created by Jews for non-Jewish nations. Jewry attempts to bring the Slovenian nation to its knees too, by fostering moral decay and impoverishment...' (quoted in: Tomc & Lešnik, 1995:123-4).

[19] See, for example, Urbančič, as quoted in: Tomc & Lešnik, 1995.

[20] Kris Killer, the Jewish Community of Slovenia's Coordinator for Religious Activities, as quoted in Utenkar, 2002:2.

[21] Martin Šteiner, 'Židje v Lendavi' (Jews in Lendava), *Razgledi* No. 9, April 29, Ljubljana 1998; Matija Rvitz, 'Položaj judovske skupnosti danes' (The situation of the Jewish Community today), *Razgledi* no. 19, October 14, Ljubljana 1998: Slavko Gaberc, 'Tiha asimilacija istrskih židov' (The silent assimilation of the Istrian Jews), *Primorska srečanja*, no. 229, year 24, May 2000; Z.V. 'Holokavst prvič v slovenščini' (Holocaust in Slovenian for the first time), *Dnevnik*, May 10, Ljubljana 2000; Miro Kocjan, 'Protižidovstva sploh ni skrival' (He did not hide his anti-Semitism), *Dnevnik*, November 11, Ljubljana 2000; Branko Soban, 'Kremelj in večno židovsko vprašanje' (The Kremlin and the enternal Jewish Question), *Delo*, November 11, Ljubljana 2000; Z.L. 'Vandali na židovsekm pokopališču' (Vandalism on Jewish cemetery), *Delo*, November 12, Ljubljana 2000; Saša Petelin, 'V sorodu z nacizmom' (Kin to Nazism), *Večer*, November 13, Maribor 2000; Maroje Mihovilović, 'Nezamenljivi politični veterani' (Irreplaceable political veterans), *Dnevnik*, November 14, Ljubljana 2000; F.L., 'Odpeljani neznano kam' (Deported to a place unknown), November 29, Ljubljana 2000; Florijan Laimiš, 'Pomor Židov v Jedwabnah' (The massacre of Jews in Jedwabne), *Dnevnik*, Marec 23, Ljubljana 2001; Vlado Miheljak, 'Bi imeli Sestro za sosedo?' (Would you have a Sister for a neighbour?), *Sobotna priloga- Delo*, May 11, Ljubljana 2002. – These titles, while exemplary for the themes addressed about the Jews and Jewry, may be slightly criptic: the last one enumerated pertains to Sestre, a rock group of transvestites that stirred the bigotry of Slovenian public in 2002; Miheljak in his article raised the question of connections between racism, anti-Semitismy and homophobia.

[22] A typical instance of drawing the Jewish experience into polemicising occurred when the president of the extreme right party, Slovenian national party, Zmago Jelinčič, implored Slovenians to tear out of the phonebook all pages that contained 'foreign letter signs, such as ć and đ'' – thus stygmatising the people of Serbian, Croat and Bosnian descent. Among the polemicists was Dr Peter Weiss who noted that such intolerance caused many of his people, the Jews, to die. In his last contribution to the controversy, Weiss concluded that 'intolerance that begins with two letters' can easily end in physical annihilation. - See *Delo*, June 6, Ljubljana 1994.

[23] While ours may not at this point be a strictly orthodox interpretation of the results of the statistical analysis, but rather a creative interpretation thereof, the expert summary analysis of the survey was made by Andrej Kveder, M.A., ZRC SAZU.

[24] Other, more qualitatively oriented research confirms this. See for example Adam (ed.), 1996. – Recent events surrounding the imposition of the Schengen regime on Slovenian state borders and the increased influx of illegal migrants and asylum seekers to Slovenia suggest the same nature of ethnocentric nationalism in Slovenia in both elitist, left- and right-oriented discourses, and popular ideation. The notion that a non-Slovenian is 'un-natural' in Slovenian space is universal and strongly corroborated by formative discourses (e.g. the media; public school indoctrination; and above all, the predominant social scientific discourse (cf. Šumi 2001), political and ideological discourses glorifying 'Slovenianness' as an unqestionable value; and even the rather common 'post-socialist' phenomenon, the equating of 'democracy' and 'freedom' with the notion of an ethnically pure political entity, the post-socialist nation-state). A major consequence of thus interiorised, and politically secured, ideation is the failure to recognise such attitudes as either

ethnocentric or racist; characteristically, Slovenians 'by citizenship' are not recognised as 'true' Slovenians due to their lack of 'Slovenian origin'.

[25] For an analytical distinction between cultural, passable difference as opposed to ethnic, impassable difference, see Šumi 2003.

[26] The question of this poll referred to was part of a set of questions seeking to determine the unwanted social (convicts, alcoholics, drug users, political extremists, homosexuals, etc.) and ethnic (people of 'other races'; Jews; the Romany) categories. Among ethnic categories, in the years 1992 – 1998, the respondents were least in favour of the 'people of other races' (39,5%; 28,3%; 17,2%; 21.1% respectivelly); the Romany (41,9%; 54,8%; 48,7%; 53,5% respectivelly), and Jews (37,2%, 20,7%; 22,0%; 24,8 respectivelly). Cf. Toš et al., 1998.

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Anti-Semitism in Bulgaria – Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

The Jews in Bulgaria can be proud of their quite old and interesting history. In this connection the history of anti–Semitism in the territories of contemporary Bulgaria dates from ancient times, from well before the establishment of the medieval Bulgarian state in 681. A logical conclusion follows from a statement of the Central Consistory of the Jews in Bulgaria to the Chairman of the National Assembly, which was based on the achievements of historical science against the introduction of anti–Jewish legislation in the country during the years of World War II. It declares that the Jewish population could not be considered as a foreign element in the territory where they had lived since before the establishment of the Bulgarian state, and where almost immediately after its establishment, they had integrated for centuries to come.[1] This idea was propounded by the distinguished Bulgarian scholar Gavril Katsarov, who in 1919, in 'Pro Causa Judaica' outspokenly wrote: 'Even before the Slavs came to the Danube, the Jews had settled in Bulgarian lands. They survived the storms of the migration of the nations there and later were reinforced with the new elements. In any case the Jews can consider Bulgaria their ancient motherland. So we should not consider the Jews as foreigners and the Jews should not separate from us […].'[2] Actually, when we address of the history of anti–Semitism in Bulgaria, we should always remain aware that tolerance for the Jews and other minorities has been the tradition of the Bulgarian nation and state, compared to anti-Semitic attitudes held by the minority. Perhaps this phenomenon has deep historical and national psychological reasons, which I shall not be able to examine here in detail; but in support of my thesis, I will cite the words of the German Plenipotentiary Minister in Bulgaria, Adolf Beckerle, who. On 7 June 1943, in his report to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Germany, officially tried to explain the failure of the final solution of the Jewish question in Bulgaria: 'It's my profound conviction that the Prime Minister and the Government are striving for the final and irretrievable solution of the Jewish question. However, they are bound by the mentality of the Bulgarian nation, which has not the ideological clearness that we have. Living together with Armenians, Greeks, and Gypsies, the Bulgarians do not find any shortcomings that can justify any special measures against them […]. In any case, I consider that it is tactically fallacious and wrong for us to exert direct pressure, which only will pass the responsibility onto us and moreover, having in mind the Bulgarian

mentality as well, contrary results will occur.'[3]

It can be considered that the earliest pieces of information about persecutions of the Jews in Bulgarian lands date from the times of Roman rule in the Balkans, and more precisely, from the period of the establishment of the dominance of Christianity in the Empire in the fourth century A. D. In the Codex of Theodosius, (named after Emperor Theodosius II (408–450)), which entered into force on 1 January 439, there is a law of Emperor Arcadius dating from17 June 397, and published formally in Constantinople on behalf of his brother Emperor Honorius, as sons and inheritors of Emperor Theodosius I the Great (346–395). In this Codex, the Governor of Illyricum Prefecture, called Anatoli, was ordered to give instructions to the governors of the provinces that 'the Jews must be defended from the insults of people attacking them, and their synagogues must be left in their usual peace.' Intolerance towards Judaism and outrages against the Jewish population during the last decades of the fourth century continued into the first two decades of the fifth century; this is why Emperor Theodosius II was forced to re-confirm his father's law with a similar one on 6 August 412, also published in Constantinople on the behalf of Emperor Honorius. Addressed to Philip, the governor of Illyricum Prefecture, the law forbade the ill-treatment and insult of the Jews because of their religion, harm outside of state justice caused by accusations against them, as well as burning and ill-intentioned damaging of their synagogues and houses. At that time the following provinces belonged to Illyricum: Acheya, Thessaly, Epirus Old, Epirus New, Crete, Macedonia, a portion of Macedonia Salutaris, Inner Dacia, Coastal Dacia, Upper Mizia, Dardania, and Prevalitana. By the time of Theodosius II, the Christian church continued to win recognition as religious fanaticism increased, manifested in the cruel persecution of pagans, people of other religion, and sectarians. The persecution of the Jews in Egypt, whose synagogues were burnt, was especially cruel. These persecutions were impelled by Patriarch Cyril of Alexandria. Together with religious prejudice, these acts were motivated by the economic interests of some strata of the population, which competed with the Jewish producers and tradesmen in the big Egyptian towns. The official authorities restricted, by the means of the Codex of Theodosius, the possibilities of the pagans in 416 and of the Jews in 418 to hold state posts. However, the Jews could be elected as decuriones whose official responsibilities, handed down from generation to generation, were difficult and risky to implement. For this reason decuriones often went bankrupt.[4]

The archaeological excavations of the ancient synagogue from the third and fourth centuries in Philipopolis (Plovdiv today) show that it was probably damaged by similar events connected with religious and dogmatic disputes, fights, and contradictions. It is possible that the building fell prey to the attacks of foreign invaders upon the Roman Empire, like the ones of the Goths in 250 and the next two decades, or to civil wars, caused by claimants for the Emperor's throne, as in 365–366, when the town was seriously damaged. Two memorial inscriptions were discovered; the first of which dating from approximately the middle of the third century, and the second from the first decades to

the middle of the fourth century, on floor mosaics of the building, which convincingly testify to the architectural decoration and arrangement, i. e., repairs and refurbishment, during two different periods of time. At the beginning of the fifth century the synagogue was demolished and rebuilt again, and it survived intact until the end of the sixth century.[5]

Toleration of Christianity in the Roman Empire, which began after Constantine the Great's Edict of Milan (published in 313), gradually shifted into intolerance that culminated in persecutions of other religions and sectarian doctrines. This process strengthened especially after 325, when the Christian church became dominant in the Empire. State policy, supported by successive Imperial decrees, as well as by the regulations of separate prefectures, and also by mandatory laws that served as a model for other regulations, also effected the Jews who lived on lands under Roman power. The general enthusiasm caused by the proclaimation of freedom of worship in the Empire was very soon troubled by a decree on 18 October 315, by the same Emperor, 'in defence of Christian religion', which directed against the influence of Judaism. On one hand, the Jewish fathers and patriarchs were responsible if anyone attacked 'with stones or other acts of rage someone who had escaped from the destructive sect' of the Jews. The perpetrator and his accessories were liable to immediate burning. On the other hand, anyone who joined the community of that 'impious sect', along with its members, were subject to 'deserved punishment'. Synagogues were not recognised as sanctuary, and Jews did not have the right to hold military posts, to marry Christian women, or to own slaves of the Christian faith. In a decree of 29 September 393, on behalf of the Emperors Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius, it reiterated that Judaism as a religion was not forbidden, but the existence of Jewish communities in some places could be obstructed. The First Nicaea Church Council in 325 took steps towards measures of differentiation between Jews and Christians, and it defined Sunday as a Christian holiday and decided Easter should not be at the same time as Jewish Passover. The times of other Christian holidays were similarly regulated. The legislations of Justinianus I the Great (527–565) were extremely intolerant towards the Jews. They consisted of all the severe laws against Jews published by his predecessors, and new restrictions were added as well. The Jews were forbidden to hold public posts, to practise law, to testify against Christians (532), to celebrate Passover before Easter (543), or to speak of the Torah. The Emperor's decrees obliged the Jews to pay taxes to the Christian church, to perform their religious services only with the Septuagint and only in the Greek language, and the oath 'More Judaico' was introduced (531), further humiliating the Jews. The Jews were obliged to pay all municipal taxes and perform accompanying duties, without having any rights or privileges in the governance of the town. The policy of Emperor Justinianus I towards the Jews can be summarised with these words from his decree: 'Let these people groan under the weight of the town duties, but not have any honour ranks, they must remain in the same wretched condition, in which they leave their souls.' The legislations of Justinianus had great influence on the civilized world for centuries to come. In the same spirit were the politics of the Eastern Emperors Heraclius I (610–641) and Leo III the

Isaurian (717–741), who ordered all the Jews in the Empire to convert to Christianity.

No less important to the negative attitude of the Christians towards the Jewish population of the Balkans were a number of churchmen, distinguished as saints, who proved to be uncompromising persecutors of the Jews and their religion. It is worth mentioning that in his sermons, the patriarch of Constantinople, St. John Chrysostom, also referred to as Zlatoust (345 or 347 - 407), condemed Judaism and wrote epistles to the Emperor requesting that Jews by deprived of their rights, not be liable to protection under the general laws, and that their synagogues be demolished everywhere. This 'saint' influenced the spiritual thought of Orthodox Christianity for centuries. In the tenth century in Bulgaria, according to an order of Tsar Simeon, and perhaps with his personal participation, a collection of speeches of St. John Chrysostom were prepared, which was titled 'Zlatostruy'. The strong influence of this clergyman it is evident in the fact that some copies of the mentioned collection from the twelfth and sixteenth centuries have reached our times. One of the students of the theologian Theodosius, named Dionysius, translated from Greek into Slavic many of the sermons of St. John Chrysostom, among which were six against the Jews. In the late classical period there was an opinion that the Last Judgement and the second coming of Jesus Christ would happen when the Jewish nation disappeared.[6]

In 681, the proto-Bulgarians, led by Khan Asparouh, united with the settled Slavic tribes, and conquered a territory of Byzantium wherein they established the medieval Bulgarian state. Here we can generalize that the First and the Second Bulgarian Kingdoms became a shelter and attractive centre for the economic activities of the Jews escaping from persecution in Byzantium and Central Europe. The famous medieval traveller Benjamin of Tudela commented on the attitude of the Byzantines toward the Jews:

> And in the town, among them, there are not any Jews, because they have been moved beyond the seacoast […]. And they cannot go out except along the sea -way in order to trade with the citizens of the town. The place where the Jews live is called Pera […]. But they do not allow the Jews to ride horses […] because they live in terrible yoke. And the hatred against them is enormous. And the Greeks pour out the dirty waters from their workshops for tanning hides in front of their yards and gates of their homes and they dirty the quarter of the Jews. The Greeks hate the Jews so much, both the good ones and the bad ones, and their yoke is so big that they beat them in the markets and make them work on the way […]. However, the Jews […] bear the yoke with condescending eye […].'[7]

The relatively tolerant attitude towards the newly arrived Jews to the medieval Bulgarian states could be explained by the centuries long contradiction between Bulgaria and Byzantium, the economic benefit of the Jewish population, and a less fanatic and dogmatic adoption of Christianity by the Bulgarians. The complicated diplomatic game of Knyaz (Prince) Boris, who manoeuvred between the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople at the time of the adoption of Christianity and its imposition on the

state citizens, even by means of terror, influenced the Bulgarian national-psychology for centuries. Even before coming to the Balkans, the proto-Bulgarians were aware of the religion of the Jews, as well as that of Christianity, as both existed in their land of origin, the Great Bulgaria of Khan Koubrat, situated among the rivers Kuban, Donets, and Dniepar. Judaism undoubtedly influenced the proto-Bulgarians due to their connections and relations with the Khazars and their kaganate. A cup of gold and wood with stylized plant figures (VII century) belonging to the treasure of Malaya Pereshchepina (the district of Poltava) connected with the name of Khan Koubrat, depicts the biblical episode of the burning bush on Horev mountain where the voice of God advised Moses to lead the Israelites from Egypt. This symbolism is important evidence of the penetration of Judaism and Christianity among the rich circles of some nomadic nations. Judaism was among the religions professed by the aristocracy of the Khazar kaganate. Clement of Okhrid mentioned that Constantine Cyril the Philosopher, who had participated in religious disputes at councils of the Khazars and the Saratsins, when founding the Slavic-Bulgarian 'Glagolitic alphabet' borrowed some letters and graphic principles from the Semitic writing tradition. In the autumn of 866 Pope Nicholas I sent one hundred and six answers to a long list of questions given by Knyaz Boris (852-889) who had converted to Christianity; it is evident from them that the Bulgarian church was set up under conditions of struggle for the spiritual superiority of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. through proselytism the influence of the Jewish religion was rather strong among those in court circles newly converted to Christianity.

A report from Solomon Abraham Cohen reports that in 967 a great number of Jews emigrated from the Byzantine Empire and settled in Serdica and Nikopol. The Romaniote communities in Vidin and Drastar (Silistra) were formed by such refugees. The rulers Assen and Peter who liberated the country from Byzantine subjection, established trade relations with Ragusa (Dubrovnik), Genoa, and Venice. A great number of Jewish merchants moved from these cities to Bulgaria. Until the arrival of the Sephardim in the fifteenth century the Romaniotes dominated in the life of the Jews in the two Bulgarian kingdoms. The second distinct group of Jews that settled in the country was that of the Ashkenazim. They came from German lands, Bohemia, and Hungary and their migration lasted several centuries - from the eleventh until the second half of the seventeenth century. The Ashkenazim settled mainly in the cities along the Danube river like Vidin, Nikopol, and Drastar. In 1360 Jews from southern German lands settled in Sofia. The number of Ashkenazim increased some years later with the Jews banished from Hungary. Jews from Nuremberg (Bavaria) joined them in 1499 having been banished by a Decree from Emperor Friedrich III (1448-1493).[8]

In a letter from the second half of the thirteenth century Rabbi Jacob Arofe wrote to his cousin, Jacob de Lates from Carcassonne, who had adopted Catholicism and begun persecuting the Jews. The letter was written about the victory of the Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Assen II over the ruler of Epirus, Theodor Comnenus, in a battle near Klokotnitsa in 1230. As a precept the author described how God, as a result of the atrocities visited

upon the Jews by the Greek ruler, embittered him against Ivan Assen II, who defeated his armies and captured him. The Bulgarian Tsar ordered two Jews to blind Theodor Comnenus, but they felt sorry for the captive because of his supplications and had mercy on him. (The Bulgarian Tsar then became angry and ordered these Jews to be thrown from a high mountain[9]. There are also other pieces of information attesting to the fact that it was usual Jews to be appointed as executioners in Bulgaria in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In 1294 Tsar Svetoslav captured the Tartar Choki, whose death sentence was executed by Jews. It is disputable if this was a humiliating obligation or a prestiged and privileged post. The possibility that the custom, known on the islands of Corfu and Sicilia as well, was adopted by Byzantium tends towards the first hypothesis.[10]

A unique event for the medieval world was the marriage of the Bulgarian Tsar, Ivan Alexander, to a Jewish woman, who accepted the Christian name Theodora. In Tsar Boril's Synodikos it is written: 'To Theodora, the devout Tsaritsa of the great Tsar Ivan Alexander and of a Jewish family, who after that was baptized and preserved her devout faith whole, the renovator of many churches, who built different monasteries, the mother of the great Tsar Ivan Shishman, may her memory live for ever!'[11] Historical science does not accept seriously the tale in a local Tarnovo legend that the Jewish name of the converted or 'the newly enlightened' Bulgarian Tsaritsa Theodora was Sarah. Several children were born from that marriage. Among them was Ivan Shishman ,the Bulgarian Tsar who ruled Tarnovo Kingdom untill it was conquered by the Ottomans in 1393.

It is interesting that during the time of that marriage, two anti-heretical church councils were held in 1350 and 1359. The second council, which was held in Tarnovo, was directed against the so-called heresy of Judaizers (*zhidovstvashti*). According to the saint's life of Theodosius of Tarnovo (Theodosiy Tarnovski), among other things, the Jews were insolent towards the clergymen, insulted the worship of icons, and denied the cult of Jesus and Mary, Mother of God. Three representatives of Judaism were initially sentenced to death, although this order was later commutated to banishment, according to the order of the King. One of the sentenced persons adopted Christianity; the other two were set upon by the frenzied Tarnovo citizens – one of them was beaten to death, and the executioners cut off the tongue and the lips of the other. There is an idea in the historiography that such a council was not held, and the arguments in support of that should be taken in account.[12]

In 1376 the Bulgarian ruler Ivan Shishman gave asylum in Nikopol to the Jews banished by King Ludwig I. In a document dated 1377 from Vidin, the capital of the kingdom of Ivan Sratsimir, there is mention of 'neighbouring communities of one faith' which serves as evidence that in many cities of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom there were well organized Jewish communities. In 1393 the Ottomans conquered Tarnovo and put an end to the rule of Ivan Shishman. After the conquest of Nikopol sultan Muhammad the Conqueror found therein flourishing Jewish communities of Romaniots, Ashkenazim and Italian Jews. They were mainly rich merchants. After the death of Ivan Shishman the Jews in the capital of Tarnovo, most of them belonging to aristocratic circles, were

banished. Since that time Tarnovo has not been populated by Jews..

Jews, also banished from Bavaria in 1470, settled in Sofia even though the Bulgarian lands were under Ottoman domination. The famous Edict of 31 March 1492 by the Spanish rulers Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand the Catholic, banished Jews from Portugal, and was followed by the order (1496-1497) of King Manuel I the Fortunate which necessitated thousands of Sephardim to seek refuge within the Ottoman Empire. After the conquests the Ottomans needed solvent taxpayers who could develop prospering trade and crafts in the Balkan towns which were bare of population. The Sephardim started to settle in the towns of Bulgaria coming from Salonika, Istanbul, and Edirne (Adrianople) in the south, and from Italy through Dubrovnik and Bosnia in the southwest. Aside from the towns already settled by Jews in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, like Vidin, Nikopol, Pleven, Sofia, and Plovdiv, Sephardic communities also appeared in Tatar Pazardjik, Karnobat, Yambol, Stara Zagora, Nova Zagora, Provadiya, Razgrad, Shumen, Dobrich, Kazanlik, Sliven, Kyustendil, Dupnitsa, Samokov, Gorna Djumaya, Silistra, Lom palanka, Svishtov, and Rousse.[13]

One quite important circumstance contributed to the generally good and harmonious relationships between Bulgarians and Jews. After the Ottoman conquest Bulgarian towns became depopulated. Most of the Bulgarians settled in the villages and engaged in stock-breeding, agriculture, and crafts. While the Jews lived compactly in the towns and dealt mainly in trade, crafts, money exchange, and tax and custom activities. The two ethnic groups, which belonged to 'raya', or 'the infidels', did not actually compete economically due to the dominance of Islam, however they complemented one another due to the difference in their activities. The Jewish merchants delivered the goods necessary for the villages bought the produce of the Bulgarian peasants. This separation of labour is reflected in Bulgarian proverbs,but with a certain antagonism towards the Jews: 'All Jews are liars, that is why they are rich', and 'All of them are moneychangers, tradesmen, or other easy crafts'. Despite his unequivocally expressed positive attitude towards the Jews, the first Bulgarian newspaper editor, I. Bogorov, expressed this ironic antagonism towards the Jewish population in Karnobat with the following words: 'The Bulgarians and the Turks are ploughmen and shepherds, but the fragile son of Rebekah, being afraid of holding the plough, and so as not to hurt his hands, earns his living by easy and witty profits: trade and monopoly.'[14]

In conditions of foreign national and religious domination, the Bulgarians concentrated on preserving their Orthodox faith for centuries. Different kinds of literature appeared, such as various apocryphal works and biographical compositions, where along with depictions of biblical Jewish characters, there were abuses mixed with prejudices addressed to the Judeans on the basis of the New Testament. Bulgarian folklore, in its main part originates from late medieval times and the Bulgarian National Revival, or from the period after the fall of Bulgaria to Ottoman domination. In its historicity it reaches to even earlier periods, which are given a new meaning by the newer times and historical realities. The oaths, folklore, songs, myths, and legends, expressed an attitude

towards the alien religion, but not towards the nationality or race of the Jews.

Bulgarian common or unwritten law was formed and developed in medieval times in order to regulate the state, social, and family life of the Bulgarian nation. It continued to be in force during the period of the National Revival, although after the middle of the nineteenth century it suffered the restrictions of the Ottoman Empire in connection with its modernization. Although under the sanctions of the Ottoman state, the Bulgarian Community Self Governance enacted jurisdictional functions with mayors, *knyazes* (princes). and elders; held guild associations with resolutions of the *lonca* (loggia), the clan, the patriarchal community, and the family under the instruction and disciplinary order of the elders, the households, and the Orthodox church, in cooperation with the metropolitan ecclesiastical, monastery and other courts; where along with canonical legislation it penetrated a number of common law norms. The Christian religion, which was present with its conceptions and ideas in the view of life of the Bulgarians, also strongly influenced common law. This is why it was quite natural that the Jews, as people of a different religion, in their contact with the surrounding Bulgarians became an object of the non-written national punitive common law norms.[15] The attitudes towards the Jews depicted in them are a consequence of the real conflicts in life caused by religious contradictions and prejudices that were characteristic for the medieval mentality. From the customs and concepts of Bulgarian national law, it is clear that the Bulgarian nation was obliged to persecute and punish actions directed against its official religion. For a person of alien faith or nationality to insult the Christian faith, not to mention persecution of Christians for religious reasons, was considered a mortal sin, and one that could not be overlooked for punishment; this also applied to anyone who appealed to voluntarily converts to an alien religion. An informant of the times tells us it was not considered a sin to beat a Turk or a Jew for swearing on the Christian religion, the Holy Cross, or the Mother of God: 'There was somebody like a Jew or a Gypsy, and a Turk (vagabond) too, who sometimes have made fun of the priest or our faith – and they have always been beaten well, tied up and taken to the town-hall, where they were punished again.' It is worth noting that aside from Bulgarian penal law, the traducers of the faith were subject to sanction by the official Ottoman administrative and juridical authorities as well. Undoubtedly it was an important factor for suppressing ethnic and religious collisions. There existed the concept: 'if the Jews steal a child and slaughter it, and take its blood, the nation can destroy the Jewish houses and kill Jewish men and women, even children – there is no sin'. This notorious blood libel against the Jews was not at all alien to the world view of the Bulgarians. Moreover, prejudice towards the Jews was not only adopted but was rationalized and sanctioned by the common law norms. Not only blood revenge, but any outrages against the Jewish population was tolerated and justified. The prejudice that Jews used Christian blood for ritual purposes suggested ethnic-religious revenge, and it was not viewed in light of individual guilt but as collective responsibility. The adoption of another religion had a dark devil shade in the ideas of the Bulgarians. Their contempt of the proselyte was wider than their contempt for a person of another

faith. The worst punishment was required as a rule if the violator was of alien religion: 'If he is a Turk, or a Jew and forces somebody to adopt Turkish or Jewish faith, he deserves a bullet.' The prejudice regarding the blood accusation strongly influenced and was a ground for the appearance of the law against forced converstion to the Jewish faith. The common law of the Bulgarians, closely connected with the Christian religion and the prejudices of the time, rarely tolerated demeaning relations with infidels and foreigners, in this case, with the Jews. The Jew was considered as a real threat for the Orthodox Christians, not only because of prejudicial beliefs that he killed because of necessity of Christian blood for his rituals, but due to the belief that the Jew encourages the deviation of Christian souls from 'our clean faith' in favour of the ' dirty Jewish faith […] '. The superior number of the people of the Christian faith over the infidels is important for each religion; because of this point of view it was said: 'one less non-christened'. The sources of the common law depicted the Jew in the character of the moneylender, which put him in the category of a social evil for the Bulgarians.[16]

During the epoch of the National Revival the Bulgarians did not have original anti-Jewish literature. In the spirit of medieval religious contradiction, the book 'Jewish Servings and All Their Malefactions with the Testimony of God's Holy Old and New Scriptures' (*Slouzhenie evreysko i vse zlotvorenie nihno so pokazanie ot sveshteno i bozhestveno pisanie vehto i novoe*) was translated from Greek into Bulgarian by the clergyman Nathanail Zografski and the merchant and teacher G. Samourkashev.

Sultan Mahmud II (1808 – 1839) managed to prepare the ground for purposeful governance in the form of a Europezation of the spirit of the moderate bourgeois reforms. Months after his death, with the Hatti-sheriff of Gul Hane from 1839, the Epoch of Tanzimat started. The Hatti-sheriff and Hattihumayun in 1856 proclaimed freedom of worship in the Ottoman Empire, as well as a number of other freedoms. The popularization of the reforms among the different nations was the main task of the Vilayet newspapers as semi-official organs. The reform activities particularly needed to gain the trust of the subordinate nations towards the imperial power.

On the pages of the newspaper 'Tuna\ Dounav' (the Danube) we find information about anti-Semitic activities among the Bulgarians during their National Revival. These were blood accusations in Sofia and Kyustendil that happened in 1875 at the time of Passover. 'The Danube' newspaper wrote that the accusations were a result of superstitions, which in both cases it tried to dispel by means of the truth ascertained by the efforts of the local authorities. The subject of the persecution of the Jews abroad took an important place on the pages of 'The Danube' newspaper. The newspaper condemned the persecutions in Romania and paid attention to the situation of the Jews in Russia and Western Europe. It was emphasized that the intolerant events were a sign of a lack of civilization in the society. It was also emphasized that the Jews enjoyed religious tolerance and civic equality in the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, reality in the Ottoman Empire was somewhat different – full of examples of terror; however, the importance of the propaganda in the vilayet newspapers should not be underestimated as a factor

for forming feelings of inter-ethnic tolerance, especially among the Bulgarians. Also, under this influence these principles were established in the periodicals of the Bulgarian National Revival, which were published in the Empire.

The Bulgarian National Revival was occurring in conditions of strong resistance by Bulgarians against the attempts for assimilation of the Greek ecclesiastic expansion and against Ottoman political domination. So it was difficult for the Jew to be considered an enemy in the consciousness of the Bulgarians in times when the nation had to solve problems with two clearly defined ethnic and religious oppressors; this is well expressed in the proverb: 'The Turks, by means of force, and the Greeks by means of books have brought us to this situation.' All the antipathies of the Bulgarians towards the Jews remained at a mundane level, in the frames of the absurd, and too far removed as a problem to require an urgent solution of national doctrine.[17]

It may be said that the the determining factor in the establishment of good relations between Bulgarians and Jews, especially after the Liberation of Bulgaria, was the democratic ideals of the leaders of the Bulgarian National Revival – both educationalists and revolutionaries. Their ideas for a future democratic state government were established during the National Revival and found their most eloquent expression in one document with national importance, the 'Regulation of the Workers for the Liberation of the Bulgarian Nation'. This was the project of a statute of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee in Bucharest and was prepared by the national hero Vassil Levski. In this project-statute it was written: 'Purpose – by a general revolution to effect a radical reorganization of the present despotic and tyrannical state system and for it to be replaced by a democratic republic (national government)[…] and the Turkish status of a master man to give place to the compliance, brotherhood, and perfect equality among all the nationalities. Bulgarians, Turks, Jews, and others will be equal in every respect, in their faith or nationality or citizenship, or whatever else, all of them will be an object of the same general law, which will be established with the compliance of all the nations.'[18] During the Bulgarian National Revival, the Jews proved to be traditionally loyal citizens of the Ottoman Empire. However, quite a lot of the representatives of the Jewish community showed a fondness for the national strivings of the Bulgarian nation. That is why, whilst travelling around Bulgaria in the name of the national revolution, Vassil Levski found shelter and support in the Jewish families Geron from Pazardjik, Garti and Saranga from Plovdiv, and Rahamim from Ruse. Sofia Community Rabbi and later Main Rabbi Gabriel Almoznino, together with three other Jews, took part in the delegation that greeted Russian General Gourko when the town was liberated.[19]

The political ground in the anti-Jewish direction was much more strongly expressed by Ivan Vazov - a person that belonged to the pre-liberation and post-liberation Bulgarian Epochs. He considered Benjamin Disraeli to be the worst enemy of the nation, as English Balkan policy was lead by him. This extremely negative attitude towards a British politician and statesman increased after he disputed information about the Turkish outrages during the April Rebellion in 1876. Ivan Vazov did not miss the opportunity to

emphasize the Jewish origin of this British statesman. The negative feelings towards the Jews as betrayers, guilty for Bulgaria falling under the Ottoman yoke, were described by the Patriarch of Bulgarian literature in the drama 'Kam propast' (To a Precipice) and the historical novel 'Ivan Alexander' (1907). In these works the legends of the 'Zhidov grob' (Jewish Grave) near Tarnovo were retold, according to which under a the pile of white stones lay the Jew (the *Zhid*) who betrayed the capital to the Ottomans, and was killed by Bulgarians. It was a custom for the local inhabitants to throw a stone at that place and say various curses.

Nonetheless, in respect to anti-Semitism, the energy of Bulgarian nationalism was mainly directed beyond the borders of the Empire, as inside those borders it was limited to acting within the customs and traditions of the established way of life and religion, due to the medieval mentality dominating the masses, even during the Bulgarian National Revival. During the Russo–Turkish War of Liberation, anti-Semitic actions in Stara Zagora and Kazanlyk were the exception. This is why blood libel remained actual as an event after the restoration of the Bulgarian State, as it was extremely inefficient to reinforce and develop one anti-Semitic national doctrine.[20]

After the Liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman domination the legal status of the Jews as citizens of the country and as a part of its society was determined by two main factors: the international treaties, approved or signed by Bulgaria either of her own free will or by force; and inter state legislation. Shortly after 1878 the Principality of Bulgaria (in geographic terms Northern Bulgaria) and the autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia (in geographic terms Southern Bulgaria) were founded according to the Treaty of Berlin (July 1/ 13, 1878). In 1885 they united as one state under the name of the Principality of Bulgaria which became legally independent like a Kingdom after 1908. The state system and its way of ruling, as well as the citizens' participation in exercising and controlling these powers were regulated by the main laws of these state formations. These were the Constitution of the Principality of Bulgaria (the so-called Tarnovo Constitution – because it was adopted in the old capital city of Tarnovo on 16 April 1879), and the Constitutional Statutes of Eastern Rumelia passed on 14 April 1879 in the city of Plovdiv. These acts determined the basis of the internal legal status of the Jews in Bulgaria. In contrast to the situation in some neighboring Balkan countries as well as in some countries belonging to the Great Powers, these acts did not discriminate between the Jewish population and the other citizens at all. The main principle underlying the said basic acts was the legal equality of all citizens regardless of their religion and nationality.

According to the Tarnovo Constitution the Bulgarian state was at first defined as politically autonomous, but national, unilingual with the dominant Eastern-Orthodox religion. Not only the principle of citizens' equality, but also the principle of the equality of the nationalities was passed more firmly in the Constitutional Statutes of Eastern Rumelia than in the Constitution of Tarnovo. The Constitutional Statutes were drawn up by the European Commission, which was in session in the city of Plovdiv. Eastern Rumelia was an autonomous region under the direct political and military power of the

Ottoman Empire (Article 1). The state was characterized as being multinational and trilingua: Turkish, Bulgarian, and Greek were proclaimed as basic languages. They were used by the central and the local administrative authorities, the judiciary powers, and by private persons in accordance with specified rules (Article 22). State posts were distributed among the nations proportionally, on the grounds of elections (Article 21). The spiritual heads of the ethnical-religious communities, including 'the chief rabbi who judges in the chief town of the region' participated in the Regional Assembly, the principal councils, and the commissions in making the district electoral lists by right as members (Articles 69, 125, 165).

The international acts were the other prerequisite for proclaiming legal equality for all citizens of the country irrespective of religion, mother tongue, ethnic origin or nationality. Acts such as the Treaty of Berlin (1878), and the minorities' protection rules in Section IV, Articles from 49 to 57 included in the Peace Treaty of Neuilly (1919) regulated the international legal matters of minority protection by the League of Nations. The Tarnovo Constitution had to conform with Article 5 of the Treaty of Berlin, which did not give ground to the Bulgarian public law requiring restrictions of civil and political rights, work in public and state services, the conferring of titles and honours, or the practice of various professions and industrial manufacturing in whichever part of the Principality, due to difference in religion.[21]

On the basis of the specified prerequisites the principle of equality for all Bulgarian citizens was a principle underlying all official internal legal acts. Of course, this fact does not mean that there was no anti-Semitism in Bulgaria, however, its existence was to an inconsiderable degree compared with most countries of the world. In the interests of historical truth we can mention that there were some restrictions for Bulgarian Jews regarding access to high military ranks and many posts in the state administration. These restrictions, however, were regulated by inner rules and confidential circular letters and their application or non-execution depended on various subjective factors. The confidential character of these acts indicated that they were a way to get around Bulgarian legislation, and in principle they violated it. There were restrictions for Jews in Bulgaria regarding their access to the Military School, the School of the Officers of the Reserve, the Bulgarian National Bank, etc.[22]

The founders of the Tarnovo Constitution did not take into consideration some of the articles of the Berlin Treaty, like Articles 5, 8 and 12, which concerned matters on the rights of minorities and religious communities. According to these articles it was guaranteed that the religion professed by the citizens could not be used as grounds for restricting their personal and political rights, or to act as an obstruction to the appointment to, or practice of, a job or profession. The state could not obstruct the hierarchical structure or relations between clerical heads and their communities. The absence of these decrees in the main law of the country gave the authorities the opportunity not to solve problems arising in favour of the minorities. Despite the abovementioned restrictions, there were a number of cases where Jewish doctors were deprived of their rights to

practice their profession because of their religion affiliations.

At the primary legislation of the educational system serious obstructions were created for the schools, supported by the religious communities of the Israelites, Gregorians, Patriarch supporters, Muslims and others, as the right of their alumni to continue their education in the state schools was restricted. The dispensing of funds was either absent or it was restricted to separate ethnic religious communities. The state stimulated education in the newly established municipal and state schools, and the teachers in them were granted with a number of privileges. These schools were financed normally, while the other ones were almost self-supporting – but nonetheless controlled by the state. During financing, preferences were given to ethnic or confessional groups, which had the potential to Bulgarize themselves, such as the Bulgarian Mohammedans, Gagauses, Wallachians and Bulgarian Catholics (*Pavlikyans*), as well as those schools that had introduced the teaching and study of school subjects in the Bulgarian language, as the Jews and Armenians had done. The so called 'regime of capitulation' inherited by the Ottoman Empire and underlying the Berlin Treaty, was not adopted in the Principality.

The policy towards minorities was influenced by Great Britain, France, Austro–Hungary and others thru diplomatic missions in defence of the rights of the Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Jews. Just the opposite direction was taken by Russia in its traditions in the state structure of the Temporary Russian Government and by Russian colonels, clerks and alumni in the government of the country. Dating from that time are the first measures against Muslims, Greeks, and Jews. During the regime of the attorneys steps were taken against the Jews by obstructing their economic enterprises in the Danube and the Black Sea towns.

There were anti-Semitic persecutions in Karlovo and Stara Zagora during the Russo–Turkish War, and the refugees returned there only with the help of the administrative authorities, which prevented the demonstrations by resentful local Bulgarians from turning into outrage. Exarch Yossif I himself supported G. Krastevich in accepting Jewish refugees back to Karlovo. Some of the unwanted Jews were accommodated in deserted or newly established villages. The authorities in Eastern Rumelia paid considerable attention to that case not only because they followed in principle the policy of preventing and settling conflicts among the ethnic religious communities, but also because the matter was still tabled at the Berlin Congress as a part of the examination of 'the Jewish problem'. The acceptance of Jewish refugees was normal in the towns of Kazanlyk, Haskovo, Yambol, and Sliven, and their properties were preserved and given back. As a rule, the representative was the Rabbi (*hahambashi*) of the Israelite community with a Head Office in Plovdiv. He received a license from the governor of the region and confirmed the appointment of the Rabbis in the different religious communities.[23]

The last two decades of nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century indicated certain anti-Jewish activity in Bulgaria, expressed by the publication of anti-Semitic literature (books and brochures) and periodicals (newspapers and single newssheets) and the establishment of anti-Semitic societies. During that time the process

of disintegration of the crafts, caused by competition from imported goods as well as by the local industry, started to be felt. The economic interests of some Jewish tradesmen began to conflict with the interests of the Bulgarian merchants and workers in other economic spheres. The initial activity was connected with the name of Tr. Bozhidarov, who read several anti-Semitic lectures round the country and collaborated in the publication of several anti-Semitic books about the Talmud and others topics in 1882, 1884, 1885 and 1886. In Ruse, the anti-Semitic campaign was initiated by the satirical newspaper 'Resheto' (The Sieve) in 1884–1885. But that propaganda was too abstract for the vital national tasks of the Bulgarians, busy with the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Roumelia. After an interruption of several years, the anti-Semitic work was re-initiated by V. D. Kazakov, who published a humourous political and literary weekly, 'Dve i dve pet' (Two and Two is Five), in 1889. The publication had a short life. In different periodicals some separate anti-Semitic articles appeared like one by D. Levov in the 'Svoboda' (Freedom) newspaper - an organ of the Popular and Liberal Party of St. Stambolov – and another by D. Profan in Stambolov's newspaper, 'Balkanska zora', (Balkan Dawn) in1892. The tendency continued in 1897–1900 in the opposition's Stambolov's newspaper, Narodna zashtita (National defence), and in 1901–1903 in the organ of the Liberal Party, 'San-Stefanska Bulgaria' (San Stefano Bulgaria) – published in Plovdiv – which, as a nationalistic one, was against all minorities in the country. There was anti-Jewish propaganda in the opposition's Liberal Democratic newspaper, 'Zora' (Dawn), with editor I. Y. Popov; as well as in the popular party newspaper 'Narodna volya' (Popular Will) (1899), Stambolov's newspaper 'Narodna sila' (National Strength) (1898) of T. D. Tsankov in Shumen, the popular party newspaper 'Sliven' (1894 – 1901) in the town with the same name, and the 'Bulgarski narod' (Bulgarian Nation) newspaper (1902 – 1904) in Yambol. In 1893 and 1894–1895 anti-Semitic magazines and newspapers of Nikola Mitakov appeared such as 'Bulgaria za bulgarite' (Bulgaria for the Bulgarians), 'Bulgaria bez evrei' (Bulgaria without Jews), and 'Narodna svoboda' (National Freedom), which had a rather comical appearance and contents. The economic interests of individual peoples could be seen in these publications, and they appealed for the establishment of anti-Semitic societies, and of an anti-Semitic Party. Apart from calumnies and insults, the publications called for a limitation of the political and economic freedoms of the Jews, expelling them from the country and even their physical extermination. The editor led an anti-socialist campaign, because of the defence and support that the social democrats gave the Jews. N. Mitakov published several anti-Semitic brochures in 1894 and as a result he was given a sentence of four-months in prison and a fine for calumny. Three brochures in the same spirit were published by Atanas Klepanov and Mihail Grebenarov in Sofia in 1894, as well as two by Ivan Ikonomov: 'Pazete se ot evreite' (Beware of the Jews) (1891) and 'Sotsializam i vyatar' (Socialism and Wind) (1901). A brochure by the teacher Djongozov from Lom about the trial in the town of Polna (Bohemia), and another one titled 'Pazete se ot evreite' (Beware of the Jews) by A. Lipin were also published. The following brochures were published in Ruse: 'Borbata protiv evreite' (The Struggle

Against the Jews) (1891) and 'Pazete se ot evreite' (Beware of the Jews) (1899). The authors S. and F. Hristo Angelov published the brochure 'Evreite' (The Jews) in Vidin in 1897 and D. A. Spirov published the brochures 'Uchastieto na evreite pri klanetata nad armentsite v Tsarigrad' (The Participance of the Jews in the Process of Slaughtering the Armenians in Istanbul) and 'Armenia i sultan Abdul Hamid' (Armenia and Sultan Abdul Hamid') in Kazanlik in 1896. The tailor Stefan Tsankov published the brochures 'Predpazlivost of evreyskata eksploatatsia' (Wariness from the Jewish Exploitation) and 'Yeudey' (Israelite) in Shumen in 1898.

Anti-Semitic materials also appeared in the newspapers 'Otziv' (Response) (1897–1903) and 'Nov Otziv' (New Response) (1898–1901) of the Liberal Party of Dr. V. Radoslavov, 'Poshta' (Post) (1899–1900) and 'Vecherna Poshta' (Evening Post) (1900–1914) of Stoyan S. Shangov - the organ of the town anti-Semitic Committee in Bourgas - 'Golgota' (Golgotha) (1889–1900), 'Rodopski kurier' (Rhodopi Courier) (1899–1900) and the newspaper 'Haskovo' (1895–1896) of the Popular (Narodnyashka) Party, published in Haskovo, the 'Zashtitnik' (Defender) newspaper (1894–1895) , 'Strandja' (1896–1899) – the organ of the Thracian Society with the same name - 'Badeshtnost' (Futurity) (1897) and 'Zapiski' (Notices) (1901) of At. Hr. Angelov in Vidin, 'Otbrana' (Defence) (1899) in Stara Zagora, 'Sveshtenicheski zhezal' (Priest's Sceptre) (1902) of Ivan Ikonomov in Plovdiv, 'Ptitsa' (Bird) (1894) of G. P. Nikolov in Pazardjik. The anti-Jewish periodicals had a small circulation as a rule and survived for only a short time, as the publishers themselves confessed the lack of success to influence the public opinion and energy. 'Golgotha' called for outrages and massacres of the Jews. These types of anti-Semitic declarations in the periodicals were met by the majority of Bulgarian society with bewilderment and contempt. In 1894 the historical and geographical book 'Knyazhestvo Bulgaria' (Principality of Bulgaria) of G. G. Dimitrov appeared, wherein there was a chapter titled 'Evreite' (The Jews) with anti-Semitic content and presenting cases of ritual murder as reality. This chapter was also published as a single brochure in Pazardjik in 1895. In 1902 in Vidin, Dimitrov published the brochure 'Kakvi sa i kakvo varshat evreite' (What are the Jews Like and What Do They Do), which was the third edition. In 1895 in Lom, M. N. Angelov published the book 'Po evreyskiya vapros (About the Jewish Problem) which is full of calumnies about the usage of Christian blood. In Plovdiv the books of Neofit appeared – 'Evreyskata religia' (The Jewish Religion) (1885) and the publications of the German agent Osman Bey Kibrizli Zoali who adopted the Islam - 'Prevzemaneto na sveta ot evreite' (Conquering of the World by the Jews) (1897). The brochure 'Gonitelite evrei' (The Jews – Persecutors) was published (1897) in Sliven. This called for measures against the Jews, exposed as the killers of Christ. Regarding the traditional blood accusation, the book of T. Chernev 'Kakvi sa evreite i upotrebyavat li te hristiyanska krav' (What are the Jews like and Do They Use Christian Blood) was published in Yambol in 1898. Almost entirely in this ferocious spirit is the book of Stoyan S. Shangov 'Judaism and Talmudism' in 1900. In Sliven, Bishop Serafim translated from Russian the book of S. Marokski 'Vrazumlenie na

evreite ili zlatnoto sachinenie' (Bringing the Jews to Their Senses or the Golden Essay') (1889). In 1896, G. P. Kantardjiev organized in Sofia the publication of a book translated from the German,'Zavladyavaneto na sveta ot evreite i dopalneno s vsemirniya izraelski sayuz sas sedalishte v Parizh' (Conquering of the World by the Jews and supplemented with the Alliance Israelite Universelle with Head Office in Paris). In the same year in Yambol, the following books were published: 'Rodshildovtsite' (The Rothschilds) and 'Evreite' (The Jews) about the parasitical and exploitative nature of the Jewry. In 1898 the book 'Politiko–ikonomicheskata borba protiv evreite' (Political and Economic Struggle Against the Jews) by N. A. Virhovski was published. The anti-Semitic workers made use of the Dreyfus affair in the organs of the press as well.

During the described period anti-Semitic disturbances were caused by the medieval accusation of ritual murder. Such accusations occurred in Vratsa in 1891 after the murder of a girl, in Lom in 1904 after the disappearance and death of a young man, in 1905 after a man who was popular in his pub went missing, in Sofia in 1907 after a General's child went missing, and a case in Ruse in 1908. The Vratsa accusation escalated into a trial (1893) which ended in acquittal, and anti-Jewish outrages were avoided after the interference of the Minister of Ecclesiastical Matters, Grekov, and the Minister of Interior Affairs, St. Stambolov. The popularity of the belief in the blood ritual of the Jews is shown by the fact that the prosecutor in the above case relied on said belief in his indictment, as well as by the anti-Semitic literature, and police searchs of Jewish houses. In 1897, due to increased troubles and outrages against the Jewish population in Kyustendil, Dupnitsa, Lom, Pleven, Varna, and others, the Chairman of the Sofia Jewish Community officially addressed the Minister of Religious Affairs for support – with insistence. As a result the Government took the necessary measures. The legal proceedings in Yambol in 1898 with the accusation that Bohor Shishedjiev consumed Christian blood at Passover concludedd in 1903 by acquittal from the Court of Appeal in Plovdiv. In spite of the appraisal by medical experts, which rejected the accusation, the case in Lom (1904) was connected with an anti-Jewish demonstration during the funeral, an assault on Jewish houses, and a strong military interference against the trouble-makers. The following year there was another demonstration due to a case that occurred in the town. There were some incidents of anti-Semites who attacked Jewish houses and broke windows with stones in the quarters around Orthodox churches in Sofia at the end of the nineteenth century, when pictures about the case in Polna were exhibited in a bookshop. In 1899 the anti-Semitic society in Bourgas sent a petition to the National Assembly for restriction of the civil rights of Jews – prohibitions against: settlement in the country, buying real estate property, tradeing out of the towns, realization of commissioner activities, working at customs, bor being granted credit by the Bulgarian credit institutions. Apart from that, the Jews were to be liable for a tax on their stay in Bulgaria, and the death penalty was to be adopted for participants in the kidnapping of Christian children. In 1901 there was an anti-Semitic demonstration in Sofia due to the desire of a Jewish woman and a Bulgarian man to marry. In the same

year there was an anti-Jewish outrage in Kyustendil and the synagogue was violated. Before that, in the same town, fights had been organized against Jews by members of the 'Judas' Anti-Semitic Society. In the village of Varvara a Jew was killed. There were incidents in Yambol and Pleven in 1901 as well as in Sofia and Plovdiv in 1903. Because of an incident concerning a child, the authorities searched the synagogue in Sofia.[24]

However, in 1907 the university students and socialists rose in defence of the Jews.

The main accusations of the anti-Semitic propaganda in Bulgaria during this period of time were that the Jews were foreigners, although they were born in the country, and as objectionable elements they had to be expelled by 'patriotic' Bulgarians. Apart from that, it was held that all Jews were rich and impostors and therefore exploiters and parasites, living on the back of the Bulgarian nation. As a result of the competition in the trade, industry, crafts, liberal professions and others, a number of Bulgarians became unemployed. As the 'killers of Jesus Christ', Jews were seen as blood enemies of the Christians. The Jews, whose character was presented as an ugly and ridiculous one, drank the blood of the Christian children in their religious rituals on their Passover holidays and prepared their Passover buns (*boyos*) with Christian blood. As a reply to the defensive attacks of the social democrats, the anti-Semites claimed that the socialistic principles of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were in the interest of the Jewish capital and aimed at the destruction of society in the interest of the Jews. In this period, according to anti-Semitic workers in Bulgaria, it was characteristic for the Jews to pursue economic profits thru the elimination of competition by all possible means. The anti-Semitic propaganda, by its nature, was at a low cultural level, it did not have respectable representatives with scientific erudition and was characterized by primitive and economic anti-Semitism of a medieval type. The lack of outstanding social differences between Bulgarians and Jews, the weak religiosity of society in general, socialist propaganda against anti-Semitism, the laws of the country, and last but not least, the part of the state and local authorities, were among the factors which limited the effect of these events in the country. Anti-Semitism was not able to develop organizationally and so to grow into a powerful movement.[25]

In the 1930s anti-Semitism in Bulgaria entered a new stage, connected with race theories under the influence of national socialism in Germany. At the beginning of 1932 in Sofia the psychopath Kalpakchiev kidnapped two Jews, a doctor and an old-clothes man, but the police prevented the tragedy and the court sent the attacker to prison for two years. Tolerated by the authorities, nationalistic and fascist organizations like 'Rodna Zashtita', 'Otets Paisiy', 'Koubrat', 'Ratnik', 'The Legionaries' and others terrorized the Jews. In the centre of Sofia, the ratniks, encouraged by the director of the police, Colonel Pantev, organized attacks against Jewish shops and law offices. Nazi literature was also spread.

By signing the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria assumed the obligation to protect minorities without any objections. The clauses of Section IV, however, did not make a considerable change in the legal status of the Jews in Bulgaria. Guarantees of Jewish population rights and freedoms which were considered in individual aspects as indi-

vidual citizens, and in collective aspects as organized groups, existed in the Tarnovo Constitution and in the whole state legal system. Bulgaria, being a defeated country, deprived of territories with a compact Bulgarian population, was interested in adopting the specified articles of Section IV as well as the convention for freedom of minority emigration. Thus, in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria was obliged to recognize the minorities protection decrees as basic laws. There were no laws, rules or official orders that could contradict these decrees or make them invalid.[26] The adoption of the Nation Defence Act by the majority of the Twenty-fifth Ordinary National Assembly was an absolute revision of this section of the Treaty of Neuilly and a violation of internal laws.

The National Defence Bill was proposed in the National Assembly by Bogdan Filov's government on 6 November, 1940.[27] This document was drawn up in the Ministry of Health and the Interior, which was headed by Peter Gabrovski (1898-1945) from 15 February 1940 till 14 September 1943.

But these resolutions were taken later. The motives for the preparation of the National Defence Act (NDA) for Bulgaria, were, however, for similar foreign political reasons subject first of all in binding Bulgaria to Nazi Germany.

It is obvious that the National Defence Bill was drawn up on B. Filov's verbal order. P. Gabrovski was one of the leaders of the nationalistic organization 'Champion of the advancement of the Bulgarian national traits' (*Ratnik za napreduk na bulgarshtinata*), founded in 1937. This organization maintained a pro-German political line and anti-Semitism was one of its basic manifestations. In adapting these racist theories to the native soil these champions (*ratnitsi*) made popular the thesis about peculiar racial aspects of the Bulgarians which made them different from the other Slav nations.[28]

The first draft of the NDA was prepared in the Ministry of Public Health and the Interior soon after the talk between B. Filov and P. Gabrovski; it was discussed 'in detail' in the Council of Ministers. The first draft was discussed by the government and some recommendations and amendments were obviously made then. On the grounds of these talks the National Defence Bill was drafted by the Ministry of Public Health and the Interior. The government agreed to propose this bill in the National Assembly. However, a month earlier, on 9 October, 1940, P. Gabrovski's statements had been published in the press. In them he tried to back with arguments the necessity of proposing a bill in the National Assembly, with the aim of drawing up and introducing the National Defence Act.[29] It was these statements which gave rise to the first protests against the future act as early as October 1940. They soon grew into large public legal and underground resistance movement against the anti-Semitic bill which was being prepared.

The struggle against the anti-humane act continued in the National Assembly during the first and second readings of the bill on 15, 19 and 20 November and on 20 and 24 December 1940. Nine people voted for the bill and eight voted against it or had some reservations, including three deputies from the government majority.[30]

The anti-Semitic acts which were later passed are also signed by Vassil Nikolov

Mitakov, Minister of Justice from 1 January 1941 till 11 April 1942, in his capacity as keeper of the seal. He was a brother of the deputy of the majority, Kroum Mitakov, and a son of above-mentioned N. Mitakov – a notorious anti-Semite in Bulgaria at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. V. Mitakov's participation in anti-Semitic acts may have been formal in character, but his empathy as a Minister of Justice in drawing the Bulgarian Citizenship Act (hereinafter referred to as BCA), approved by Edict No 275, dated 16 December 1940, was significant. Under Number 15 in this Act, which came into force after its promulgation in the Official Gazette on 20 December 1940, an article was inserted which was fatal and hid the true intentions of the ruling circles in relation to the Jews. In his speech before the National Assembly the minister noted the following about this newly-introduced article:

> any person of non-Bulgarian origin who has emigrated loses his/her Bulgarian citizenship, because it is considered that by the fact of emigrating the only connection between this person – the residence – and the state is broken and also with this, the difficulties are removed in the cases when persons come back to the kingdom again as citizens several years after their emigration, after having spent years abroad and having lost touch with Bulgaria with which, as the saying goes, the only connection was the fact of their residence.

By virtue of Article 15 of the BCA, the Bulgarian citizen of non-Bulgarian origin who emigrated from the Kingdom lost his/her Bulgarian citizenship by the fact of emigration. He had to liquidate his/her properties within three months as of the date of leaving the territory of Bulgaria. Otherwise, the properties would be liquidated through the court as stipulated by Article 20, Paragraph 2. In Article 15 it was said: 'The one, who has emigrated from the Kingdom by virtue of an agreement between Bulgaria and another country also loses his/her Bulgarian citizenship if not otherwise stipulated in the agreement.' In Article 16 it was stipulated that the wife and the children of full legal age also lost their Bulgarian citizenship if they had emigrated together with those persons stated in the cases of Article 15.[31] Thus the fate of the Jews from Vardar Macedonia and the Aegean Region were decided, namely, on this ground, NDA and the Agreement of 22 February 1943 between Alexander Belev, Bulgarian Commissar on the Jewish questions, and Theodor Dannecker, SS Hauptshturmfeuhrer, regarding the deportation of Jews to Poland. The Agreement was supported by the Decrees of the Council of Ministers, Record Number 32 regarding the deportation of 20,000 Jews living within the new and old boundaries of the country, their deprivation of Bulgarian citizenship, and the expropriation of their properties.

Three days after the BCA came into force, on 24 December 1940, the 25th Ordinary National Assembly passed the National Defence Act. It was approved by Edict Number 3 of 21 January 1941, signed by Tsar Boris III, and was promulgated in the National Gazette on 23 January 1941. In the scientific literature one comes across the statement that the content of this act 'in many respects is analogous to the racist Nuremberg laws already in force in Germany'. However, the question has not been investigated in detail.

The fact that the *ratnik* Alexander Belev, legal adviser at the Ministry of the Interior and Public Health, was sent on a business-trip to Germany is given as a proof. There he had experience to draw upon in the 'building the legal basis of anti-Jewish legislation' in Bulgaria. The pogroms against the Jews in Sofia in 1939, and the organization and realization of the anti-Semitic policy in Bulgaria, which was coordinated with the Nazis, are connected with his name.[32] By adopting the NDA anti-Semitism was accepted and erected as a state policy for the first time in Bulgaria. It was with this act that the grounds of anti-Semitic legislation in Bulgaria were laid during the years of the Second World War, as well as by the official approbation of the principle that 'the Bulgarian Jews are a social evil, they are an obstacle to the development of the Bulgarian nation and for that reason they have to be separated from the Bulgarian people by being deprived of all political and most of the civil rights'.[33] This formulation is close to the national-socialist doctrine according to which the Jews are held to be an inferior hostile race threatening the Aryan race with demoralization. The beginning of the legal anti-Semitic persecutions in the country were laid with the NDA. During the discussed period the legal norms had the aim of distinguishing the Jewish population from the other Bulgarian citizens and also of putting restrictions on the Jews by gradually escalating to their complete deprivation of their collective and individual rights. It was exactly from the said Article 15 and Article 16 of the BCA and the anti-Semitic legislation that followed that the way was paved for the deportation of Bulgarian Jews out of the country, which actually meant their destruction in the death camps – as happened with Jews of Vardar Macedonia and the Aegean Region. In this way the line of German anti-Semitic legislation – from deprivation of rights to extermination – was followed for almost three years.

The general restrictions in Chapter II led to complete discrimination against Jews, and turned them into an underprivileged people. 'Persons of Jewish origin', a term used in the law, could not become Bulgarian citizens. Jewish women accepted the citizenship (or lack thereof) of their husbands (Article 21, a), Jews did not have the right to elect or be elected in public-legal elections or in the elections of any association with non-profit aims. Those who held an elective office pending the law coming into force had to re-sign their office within a one-month period, due to their origin (Article 21, b). It was forbidden for Jews to hold governmental, municipal or other posts in public authorities or in private-legal organizations which made use of legal privileges or were supported materially by the public authority. Jews who held such offices had to resign within a one-month period(Article 21, c). Jews were deprived of the right to marry or to cohabit with a Bulgarian or to have a Bulgarian as a servant in whatever form (Article 21 e, zh). Jews were not allowed to be members of organizations under the supervision of the War Ministry (Article. 21, d). They were held to be unfit for military labour service had to pay a tax. It was forbidden for Jews to purchase an exemption. They were obliged to serve only as labour service men in separate labour groups (Article 21, g). The Minister of Public Education determined the number of Persons of Jewish origin who could be admitted to the national educational establishments in case there were no Bulgarian

candidates (Article 22). Chapter III referred to restrictions connected with freedom of residence for Jews in the country. No Jew could change his/her residence and especially to move to Sofia without getting a permission from the Police Department. According to a report by the Minister of Internal Affairs and Public Health the Council of Ministers could determine the towns, villages, and regions where Jews did not have the right to live. The Central Power could specify new residences for Jews already living in these towns and villages (Article 23, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3).

The restriction clauses of the act continued in Chapter IV. They were related to the properties of persons of Jewish origin. Jews could not possess, own or rent personally or through 'dummies' land or house properties in the villages with exception of those in the resorts. The owners of land properties had to offer them to the State Land Fund at the Ministry of Agriculture and State Properties to be bought off within a three-month period. The stated house properties had to be sold to Bulgarians or companies with Bulgarian capital within a one-year period. Rented land properties had to be vacated by the Jews by 1 October 1941.

In connection with the residence (Article 23) and registration of the Jews in the municipalities (Article 16) the aim by Article 24, was here also intended to stop any possible deviations from the concentration of this population in the towns and villages as determined by the authorities. There, the Jews could be submitted to eventual further measures in a compact way.

The professional and business activities of the Jews were restricted in the last chapter of this part of the NDA.

From the diary of Lyubomir Loulchev, personal advisor of the Tsar and follower of the religious sect 'The White Confraternity' lead by 'the teacher' Peter Danov, we learn that during their meeting in connection with the bill on 9 November 1940 the Tsar told him the following: 'I postponed for a long time and I did not want we to draw it up but now, when Romania, Hungary and even France have it, I decided that it is better to make it ourselves than to have it imposed on us.'[34]

The Regulations for applying the NDA were issued 'by virtue of Article 50 and the VIII Decree of the Council of Ministers. It was promulgated two days after its approval by Edict Number 21 dated 15 February 1941. What had not been passed in the NDA in the National Assembly was elaborated here in greater detail and in practice it complicated the situation of the Jewish population with its concrete form. The main purpose of the Regulations were to put the NDA into effect. From the articles of the NDA it was seen that nearly all ministries had to carry out the measures related to the Jews and the Regulations involved more concretely the Prosecution and the judicial power. Naturally, the main activity related to the Jewish question fell to the Ministry of Public Health and the Interior, and to the Police Department subordinate to it. The Regulations enlarged, to a certain extent, the circle of people regarded as being of Jewish origin and therefore coming within the provisions of NDA. This mainly concerned cases of mixed marriage.

Then followed several Decrees of the Council of Ministers on 26 February, 3 and

16 April, 8 May, and 6 September 1941, and Regulation for the Application of Article 25 of the NDA, promulgated on 29 July 1941, which further specified the articles of the NDA which discriminated against the the Jews. In fact, these acts followed the tendency of increasing the restrictions on the professions exercised by Jews and for their participation in the economic life of the country. In connection with this, on 11 July 1941 the Twenty-fifth Ordinary National Assembly passed the Act of Single Tax upon the Property of the Persons of Jewish origin (promulgated in the Official Gazette on 14 July 1941). The aim was to appropriate a large part of the large and middle-size properties owned by Jews and thereby to decrease their economic importance in the country.

Regulation VI-131 on the Application of the Act of Single Tax upon the Property of Persons of Jewish origin was promulgated on 21 July 1941. In accordance with it all movable and immovable properties of Jews, Bulgarian and foreign citizens, were taxed regardless of whether they lived within (including the newly annexed lands in 1940 and 1941) or outside the kingdom. Every Jew had to declare all his/her property. In accordance with Article 18, the NDA was valid in relation to Jews and inhabitants of lands liberated in 1940 - 1941. On 23 June 1942 the National Assembly passed the Interpretive Act of Article 6 of the Act of Single Tax upon the Property of Persons of Jewish origin (effective as of 2 July 1942). Then followed the Act for Paying Off the Lands Belonging to Persons of Jewish origin which were offered to the State Land Fund to be bought up in accordance with the NDA passed by the Twenty-fifth National Assembly on 13 July 1941 (promulgated on 19 July 1941).

The Regulation regarding Citizenship in the Lands Liberated in 1941 was also related to the anti-Semitic legislation in Bulgaria. It was approved by the Thirty-first Decree of the Council of Ministers on 5 June 1942, and promulgated on 10 June 1942. In Article 4, Paragraph II the Jewish population was explicitly separated from the Regulation wherein Yugoslavian and Greek citizens of non-Bulgarian origin, with place of residence in the lands annexed in 1941, became Bulgarian citizens. Jewish women adopted the citizenship of their husbands, which in the cases of mixed marriages proved to be favourable for their fate. By virtue of this Regulation the Jews there were regarded as foreign citizens due to the explanation given in Article 4: 'This regulation has no reference to the persons of Jewish origin.' In 1943 they were handed over on the sly for annihilation by the Nazis.

Very important to the fate of the Jews in the so-called 'old boundaries of the country' which coincide more or less with those of present-day Bulgaria, was the Act of Assigning to the Council of Ministers to Take All Measures for Settling the Jewish Question and the Questions Connected with It, and mainly the Regulation of the Council of Ministers dated 26 August 1942 (effective from 29 August), issued on its basis. By virtue of this Regulation the Commissariat of the Jewish Problem was founded at the Ministry of Public Health and the Interior (Article 1). The regulations and orders of the commissar at the head were not subject to appeal (Article 4). On 3 March 1942, after a proposal made by P. Gabrovski, Minister of Internal Affairs and Public Health, the Council of

Ministers appointed Alexander G. Belev as commissar on the Jewish Problem. By virtue of Regulation of 26 August 1942 the Commissariat of the Jewish Problem issued the Regulation of the Organization and Management of the Jewish Communities. The Central Consistory of the Jews in Bulgaria and the Jewish Communities were put under the control of the Commissariat. All regulations and memorandums of the commissar on the Jewish problem, issued by virtue of the said acts, can be considered as a continuation of the anti-Semitic legislation in Bulgaria during the Second World War. It completely paved the way not only for the humiliation and plunder of the Jews in the country, but also for their physical destruction. The Regulations of the Commissariat on the Jewish Problem, to which there was no appeal, in accordance with the Regulation of 26 August 1942, were approved by Decree of Tsar Boris III, promulgated on 27 November 1942.

The Regulation of 26 August 1942 approved by the Council of Ministers expanded, and in many aspects changed, the NDA at the recommendation of Al. Belev. There were no discussions in the Parliament this time. This Regulation increased the bans for the Jews and restricted the privileges for the separate categories that were initially determined. In relation to this, the definition of 'persons of Jewish origin' was specified completely and expanded in a separate chapter.

Mortal danger threatened the Jews as a result of the resolutions of the Conference held in the Gestapo on 20 January 1942.The agreement between A. Belev and T. Dannecker outlined the deportation of 20,000 Jews from Bulgaria and the preparation of the echelons. This mortal danger for the Jews in Bulgaria was prevented by nation-wide efforts and many lucky coincidences which are the field-work of past, present, and future scientific studies and interpretations.

As a result of the anti-Semitic legislations and the acts of the Executive power in March 1943, 7,122 Jews from Vardar Macedonia and Western Districts as well as 4,221 from the Aegean region were deported and sent to the death camps at the request of and under duress from the Nazis. In August 1941 Jewish labour groups were organized within the so-called 'old boundaries' of the country and in May/June 1943 the Jews from Sofia were moved to the province. The Jews from the strategic centers in the country such as Shumen and Varna were also moved to the interior of the country.

There should be no doubt that anti-Semitism in Bulgaria during the 30s was strongly influenced by its spread in West Europe and especially in Germany. Several nationalistic organizations, imitating their Nazi prototypes in an artificial way, started at that time to propagandize racial anti-Semitism. It seemed exotic and alien to the society but not insignificant as a phenomenon introduced on Bulgarian soil. For that reason a prevailing portion of intellectuals were opposed to, it with the necessary consideration, years before the surprising appearance of the NDA. A weighty proof of this is a documentary collection by Buko Piti, 'The Bulgarian Public about Racism and Anti-Semitism', released in Sofia in 1937. There are censure-deserving opinions of influential people in the country, including politicians, in this collection.

The introduction of anti-Semitic legislation in Bulgaria was realized without di-

rect German duress; it was on the initiative of the ruling circles in accordance with the directions and the moment chosen by Tsar Boris III. This was during the last moments before the appearance of an outer duress regarding the Jewish question, when a more severe law could have been imposed. This was the moment after the adoption of anti-Semitic legislative measures in the satellite countries of Germany. The Tsar did not want the Germans to take this fact into consideration. Just the opposite, with the adoption of the NDA he wanted to prove to them that Bulgaria was also a satellite country even if it did not sign the Tripartite Pact. In this way the combination of pro-German orientation and officially declared neutrality could continue. It was exactly the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Tripartite Pact that was of importance to Germany in order to realize the expansion on the Balkans more quickly and with fewer problems, especially after the failure of Italy in its aggression against Greece in the autumn of 1940. Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941. This move was closely related to the necessity for German troops to pass through the country in realization of the 'Marita' operation. In the end of April continental Greece was occupied by Germany. At the end of June 1941, the Aegean Sea region was annexed to Bulgaria without the participation of her army. However, this territorial acquisition became a fact without being regulated by international treaty, and the new boundaries had to be confirmed after the end of the war. The settlement of the Jewish question as Germany wanted it could be numbered among the reciprocal Bulgarian gestures of gratitude to Germany.

As a result of this, Decree Number 113 of the Council of Ministers was issued on 12 August 1941 (Record No 132). It was based on the NDA (Article 21, letter D) and was related to the military labour service of the Jews which should be done in special labour groups formed at the Ministry of Public Works, Roads and Services (item 1).

Men between twenty and forty-six years of age were organized in groups of about one hundred to three hundred people irrespective of their citizenship. They were sent to various building sites, and sites connected with roads and railway track maintenance.

The solid German duress on Bulgaria regarding the Jewish question manifested itself in several directions after the decisions of the Conference in Berlin for the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe at 'Am Grossen Wannsee' (20 January 1942). The change in understanding, according to 'the decision of the fuehrer that all Jews must leave Europe in the end of the war',[35] is noticeable in the order given by Goring to Heidrich, dated 31 July 1941, to undertake all necessary preliminary measures for a uniform cardinal solution of the Jewish question in that part of Europe which was under German domination. A ban for the free movement of Jews was also stipulated. On 14-15 October 1941 the last transport with emigrants set off from Germany for Portugal.[36] After the Berlin Conference the real intentions were concealed by the lie of a new homeland in Poland or with expressions in secret German documents such as 'deportation to the East', [37] and 'sending to the East regions' of the Reich.[38]

From B. Filov's diary it can be seen that the prime-minister and the Tsar paid attention to the difficult position which the Germans had at the Eastern Front after their

failure at Stalingrad, and the complicated situation with the English in Africa, as well as with the Americans after their landing there. Finally, all this led to a change in German propaganda, namely, that the war instead would be continuous instead of being short.

The text of H. Wagner's report of 3 April 1943 is very indicative of the responsibility in settling the question of the Jews from Macedonia and Thrace: 'On our initiative Bulgaria decided that the Jews living there should be deported to the Eastern regions and in this case it accepted our help, too.'

According to a proposal made by T. Dannecker, in order to reach the number of 20,000 people Al. Belev had to resort to the so-called 'undesirable Jews', i.e. to 'a small number of Bolshevist-Communist elements' mentioned by Tsar Boris to J. Ribbentrop.

On 2 March 1943 the Council of Ministers passed several decrees connected with the deportation of the Jews from the new and old lands of the country, and with the expropriation of their property. According to 114th Decree the Main Railway Department was required to transport free of charge all persons of Jewish origin, living in Macedonia, the Aegean region or within the old Bulgarian boundaries, subject to being sent to camps. They had to be transported in special trains or in separate wagons to the places determined by the Commissariat of the Jewish problems. According to 116th Decree all persons of Jewish origin to be deported from the country would be also deprived of their Bulgarian citizenship. According to 127th Decree the commissar of the Jewish problem, by agreement with the German authorities, had to deport from the country up to 20,000 Jews from the newly annexed lands.[39]

On 7 June 1943, A. Hoffman sent a report to the Gestapo. The report was coordinated with A. Beckerle and it showed very precisely the further development of the Jewish question in Bulgaria: 'In April the situation changed for the worse because the Bulgarian government, probably complying with the Tsar's intentions, did not speed up the deportation, but made use of the Jews in labour camps.' In May Al. Belev made a suggestion for new deportation plans to P. Gabrovski by using government instructions for anti-Communist and anti-Jewish activity made after cases of terrorist actions performed by Jewish Communists. One of the plans was for deportation of 'all Jews from Bulgaria to the Eastern German regions for reasons of internal state security.' Another plan, in case of failure of the first one, was connected with 'moving 25,000 Jews from Sofia to the province'. According to the report the development was as follows:

> The Minister of the Interior himself agreed with Belev's proposal and he was even ready to approve a deportation of the Jews to the Eastern regions. During the audience on 20 May 1943 he presented to Tsar Boris the offers made by the commissar on the Jewish problems Belev as his own. The Tsar, however, decided that he should immediately start moving the Jews to the province and as a result of that for the time being the plan (a) was neglected. [40]

In A. Hoffman's report to the Gestapo it was mentioned that the government and especially B. Filov would keep their promise before A. Beckerle for the deportation of the Bulgarian Jews to the east regions.[41] The German diplomacy, however, had to agree

with the delay of the question by accepting as well-grounded the reasons given by the Bulgarian diplomacy. These reasons were the people's resistance in and out of the Parliament, the national psychology, the fact that the question was not solved in Hungary, Romania and other countries, the fact that the Jewish labour force was necessary for the Bulgarian economy, etc. That is why in the beginning of June a waiting position was adopted on the recommendation of the German legation. A. Hitler personally had only military and strategic requirements during his meetings with Tsar Boris.

After the monarch's death (28 August 1943) the Nazis continued to believe, persuaded also by the minister-plenipotentiary, A. Beckerle, that 'soon' the Jewish question would be finally settled in Bulgaria. However, as H. Wagner wrote in a letter to E. Kaltenbrunner on 31 August 1943, it was,

> unconditionally necessary to wait and see what the development will be in Bulgaria after the death of Tsar Boris. That is why to take any steps on the Jewish question is not only without any chances for success but it is also dangerous from political point of view at the present moment.'

That opinion was formed after A. Beckerle reported to H. Wagner that 'any step on behalf of Germany even under the strongest pressure will be turned down by the Bulgarian government'. The minister-plenipotentiary received this impression after his talks with the 'respective ministers', and after a discussion with B. Filov.[42] After the deportation from Macedonia and Thrace the required amount of 250 Reichsmarks per Jew was considered very high on the part of Bulgaria. The Nazis did not raise the question again, and it remained for 'a later agreement'. [43]

The intention to use the 'Jewish question card' in an attempt for 'a turn' and a reorientation of Bulgarian foreign policy became more and more obvious, especially after the Second World War, when from both a home and a foreign policy point of view the time for responsibility would soon come.

Anti-Semitic legislation in Bulgaria was invalidated and abrogated by the acts of the regents and the governments of Ivan Bagryanov, Konstantin Mouraviev, and Kimon Georgiev such as the 'Regulation for Amendment and Supplement to the NDA and the Regulation Issued on the Basis of the Act of Assigning to the Council of Ministers to Take All Measures for Settling the Jewish Question and the Questions Connected with It' (29 August 1944), amnestying 'the crimes under the NDA', abrogation of the single tax, the Regulation-Act abrogating some acts dated 13 October 1944, the Regulation-Act canceling the restrictions for persons of non-Bulgarian origin of 14 November 1944, the Regulation-Act of settling the property consequences from abrogating the anti-Semitic acts of 24 February 1945, and the Act of Amendment and Supplement to this Regulation-Act, etc., with which the constitutional rights and freedoms of the Jewish population in Bulgaria were almost completely restored.[44]

In 1947-48 the emigration process began in Palestine and Israel. In 1949, from 25 October to 16 May, 32,106 people left Bulgaria for Israel. Subsequent to this, in July 1949 the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party informed the Consistory that

return of emigrants back into the country was not permitted. Several dozens Jews, who could not adapt to life in Israel, were not allowed back into the country. The Consistory was forced by circumstance to sell Jewish public real estate properties, or to rent them out. In 1951 a general campaign began for eliminating the Jewish institutions. A part of them were transferred forcefully and gratuitously to the state authorities – schools, cultural and educational centres, children's and old people's homes, co-operations, a hospital and a clinic. In the new economic conditions the Consistory was forced to orientate only towards cultural and educational activities. Its social and charity activities were strongly limited. The emigration of the Jews to Israel provoked some reactions of anti-Semitism. Some Jews were released from work because of unemployment in the towns, with the hope that they would leave for Israel and improve their standard of living there. However, this was not an official governmental course. The Consistory gradually reduced its activities and almost entirely started to act in accordance to the policies of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. As a result of the Law for Religions, religious institutions were seized by the state, and the related communities were closed down. Contacts with Israel were obstructed. In 1956, on the occasion of events in Hungary, some symptoms of political anti-Semitism were evident. Among a part of the Communist leaders, expressed and spread opinion was that the revolts were due to the fact that the executive body of the Hungarian Socialistic Workers' Party included many Jews. Anti-Semitic inclinations at a political level did not influence in favour of anti-Jewish measures on a daily level. These inclinations were instead influenced by similar attitudes towards the Jews in the USSR, and the anti-Semitic trials in Eastern Europe.[45] In the 1960s, in connection with international politics, anti-Semitic inclinations were provoked by the official state policy of supporting the Arab cause at the expense of Israel and proclaiming Zionism as an ideological plan and a tool of imperial reaction.

After starting Bulgaria on the way of to democratic reforms (1989), one of the numerous novelties for the society was the appearance of open forms of anti-Semitism. Some anti-Semitic inscriptions and swastikas appeared at public places, especially often on the synagogue and the Jewish school in Sofia on the occasion of the Hitler's birthday. The gravestones in the Jewish cemeteries were broken and destroyed in a number of Bulgarian towns, and the old cemetery in Vidin was lost forever to cultural and historical heritage. A wealth of translated and original anti-Semitic literature appeared. The motive for the publication this type of literature was, at first, trade profit. At the beginning of the 1990s the book 'The World Conspiracy' by Nikola Nikolov, an emigrant from the USA, had an amazing success. A number of his books followed, which motivated an increasing number of anti-Semitic publications, emphasizing the world Jewish conspiracy and the secret force of Freemasonry. In a supplemented contemporary preview to the new edition of an anti-Semitic book of the 1920s, 'Massoni, Evrei i Revolyutsii' (Masons, Jews and Revolutions), by Nikola Ivanov, Hristo Hristov wrote the following explanation for economic hardship in Bulgaria:

The total economic and moral degradation, which our Mother Country is now

in, the tremendous efforts, which cost us for gaining back our own land, the land of our ancestors, the skilfully tolerated criminality and the total chaos in our state, are only the visual part of the Judaic–Masonic conspiracy against Bulgarian nation. [46]

Today the book market in Bulgaria is flooded by publications with large circulations in a series of books by 'Dr. E. Antonov' (Lakovpress publishing house) and the publishing houses of anti-Semitic and Nazi literature 'Zhar Ptitsa' (Firebird) and 'Zharava' (Embers). If, up until the present moment, there were separate anti-Semitic articles in the periodicals, and separate anti-Semitic statements on television programs, today, in the person of the 'Monitor' newspaper we have the first distinguished daily paper with a determined anti-Semitic and anti-American political direction. Behind its activities and the actions of the publishing houses 'Zhar Ptitsa' and 'Zharava', according to some commentators, stand certain political interests. Some ideas were discussed about establishing a nationalistic party on the example of the ones in Austria and Russia, which would serve as an equalizer to bend the scales in favour of a certain political and economic direction according to the circumstances. There are some Bulgarian anti-Semitic web sites in Internet.

We could prognosticate that in the future anti-Semitic literature and activities would hardly terminate their existence. Some voices are raised for lawful obstructions, based on the Constitution against anti-Semitic publications and activities. We could presume that the restriction of anti-Semitic activity would happen as a natural process as part of the improvement of the social-economic climate in the country, and thanks to the traditional tolerance of the Bulgarian nation and society to minorities.

Notes

[1] See the statement of the Central Consistory of the Jews in Bulgaria to the Chairman of the National Assembly against the Nation Defence Bill from 21 October 1940 (ЦДИА, ф. 173, оп. 6, а. е. 1087, л. 29-39), published with abridgements IN: Борбата на българския народ за защита и спасяване на евреите в България през Втората световна война (Документи и материали). Съст.: Коен, Д., Добрианов, Т., Манафова, Р., Танев, Ст., София, БАН, 1978, pp. 23-33.

[2] Кацаров, Гавриил И. Един поменик на старата история на евреите в България. – IN: Pro causa Judaica. София, бр. 18, 15 декември 1919 г.

[3] A report of the German minister plenipotentiary in Sofia (A. Beckerle) to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the reasons for the failure connected with the final solution of the Jewish problem in Bulgaria - 7 June 1943. – IN: Борбата на българския народ за защита и спасяване на евреите в България през Втората световна война (Документи и материали). *Op. cit.*, p. 225 and 227.

[4] Извори за българската история, Том II - Латински извори за българската история, Том I. Под редакцията на Дуйчев, Ив., Войнов, М., Примов, Б., Велков, В. София, БАН, 1958, с. 283-284 (Codex Theodosianus, 33. De Iudaeis, XVI. 8, 12; XVI. 8, 21).

[5] Данов, Христо, Кесякова, Елена. Една уникална находка - старинна синагога в Пловдив (Нови страници от историята на Пловдив и Тракия през късноантичната епоха. - Годишник на Обществена културно-просветна организация на евреите в Народна Република България (ОКПОЕ в НРБ), г. XIX, София, 1984, pp. 207-224; Данов, Христо. Нови страници от историята на Филипопол и древна Тракия през късната античност. – IN: Годишник на ОКПОЕ в НРБ, г. XXI, София, 1986, pp. 39-43; Кесякова,

Елена. Антична синагога във Филипопол. – IN: Археология, 1989, 1, pp. 20-21; Кесякова, Елена. Филипопол/ Philippopolis през римската епоха. София, 1999, pp. 76-82.

[6] Ешкенази, Ели. Заселването на евреите на Балканския полуостров, тяхната организация, икономика и бит до образуването на Първата българска държава. - Годишник на ОКПОЕ в НРБ, г. I, кн. I, София, 1966, с. 95-101; Бек С., Бран М. Еврейска история. София, 1922, p. 22, 28, 203; Иречек, Константин. История на българите. София, 1929, p. 243.

[7] Ешкенази, Ели. Към въпроса за историята на евреите на Балканите от образуването на Българската държава до падането ѝ под турска власт. – IN: Годишник на ОКПОЕ в НРБ, г. II, кн. I, София, 1967, p. 47.

[8] Paounovski, Vladimir, Vassileva, Boyka. *History of the Jews in Bulgaria, The Saved and The Savers 1940-1944.* Sofia, 1998, pp. 6-8.

[9] Ешкенази, Е. *Op. cit.* pp. 48-49.

[10] Ардити, Бенямин. Царица Сара-Теодора. - IN: Видни евреи в България (Галерия на забравените). Съст.: Бенямин Ардити. Том I, Тел-Авив, 1969, pp. 141-142.

[11] Paounovski, V., Vassileva. B. *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-8.

[12] Ешкенази, Е. *Op. cit.* pp. 49-51; Андреев, Йордан, Лалков, Милчо. Българските ханове и царе от хан Кубрат до цар Борис III. Исторически справочник. Велико Търново, 1996, с. 275-276; История на България. Том I. София, БАН, 1954, с. 224-225; Ардити, Б. Op. cit., p. 145-147.

[13] Paounovski, V., Vassileva. B. Op. cit., p. 6-12.

[14] Цепенков, Марко, К. Фолклорно наследство. Том I, Автобиография. Песни. Пословици и характерни изрази. София, 1998, pp. 240-467.

[15] Василева, Маргарита. Димитър Маринов и българското обичайно право. – IN: В: Димитър Маринов, Българско обичайно право. София, 1955, *p. V-VI*; Андреев, Михаил. Българското обичайно право и неговото развитие през последните десетилетия на турското иго. – IN: Исторически преглед, г. XII, София, 1956, No 5, pp. 61-62, 64-65, 68, 71.

[16] Пауновски, Владимир. Другите. – IN: Българи и евреи. Ч. I, София, 2000, pp. 225-290.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 211-224, 289-290.

[18] Страшимиров, Д. В. Левски. Живот, дела и извори. София, 1929, pp. 218-226; Унджиев, Иван. Васил Левски. София, 1945, pp. 364-365.

[19] Paounovski, V., Vassileva. B. *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

[20] Пауновски, В. Другите. *Op. cit.*, pp. 223-224, 265-276.

[21] Българската държавност в актове и документи. Съст.: Васил Гюзелев. София, 1981, с. 209; Paounovski, Vladimir, Ilel, Yosif. *The Jews in Bulgaria Between the Holocaust and the Rescue*. Sofia, 2000, pp. 67-71.

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[25] *Ibidem*, pp. 222, 235-236.

[26] Ньойски договор. С обяснителни бележки от д-р Б. Кесяков и Дим. Николов. София, 1994, pp. 18-19.

[27] Оцеляването. Сборник документи 1940-1944. Съст.: Давид Коен. София, 1995, p. 305.

[28] Борбата на българския народ за защита и спасяване на евреите в България през Втората световна война (Документи и материали). *Op cit.*, p. 314.
[29] *Ibidem*, pp. 20-22.
[30] Оцеляването. *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
[31] Законите за защита на нацията. Българското поданство. Опростотворение на преките данъци. За изменение на някои закони по преките данъци. За изменение и допълнение на наредбата-закон за данъка върху приходите. С мотиви и разяснения. София, б. g., pp. 8, 13-14.
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[33] Калев, А. *Op. cit.*, p. 52.
[34] Оцеляването. *Op. cit.*, p. 134.
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[37] Коен, Д., Златаров, Л. *Op. cit.*, p. 329.
[38] *Ibidem*, p. 339.
[39] Борбата на българския народ за защита и спасяване на евреите в България през Втората световна война (Документи и материали). *Op cit.*, pp. 315, 320; Оцеляването. *Op. cit.*, p. 162-164.
[40] Коен, Д., Златаров, Л. *Op. cit.*, p. 343.
[41] *Ibidem*, p. 346. Report by A. Hoffman coordinated with A. Beckerle to the Fourth Department (Gestapo).
[42] *Ibidem*, pp. 348-349. Letter by H. Wagner to E. Kaltenbrunner.
[43] *Ibidem*, p. 340; *Akten zur Deutschen auswartigen Politik 1918-1945*. Göttingen - Bonn - Frankfurt/ M. Series E, Band V, pp. 523-525.
[44] Paounovski, V., Ilel, Y. *Op. cit.*, pp. 71-120.
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The Existence of Absence

The Jewish presence in Veroia through the Memories and Narratives of Christian Inhabitants

BARBOUTA – JEWISH QUARTER / Place of Coexistence, Symbol of Culture / Cultural Heritage Monument. This municipal keynote sign stands today in the southeast entrance of the old Jewish quarter of Veroia, ambiguously signifying the past and the present[1].

Veroia is a city of about 40,000 inhabitants situated seventy kilometers W/ SW of Salonika. As did most towns in present Northern Greece, at least those dating from the Ottoman sixteenth century, Veroia had had an eminent multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural physiognomy. Jewish presence was one of the basic components of such a mosaic. The first organised Jewish settlement in Veroia dated from the first centuries BC[2]. The community developed remarkably in the early sixteenth century when a considerable number of Sephardic Jews established there, assimilating the already existent Greek-speaking Jews, the so-called Romaniotes.[3] Their basic professional occupations were those of wool fabric production and trade.[4] The 19th century marks the most prosperous period of the Veroia Jewish community. In May 1943, 680 out of the 850 listed Jews of the city were deported to the death camps. After WWII, the Central Board of the Jewish Communities of Greece didn't manage to rehabilitate the six percent who survived; most of them, for psychological, economical or social reasons, made the *aliya* to Israel, whereas others moved to Salonica, and their real estate property in Greece was sold. The community officially ceased to exist in the late '50s.

The function of memory, the definition of identity and the attitude towards the 'other' guided us to Veroia, aiming to explore the ideas, pre-conceived as well as factual, that the Christians have for their Jewish onetime fellow citizens. The fact that today there are practically no Jews in Veroia render it an ideal case study of the so-called 'absent existence'.[5]

Month-long fieldwork expeditions were twice carried out in August 2001 and September 2002.[6] Our 'base of operations' were the Municipal Animation and Care Centres for Elderly People, and of course, the Barbouta (the Jewish quarter) and the aged neighbours in nearby houses. Most of the informants were aged between 70 and 85 years old, all were Christians, and permanent inhabitants of the city of Veroia.[7] The questionnaire – used as the warp in the weaving of narration – was focused on everyday social relations, whereas the weft consisted of parallel stories and memories.[8]

Asking elder Veroiotes about their Jewish fellow citizens implies a transfer into the

past, which is often idealised. They give the impression that they still live in that time, often conjugating verbs in the present tense, as if the description and the happening are two simultaneous actions. Sometimes the informant speaks about an incident, as if he lives it at the same time. Furthermore, the informant's notion of time is not that of a straight line, but mostly circular.[9]

Based inductively on the interview clues, we describe, initially, the Jews inhabiting, working, and functioning in the city, as seen by the Christians. Thereinafter, we investigate the reality of Jewish-Christian relations. Ultimately, after having detected stereotypes and prejudices, we scout the consolidation mechanism in the image of the Jew.[10]

The Jews in the City

At the very first question of the interview, '*Do you remember any non-Christians in Veroia?'*, the informants immediately enumerate Turks and Jews. They scarcely use the term 'Israelites' in plural, especially when they mention the community as a whole, while 'the Jew' is a term commonly used in a general way, to describe behaviours or customs.[11]

The prevalent narrative starting point is reference to the Jewish quarter of the town. It is called *Barbouta*, the name deriving from the river that defines the NW limit of the quarter, or *Havra*, confusing the quarter with the synagogue, similarly indicated. The coincidental terminology between the general definition of the synagogue and the specific appellation of the quarter implies an unconscious semantic identification: the synagogue as trademark of Judaism condenses the whole quarter, the whole Jewish presence.[12]

In the collective conscious, the Jews are tightly bound to the urban space accorded to them. The quarter receives stereotypical features equally credited to its inhabitants: mysterious, dangerous, and unwholesome.[13] Furthermore, these traits are reinforced by certain unique architectural particularities of houses in the Jewish quarter: attached one to another, they communicate by secret hidden interior horizontal trapdoor-like openings. Ad to this the fortified impression of Barbouta's continuous outside house walls, and the two heavy wooden gates closing after the sunset, illustrate the isolation of the Jewish community.[14]

The Jews, although they voluntarily lived here, quasi-ghettoised, had been working all over the city, sharing with Christians and Moslems the principal streets of the commercial district of Veroia. Almost all the informants clearly remember Jewish stores, insisting on the unique persuasive capacity of the Jewish salesmen, characterising as '*Jewish*' the successful bargain (*evraiko pazari*). The Jew is identified with the *merchant*, the term having become synonymous of the trader: '*they were all merchants*', '*they were never manual workers*'. The generally negative connotations of the Jewish merchant's archetype are due to the professional competition between Christians and Jews.

If not in trade then it is in finance, basically in usury, that the Christians describe the Jew. They even mention Jews made rich by 'shylocking' to both Christians and their

co-religionists.

We received only scarce information about other Jewish professional activities, such as that of shoemaker, tailor, or peddler, but this is understood for the inter-war years – the basic period of our informants' memories: the illustrious cloth fabric activity had long before perished.[15]

Jewish-Christian social contacts

The overwhelming majority of the testimonies dissolve the myth of interactions through harmonious coexistence between Christians and Jews. The relations between the two communities were not in conflict because they were precisely defined.[16] Adjectives such as '*good*', '*easygoing*', and '*peaceful*' reflect this fact more than the fraternity affiliations. '*They were not bothering us, we were not bothering them,*' expresses the scarce communication between the groups. Avoiding contact meant avoiding the tension, and this was the rule. Ninety-eight percent of the informants in Veroia don't overlook preconceived differences between themselves and the Jews, even if it is difficult to point them out.

The two communities met and communicated in specific places, mainly at school and in the professional field.

As the education offered by the Jewish religious school was deficient and inadequate for the needs of the '30s society, Jewish children attended public state schools together with Christian children of the same age. At school, uniformity was demanded; all disciplines, even the religious order lesson (*thriskeutika*),[17] were compulsory, even for Jewish students. All children played together in the courtyard, or even at the end of the school day, and they all had sobriquets without religious innuendo. Sometimes they even exchanged visits to each other's houses. But we have to bear in mind that children are meant to be par excellence – more susceptible to novelties and curiosities, less bound to prefabricated ideas.[18]

The professional field was equally appropriate for 'safe' everyday relations, once the market area of the city was not divided into community sections. The Jewish merchant, as we've already mentioned, remains the most outstanding Jewish stereotype for the Christians. Notwithstanding, souvenirs of Jewish traders become more specific, while the informants note snapshots – incidents, pointing out Jews by name. We also learned that Jews might and did employ Greeks and vice versa, even if it was not a rule.

Although sociability might consist of family visits, official mutual invitations to religious, domestic or synagogue celebrations did not occur. Only if a Christian family was living near the Jewish quarter did they have more close and regular contact, as proximity sometimes overcame community boundaries. Nevertheless this cannot be seen as a proper Jewish attitude, even if it is reciprocal. It is not a question of community restrictions; it is a basic and heart-felt expression of community self-centredness and autarchy.

This attitude is eloquently expressed in matrimonial practices: until the early 20th

century endogamy was strictly one-way. At any rate, most of the informants mention cases of inter-communitarian romances. Following the double stereotype of the pretty Jewess coming from a well-off family, the classic scheme was that of a Christian man falling in love with a Jewish woman.[19] Most of these flirtations didn't blossom into more serious relationships or marriage, prevented by the solid and insurmountable social system. In the case of mixed marriage, conversion was a sine-qua-non condition.

Converting at that time was not a simple typical proceeding, as it brought about exclusion from both the family and community of the converted.[20] It was, for the most part, the Jew who was supposed to christen: according to the informants, Christianity is a statute attributed forevermore, it can't be given up, but it can be bestowed upon the neophyte through the ceremony of baptism. Thus, as some differences are beyond religious significance, we come across the paradox of the '*baptised Jew*'.[21]

Asking about the period of the German Occupation, which strangely enough is not the narrative starting point here, the outline is by and large repeated: wealth leading to problematic feelings of self-sufficiency, ignorance leading to political passivity, followed by vivid descriptions of the rounding up and deportation of the Jewish community of Veroia. The discourse of these men, more specifically of old Resistance partisans, once more sets up the question of Jewish responsibility, both at the individual and the community level.[22]

The feelings towards the '*definite perdition of the Jews of the city*' differ. Those more prejudiced against Jews are more distant, feeling almost relieved by the post-war degree of religious and ethnic homogeneity of the city, whereas others express their hostility against the Germans, and keep a bitter recollection of the vanished Jewish community.[23]

Stereotypes and Prejudices

The informants regularly mention Jewish names, trying to strengthen the validity of their memories by personalising them.[24] It is useful to keep in mind that this is one of the very few examples showing the informants' concern to avoid generalisation.[25]

Willing to explore the haul of memory and the heft of the stereotypes, we invite the interlocutors to remember characteristic Jewish persons. Even if this effort ends inconclusively, we can deduce that the public discourse is indoctrinated by a stereotypical image of the Jew – as an individual as well as member of the organised community.[26]

A frequently clichéd Jewish feature that the Christians covet and respect at the same time, and which they appreciate as one of the basic Jewish qualities is communitarian solidarity, the cornerstone of community well-being. Religiousness, in a wide and generalised way, consists of another distinctive mark admired by Christians of the Jews of their town. '*They were all going to the havra (synagogue).*' The fact that the Christians are aware only of the religious and not of the multiple (administrative, educational, philanthropic) functions of the synagogue, both as institution and as venue, show moreover the veiled knowledge the Christians possess concerning the everyday life of their heterodox

fellow citizens.

The Jew, even vanished, is still considered to be a penny pincher and tight-fisted. Moreover, information concerning the professional occupation of Jews is equally submitted in a stereotypical manner. The Jew is *the merchant* and *the usurer*. The stereotype of the rich, materialistic, arrogant, and miserly trader overshadows the reality of the community's interior stratification.

Another strong stereotype is that of the beautiful Jewess. '*These women, they were of an excessive beauty*', both men and women informants point out. In parallel, most of them praise the Jewess' qualities as housekeepers, cooks and mothers. '*Jewish mother*' is a phrase heard in Veroia even now.

This image of the cleanliness, tidiness and orderliness of the Jew, juxtaposed onto the preconceived idea of the impure and unclean Jew, contains the contradictory meeting point of stereotypical images and religious prejudices, so astonishingly incompatible and complementary at the same time in the social imaginary.

Religious prejudices, reinforced by the low clergy's preaching and para-religious rhetoric aiming for unity of the Orthodox, are based on slander and accusation (i.e., Jewish responsibility for Christ's crucifixion, the lack of baptism in the Jewish religion, etc.). Basically, these prejudices express fear of the other, the unknown, and the different as represented by the Jew. [27] Instead of approach and understanding, they prefer eliminating and diminishing the Jew as the scapegoat par excellence. Through the women's testimonies we draw out legends perpetuating the stereotype of the impure, non-baptised Jew, seeking to pollute the virtuous Christian, or even to draw blood from young Christians, in order to prepare the unleavened Passover bread.[28] In Veroia, the Jew, as well as the Jewish quarter, is perceived as a locus of threat and danger, a fortified and to-be-avoided site.

Conclusion

If the everyday relations between Christians and Jews in Veroia were not as interactive and intense as they were thought to be, and if the Christians' knowledge of their Jewish fellow citizens' way of life, history and religion is not as exact and thorough as the former still believe it to be, what kind of coexistence do we pretend to trace?

The image of the Jew is mainly built on stereotypes and religious prejudice projected onto individuals. Another factor influencing the informants' discourse is their own profile, defined by their gender, the location of their home in the city, their origin, and their professional occupation.[29] All these put together yield an imaginary, constructed reality, consisting of received prefabricated ideas. Such a reality brings forth certain aspects of cohabitation, but conceals others.

To return to my earlier analogy; the yarn of this narration relies on the unconscious comparison between themselves and the other, the attempt to define the other by a sunken juxtaposition of the two. It is of significance that the Veroiotes Christians never call the

Veroiotes Jews 'natives', never ascribe them as sharing the Greek identity as happens in other cities (mainly where the Jewish population was Greek-speaking Romaniotes). The fact that the Jews of Veroia were of Sephardic origin and were speaking *ladino* – even if in the course of time the use of the Greek language became widespread among them – place them in the position of 'foreigner', 'alien', and the 'stranger by origin'. Not even centuries-long settlement warrants autochthonism for the Jews.

In any case, the informants' discourse juxtaposes the term '*Jew/Jewish*' firstly to '*Greek*', and afterwards to '*Christian*'. Even if this last one is not always mentioned on its own, the Christian Orthodox religion is considered to be an integral component of Greek identity. They adopt propositions or names, used in oppositional pairs, such as '*we*' – *'they'*, '*our(s)*' – *'their(s)'*, '*the Greeks*' – *'these people'*, and '*the Christians*' – *'the others'*. This difference bears neither ethnic signification, nor necessarily a religious one. '*Jew*' is a mark of difference par excellence, loaded mostly with negative connotations.

In the spoken language '*Jew*' – first linked to the trade activities stereotypically carried out by Jews – became synonymous for tight, parsimonious, and ungenerous, or even worse, implies an insult: '*seed of a Jew - evraiosporos*'.

The sociability framework, strictly defined in space and time, consisted of professional contacts, mainly financial and commercial ones, of neighbourhood relations and childhood friendships. Interviews revealed that constant and interactive personal relations were not the rule. Such limited and superficial contacts gave place to ignorance or, at best, to vague Christian conceptions concerning Jews; at the same time, stereotypes and prejudices found a rich breeding ground.

Along with all the sayings, constructions, and preconceived ideas, Christians and Jews were citizens of the same town, each preserving its own identity, sharing the 'harmony of indifference and suspiciousness' in a more or less mandatory cohabitation.

Notes

[1] The old Jewish Quarter of Veroia, nowadays deserted of its Jewish inhabitants, stood abandoned until the early '90's. Most of the 26 houses still standing have been sold to Christians by relatives of the deported members of the community, whereas some six houses belonged to the Municipality. The Central Archaeological Council of Greece characterised Barbouta as a highly protected traditional quarter, a fact that brought important EU funds for its restoration (Leader II program). The Municipal Technical Society 'Hephaistos' took on the restoration of the houses belonging to it, as well as those belonging the synagogue for the Central Board of the Jewish Communities of Greece. It also carried out the 80% of the restoration work of the individuals' houses. Actually, in Barbouta today one of the oldest buildings hosts the International Institute of Architecture, indicating the Municipality's intentions to turn the quarter into a cultural district, all to show this prominent Jewish heritage as a particularity of this city.

[2] The first mention of Jews in Veroia appears in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 17: 1-13), testifying to the fact that the Christian, Paul of Tarsus, preached in Veroia, in front of the Jewish Community, which comprised a monotheistic audience more open than that of the Greek Gentiles of the 1st century. See Stavroulakis N., *Jewish Sites and Synagogues of Greece*, Athens, 1992, p.197.

Additionally a contemporaneous tombstone, dedicated by a certain Alexander to his charitable mother-in-law Marea, mentions the existence of a synagogue. See Messinas, E.,*The Synagogues of Salonika and Veroia*, Athens, 1997, p. 112. These Jews firstly settled in Veroia were Romaniotes, meaning Greek speaking and following the minhag written down in the Mahzor Romania.

[3] Under the Sultanate of Bayazid II (1447-1512) a considerable number of Sephardic Jews settled in the Balkans. They were also established in Veroia, bringing with them the Judeo-Spanish (*ladino*) language, together with professional skills. The community was said to have been '*high- minded*' until the seventeenth century, before having being shaken by the Shabbetai Zvi adventure that provoked the conversion of several Jews to Islam, as well as internal divisions. (Stavroulakis, N., *ibid*., p. 199.)

[4] Linked to the Salonika market, but not without problems of competition, the Veroia Jews were mostly occupied in the production of woollen cloth, as well as in cotton and linen bath articles, and in carpet making. As there was ample running water in the surroundings of the Jewish quarter, the Jews in Veroia also engaged in dyeing of cloth. They also produced and traded fine kosher wine, cheese and cereals. (Stavroulakis, N., *ibid*., p. 199, Messinas, E., *ibid*., p. 116.)

[5] Only Daniel Kohen's family, originating from Salonika, today live in the city. He is a lattice and window glassmaker and trader and, having survived the deportation, he is not very keen on remembering. Nevertheless, his pick-up car with his name as firm sign on it seems a bitter exhibit in an open-air Museum of Absence.

[6] The most difficult thing was to break the silence concerning the Jews in Greece, a silence that continued long into the post-war period, without any explanation other than scientific and political insensitiveness. (IN: Abatzopoulou F., *ibid.*, p. 47.)

[7] Either born in the city or having moved there at a young age and remained permanently.

[8] Often the informants refer in their discourse to two important historical facts that changed everyday life in the city and led to the modern era: the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, which occurred in 1923 and resulted in the departure of Moslems from the city and the settlement of Christian, but not essentially Greek-speaking refugees from the Asia Minor and the Black Sea; and WWII, which caused the deportation of 680 of the 850 Jewish inhabitants of Veroia in May 1943.

[9] The oral history time is '*twirling constantly: it resorts to the future, it refers to the past, and it is defined by the present*'. See Nestoros Kyriakidou, Alki, 'The time of the Oral History', IN: *Folklore Studies* ['O hronos tis proforikis istorias', *Laografika Meletimata*], Athens 1993, p. 262.

[10] 'The Jew belongs to the category of literature types, the personnae clichés offered as a pretext […] for different literary genres'. IN: Abatzopoulou F., *L'autre persécuté* (*O Allos en Diogmo*), Athènes 1998, p. 112.

[11] An informant insisted in the fact that the Jews themselves they preferred to be called '*israelites*'. Such a nomination has a mostly political rather than religious signification, opposed in the discourse of the majority of the informants to '*Greek*'. The term '*Jew*' wasn't loaded by national or ethnic signification at that time, as it did not yet exist as the nation-state of the Jews. Nevertheless, the phrase '*He was a baptised Jew*' contradicts the religious tinge of the term: a Jew remains Jew, even if baptised. Quite strangely, the term '*allothriskos*', or those who profess a religion other than the Christianity, was never attributed to Jews, butt to Turks. In the collective consciousness, Judaism, because of its common points with Christianity (i.e. the Old Testament) is not considered to be an adversary religion, but rather an un-evolved one, or even a Christian heresy. (Regarding the baptised Jews, see Abatzopoulou, F., *ibid*., p. 181.)
Nonetheless, after the emergence of Zionism, there was a strong tendency within the members of the Jewish community to call themselves '*Israelites*', deeming the term 'Jew' as discriminatory. Today we assist to the confusion between the terms '*Israelites*' and '*Israelis*', connected automatically with the Middle East conflict.

[12] The synagogue as religious nuclear of the Jewish Community, represented for the social unconscious, as it was formed by the religious prejudices, the Jewish presence in the city. Besides, the quarter was articulated around the religious centre of the community. See Karadimou – Gerolympou A., 'Poverty and marginalisation in the transforming urban space', in *The Greek Jewry, 3-4.4.1998,* Acta of the Scientific Conferrence, Society of Studies of the Neo-Hellenic Culture and General Education ['Ftoheia kai perithoriopoiisi se enan metavallomeno astiko horo', *O Ellinikos Evraismos (3-4.4.1998), Praktika Epistimonikou Sinedriou*, Etaireia Neoellinikon Spoudon kai Genikis Paideias] Athens 2000, p. 175 (173-203).

[13] The space inhabited by Jews, or even by Jewish stores, receives from the collective imaginary the same stereotypical features as its inhabitants or owners. In Abatzopoulou, F., *ibid.*, p. 267.

[14] We use the term '*marginalisation*' to describe a spatial phenomenon and not its socio-economical consequences. This shows the process of choice and the re-arranging following economic datas. '*The spatial contiguity and mixing tightened together the communitarian ties, reinforcing the consciousness of common destiny, and alleviating despair*'. See Karadimou-Gerolympou, A., *ibid.*, p. 175.

[15] The decline of the cloth production by the Veroiotes Jews began in the early nineteenth century, after the dispersion of the Corps of Janissaires in 1826, whose clothing was a Jewish monopoly. The modernisation of the textile factory, with Salonika as a centre, also contributed to the supplantation of the handicraft production of Veroia. See Nehama J., *Histoire des Israélites de Salonique*, t. VI, Paris, 1973.

[16] The special privileges that had under the Ottoman domination the Jewish Community engendered rivalry, resentment and antagonism between them and other ethnic-religious communities, mainly the Christians. In Messinas, E., *ibid.*, p. 115.

[17] Non-Christian students of public schools have been excused from attending lessons of the religious order since 1931; as the law 4862/1931, ar. 6, § 1 defines.

[18] Abatzopoulou F., *ibid.*, p. 273.

[19] Every region of the Greek territory produced folk songs praising the beautiful Jewish woman, with whom a young Christian falls in love and who he invites to convert. Normally, she refuses, or if she agrees she is excluded by her family and community.

[20] '*They had to think very seriously on the matter* (i.e., conversion)', this is the typical expression used by the informants to show the inflexibility of the social model. They imply the social consequences that the converted had to face, particularly at a family and community level.

[21] For religion as an identity component, see Hirschon-Philippaki, R., *Mnimi kai Taftotita. Oi Mikrasiates prosfiges tis Kokkinias* (= Memory and Identity. The Refugees from Asia Minor at Kokkinia), IN: Papataxiarchis, E., Paradellis, Th. (eds.), *Anthropologia kai Parelthon* (= *Anthropology and the past*), Athens, 1993, p. 357-375. Concerning baptism, see Abatzopoulou, F., *ibid.*, p. 27.

[22] In the first case, keeping in mind that the family structure at that time was more elaborate than now, and that family ties were stronger, the difficulties of escaping by joining the Resistance partisans is easily understood. When the question of mass escape is taken at a community level, we have to bear in mind that the heads of the communities – rabbis, but also mere officials, simply couldn't imagine the approaching catastrophe: they had no historical parallel to lead them, as no persecution of the past had ever led to extermination. See Abatzopoulou, F., *ibid.,* p. 42-43.

[23] Abatzopoulou F., *ibid.*, p. 278.

[24] The family name, as well as the first name, comprise prominent and eloquent identity elements that, in the case of Jews, identify the member to the community to which he belongs. The oldest and less educated informants make the name more familiar by using Greek grammar types (terminations, conjugating systems).

[25] The informants insist in mentioning Jewish names, in that way making their memory more vivid and personalised and aiming at the same time to convince us of the credibility of their sayings.

The reference of names and therefore the personalisation of the memories diminishes the inevitable generalisations which result in stereotypes. The stereotype is by definition a generalising scheme that doesn't take into account personal nuances, but refers to all members of a group. IN: Abatzopoulou F., *ibid.*, p. 158.

[26] From the testimonies we conclude that Jewish stereotypes, such as those emerging in literature, exist in the collective consciousness. As the bottom line, the stereotype, firmly linked to prejudices and being a prefabricated, monolithic, simplifying, and fixed construction over the course of the time – inherited from one generation to the next, produces a uniform, altered, unrealistic bottom of the line image of a social group or community.

[27] Abatzopoulou F., p. 147.

[28] Legend says that the Jews were preparing their unleavened bread (*matzot*) with the blood of young Christians. This 'story' was meant to exist as an argument behind every blood libel incident, and there were enough at the end of the 19th century.

[29] To continue, respectively: the politicised partisan's discourse; religious prejudices obsessing mostly women; adjacency brought into light the similarities; the arrogant conspicuousness of the Asia Minor refugees; and, professional relations. The competition between refugees from Asia Minor and Jews in the first years following the settlement of the former in the territories of the Greek state, around 1922 is to be examined. Concerning the refugee's identity consciousness, see Hirschon-Philippaki, R., *ibid.* 335-340.

Béla Rásky (Budapest)

A Story Differently Told, Remembered and Constructed: Jews and Anti-Semitism in 20th Century Hungary

'Since the end of Communist rule Hungary has been re-examining its own national identity and so too have its Jewish citizens.'[1] These identity choices are taken within the framework of a liberal state, a mode of production, diverse cultures, different mentalities, genders, sexual orientations, and religious and moral values; practices which are all together inhomogeneous – as inhomogeneous and divergent as the Jewish population of Hungary. The re-evaluation of current identity choices also means a re-examination of historical and apparently already determined choices in this regard – a rethinking and therefore rewriting of history and historical topoi.

Nevertheless, the history of the success (or even failure, regarding position) of assimilation, the rejection or recent questioning of the assimilationist narrative as well as the reasons for anti-Semitism in contemporary Hungary but especially on the problem of how (the Jewish or any) integration worked or failed, cannot be written without trying to find an answer on how assimilation and exclusion was perceived, (re-)constructed, imagined, (re-)interpreted in the 20th century from and by the non-Jewish Hungarians as well as the Jewish ones.

Compared to the major Western European tendencies as well as the Eastern European ones – the story of assimilation, or at least integration, cohabitation or the development of hybrid identity/identities of the Hungarian Jews or Jewish Hungarians (a slight but crucial terminological difference in Central European Jewish history) is unique, and has been analysed thoroughly by eminent Hungarian social scientists either immediately after the Shoah or – as another extreme – very much later.[2]

These classical essays of the assimilationist narrative – the first ones written and subsequently prohibited mostly between 1949 and 1989 - did not reduce the question of assimilation, segregation and persecution (and after the Holocaust the survival and perpetuation of anti-Jewish stereotypes) or of traditional or religious antagonisms between Jews and Non-Jews within Hungarian society but instead, highlighted the inconsistencies and difficulties inherent in the modernisation of Hungarian society, in which different social groups were allocated different social roles determined by century long predispositions within the backwardness of the region. In surmounting the traditional Hungarian nationalist scheme of modernisation, they evidently were an important step for Hungarian

historiography and subsequently Hungarian political culture.

History

In European historical comparison the integration of the Jewish population into the society of Hungary started late, but once having started it was breathtakingly fast and apparently successful. Summing up the traditional mainstream and historiographically still valid though recently challenged interpretation of Jewish assimilation, the Jews were offered a 'social contract'[3] in the course of the 19th century as the French-Hungarian sociologist Viktor Karády suggested - according to which they received civil rights in exchange for accepting cultural 'magyarisation'. Or, as Pierre Bourdieu would put it in this case, the Hungarian Jews invested their cultural capital and were allowed to convert it into a social and economic one.[4] This contract – according to the German historian Rolf Fischer[5] - ended in some kind of a Hungarian-Jewish 'symbiosis', as a result of which 'Jews were included in and identified, or even over-identified with the Hungarian nation-state'.[6] However, this was a very superficial process – 'modern' anti-Semitism also originated in this age- and one that was also at constant risk, as was recently shown in re-reading the text of assimilation(s). The main causes for this being the defeat of the revolution of 1848 and the contradictory social development and modernisation to which this subsequently lead.

To explain both phenomena in a Hungarian context, after 1848, the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the hegemony of the Magyars within it was the categorical imperative for all action of the political elite – all other aspects – social reforms, political rights, national autonomy - were subordinated and secondary. Capitalism overran the very traditional societies of Central and Eastern Europe much faster than it did the Western ones. Industrialisation took place exclusively in an urban milieu – mostly Jewish and/or German. While most societies in Central and Eastern Europe were troubled, undetermined and reacted reluctantly to the capitalist changes (and saw them as a threat to their traditional life styles), the Hungarian Jews reacted to the new developments as they always did or had to do – adapting to and understanding the demands of the new times very quickly. For historical - and closely connected with those - mental reasons resulting from centuries long oppression, the Jews of Hungary possessed a very special rationale with very special competences, economic understandings, market mobilities and a feeling, a sensitivity for social and economic developments the main-stream population of Hungary was lacking.

So Jews and Hungarians perceived and defined each other differently in the social process of capitalising and industrialising the country – a theme that from then on characterised and – maybe – determined the relationship of the two groups up until today. While the social differences faded away in the course of the 20th century, the mutual perception of these two groups, and their experience of history (and their language in dealing with and grasping this[7]) remained different.

From the perspective of liberal Hungarians, who supported the assimilation process of the Jews, the tacit contract mentioned above – in the traditional scenario – finally helped to modernise a social structure perceived as backward. The Jewish part of Hungarian society obliged itself to support the construction of a nation-state in Hungary, to carry out the modernisation of the country, to linguistically become Hungarians, while in exchange the non-Jewish part was to fight anti-Semitism and to foster economic and social freedom (while evidently still suppressing other ethnic and national minorities on the territory of the kingdom of Hungary). However, this demanded more from the Hungarian Jews than simple lingual adjustment to the majority; the whole past of the community had to be re-evaluated, re-imagined, a new home country had to be constructed in a communicative memory.[8] A task that was – in the traditional set-up – so perfectly performed that it literally wiped out all other memories. Recently this hypothesis has also been seriously challenged – though these theses did not become the mainstream of Hungarian historiography.[9]

Superficially the symbiosis ended in an almost full-scale assimilation of the Hungarian Jews, who in the end, with their support in building up a modern nation-state, became Jewish Hungarians – at least on the surface or in their own imagination and through the traditional description of this process. Viktor Karády describes this acculturisation process through five aspects of changing of identity: cultural magyarisation, development of a political host-nationalism, secularisation, becoming citizens in a mental way ('Verbürgerlichung'), and integration.[10] It was István Bibó who pointed out that the assimilation process was not working on clearly named and constructed terms and consequently everybody could interpret his or her assimilation as he or she liked.

Tracing the history of a Hungarian football club we are able to illustrate the assimilation of the Jewish population. Ferencváros is the traditional club of the 9th district of a German petit bourgeois district, while MTK is the traditional club of the Jewish part of the population not distinctively attached to any Hungarian region or district. The traditional antagonism between these clubs is, in a way, an expression of the assimilation race between those two groups. It is worth noting that at the beginning of the 20th century MTK – Magyar Tornaklub – built Europe's then most modern stadium on Hungaria Avenue in Budapest, a symbol for the wish to assimilate.[11]

More recent and younger researchers reject the traditional assimilatory approach, stating that the 'social contract of assimilation' – though breaking with nationalistic explanation of Hungarian modernisation, nevertheless only focuses on the parties of this contract in general by ignoring the local differences and interpreting all social processes through the different stages and steps of this assimilation.

> The coexistence of Jews and non-Jews in this concept in general appears – as in Said's 'Orientalism' - in the metaphor of sexuality. In this love the Hungarian plays his male role, the Jew the female one and as an 'odd couple' live their lives in a form of 'Hassliebe'.[12]

In this perspective Jewish assimilation is discussed as an unequal controversy between Jewish and non-Jewish elites while the overall context within the society is omitted.

> The peace treaty of Trianon was the next station in Jewish-Hungarian cohabitation, but not a turning point. After the peace treaty Hungary became a more or less homogeneous nation-state, bringing a very different scenario; Jews were now seen as aliens, their presence was no longer required to boost Magyar numbers. Trianon clearly showed the shortfalls and insufficiencies of Hungarian modernisation. Nevertheless, it is this same Trianon peace treaty that helps more recent researchers to re-think the concept of the straightforward assimilation of Hungarian Jews. The historian Éva Kovács has illustrated these cases with the help of 'assimilated' Jews in the territories of Hungary that were lost after World War I. Here, suddenly, Jewish Hungarians had to decide not only between assimilation or non-assimilation, but also between national loyalties, multiple perspectives, new ambivalences and regionalisms (just as today): While Jewry in Hungary was assimilated after Word War I, Zionism, integration in to Slovak society, orientation towards the political left as well as preserving Hungarian culture and language were the given possibilities in the Czechoslovak Republic.[13]

These multiple perspectives lead, on the one hand, to the development of hybrid identities and, on the other hand, to questions about the traditional model of assimilation.

Nevertheless the assimilation model still marks the main stream of Hungarian historiography:

> The ethnocentric, colonial position of the assimilation discourse makes it possible to generalise the assimilation processes of the Hungarian Jews, to assess the new processes within the successor states – in the light of assimilation in the era of Austro-Hungarian dualism – as dissimilation, and to problematise those as a question of national fidelity and patriotism and to label the Jews of the successor states as disloyal.[14]

But also in Hungary proper, Trianon made clear how mendacious, false, unreliable and superficial the assimilation offer was; an offer that the Jewish population had taken at face value. The anti-Semitic choices of the Horthy-era made clear that assimilated Jews were no longer regarded as part of a social community, one that had evident rights, was to be protected, or its status to be guaranteed. "It was during this period that Jews were defined by others, and against their will, not as Hungarian citizens of the Jewish faith,"[15] but as an ethnic group of aliens who were incompatible with the Hungarian nation and people. "They were now regarded as Jews ('Zsidók') and not as Hungarians of the Jewish religion ('Izraelita')"[16]. Again, the fortunes of the above mentioned Jewish football club are illustrative of this larger fate; in 1926 it was renamed 'Hungaria' and at "the beginning of the year 1939 – in the sign of 'aryanisation' – a government commissar of the extreme right was appointed, and one year later the club was dissolved".[17]

Step by step and supported by European tendencies and powers this policy finally led to the death camps.

After the Shoah

With the end of World War II in 1945, parts of the Hungarian society had to solve the task of coming to terms with its extreme right wing past. A crucial point of continuing and further democratic development was the question of whether parts of the Hungarian public could work off its own anti-Semitic and fascist traditions, or whether Hungary in all would never will come to terms with these parts of its past. Between 1945 and 1948 the issue of Jews and their persecution was the focus of intensive public debates. From their nature these discussions were violent and emotional and vacillated between wholesale condemnation of a 'fascist nation' and accusations of a 'Jewish thirst for revenge', according to perspective. Very few analyses tried to mine deeper – István Bibó was certainly one of them and most of the analyses and lectures on this topic go back to his fundamental ideas, although one should not generalise these.[18]

The post-war Republic of 1945 to 1948 got its legitimacy from a critique of the past and wanted to break with the political traditions of the country's elite, find new reference points. Even if this short-lived democracy has been idealised in many ways – it was rather limited, since the Russian occupational army decided on many issues, and the Slovak-Hungarian population exchange treaty was something close to ethnic cleansing – its balance in regards to coming to terms with the past is not so bad at all. Despite all misunderstandings and dissonance in understanding the Shoah in both parts of the population, there was at least an approach, and an advance of dialogue, and the hope for reconciliation.[19] The Communist Party take-over meant an end to this painful, contradictory and hesitant coming to terms with the past. Not long after these debates began they came to an abrupt end.[20]

Silence was the result. A silence Hungarian society still has not overcome.

Sociological studies have found that anti-Semitism in the eighties was still virulent in Hungary and that the old problem of mutual negative perception and definition had not come to an end, but moreover was reproduced under new conditions. Although it seemed that after 1945 the boundary between Jewish and non-Jewish lifestyles would become less sharp, under Stalinism the factors that determined Jews and non-Jews became more pronounced.

One of the differences was the evaluation of the year 1945. What was liberation for some was liberation for the others as well – land reform, democratisation – but it was attached to a feeling of catastrophic defeat and occupation.

The other difference was the communist take over in 1948 and Stalinism. While Jewish enterprises were nationalised just as any other, and thirty percent of the deported people of Budapest were of Jewish background, these facts did not enter non-Jewish perception, and in Hungarian right-wing 'folklore' Soviet rule and Jewish population were equated. It is said that the proportion of Jewish Hungarians in the Stalinist repression apparatuses and the state offices were disproportionately high, something which is used to construct some kind of affinity for Jewish Hungarians towards the communist regime.

True or untrue, it is hard to prove, but there is yet another side to this. Stalinism struck the Jewish population as well as the others, but Stalinism did not threaten the Jews with extermination and thus they were affected by it as bourgeois but not as Jews. After 1945 with the demolition of the old system and the accompanying destruction of the social strata to which most Jews (after the Shoah) belonged, the social status of Jews changed radically. Communist Party ideology simply cast the Jewish question and anti-Semitism among the crumbling institutions of a declining world. In exchange for creating a society that eliminates the Jewish question the Communist party demanded complete identification with the 'movement'. Today, sociologists tend to interpret these facts not so with anti-Semitic prejudices but with the instruments of social sciences. For many Jews the promises of the new regime meant – much more than for the other social groups profiting from the new chances given by mobility – a complete modification of their collective life perspectives and the end of all historically suffered discrimination, the end of a life as pariahs.

> Before the war, Hungarian Jews seeking assimilation wanted to become equal members of the nation. [...] The craving for assimilation did not end with the collapse in 1944 of the illusion of its having already been achieved. [...] After 1944, joining the communist party was a way to survive the shock of the failure of assimilation and the resulting rootlessness.[21]

In the Hungarian assimilation model, even after the Shoah, and the cancellation of the treaty through the majority of the non-Jewish part of the Hungarian society, the Jews stuck to the concept assimilation. Adhering to an internationalist ideology was one of many possible ways to bring craved-for assimilation to an end, to quit 'Jewish identity'. The Jewish population wanted to reach the exact opposite of what the anti-Semites blamed them with.

If we look back on our football club- from 1951 on, MTK became the club of the ÁVH, the feared, terrorist state security. 'So in the eyes of the club the team of the old Jewish elite becomes the team of the new Jewish elite.'[22]

Communist ideology was coded differently for Jews and for non-Jews; 'avowals to communism' meant denial to be a part of anything being Jewish, which subsequently became an absolute taboo. Officially any memory of the Shoah ceased, all suffering stuffed into the party slogan 'victims of fascism'. The official taboo became an internal taboo as well, meaning that Jewish Hungarians did not talk about being Jewish even in their own families, nor did they speak of their memories or their experiences. There was silence not only from the official but also from the private side.[23]

The Revolution of 1956

In 1956, there were surprisingly very few anti-Semitic outbursts or incidences during those thirteen days – not even the revenge thirsty White Book of the Kádár regime could find more than twenty-one anti-Semitic manifestations between October 23 and December

31, 1956. Nevertheless many Jewish persons memories towards 1956 are ambivalent, remembering the revolution of 1956 as an anti-Semitic eruption. The experiences and fears of 1944 evidently predetermined any perceptions of radical political changes, something that can also be proven by the relatively high number of Jewish refugees after the suppression of the revolution.[24]

After 1956 the silence on Jewish identity continued, 'This silence, however, was different from that of the '50s: It brought no relief. It was accompanied by the permanent awareness of being silent, some vague tension, uneasiness about the fact that there was *something* to be silent about.'[25] In this phase one could say that this shows the extent of assimilation in that there is no such thing as Jewish consciousness in Hungary. 'Jewish consciousness in today's Hungary is basically empty: it is simply the consciousness of being different,'[26] András Kovács wrote in 1983. It is this very silence that became so crucial and decisive for the reconstruction of Jewish identity after 1989.

The mutual perceptions and definitions – without the healing discourse prevented by the official and private taboos – did not help to close the ditches. Here we find ourselves at the core of the 'Jewish question' in Hungary of the eighties, which has been and still is a subject of lengthy discussion. It is not necessary however, to retrace these debates to understand the nature of this question. It is sufficiently defined by an everyday experience, 'in Hungary Jews and non-Jews remain separate from each other, they remain aware of their Jewishness or non-Jewishness, and distinguish their reference groups accordingly. Publicly, of course, there is no such thing as the Jewish question.'[27]

After 1989

In 1956, and in the years of the soft Kádár dictatorship, old identity patterns – the symbiotic one – became dominant again: Jewish Hungarians participated in national projects, became part of the democratic opposition of the eighties. The 'Jewish question' or anti-Semitism disappeared completely from public discourse, on the one hand because of taboos on the other hand because the early consumer's society of late Kádárism softened the boundaries between life styles, mobility, social and cultural milieus. The success of our football club in the 1987 championship in a way can be interpreted as a symbol for the crumbling of the Kádár regime.

In the final days of the Kádár dictatorship, people slowly started to talk again, to research, to publish on Jewish Hungarian history, on traditions, on literature – cautiously, carefully. The discussion on Hungarian Jewish identity started in the mid-eighties, the decade when the first sociological surveys were made on memories, awareness, and identity of the second and third post-Shoah generations. These surveys – made by activists of the democratic opposition and intellectual circles – had the nimbus of being oppositional, hence to the taboo in which the 'Jewish question' was embedded in Kádárist Hungary. With the help of these documents we can assume that anti-Semitism in those days was

weaker but still present; despite some anti-Semitic undertones at football matches and mass events, it was less a problem of the under classes than one of the middle classes and the Budapest intelligentsia.

Only after 1989 were all taboos finally broken, and new discussions – often painful ones – started. The freedom of public life also meant a freedom of discussion of topics which up to then were taboo and in a way protected Jewish Hungarians from insults – if only in a superficial way. Apparently protected and not used to any public and free discourse, a very sensitive Jewish community often regarded any kind of public discourse on Jewishness and Jewish history by non-Jewish communities as a problem and/or an irritating annoyance - and sometimes saw anti-Semitic assaults were there were none. Evidently, after the Shoah, one can only overreact to seeing the phenomena of anti-Semitism in public.

But no doubt, there were and are anti-Semitic tendencies in public in Hungary – no stronger and no weaker than anywhere else in (Central) Europe. There are also other European countries where politicians do not distance themselves from anti-Semitic hecklers. But still, political anti-Semitism in Hungary is something happening on the margins; sometimes deliberately provoked by right-wing politicians, who shamefully play with these attitudes. We should not forget however, the democratic republic of 1989 did not create its identity from the critique of the recent past(s), but it in a way re-activated the strings of an old, historical Hungary. This changed back and forth from government to government, and the republic has not yet decided which reservoir of memories it is going to use to create continuity. Hungarian society is deeply split on this question. So again, it is hard to construct identities in an environment that is not on terms on its own identity.

How can the Jewish Hungarians – regardless of whether they follow the symbiotic, assimilationist patterns or others - recover and remodel their identity when the chain of tradition 'has been broken, when parents are ignorant of their religious and cultural heritage and when the grandparents have chosen to forget? What are the identity options to Jewish individuals and groups in Hungary today?'[28]

> For those in Central Europe who are grandchildren of the survivors of the Second World War, Jewish identity has long been rumoured to be a largely unconscious affair, if not completely extinct. In post-war Central Europe identity is torn between the twin temptations of assimilation and emigration. Somewhere between these two poles, the concept of generations died. However, a group of young intellectuals from this post-Holocaust 'third generation' are currently challenging this view.[29]

This is happening not so much with empirical methods, but again, as in the important and already mentioned survey of András Kovács in the eighties, with the qualitative method of the interview.[30]

A very recent, yet empirical survey published in 2002 at the 'Minority Research Institute' of the Sociological Department of ELTE University warns not to project the results of the investigation upon the whole Jewish population of Hungary since presumably only those Jewish Hungarians took part in it who feel more or less attached to their

own Jewish identity.

According to this survey, the overwhelming majority of Jewish Hungarians live in Budapest, evidently due to the Holocaust in which the provincial Jews were murdered. Regarding the question on their identity - with two possible choices out of five - the answer given most was 'I am a Hungarian with Jewish faith/background' or 'I am Hungarian as well as Jewish'; only fifteen percent of the questioned said their Jewish identity was strong, one third said it was weak, and fifty-two percent answered 'My Jewish identity is rather strong, but there are also other things which are important to me.'[31]

Nothing is more important in the collective memory or identity of this group than the Holocaust. While the survivors tended to treat the Shoah as a secret of their own which they kept or had to keep and furthermore felt they had to hide even from their own children, they unwittingly passed it on to the third generation: 'The transmission takes place through slips and silences and spontaneous outbursts (...) - with the aid of the entire artillery of meta-communication.'[32]

Through the event that they have never experienced but can remember, through an unconscious behaviour they find a conscious identity. The study comes to the conclusion that the awareness of Jewish Hungarians towards their own roots, towards their own traditions is slightly growing. Surprisingly, it is neither religion nor culture, but the memory of the Holocaust that stands in the centre of this identity[33]. This is one of the issues dividing Hungarian society, with sixty-six percent of the Budapest population (obviously the most liberal and 'enlightened') thinking that the Holocaust should be taken off the agenda after so many decades.[34]

Regarding identity options in post-Communist Hungary, there are three patterns: the religious, the ethnic and the socio-cultural. The religious means the revival of traditional values, which in themselves are very diverse. But is in the context of the Shoah that we have to understand the actions of the majority of Jewish Hungarians in rejecting the idea of receiving a national or ethnic minority status if the chance and possibility for that was given by the Hungarian law; fewer than a thousand Jews signed the petition which would have entitled them to be recognised as such. "The answer to this question is to be found in the historical past of Hungary's Jews. Despite the brutal shock that the supporters of assimilation experienced between 1920 and 1944, the majority of contemporary Hungarian Jews subscribe to the assimilation model, albeit with reservations."[35] It is no coincidence that among the most ardent advocates in defining Jews as an official, national minority were nationalist groups with an anti-Semitic agenda.[36] The social and cultural option is perhaps the most popular one among Hungarian Jews; in post-1990 Hungary, Jewish cultural, recreational, sporting and private societies form the focus of contemporary Jewish identity.

Finally, we should address the diversity of Jewish responses possible in today's Hungary and not forget that in today's extremely diverse societies Jewishness is no longer such a strong identity feature. Hungary here follows – just as in many other areas – the Western European model allowing identity patterns which can be coded multi-culturally,

ethnically, or spiritually diverse; or by any other combination of symbolic attachments. The renegotiation and reconstruction of any identity is characterised by the ability of individuals and groups to choose from a variety of identities - in a framework and context of social networks and resources.

Notes

[1] Leonard Mars, Discontinuity, Tradition, and Innovation: Anthropological Reflections on Jewish Identity in Contemporary Hungary, IN: *Social Compass* 46(1), 1999, pp.21-33, 21.

[2] Examples for the assimilation discourse: Viktor Karády, *Túlélők. Fejezetek a magyar zsidóság szociológiájából 1945 után* (=Survivors. Chapters on the sociology of Hungarian Jewry after 1945). Budapest, 2002; István Bibó, The Jewish Question in Hungary. IN: Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination. Selected Writings. Boulder, Social Science Monographs, 1991. pp. 155-324; examples for the critique on it: Gábor Gyáni, *Polgárosodás mint zsidó identitás* (=The process of becoming citizens as a form of Jewish identity). IN: BUKSZ (Budapesti Könyvszemle/Budapest Book Review) 1997/9/3, pp. 23-34; and Gábor Gyáni, *Viszontválasz Karády Viktornak* (=Answer to an answer of Viktor Karády), IN: BUKSZ 1998/10/1, pp. 20-27.

[3] Viktor Karády, Antisémitisme et stratégies d'intégration: Juifs et non-Juifs dans la Hongrie contemporaine, IN: *Annales Economie, Société, Civilisation* 2, pp. 239-264, 1993, p. 242; originally quoted in: Leonard Mars, *Discontinuity, Tradition...*, p. 21.

[4] Pierre Bourdieu, 1983, Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital. IN: Reinhard Kreckel (Hg.), *Soziale Ungleichheiten*, Göttingen, 1983, pp. 183-198, 190.

[5] Rolf Fischer, *Entwicklungsstufen des Antisemitismus in Ungarn (1867-1939). Die Zerstörung der magyarisch-jüdischen Symbiose.* München Oldenburg, 1988.

[6] Mars*, Discontinuity, Tradition...*, p. 22.

[7] Kovács Éva / Vajda Júlia, Mutatkozás. Zsidó Identitás Történetek (=Showing. Jewish Identity Stories). Budapest, 2002, pp. 45-52.

[8] Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen.* München, 1997, p. 43.

[9] cf. Gyurgyák János*, A zsidókérdés Magyarországon. Politikai eszmetörténet* (=The Jewish Question in Hungary. A Political History of Ideas), Budapest, 2001.

[10] Viktor Karády, *Juden in Ungarn. Historische Identitätsmuster und Identitätsstrategien*, Leipzig, 1998, p. 114.

[11] Miklós Hadas / Karády Viktor, Futball és társadalmi identitás. Adalékok a magyar futball társadalmi jelentéstartalmainak történelmi vizsgálatához (=Football and identity. Remarks on a historical exploration of the symbolic content of Hungarian football). IN: *Replika* 17/18 "A foci", June 1995, pp. 89-120.

[12] Éva Kovács*,* Die Ambivalenz der Assimilation: postmoderne oder hybride Identitäten des ungarischen Judentums (typed manuscript of the lecture at the workshop "Die Habsburger-monarchie: Ein Ort der inneren Kolonisierung?" September 19th/21st, (Kommission für Kulturwissenschaften und Theatergeschichte of the Austrian Academy of Sciences); publication forthcoming.

[13] É. Kovács*, Die Ambivalenz...,*

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Mars, *Discontinuity, Tradition...,* p. 26.

[16] *Ibid*., p. 22.

[17] Hadas / Karády, *Futball és társadalmi identitás ...*

[18] Ungváry Krisztián, Bibó és a zsákutca. Avagy miért nem tudunk mit kezdeni Bibó szellemi

örökségével (=Bibó and the dead end. Or why we cannot do anything with Bibó's intellectual heritage). IN: *Mozgó Világ* 2001/2, pp. 78-82.

[19] Béla Rásky, Nationale Frage und Arbeiterbewegung in Ungarn. IN: Helmut Konrad (ed.), *Arbeiterbewegung und Nationale Frage in der Nachfolgestaaten der Habsburgermonarchie*. Wien / Zürich, 1993, pp. 65-96.

[20] András Kovács, The Jewish Question in Contemporary Hungary. IN: *Telos*, Number 58 / 1983/84, pp. 55-74, 54.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 60.

[22] Hadas/Karády *Futball...,* p. 100.

[23] Karády*, Juden in Ungarn,* p. 123.

[24] Cf. Heller Ágnes, *Bicikliző majom* (=Monkey on the bicycle). Budapest, 1998.

[25] A. Kovács, *The Jewish Question...,* p. 68

[26] *Ibid*., p. 68.

[27] *Ibid*., p. 56.

[28] Mars, *Discontinuity, Tradition...,* p. 22.

[29] Péter Krasztev, Confronting Jewishness. IN: *Central Europe Review*. Vol. 1. No. 8. 16 August 1999; http://www.ce-review.org/99/8/krasztev8.html.

[30] É. Kovács / Vajda, *Zsidó identitás...*

[31] András Kovács (ed.), *Zsidók és zsidóság a mai Magyarországon. Az 1999-ben végzett szociológiai felmérés eredményeinek elemzése* (=Jews and Jewry in Today's Hungary. Analysis of the results of a sociological survey in 1999). Budapest, 2002, p. 142.

[32] Péter Krasztev, Confronting Jewishness. IN: *Central Europe Review*. Vol. 1. No. 9, 23 August 1999. http://www.ce-review.orf/99/9/krasztev9.html

[33] Gábor Czene, A holokauszt emléke a legerősebb kötelék. Kovács András a magyarországi Zsidóságról készült első szociológiai felmérésről (=The memory of the holocaust is the strongest linkage. András Kovács on the first sociological survey on Jews in Hungary). IN: *Népszabadság*, 2002-09-16, p. 7.

[34] Á. Kovács, *Zsidók és zsidóság...,* p. 153.

[35] Mars, *Discontinuity, Tradition...,* p. 27.

[36] András Kovács, Are Hungarian Jews a National Minority? Remarks on a Public Debate. IN: *East European Jewish Affairs* 24(2): pp. 63-71, p. 70.

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Romanian Jews in the Early Years of Communist Rule

Notes on the Myth of 'Jewish Communism'

At the highpoint of the Communist led campaign against his government, the conservative Romanian prime minister, General Nicolae Rădescu spoke to the country in a radio address on the 22nd of February 1945. Among other things he said:

> Romanian Brothers, those - who as the common people say - recognize neither God nor a fatherland are determined to put the torch to our country and to drown it in a sea of blood. The forces intent on terrorizing and oppressing our people are led by Ana Pauker and the Hungarian Luca. We will destroy them. From time immemorial our people has successfully defended its essence and it will not now be brought to its knees by a hand full of nobodies.[1]

At this point Rădescu was in a difficult situation. A strengthened USSR had brought Romania into its sphere of influence. His government no longer enjoyed Moscow's support and was about to be replaced. This was the real problem facing the country and facing Rădescu. However, in his speech the prime minister did not attack the leaders of the USSR, he did not even attack the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party as such.[2] Instead he attacked the 'aliens' in the Communist Party – a term the nationalists used to designate the members of Romania's national minorities. It is of note that Rădescu found it necessary to refer expressly to Vasile Luca's ethnic origin, while not mentioning Ana Pauker's. Rădescu assumed that everyone would know that she was a Jew. He did not need to mention this fact because the connotations of her name were well known by his audience. Rădescu's speech was governed by the unarticulated assumption that it was the 'aliens' who were responsible for what was most horrible and characteristic in Communist aggression. A further assumption was that (genuine) Romanians were incapable of committing such treason against the nation.

In the context of the time Rădescu did not take an extreme position. He had been an opponent of Antonescu's dictatorship and had actively participated in its overthrow on 23 August 1944. Rădescu was a typical representative of moderate Romanian nationalism. He merely articulated a belief that was universally held in Romania at that time: that Communism was identical with the 'alien' minorities, (and foremost among these were Hungarians and Jews).

To this day the myth of 'Jewish Communism' is a part of Romania's public discourse.

It is still propagated in other states of the former Eastern bloc as well.[3] The various forms of the myth centre around two stereotypical constructions: that 'the Jews' were responsible for the Communist dictatorship and that they profited most from it.

What can be said of this myth? Like all myths it lives by an extreme simplification and rigid reduction of complex matters: a kernel of fact is magnified until it no longer bears any relationship to reality. Indeed it is a fact, that there were Jewish Communists, and in the inter-war period Jews accounted for about 18% of party membership.[4] This percentage was considerably higher than the Jewish share of Romania's total population, which in 1930 was about 4%. It is also a fact that with the fall of the Antonescu regime racist persecution of the Jewish population came to an end; the surviving Jews 'profited' by no longer being killed, deported or discriminated against.

Beyond these facts the allegations that the Jews profited most or played a leading role in the establishment of the Communist regime are patently false. The great majority were not Communists and indeed, there were more anti-Communists than Communists. A closer look at the conditions of the Romanian Jews shows very clearly that not only had they been the primary victims of the right wing dictatorship, but that the majority of Jews were also victims of the left wing dictatorship.

In support of this argument I will address the following questions:

1. What was the policy of the Romanian Communist Party toward Jews in Romania after 1944?
2. What were the reactions of the Romanian Jews to Communist Party position?[5]

Policy of the Romanian Communist Party Towards Jews

Immediately following 23 August 1944 the leadership of the Communist Party assumed that the Jews, who had been persecuted under the former regime, had no political option but the Communist Party, since, of all the parties, theirs was the only one that symbolized a complete break with the former regime. Because parties of both the left and the right viewed the Jews as the natural ally of Communism and the Soviet Union, they were in substantial agreement in assuming that the Romanian Jews would choose the Communist option. The error of this assumption soon became apparent. Yet this did not lead to a positive change of policy, but resulted in the Communist Party applying even more pressure against the Jewish sector.

From the very beginning the Communist Party denied that Romanian Jews constituted an independent national group. In November 1944, in a discussion with party members on the topic, Vasile Luca, one of the party's most prominent members and responsible for the Communist led mass organizations, argued that the Jews were too heterogeneous a group to be considered one people. He said:

> It is only as a result of Fascism and its machinations that, in recent times, the Jews have become a nationality, and have been viewed as such [by others].

> We cannot recognize this artificial national product. The Jews do not have any national interests. They do not have any particular political interests. They have the same interests as the people of Romania.[6]

When one of the participants in the discussion asked: 'If the Jews are not a nationality, what are they?', Luca was ready with an answer – the Jews are a group of human beings who have lost their national basis. 'They don't know exactly what they are themselves.'

The assumption that the Romanian Jews had no other option but the Communist Party, and that they had no particular political interests of their own had consequences for the political course taken by the RKP. From these assumptions, the Communist Party drew the conclusion that in practice it need not undertake any particular activity in the interest of the Jewish population.

The Communist Party therefore believed that with the revocation of the Anti-Jewish legislation and the re-establishment of legal equality in the law of December 1944, it had already done enough to compensate the Jews for the persecution they had suffered**.** Actual compensation, i.e., for lost private property, rental contracts that had been broken, and lost employment, was carried out late and then only to a limited extent.

We must bear in mind the enormous financial costs which the Romanian state had to carry as a result of war damages and the armistice agreement and which practically rendered it incapable of granting full restitution; nevertheless, it is also true that the state lacked the political will to do its utmost to meet justified demands. In addition, we may assume that, in general, the Communist Party, which had dominated the government since March 1945, had ideological reasons for opposing the restitution of private property. After all, such a policy contradicted its overriding political goal of dispossessing the propertied classes.

Nevertheless, it is characteristic of the situation that even where meeting Jewish demands would not have cost the state money, it postponed settlement. One example of this is the delay in regulating citizenship rights. As early as 1938, with the anti-Semitic measures of the Goga regime, many Jews had lost their citizenship. After 1944, the new citizenship law was again and again postponed. The documentary sources do not give a direct answer as to why these delays took place. However, the evidence supports suspicions expressed at the time by representatives of the Jewish community – that the Communist Party had acted in a purely opportunistic manner. The Communist leaders knew that restoring citizenship to the Jews would be unpopular with many segments of the Romanian population. Therefore, not until 1947, when the seizure of state power was almost complete, did it take action.

What were the reasons for these delays? What were the Communist Party's priorities? The main goal of the Communist Party was to increase its power base in Romania. Thus it was a vital necessity for the party that its organizations grow and that they grow fast. Therefore it directed its main effort towards winning support among the masses of ethnic Romanians.

As a matter of fact, after 1944 the Romanian Communist Party did grow very rapidly

and made itself 'Romanian'. According to a survey completed on 1 June 1947, the party had 703,000 members, of which 83% were ethnic Romanians; the Hungarians accounted for under 12%, the Jews for just over 4%, with the remaining few percent divided among the other national minorities.[7]

The Communist Party was aware of the widespread anti-Semitism within the Romanian population and ready to make important concessions to it. As a first step, it avoided raising any public demands that might be seen to benefit the Jews in Romania. Indeed it completely avoided bringing up such themes before a non-Jewish public. In a meeting of the various mass organizations on 5 October 1945, Vasile Luca openly conceded that, because of resentment on the part of the Romanian public, the party could not allow Jewish comrades to occupy high leadership positions. Luca argued that Jews could attain actual equality only to the extent that the ' spirit of democracy' took root in the Romanian masses. Until that time, the Jews would have to be patient.[8]

Reactions of the Romanian Jews to the Communist Party Position

In a short time the Communist Party found itself disappointed by the reactions of the Jewish population. Communist propaganda had failed to impress the greater part of the Jewish population. Instead, it was primarily the Zionist organizations that gained political influence. The Romanian Jews developed a very intense political life of their own, in which the Communists were reduced to playing a marginal role. More than anything else, it was the strength of the Zionists that surprised the Communist Party leadership and induced them to partially change their course. Under the Groza government, the first purely Communist government, which had come to power in March 1945 (after the fall of Rdescu), the pressure on the Jewish organizations was considerably increased.

At the end of April 1945 the Romanian Communist Party founded a Jewish front organization, the 'Democratic Jewish Committee' (Comitetul Democrat Evreesc - CDE). This was an obvious attempt to imitate the procedure adopted with regard to the Hungarian minority, rather than an attempt to imitate the soviet Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee. As in the Hungarian case, a national mass organization was to be used to gain influence within a national group by discrediting and later destroying the genuine minority organizations. This imitation of a procedure adopted with the Hungarians seems strange indeed: as just mentioned, the Communist Party did not recognize Jews as a separate national group, yet it began to treat them as such.

Until 1953 the CDE remained an essential factor in the process of bringing the Jewish sector (political groups and communities) into line. In this process four stages can be distinguished. For the most part they followed one another, but there were also instances in which they overlapped. Through all of them, with changing emphasis, the tactics included propaganda and actively seeking support, combined with intimidation and violence.

a Participation

In the period between the two World Wars, the Romanian Communist Party made almost no effort to address Jewish interests. In 1944 it began to massively intervene in the internal affairs of the Jews. The first opening occurred by means of equal representation on the interim-commissions for directing the Jewish communities. Communists, people who understood themselves to be without religion, became members of the body charged with organizing Jewish religious life.

The founding of the CDE was another important step on the way to stronger Communist influence in the internal life of the Jewish community. A manifesto issued by the leadership proclaimed that it would not replace any existing Jewish organizations, but would guarantee co-operation between all 'democratic' Jewish forces. As in other cases where co-operation was confined to so-called 'democratic' forces, here too the existence of 'undemocratic' Jewish forces is tacitly implied. Thus, covertly, the accusation of fascism was already raised against the group that had suffered the most under Europe's right wing dictatorships. It would not take long before the accusation was openly made.

b Division

As the Communists began to take part in Jewish life, they also began to play one group off against the other. This was not too difficult to do, since even without the Communists' efforts, deep ideological and personal differences already divided the Jewish community. The representatives of the Romanian Communist Party marked out individual groups and specific persons for attack. Other groups, primarily the Jewish Party, which had enjoyed success in the period between the Wars, were excluded from the outset because of their so-called 'anti-democratic' nature. On this question the unity of the Zionist Executive was destroyed. One of the largest factions within it was identical to the leadership of the Jewish Party. The majority of the Zionist Executive expressed solidarity with the Jewish Party and declined to join the planned CDE if the Jewish Party was to be excluded. This led to a de facto split of the Zionist Executive, since a minority was willing to join the Communists without the Jewish Party. The motives for this conduct on the part of Zionists, who were by no means Communists, are various. They include ideological and personal conflicts with the Jewish Party, faith in promises made by the Communists that would benefit their own group, as well as simply yielding to the pressures that were constantly directed against all non-Communists. Thus, despite a majority vote for the Jewish Party in the Zionist Executive, the Communists attained their goal. The minority who had lost the vote simply declared that they did not consider themselves bound by the majority vote. In view of the general power relationships, the majority was forced to accept this violation of the Zionist Executive's statutes and to refrain from sanctions against the minority. (The statutes would have permitted expulsion). Thus the courageous vote of the majority had no effect on the course of events. In order to understand the process of the Communists' seizure of power such experiences can hardly be rated too highly. The next time such an occasion arose, how many non-Communists would risk incurring personal danger by indulging in such a symbolic gesture? The CDE used similar tactics against the

Union of Romanian Jews (Unuinea Evreilor Români - UER), a prestigious organization led by Wilhelm Filderman. Here they had little success in the beginning, due to the fact that the UER was far more homogeneous than the Zionist Executive. But as time went on, here also the increased pressure yielded results. At first some of the leading members of the UER were initiated into the Communists' plans. When the majority of the UER's steering committee declined to agree to join the CDE, the minority (constituted by those leaders who had previously been approached by the Communists) attempted to divide the UER. Although they were expelled, they quickly founded a 'democratic' UER and brought it into the CDE.

In this manner the subversion of the Jewish political parties began as early as 1944-45. By the end of 1948 all the Jewish parties had been eliminated, independent of whether, like the Zionist Executive and the Jewish Party, they had resisted the CDE, or whether they had co-operated with it.

c Co-optation and Take over

Division and subversion were the tactics used against political groups; the goal was to eliminate them. Similar tactics were used in the regime's contacts with the Jewish communities themselves, however, the goal was not to eliminate them, but to take them over and force them into line. The individual Jewish communities, the Association of Jewish Communities, and the office of the Chief Rabbi continued to exist. But under the old names completely new power relationships came into being. Step by step all those opposing the Communists were driven out of leadership positions until only representatives of the CDE remained and a few so-called 'independents', who were, in fact, anything but independent, and easy to manipulate. The change in leadership of the parent organizations of the Jewish communities marked the end of the take-over process.

d Centralization

The individual Jewish communities lost the almost complete autonomy that they had previously enjoyed and became mere branches of the Association of Jewish Communities. Even the most minor decisions were taken at the top, by the Association, and made binding for all. In the past Jewish communities of various orientations had existed, now they were fused together into unified communities. Particular individual associations, such as the Sephardic communities and the Transylvanian Orthodox Bureau, were disbanded. (In the last instance it was the CDE that profited from this centralization.) Through the destruction of the Jewish communities' pluralistic political and social life, the CDE gathered functions and responsibilities into its own hands that had previously been shared between the Jewish political parties, the Zionist groups, and the large international aid organizations.

But hardly had the CDE attained these competencies when it was forced to yield a part of them to the Romanian state. The CDE had fulfilled its purpose and was no longer needed. This second form of centralization, the take over of functions and responsibilities by the Romanian state, once again had an impact on the Jewish communities. After they

had earlier lost their internal self-administration to the Association of Jewish Communities, now, in 1948, the state took over responsibility for Jewish communities' schools and welfare facilities. All that remained to them were their religious responsibilities, which had to be carried out under the authority of the Communist state, watched over by controlling bodies whose members were atheists.

Due to all this, the CDE did not emerge victorious. It had lost the battle to win influence 'in the Jewish street'. It had no roots in the Jewish population and no real popularity, and therefore remained an organ of the state that had been forced upon them. Under the conditions of an established dictatorship the simple fact of its failure could be disguised in the dense fog of official propaganda, but even here only in part. The real state of affairs manifested itself in the uninterrupted desire, on the part of the Jewish population, to leave the country.

Whenever the possibility of emigration to Israel presented itself, the state authorities were flooded with applications. The enormous desire to emigrate was variously motivated. An important source is certainly to be found in the terrible events of the Holocaust. In that period a deep divide opened between the Jewish population and the surrounding non-Jewish environment. Although it would have been very difficult to overcome this divide, the task would not have been impossible. But the Communist regime failed completely. Even as time advanced the number of those who wished to emigrate did not diminish, in fact it grew. This took place despite the fact that the economic situation had improved, the dire straits of the first post war years had been overcome, and rabid anti-Semitism, though not eliminated, had been effectively curtailed. In 1949, the number of Jews living in Romania was estimated at 428,000. By 1967 only 100,000 remained. More than 75% of Romanian Jews had emigrated.[9]

Notes

[1] Scurtu, I., (ed.), *România. Viaţa politică în documente*. 1945, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 149-150.

[2] The name of the party changed in March 1948 from the Communist Party in Romania (Partidul Comunist din România - PCR) to the Romanian Workers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Român - PMR). Nevertheless the party will be called the Communist Party throughout this paper.

[3] See e.g.: Vago, R., *Anti-semitism in Romania 1989–1992*, Tel Aviv 1995; Shafir, M., The Romanian Radical Right Since 1989. IN: *East European Jewish Affairs* 24.1994, 1; Shafir, M., Jews and Anti-Semites in Romania since the Death of Rabbi Rosen. IN: *East European Jewish Affairs* 25,1995, 2; Shafir, M., The Mind of Romania's Radical Right. IN: Ramet, S.P., (ed.), The *Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989*, University Park/Pa, 1999, p. 21–45; Shafir, M., Between Denial and 'Comparative Trivialization': Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe. Jerusalem, 2002 (= Acta, Occasional Papers 19); Volovici, L., *Anti-Semitism in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: A Marginal or Central Issue?*, Jerusalem, 1994.

[4] Shafir, M., *Romania. Politics, Economics and Society*, Boulder, 1985, p. 26.

[5] This paper draws upon the results of: Glass, H., *Minderheit zwischen zwei Diktaturen. Zur Geschichte der Juden in Rumänien (1944-1949)*, München, 2002.

[6] Undated report (November 1944). Arhivele Naţionale Timişoara, Comitetul Judeţean PCR Timiş,

Comitetul Democrat Evreesc, dosar, 1/1944–1947, p. 14–15.

[7] Buzatu, G., Românii în arhivele Kremlinului, p. 159.

[8] Şedinţa cu responsabilii organizaţiilor de masă, 5.10.1945. Arhivele Naţionale Bucureşti, fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, 86/1945, p. 15–16.

[9] Congresul Mondial Evreesc (publisher), Aşezările evreilor din România, Bucureşti 1947, p. 31-32; Wasserstein,B., *Europa ohne Juden, Das europäische Judentum seit 1945*, Köln 1999, p. 10.

Michael Shafir (Prague)

Memory, Memorials and Membership:
Romanian Utilitarian Anti-Semitism and Marshal Antonescu

That memory and memorials are interconnected there can be little doubt. 'Memorials' are etymologically linked to 'memory', that is to say to that function defined by the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* as, 'a faculty by which things are recalled to or kept in the mind.' The link between either of the two notions and 'membership' is less apparent at first sight. Yet from the same dictionary one learns that memorials, that is to say man-created objects or events 'serving to commemorate,' are implicitly fulfilling a social function: the dictionary mentions as exemplification memorials, statues, festivals, buildings and religious services. It is hard to imagine these being inaugurated or held in the presence of only a single individual. Those who unveil statues, launch festivals, build memorials or conduct religious services have in mind other human beings. Whether 'memory' is *singularly* social, as Maurice Halbwachs argued,[1] is, of course, debatable. There can be no doubt, however, that at least *one* of memory's functions is both socially-induced and *socializing – in* other words linked to group-membership.[2]

Memory, Memorials and Membership in a Post-Communist Setting

People belong to multiple social groups and associations. Compatibility among them is not always smooth. What is more, people *aspire* to belong to groups or associations other than those in which they were born, raised or professionalized in. Each of these groups may not only have *different* 'memories,' but those memories may clash with one another and even more so with the collective memory of the associations one aspires to. In a world about to become one large village, aspirations to membership necessarily translate into a multiplication of these clashes. How many different 'memories' are involved in, say, the Liberal International? What sort of common 'memory' can a Socialist International made up of both traditional social democratic parties and Communist successor parties have? Which is to 'impose' its memory on the other, for what reasons, and how? Finally, can a NATO enlarged to include both former World War II allies and former Axis powers have a joint 'memory'? It is quite obvious it can, since Germany and Italy have long been part of the Atlantic Alliance, but the forging of the collective NATO memory only became

possible after one side 'imposed' its memory on the other. At the end of World War II it was clear who the losers and who the winners were. It is less blatantly clear who the losers are at the end of the Cold War, though the winners may be indisputable. The 'losing' side at the turn of the 21st century can – and does – claim victory as well. The argument of 'return to one's own self' may not be very convincing to foreign audiences, but is very persuasive for domestic ones. Where, then, is the new collective memory to start from? Whatever the 'Global Village' is or will become we might be uncertain of, but one thing is inevitable; it is (and will remain) one huge festival of Festingerian 'cognitive dissonance'.[3]

The literature on 'memory' is by now so vast that one would need a huge … well … memory, and a correspondingly enormous footnote just to mention the most prominent names associated with it in the last decades. Suffice it to say that Paul Ricoeur traces preoccupation with what 'memory' is all about back to the ancient Greek philosophers, proceeding to Augustin, John Locke, Freud, Halbwachs, Yersushalmi and Pierre Nora (to mention but a few) before he produces his own theory.[4] Nora's name, of course, is above all linked to that aspect of memory that is focused on memorials. The immense success of Nora's seven-volume *Lieux de mémoire*, the first of which was published in 1997[5], is, as Jean-Charles Szurek would eventually observe, both emblematic and paradoxical. What started as an enterprise aimed at 'saving national memory' ended up by concluding that there was nothing to save; on the contrary, we are living in the age of a '*tyranny* of memory'.[6]

Whence the obsession? Numerous explanations have been provided. Despite their multiple differences, historians, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists converge on one point: memory is about *the present*. If the 'tyranny of memory' cannot be escaped, this is because no one has yet devised a time machine for escaping from the present. In other words, there is no way to deal with the 'then' without telescoping it from the 'here and now.' As Martin Malia wrote after citing Benedetto Croce's famous remark that 'all history is contemporary history,' '[we] invariably read the past through the prism of the present with all its political, cultural and ethical passions.'[7] Memory, memorials and commemorations are all about the legitimation process, be this the personal legitimation of politicians and the politics they are supposed to represent, or the collective legitimation of a society's perceptions of itself. Anthropologists, such as Katherine Verdery, may strive to 'think of legitimation in less rationalistic and more suitable "cosmic" terms, showing it as rich, complex and disputatious processes of political meaning-creation,' and indeed even to formulate theories on the space-time axis proceeding from introspection on what happens with the movement of anonymous re-interred dead bodes in former Yugoslavia. But there is nothing 'cosmic' about legitimation processes. Politicians and historical figures can be legitimised (or de-legitimised, or re-legitimised) only for the purpose of the present. Legitimacy will not thereby descend on the past, nor is there any guarantee that it would survive as such in the future. But Verdery, I believe, is quite correct in appreciating legitimation as 'a process that employs symbols.'[8] As much as they diverge in their approach, Verdery converges on this point with Romanian historian Andrei Pippidi.

For better or worse, Pippidi's views are also closer to mine than are those of Verdery.

Pippidi speaks of the need to develop a 'theory of symbolic history' for the purpose of comprehending the handling (or mishandling) of memory as a social phenomenon.[9] Symbols for what?: for configuring or reconfiguring the present, of course. One can, as George Schöpflin does when he analyses 'commemoration', see in it a process, a 'ritualised' recalling of what societies stand for. 'A society without memory is blind to its own present and future, because it lacks a moral framework into which to place its experiences.'[10] There is, on the face of it, little to argue against that perception. No polity can function without – to use Benedict Anderson's terminology – a positive 'imagined community' to which reference can be made.[11] For, as Romanian historian Lucian Boia put it, 'the past means legitimation and justification. Without having a past, we can be certain of nothing.'[12] The symbolic aspect of memorials and commemorations is even more pronounced in societies whose national identity is fragile and whose future is uncertain. The distortion (but not obliteration!) of national symbols in East Central Europe under Communist regimes and the search for either new or renewed 'symbols' in the wake of regime change made Jacques Rupnik observe in the early 1990s that, 'demolition of [Communist] statues, and restoration of former denominations to streets, are but the exterior aspects of the search for a 'usable past,' whose force is proportional to the fragility of national identity and uncertainty in face of the future.'[13]

But one cannot ignore the other side of the coin, and that side is particularly strong in societies that left behind one past but are uncertain of what to replace it with and who should be chosen to symbolize it. Which past is deemed as worthy to be 'used' or 're-used?' What Pippidi calls 'the macabre comedy of posthumous rehabilitations all over Eastern Europe after 1989,' demonstrated that the past was undergoing a process of being reshaped 'by partisan passions, with each political family introducing in the national pantheon those historic figures in whom it can recognize itself or whom it abusively claims [as its own].' One must ask, we are told by Pippidi, 'Who Is On the Way Out? Who Is on the Way In?', all the while bearing in mind that, '[at] a time when all Central East European Countries reject the Soviet model, searching for an own (old or new) national identity, historians and politicians compete for the reinterpretation of the past.'[14]

One of the main reasons for the emergence of this situation rests in what elsewhere I called the double dilemma of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung:* is it possible to overcome the Communist past without leaning on that which preceded it and is it possible to overcome the authoritarian past that antedated Communism without idealizing that past beyond recognition?[15]

Memory can be, and memory is, used for the purpose of manipulation, precisely *because* it has little in common with the past and is all about the present and future. Choosing between different 'memories,' Pippidi writes, is also a choice on different options for the future.[16] This is exactly what Ricoeur has in mind when he writes that 'the same events may mean glory for some, humiliation for others. One side's celebration is the other side's hatred.'[17] Schöpflin seems to choose an apparently irreproachably democratic,

but reproachably impractical way out of the dilemma. 'It is very difficult,' he writes, 'for one community to look with anything worse than indifference at the commemoration pursued by another. Yet if we are all to survive in the European tradition that I believe is our heritage, living in diversity is a *sine qua non.'* This, he adds, is difficult at moments but, 'if we have the confidence in ourselves, in our values, then the commemorations of the others need not be seen as offensive.' His advice is particularly directed at minorities, which are told 'majorities have the same rights to cultural reproduction as minorities and those rights should be respected.' That Schöpflin is aware of the 'clash of memories' mentioned above there can be no doubt. What is, however, debatable is whether his rejection of a 'multiculturalism that seeks to impose particular restrictions on majorities' has taken into account that *cultural* reproduction entrenched on the commemoration of those who denied *reproduction* from others may be off the line of 'European tradition.'[18] Rather, it may be related to what Ricoeur terms as 'manipulated memory,' and may have little in common with democratic attitudes. On the contrary, that manipulation may reflect what Ricoeur describes as the 'ideological' aspect of manipulated memory, and it is not by chance that he cites at this stage Tzvetan Todorov's *Abuses of Memory,* taking distance from the 'contemporary frenzy of commemorations, with their convoys of rites and meetings.' Furthermore, it is not by chance that Ricoeur cites the Bulgarian-French historian's warning that the monopolization of memory is by no means singularly restricted to totalitarian regimes. It is, we are told, shared by all those who seek glory.[19] In other words, when we speak of the symbolic aspects of 'memory,' the question of 'symbols for what?' must never leave aside the no less relevant accompanying questions of 'which symbols?' and 'symbols for whom?'.

It was precisely these questions that I posed in a previous article on Marshal Ion Antonescu's process of rehabilitation in post-Communist Romania, as the '*Cui bono'* part of the article's title illustrates.[20] This study is a sequel to that article, tracing developments since its publication in 1997. There were three main points made in that previous article. First, that the rehabilitation process was mainly aimed at undermining the nascent Romanian democracy, being inspired and (up to a certain point) instrumentalized by personalities with strong links with Nicolae Ceauşescu's Communist secret police; second, that the Greater Romania Party (PRM) led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor was the main venue through which the process was pursued, but at the same time its partial success was imbedded in the strong roots of Romanian national Communism; and, finally, that the 'utilitarian anti-Semitism' of the country's 'successor party' (called first the Front of National Salvation, then the Democratic Front of National Salvation, then the Party of Social Democracy in Romania, or PDSR, and, as of 16 June 2000 the Social Democratic Party, or PSD) leadership had also played an important, if somewhat self-defeating, role in that process. 'Utilitarian anti-Semitism' refers to the occasional exploitation of anti-Semitic prejudice for the needs of the hour by politicians who, by and large, are probably not anti-Semitic. As described in that article, the drive to rehabilitate Hitler's war-time ally included:

those in whose eyes the rehabilitation is mainly perceived in utilitarian terms:

> if it serves the political needs of the hour, these forces are ready to 'close an eye' to it, expecting to deal with its unwelcome implications at a later stage. Evidence shows that this is precisely the case of the PDSR. For a second group, however, Antonescu's figure is not merely an instrument (though it is that too) but a 'legitimation model.' In other words, the Marshal is not only a means but also a purpose. And the purpose is simply the liquidation of Romania's incipient democracy. The members of this group have one thing in common: some direct or mediated link to what [...] I am inclined to label as 'the Forces of Old.' I mean that Romanian version of the 'extended family' that is the 'extended *Securitate.*' [21]

I was pointing out in that article that the Communist mishandling of history is a partial explanation of the facility with which Antonescu had been transformed into a 'hero-model.' Yet the study also insisted on the attraction Antonescu could exert as an anti-Communist symbol. At that point in time, I was not sufficiently aware of parallels elsewhere in the region, which I eventually came to 'dissect' in my subsequent research.[22] As Tony Judt would put it in 2000,

> [the] mis-memory of Communism is [...] contributing [...] to a mis-memory of anti-Communism. Marshal Antonescu, the wartime Romanian leader who was executed in June 1945 [sic], defended himself at his trial with the claim that he had sought to protect his country from the Soviet Union. He is now being rewritten into Romanian popular history as a hero, his part in the massacre of Jews and others in wartime Romania weighing little in the balance against his anti-Russian credentials. Anti-Communist clerics throughout the region; nationalists who fought alongside the Nazis in Estonia, Lithuania, and Hungary; right-wing partisans who indiscriminately murdered Jews, Communists, and liberals in the vicious score settling of the immediate post-war years before the Communists took effective control are all candidates for rehabilitation as men of laudable convictions; their strongest suit, of course, is the obloquy heaped upon them by the former regime.[23]

Unlike the earlier article, this sequel will not concentrate its attention on the PRM, whose activity 'in the service of the marshal' (the title of an apologetic book on Antonescu that does not deserve citation) and its own self-serving political purposes hardly underwent any change in the years that have elapsed since the completion of *Qui bono*. Instead, the present study first surveys developments during the four-year time span that Romania was governed by a coalition of centre-right parties and by President Emil Constantinescu, seeking to inquire whether official or officially-related attitudes displayed towards the legacy of the *Conducător* underwent any significant change in that period. It then returns to scrutinize utilitarian anti-Semitic attitudes in the old-new regime – returned to power by the electorate in the year 2000. The study concentrates its attention, in the third part, on the reasons that prompted the issuance of Emergency Ordinance 31 (which forbade the cult of Antonescu and introduced penalties for Holocaust denial), as

well as on an analysis of that ordinance's saga. It concludes by posing a few questions pertaining to 'constrained memory.'

Between One Governance and the Next

When President Emil Constantinescu replaced his predecessor, Ion Iliescu, in 1996, there was hope that the age of utilitarian anti-Semitism had come to an end. The new governing coalition was no longer leaned toward extremist parties. It encompassed a broad spectrum of centre-right parties and the ethnic Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania – in other words what for the last seven years had been described by the generic term of 'the democratic opposition.' As if to illustrate that hope was well-founded, the country's new head of state, in a message addressed to the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania on 4 May 1997, for the first time acknowledged Romania's collective responsibility for the perpetration of the Holocaust. In the message that marked Holocaust day, the head of state told his Jewish co-nationals that while the Holocaust was not 'planned by Romanians' and while some Romanians had risked their life to save Jews,

> we are also aware that other Romanians, blinded by criminal furore, participated in this horrible crime, in implementing the Nazi project of the 'final solution.' Romania's wartime authorities more than once attempted to oppose the Nazi demand for the full liquidation of the Jewish population, organized the immigration of groups of Jews to Palestine, even openly protected some personalities of the Jewish community in Romania. But the same authorities organized deportations and promoted a racial legislation. Today *we accept responsibility for this dramatic inconsistency.* The sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Jews from all over Romania is a burden on our heart, on all Romanians. The death of innocents can neither be forgiven, nor undone, nor forgotten. It is our duty to offer the victims of the Holocaust time and time again our memory, the assurance that nothing will be forgotten – no deed and no name. It is my duty as president of Romania, as president of all Romanian citizens, to be the guarantor of that memory, now matter how painful it may be; it is my duty to keep alive the memory of Jews who fell victim of the genocide. You are therefore not alone at this commemoration; through me, all Romanians remember every single Jewish fellow-citizen who perished without any guilt more than five decades ago.
>
> Our common memory is their posthumous victory. It is the weapon that helps us over decades and generations, to struggle against the temptation of not feeling guilty for our own past.[24]

The president was certainly taking a position his predecessor had never taken, for although Iliescu had condemned the atrocities committed by the Iron Guard and the anti-Semitic policies of the Antonescu regime, he never spoke of any Romanian contribution

to the implementation of the 'Final Solution.' Even if Constantinescu was intentionally getting his chronology upside-down: whatever steps were taken by the Antonescu regime to remedy the plight of Jews followed Stalingrad and were aimed at sending a signal to the Allied powers, not the other way around as presented in the message. The president was the first in admitting that the *individual guilt* of leaders and their followers can translate into the *collective responsibility* of future generations. This is precisely what *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is all about. Only individual guilt can be subject to criminal prosecution, but only admittance of collective responsibility can attest to a will to overcome the burdens of the past. Unfortunately, Constantinescu's statement was largely ignored in Romania.[25] It was, in fact, ignored to such extent that at the end of 2000, writer Nicolae Balotă made public a letter he had written to Constantinescu in 1997 in which he urged the president to do precisely what Constantinescu did when he addressed the Jewish community. Balotă was wrongly persuaded three years on, when he claimed Constantinescu had not even bothered to reflect on his suggestions 'with any [sense of] profundity.'[26] During a visit of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington on 18 July 1998, Constantinescu once more employed an inverse chronology in his speech, speaking first about the saving of Jews rather than starting with the persecution that preceded it. At the same time however, the president remarked,

> despite these [commendable acts] no one has the right to ignore that the Holocaust tragedy did not shun Romania; no one has the right to deny the tragic fate of Jews who lost their life and their beloved ones in Bessarabia and Bukovina, in Transnistria, in Iaşi, Bucharest or Dorohoi,...the persecutions and the humiliation to which they were subjected during the Legionary governance and [the Antonescu governance] that followed it. Even if Nazi Germany's direct or indirect involvement was not negligible either, responsibility for those Romanian citizens who were persecuted rather than being protected by the Romanian state cannot be and must not be eluded.[27]

Between the two declarations, however, facts were not quite matching words. On 22 October 1997, then-Prosecutor General Sorin Moisescu launched a procedure for the official rehabilitation of eight members of the Antonescu government. The procedure, called *recurs în anulare* or 'extraordinary appeal,' would have clearly opened the path towards Antonescu's own posthumous judicial rehabilitation, long demanded by the PRM and other ultra-nationalists in Romania.[28] Moisescu explained that the Romanian Penal Code does not provide for 'collective responsibility' and that by suspending the constitution, dissolving the parliament and assuming full personal power, Antonescu had by implication also abolished the principle of collective ministerial responsibility.[29] While on a visit to Berlin on 7 November, Constantinescu told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent William Totok that he was aware of the 'delicate international implications' the rehabilitation might raise but that the officials involved had been 'outstanding Romanian cultural figures' who were not associated with any of the 'negative aspects' of Antonescu's rule.[30] The claim was quite thin. Most ministers involved had indeed been

'cultural figures' but their alleged non-involvement was more than questionable. In a decree signed on 7 March 1941, for instance, General Radu Rosetti, Antonescu's first Minister of Culture, Cults and the Arts (January-December 1941), stated, 'the ethnicity of our nation must be shielded from mixing with Jewish blood.'[31] As Minister of Culture in Romania's first short-lived (December 1937-February 1938) anti-Semitic government of Octavian Goga and Alexandru C. Cuza, philosopher Ion Petrovici was personally responsible for the introduction of a *numerus clausus* in schools and collectively responsible for the government's decision to deprive some 200,000 Romanian Jews of their citizenship. Petrovici was again Minister of Culture and Cults in the Antonescu government between December 1941 and 1944, organizing, among other things, an inter-governmental agency that coordinated the deportation of Jewish converts.[32]

Moisescu's decision to launch the rehabilitations triggered the protests of U.S. Helsinki Committee co-chairmen Senator Alfonse D'Amato and Representative Christopher Smith. It was neither the first nor the last such protest from the two prominent congressmen.[33] In a letter to President Constantinescu, they said the officials whose rehabilitation was sought had been 'cabinet members in a government that was responsible for the persecution of the entire Romanian Jewish community and the deportation and murder of at least 250,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews.' Their rehabilitation would, 'call into question the sincerity of Romania's commitment to the West's most fundamental shared values and is likely to trigger a reassessment of support for Romania's candidacy for membership in our economic and security institutions,' i.e., NATO, and (presumably) the EU as well.[34] 'Memory' was thus for the first time being unambiguously linked to 'membership.'

Only one day earlier, Moisescu had attempted to explain why he deemed it proper to rehabilitate the eight officials. On 22 November, compliance followed. Closer examination, it was now said, had established that 'collective ministerial responsibility' did, after all, apply to in all but one of the eight cases. The other seven ministers, according to the same statement, could not be absolved of the 'political responsibility' they carried for 'military, economic and social decisions' taken by the cabinet they had been members of, such as 'socially-discriminatory measures taken against some Jews on 30 June 1941' (a euphemism for the Iaşi pogrom) and the waging of war on the Soviet Union in November 1941.[35] Following the Nuremberg trials model, these had been considered to be 'crimes against peace' by the tribunal that had sentenced the eight in 1949. The only exception was to be made for Toma Petre Ghiulescu, who had only briefly (5 April-26 May 1941) served as Undersecretary of State in the National Economy Minister and resigned prior to 30 June 1941. Ghiulescu was rehabilitated by the Supreme Court on 26 October 1998, and the occasion proved that apprehensions regarding the 'extraordinary appeal' launched by Moisescu proving be but the first step towards Antonescu's own rehabilitation had not been exaggerated: Giulescu's family asked the court to rehabilitate the entire Antonescu cabinet, including the *Conducător.* The plea, however, was dismissed.[36] On 17 January 2000 the same court also rehabilitated Netta Gheron (not included on the list submitted by Moisescu), who served as Finance Minister at the twilight of the Antonescu cabinet,

between 1 April and 23 August 1944.[37]

In "Marshal Antonescu's Post-Communist Rehabilitation: *Cui Bono?*", I examined closely the rehabilitation process used and abused by the Communist-successor parties and the extremist ultra-nationalist formations. It is not insignificant to scrutinize reactions to the rehabilitation attempts among the former 'democratic opposition,' now that it had taken over power.

The National Liberal Party (PNL) has a particularly long post-1989 record on support of Antonescu's rehabilitation drive. The most emphatic spokesman for this cause among parliamentarians representing the party was Dan Amadeo Lăzărescu, who also claims to be a historian. In the first (1990-1992) legislature he spoke in parliament several times in praise of Antonescu and seemed to have never changed his mind. By 1997, in an article published in *Aldine* – an ultra-nationalist, fundamentalist Orthodixist and anti-Semitic supplement of the 'democratic' daily *România liberă* – Lăzărescu was defending Moisescu's rehabilitation initiative and was writing that the Romanian people 'cannot comprehend the absurd pretensions of some [Jewish or Jewish-supporting] circles over the ocean to except [Antonescu and his cabinet ministers] from the noble principle of rehabilitation and restitution of property confiscated by a regime eager to liquidate by all means Romania's political, military and social elites'[38] Lăzărescu eventually turned out to have been a *Securitate* informer.[39] His opinions on Antonescu were certainly reflecting those of the 'Forces of Old.'

As William Totok showed, even PNL's first post-Communist party chairman, Radu Câmpeanu, was a staunch defender of Antonescu and a 'Holocaust negationist'.[40] Câmpeanu had also been suspected in some circles of having collaborated with the *Securitate* during his Parisian exile, from which he had returned in 1989. In his case, however, the suspicion has never been confirmed. But PNL Senator Alexandru Paleologu, one of the few to have openly admitted to have been recruited by the *Securitate* as an informer while in prison but to have never actually informed,[41] should not be suspected of 'serving the Cause' when he rushed to Antonescu's defence. Largely considered to be a liberal spirit – though somewhat of a maverick – he belongs to that category of Romanian intellectuals who are simply unable to take a critical look at the country's contemporary history**.** Not an extreme nationalist, he nonetheless insists on ignoring historic evidence and on considering Romania's nationalism as a 'benign' and 'necessary' form of identity-searching,[42] hence often finding himself on the same barricades with Romania's ultra-nationalists whom he otherwise opposes – perhaps to his own surprise.[43]

Consequently, it was hardly unusual to find Paleologu denouncing Marshal Antonescu's perception as a fascist. 'Antonescu's rule,' he wrote, was 'at most' one that can be qualified as 'a national regime with authoritarian features.'[44] As for some of his cabinet members whose rehabilitation Moisescu had just initiated, Paleologu wrote that he had personally known them and could vouch for their being 'people of integrity and a strong character.' Some of them might have been anti-Semites, the Senator added, but opinions 'cannot be put on trial.' In his view, even the Nuremberg trials should never have taken

place, since they were nothing but the 'trial of the vanquished by the victors.' He would not deny that 'the massacre, killing or starving to death of some Jews through mishandling is a horrible, monstrous thing'. The question remained open, however, whether Antonescu's cabinet members knew about those massacres and approved of them. And even if they did, 'could they possibly have resigned from the cabinet?,' Paleologu added, apparently unaware that he was contradicting his own statement on the regime being merely an 'authoritarian' one.[45] Never missing an occasion whenever he writes on Antonescu to point out that he had been a staunch opponent of the marshal after Antonescu decided to continue the war beyond its scope of retaking the Soviet-annexed territories; Paleologu is apparently unaware of how oblivious he is to Jewish suffering (which he never claims to have opposed) under the marshal.

In a nutshell, Paleologu was arguing that Antonescu should never have been tried because victors must not administer justice onto the vanquished, and that his ministers – should not have been put on trial because Antonescu's views may not have been their own, and even if they were, they could not be held responsible for overseeing that these views were translated into deeds.

Another prominent PNL defender of Antonescu was the party's then National Council Chairman (and thus practically the second man in the PNL hierarchy), literary critic Nicolae Manolescu, who as early as December 1995 was writing in an editorial in the weekly *România literară* that Jewish historians should finally comprehend that Antonescu cannot be judged solely from the perspectives of the crimes he had committed against their brethren.[46] I have extensively dealt with his case elsewhere and it will not benefit anyone (least of all Manolescu) to tell his saga all over again.[47] But his undoubtedly is a sad case. A brilliant literary critic and an opponent of the Ceauşescu national-Communist policies, after the change of regime Manolescu became involved in politics but applied to it the same 'impressionistic' approach that guides his literary output. Just as he sees nothing wrong with contradicting himself when he writes about literature,[48] he would contradict himself—including on Antonescu— time in and time out.[49] Indeed, Manolescu would go as far as to come out in defence of the 2002 governmental ordinance (see below) forbidding the cult of the very same man (when only a few years earlier, he had written that the man must be evaluated less unilaterally than Jewish historians were in the habit of doing).[50] His most inspired political step appears to have been his 2001 decision to leave politics behind and return to what he does best.[51]

The largest party in the now-ruling coalition is the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNT–cd)—the PNL's main partner in the umbrella organization of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR). Although less present in the media, PNT–cd politicians were in fact more active than their PNL peers in pursing Antonescu's judicial rehabilitation. On 14 June 1999, PNT–cd Senator Ion Moisin demanded that the house pass a resolution rehabilitating Antonescu, describing the marshal as, 'a great Romanian patriot, who fought for his country till his death.'[52]

There were also drives to rehabilitate Antonescu emerging 'from below', in civic

society. In 1999, six Timisoara-based NGOs initiated a 'rehabilitation trial', which, expectedly ended in Antonescu's exoneration by a 'moral jury'.[53] Earlier, the town's local council, in which the ruling CDR had a majority, named a street in the marshal's honour. With Pippidi's remarkable exception, historians asked to react to Moisescu's initiative tended to be explicitly or implicitly supportive. What is more, among those expressing such indirect or direct support there were some who by no means belonged to the category of Holocaust deniers – for example Dinu C. Giurescu and Alexandru Zub.[54] The most emphatic, however, was Florin Constantiniu, who in what would become with him a recurrent favourite theme, compared U.S. pressures to annul the rehabilitation drive with the Sovietization of Romania. In an article suggestively entitled "Yesterday Moscow, Today Washington," Constantiniu presented the d'Amato-Smith protest letter as an attempt to censor healthy historical debate in Romania. According to the historian, the letter was tantamount to an act of censorship, and was all the more unacceptable as this censorship attempt stemmed from those who had abandoned Eastern Europe to the U.S.S.R. after World War II. The same people, he wrote, prove time and again to be very sensitive to the crimes of fascism, but are oblivious to those of Communism.[55] Many allegedly democratic media outlets echoed the same line. For journalist Ion Cristoiu, the U.S. congressmen were, 'Two Bolsheviks From the American Congress,' as the title of his editorial in the daily *Național* proclaimed on 25 November 1997.

The four years of CDR in power, in sum, had demonstrated that, with a few notable exceptions, the 'choice of memory' had remained problematic. The refusal of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung,* as Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine showed in 1999, was not limited to the opportunists and the ultra-nationalists.[56] Even if their motivations were different, opinion leaders in Romanian society were contemplating the past from a perspective that was obviously quite different from that possessed by the group of which they all wished to become members — Western democracy and, more specifically, NATO.

Utilitarian Anti-Semitism Revisited.

The outcome of the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania should have taught the PDSR (or its successor, the PSD) a hard lesson on the dangers inherent in the ambivalence of courting the extreme nationalist electorate and its representatives. The PRM garnered nearly 20 % of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies and more than one voter in five (21.01 %) cast a ballot for Romania's extreme nationalist party. Moreover, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the party's leader, forced Iliescu into a runoff in which he obtained 33.17 % of the vote. Nevertheless, would be inaccurate to claim that anti-Semitism, or extreme-nationalism in general, was the main factor behind the PRM's electoral performance, one that had transformed the party into Romania's second-largest parliamentary formation.[57] The vote was above all a protest-vote triggered by the dismal performance of the right-right government that was voted out of power. In light of this, for many Ro-

manians the anti-Semitic and xenophobic attitudes of the PRM were not reason enough to refrain from supporting that party, which increased its parliamentary representation nearly fourfold from the last elections. The question with which I ended an article on extremism in Romania up to the 1996 elections ('But what about the year 2000, when the next elections are due? Or 2004, or 2008, for that matter?') was prophetically more accurate than I wished it had been.[58]

Much of Ion Iliescu's campaign between the runoffs was geared at emphasizing his rival's extremist postures and the dangers involved in them for Romania's international image. Yet as he kicked off his campaign to regain the office he had lost to Emil Constantinescu in 1996, quite different notes were being played on the electoral score. In October 2000, in an interview with the daily *Adevărul*, Iliescu was keen to tell the electorate that he had always valiantly defended Romania's historical record. His detractors – of which Tudor had been orchestra conductor, one should add – were focusing on unimportant gestures (Iliescu had covered his head during visits paid to the Choral Temple in Bucharest and to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington in 1993) and overlooking significant content. For instance, Iliescu noted, no one had remarked on the difference between himself and Polish President Lech Wallęsa: unlike Wallęsa, when visiting the Israeli Knesset, Iliescu alone had refrained from apologizing for his countrymen's participation in the Holocaust. The issue, Iliescu emphasized, was one that still required elucidation by historians.[59]

Instead of telling his critics that the time had come to assume collective responsibility (which is by no means tantamount to collective culpability), Iliescu was striking one more note of utilitarian anti-Semitism. While stopping short of exonerating Antonescu, he was 'leaving judgment' to historians. On the eve of his renewed mandate he told an audience at a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty briefing in Washington that Marshal Ion Antonescu 'had some merits', too. It was Antonescu, he said, who had quashed the Iron Guard rebellion in early 1941, and 'Antonescu proved more tolerant' towards the Jews than did Admiral Miklós Horthy's Hungary, not to mention the fact that he 'had the merit of liberating the territory occupied by the Soviets'. And why, he asked, are double standards applied; why is it that Romania being singled out for attempts by some people to rehabilitate Antonescu, while the fact that Marshal Philippe Pétain in France is being venerated by some followers is overlooked, as indeed, is the fact that Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim is considered a national hero in Finland? Unfortunately, no one in the audience had either the knowledge or the audacity to point out that (despite his personal responsibility for anti-Jewish legislation and the deaths of Jews in enforced labour in 1941, or for those massacred as 'alien Jews' in and around Novi Sad in 1942) Horthy was a strange anti-Semite who, up to the country's invasion by Germany in March 1944, had in many ways had protected Hungarian Jews from a worse fate.[60] And there was no one in the audience to tell Iliescu that Mannerheim, while a Hitler ally during the Soviet invasion of Finland, had kept Finnish democracy in place, was not guilty of any war crimes, and that in total only seven Finnish Jews had perished in the Holocaust. Indeed, at least

300 members of the tiny (2,000-strong) Jewish community in that country had fought in Finish uniform alongside the German army for their country's liberation.[61] Estimates for Jews exterminated during the war in territories under Romanian rule, on the other hand, range between 102,000 and 410,000.[62]

Having regained the presidency, Iliescu had lost the electoral 'excuse' for employing utilitarian anti-Semitism; yet he was showing no sign of renouncing it. In a speech at the Choral Temple in Bucharest marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Iron Guard pogrom in Bucharest on 21 January 2001, he said the Iron Guardist 'aberration' had been a 'delirium of intolerance and anti-Semitism'. However, the president added, that brief 'delirium' excepted, there had been no Romanian contribution to 'the long European history' of persecution of the Jews, and it was 'significant' that there was 'no Romanian word for pogrom.' In other words, there had been no 'Antonescu episode' in the history of Romanian Jews. Furthermore, he hastened to add, it was 'unjustified to attribute to Romania an artificially inflated number of Jewish victims for the sake of media impact'. Romania's distorted image, according to Iliescu, was likely to be corrected only when 'Romanian [rather than Jewish] historians tackle the subject.'[63]

Hardly six months had passed, however, and Iliescu's 'unique aberration' of 1941 grew slightly larger. With Romania banging on NATO's doors and against protests in the U.S. and Israel triggered by the Antonescu cult in Romania, Iliescu attended a ceremony marking the Iaşi pogrom where he felt compelled to declare, *'no matter what we may think,* international public opinion considers Antonescu to have been a war criminal.'[64] What he referred to as 'international public opinion' had spoken out before, but had then been largely ignored; or rather, attempts were made to misinform those protesting the Antonescu cult, including by Iliescu himself.[65] Now, suddenly, Iliescu was discovering it. Still, he was not telling his countrymen that they must change their *mind* about Antonescu (it does not matter what we *think*) – only that they must change their *discourse* about him – an option Romanians were certainly not unfamiliar with after nearly half a century of Communism.[66]

At the beginning of the same month, a scandal of some proportion had shaken the Romanian military, and with it the public at large. On June 1st, General Mircea Chelaru, former chief of staff of the Romanian Army, had attended a ceremony in Bucharest unveiling of a bust of Antonescu. The event took place on the 55th anniversary of the marshal's execution, with the bust being displayed in the courtyard of the Saints Constantin and Elena church, which Antonescu had founded in 1943. Alongside Chelaru, present at the ceremony were also PRM leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor, his deputy and Senate Deputy Chairman, historian Gheorghe Buzatu, and Marshal Antonescu League honorary chairman Iosif Constantin Drăgan.[67] Known for his extreme nationalist postures, Chelaru had the briefest term a post-post-Communist Chief of Staff has ever had: from 15 February 2000 to 31 October. In-between, he had presided over an attempt to unveil an Antonescu statute in Iaşi, on what was planned to be a 'Marshals' Alley.' The alley was to host the busts of Romania's two other marshals —Marshal Constantin Prezan and Marshal Alexandru

Averescu. Following protests of the town's Jewish community, the planned Antonescu bust was replaced by one of King Ferdinand and the bust representing Antonescu was removed to the nearby Leţcani cemetery, which was named on the occasion in Antonescu's honour. According to media reports, there had been pressure to renounce the project from abroad as well, in other words from the U.S.[68]

Chelaru was forced to resign as chief of staff after having displayed what appeared to be Bonapartist postures: he warned publicly against alleged dangers to the country's territorial integrity by 'enclaves' being formed not only in Transylvania – under Hungarian inspiration – but also in the southern parts of the country, allegedly under Bulgarian inspiration. The suspicion arose that Chelaru might be contemplating some form of military take-over, and that suspicion was perhaps confirmed by his joining a group calling itself the National Association of Military Personnel upon his dismissal. The group comprised active and retired soldiers who purported to represent an effort to 'prevent corruption, anti-social and anti-national acts, and the struggle against crime'. Since the group infringed on military statutes, it was not recognized by the Defence Ministry and was forced to disband. According to a U.S. intelligence report, President Constantinescu had argued against Chelaru's resignation, but the Supreme Defence Council decided to impose it 'to avoid any misinterpretation [of] [...] the exercise of democratic control over the armed forces' by NATO.[69] The general became chief of the army's Institute of Strategic Studies upon his resignation as Chief of Staff.

His participation in the bust-unveiling ceremony was to lead to his departure from the Army itself. Under obvious pressure from NATO circles – as could be read between the lines of a press release from the Defence Ministry. The general was charged with having infringed on military regulations forbidding participation in manifestations of a political character. 'It is regrettable,' the press release said, 'that individual gestures connected to a person who has been condemned by the international community [can] overshadow the collective efforts of the Army [...] to join NATO and the European Union.'[70] Prime Minister Adrian Năstase intervened personally in the affair, telling a forum of his party that 'at least two countries,' the U.S. and Israel are 'disturbed' by the continued Antonescu cult in Romania. As a 'representative of the Army,' the premier added, Chelaru should have 'taken into account these sensibilities, particularly at a time when politics are vital for Romania in its relations with NATO and its members' ahead of the planned November 2002 summit in Prague, where the organization's enlargement figured on its agenda.[71] President Iliescu, in turn, said that each time Chelaru had visited the U.S. as Chief of Staff, he had been confronted with the 'bad impression' the pro-Antonescu cult created there and has been questioned on the matter by his U.S. counterparts. A man in Chelaru's position, Iliescu added, should have been aware of these 'bad marks' detrimental effect on the country's present efforts to improve its image abroad.[72] Rather than face being court-marshalled, Chelaru retired from the army.

Before submitting his resignation, Chelaru stated on Romanian television that he was, 'wondering why we should take into account the sensibilities of others, while everybody

can scoff at and mock our own sensibilities.' On an earlier occasion, he told Mediafax, 'We are being ordered to spit [on everything that is dear to Romanian collective memory], so spit, brothers, spit.'[73] In an interview with the Romanian Radio approximately one month after his departure from the ranks, Chelaru emphasized that his decision to leave the Army had been determined by the inner conflict (Festinger would have called it 'dissonance') he was confronting as a result of an 'arbitrary cosmopolitan act' toward a 'high-ranking officer' committed by that very organization that should be the 'guardian of the nation's symbolic values'. As a result, he said, he took the decision to go into retirement and 're-generate' himself.[74] On the other side of the Atlantic, Christopher Smith was professing to be 'encouraged by the swift and unequivocal response by the Romanian government to the inexcusable participation of General Mircea Chelaru' in the bust-unveiling ceremony of 'Romania's war-time dictator'.[75] The 'clash of memories' could not be more blatant. As for 'regeneration,' Chelaru re-emerged in 2002 as the newly elected chairman of the extra-parliamentary extreme nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity.

Utilitarian anti-Semitism had thus reached a crossroads. On one hand, what was once a bastion of the marshal's rehabilitation – the Army itself – was beginning to get rid of some of the cult's most ardent supporters. On the other hand, there could be no doubt that there was both resistance and rejection of this drive within the ranks of the military. Perhaps nothing better illustrates this than a volume produced in 2000 by military historians from the Institute for Defence Political and Military History Studies. The body of the volume, whose 'co-ordinator,' that is to say editor, was Antonescu-apologist Colonel Dr. Alexandru Duu, was a continuation of what Romanian military historians had produced ever since the days when institute was still called the Centre for Military History and Theory, and was headed by the president's brother, Ilie Ceauşescu. The introduction, however, took the opposite position. It carried the telling title "A Futile Saga" and was authored by General Mihail Ionescu, who became the new head of the institute in August 2000.[76] Which of the two sides would now get the ear of Romania's hitherto utilitarian anti-Semites?

An Ordinance Imposed From Afar

On 13 March 2002, the Romanian government issued an emergency ordinance banning the cult of Marshal Ion Antonescu. The ordinance came into force on 28 March, with its publication in the official gazette, the *Monitorul oficial*. For unclear reasons, the issuance of the document was kept a secret for five days, its contents emerging only on 18 March. The most likely explanation for the short lived secrecy should probably be sought in a concerted public relations campaign targeting foreign, rather than domestic audiences. For it was also on 18 March that, at the National Defence College in Bucharest, the first syllabus for high-ranking officials on the Holocaust in Romania was launched. Teaching the first course was Dr. Radu Ioanid of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

in Washington, a Romanian-born historian and author of several books on anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Romania.[77] Not without reason (see below), Ioanid was viewed by many in Romania as some sort of 'chief monitor' of the thriving Antonescu cult, the man who was behind alerting U.S. congressmen and Jewish American organizations that time and again protested against the transformation of the country's wartime leader into an object of semi-officially sanctioned cult. It was apparently hoped that the impact of the announcement on the ordinance would be enhanced by Ioanid's presence at the inauguration of the syllabus – and its echoes on the Hill would not be missed.[78]

By issuing the ordinance, Premier Năstase was fulfilling a pledge made during an October 2001 visit to the Holocaust Memorial Museum and at a meeting with U.S. Jewish leaders in New York. That the Romanian premier was also received on the occasion of that visit by U.S. President George W. Bush for a previously unscheduled meeting probably had little to do with the way the Holocaust was being treated in Romania;[79] rather, it was a 'friendly signal' for the premier of a country that had rallied behind Washington more than others in East Central Europe after the terrorist attack on New York and Washington on 11 September 2002. But the signal was being beamed at a time when Romania was intensifying its efforts to be accepted as a member of NATO at the alliance's November summit in Prague, and perceptions in Bucharest about who could influence a positive decision had been unmistakably displayed during a visit paid by Năstase to Israel in July of that year, when he sought to enlist the support of the country's two chief rabbis for Romania's membership of NATO.[80]

In interviews granted on the occasion, Ioanid bluntly told his hosts that Romania 'cannot enter NATO with Antonescu on its banners.' To become a member of the alliance, he said, Romania must also become a member in the family that shares its values.[81] To make that statement in the heart of one of the Antonescu cult cradles – the Army – showed no small measure of self-confidence (as well as some *chutzpa*). As mentioned, the Romanian military and the college that was launching the syllabus had been long among the main promoters of the cult. But Ioanid was drawing attention to recent statements by U.S. NATO Committee Chairman Bruce Jackson. Indeed, on a visit to Bucharest some three weeks earlier, and despite praising the progress made by Romania in military reforms towards NATO accession, Jackson did not mince words: 'Give me a bulldozer and I shall immediately destroy all Antonescu statues.' He noted that adherence to democratic values includes facing one's historical past and is 'not negotiable' in the accession process.[82]

The ordinance prohibited the display of 'racist or fascist symbols,' the erection of statues or commemorative plaques for those condemned in Romania or abroad for 'crimes against peace' and for 'crimes against humanity,' as well as the naming of streets and other places after those personalities. Exceptions were to be made only for museums, where such statues could be displayed for the purpose of 'scientific activity' carried out outside 'public space.' It also outlawed organizations of 'fascist, racist and xenophobic character' that promote ideas 'on ethnic, racist, or religious grounds' and extended this prohibition to both registered and unregistered foundations or any other form of organization consisting

of three persons or more. Finally, it provided penalties ranging from fines to fifteen years in prison for those infringing its regulations or denying the Holocaust.[83] In other words, the ordinance reflected the response to a situation in which the country's ruling political elite had been told it could no longer procrastinate. For what Jackson had told his hosts in February was that an option has to me made between two clashing 'memories.' On the one hand, there were the 'memories' of those promoting the Antonescu cult and of those who acquiesced to that promotion out of utilitarian motivations; on the other had, there was the 'memory' of Antonescu as chief perpetrator of the Romanian Holocaust reflected in Jewish and (more rarely) Romany commemorations of his victims. Jackson had made it crystal-clear that only the latter 'memory' coincided with the collective 'memory' of the organization Romania was striving to join.

For the purposes of domestic consumption and in what may have been an attempt to sweeten the bitter pill of foreign-prescribed medicine, the country's leadership seemed to employ an idiom different from that employed for outside usage even after the ordinance's issuance. On 22 March, Năstase was emphasizing that his is opposition to attempts to 'indict the Romanian people for the Holocaust'[84] and stressing that responsibility for its perpetration 'squarely falls on the leaders and the government of the times, and on them alone.' Năstase was thereby legitimising the jargon of Romanian Holocaust deniers, who always protest against what they claim are attempts to 'indict the Romanian people' for the purpose of squeezing fabulous amounts of compensation out of the country. Last, but by no means least, the premier was also indulging in the 'comparative trivialization' of the Holocaust[85] when he claimed, 'History has encountered situations that were a lot more grievous, any yet nobody tried to indict the German, Russian or the American peoples.'

In turn, President Iliescu, was reiterating- though in a slightly modified form – his deflection of negative perceptions of Antonescu onto foreigners. Addressing a seminar organized in Bucharest under the auspices of U.S. Jewish organizations, Iliescu said that Antonescu is considered *'by the states who fought in World War II for democracy and against Hitler'* to be a war-criminal and that consequently 'any manifestation of an Antonescu cult' in Romania*, 'no matter how one tries to justify it,*' is perceived as being 'in defiance of the international community attached to democratic ideals and values'.[86] The encoded messages of the country's two highest officials thus read: you can rest assured that we shall not force you into facing collective responsibility and you must understand that we do not necessarily identify with what is being imposed on us.

An additional signal for internal consumption came when the government, in an obvious contradiction to its own ordinance, decided to display the portraits of all Romanian premiers at its official seat. The gallery, of course, included the marshal's portrait, which triggered a letter of protest by the U.S. Helsinki Commission, objecting to both that step and to procrastination in removing the Antonescu statues.[87] Culture Minister Răzvan Theodorescu, however, had claimed on 27 May that all Antonescu statues – except a bust displayed in Bucharest in the courtyard of the church he himself had built – had been dismantled.[88] As for the governmental portrait gallery, Theodorescu explained that

the exhibit was outside 'public space,' and thus within the restrictions of the ordinance.[89] One could choose to argue that the official seat of the government is the very centre of 'public space.'

According to the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania, since 1993 six statues had been erected in the memory of the marshal—in Bucharest, Iaşi, Jilava, Slobozia, Piatra-Neamț and Târgovişte.[90] The pro-Antonescu forces, on the other hand, counted only four statues.[91]Two more statues – in Sărmaş and Călăraşi – were mentioned in the U.S. Helisnki Committee protest letter. Which of these belonged to the category of 'public space' and would thus have to be dismantled according to the ordinance's stipulation was not quite clear. At Jilava, a cross (not a statue), had been erected on the spot of Antonescu's execution sometime in the early 1990s, without any public announcement having been made on it. Being administered by the Justice Ministry, the Jilava prison grounds are arguably 'public space,' but it seems that the cross is still in its place. Two busts – in Bucharest and in Sărmaş (Mureş County) were on church grounds, the one in the capital being in the courtyard of the church built by the dictator, whose unveiling had been attended by Chelaru. Were these monuments on 'public space'? The Bucharest statue was not dismantled, but it was ordered to be 'covered.'[92] The mayor of Călăraşi denied that the statue in his town was displayed on 'public space,' saying that the bust was on the grounds of the Marshal Ion Antonescu League and was therefore untouchable.[93] That left three statues undoubtedly erected on 'public space': the one in Leţcani, near Iaşi, in a military cemetery – 'Heroes' Cemetery Ion Antonescu!'; one in Slobozia; and one in Piatra-Neam (the statue in Târgovişte apparently does not exist). These were all dismantled.[94] Finally, procedures were launched in early August against PRM Cluj Mayor Gheorghe Funar, who had displayed several blueprints for a planned statue in the town's city hall and had refused to destroy them.[95]

The cheapest statue, Pippidi writes, is the renaming of a street. 'Street signs can be replaced as one political regime chases out its predecessor.'[96] According to Premier Năstase, by 31 July, fourteen out of the twenty-five streets named after Antonescu had been renamed and the rest were to soon follow.[97] But there was clearly also local resistance. Oradea Mayor Petru Filip announced that the municipal council (located on Ion Antonescu street, one of the town's largest avenues) had rejected the government's ordinance because 'it is unclear whether the marshal was a war criminal or not.' (He eventually gave in.) Botoşani municipal council followed in its footsteps, with several councillors representing the ruling party joining those of the PRM in opposing the ordinance, but they were forced to change the decision after receiving a stern dissolution threat from Bucharest.[98] Other local councils simply ignored the ordinance without bothering to react at all.

Far more important, the fate of the ordinance itself was becoming unclear. Emergency ordinances become effective upon their issuance, but must eventually be approved by the parliament in order to become laws. Debates in commissions have shown that this is by no means to be taken for granted.

While the Senate's Human Rights' Commission approved the ordinance's text

without amendments on 9 April, the Defence Commission representatives of the PNL (among them former party chairman Mircea Ionescu-Quintus) joined those of the PRM in demanding that the text be amended. It was claimed that the Holocaust was a diffuse concept that needed clarification, and it was also claimed that the article in the ordinance prohibiting Holocaust denial infringes on the human rights in general and on the right of freedom of expression in particular.[99] Although the PNL leadership distanced itself from its representatives on the commission,[100] their position was partly embraced by the same chamber's Judicial Commission. After twice postponing approval, this commission agreed on 5 June to an amended text, based on the proposal made by Senator Gheorghe Buzatu, a PRM deputy chairman and a historian specializing in Holocaust denial. Buzatu had proposed that the Holocaust be defined as, *'the systematic massive extermination of the Jewish population in Europe, organized by the Nazi authorities during the Second World War.'* In other words, *by definition* there has been no Holocaust in Romania, since the extermination of Jews there had not been 'organized by the Nazi authorities'. The commission also reduced the maximum penalty for setting up organizations of a 'fascist, racist or xenophobe' character from fifteen to five years in prison.[101]

The definition is perfectly in line with Buzatu and his associates' peculiar 'selective negationism,' which does not deny the Holocaust having taken place *elsewhere* but excludes *any* participation of members of one's own nation in its perpetration.[102] Should the plenum of the Senate approve the amendments proposed by the two commissions – and should the Chamber of Deputies, whose commissions have not yet debated the ordinance – also heed them, the government's emergency ordinance would be emptied of relevance.

The efforts by Theodorescu to pre-empt this situation, while apparently prompted by a desire to overcome resistance, rendered a sense of the tragicomic. He proposed – as he would do at a special session of the Academy called to debate the issue of the Holocaust and Romania's role in it – that it be specified that while no Holocaust had taken place in Romania, 'Holocaust-like' policies were implemented by the Antonescu regime on territories under 'temporary Romanian occupation'.[103] The Nazis could almost make the same claim: most Holocaust atrocities, they could contend, had been perpetrated on non-German territory. Besides, to consider Bessarabia and northern Bukovina 'occupied territories' calls into question the legitimacy of Antonescu's joining the war launched by Hitler against the Soviet Union – in other words the very legitimacy on whose grounds many Romanians rejected any parallel between the two countries' wartime acts.

In Lieu of Conclusion: Constrained Memory and Its Discontents

The 'clash of memories' has expectedly resulted in the victory of the stronger. How secure that victory can be considered is, however, a different matter. Historical experience advocates caution. The 1923 extension of full citizenship rights to Romanian Jews was also achieved under considerable Western pressure over a long period of time, dating as

far back as the 1866 constitution. Then as now, the pressures extended by the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* via the Western powers were much resented, and in the end the 1923 'achievement' proved short-lived.[104]

Reactions to the ordinance confirm that a note of caution is in order. First, the acceptance of the Buzatu version of the 'definition' of the Holocaust speaks volumes of the Romanian attempt to 'have the cake and eat it as well.' Second, the Romanian leadership's ambivalence in presenting the necessity of having the ordinance approved told a different story to domestic ears than the tune played for international listenership. In defending the ordinance, Defence Minister Ioan Mircea Paşcu went as far as urging young PSD members to be 'rational, rather than emotional'. Medieval prince Vlad the Impaler – for many a national hero – would have been condemned for 'crimes against humanity', had he been put on trial at Nüremberg, Paşcu said,[105] thus hinting that he agrees that Antonescu's condemnation was quite unfair, but also that history's *final* judgment may produce a different verdict. Moreover, and third, there was obvious reluctance within the ranks of the ruling party itself to the government-initiated measures. This was hardly surprising, as the PSD has always willingly included in its own ranks nationalists and extreme nationalists. Former Iliescu critic over Antonescu and his positions on the Holocaust, Adrian Păunescu, was now a PSD Senator and he did not hesitate to wage war on his own party's position. In fact, the debate at the Romanian Academy was prompted by Păunescu's insistence that 'history must be left to historians' – which was also one of the main anti-ordinance postures displayed by the PRM – and not only by it.[106] Nor was Păunescu alone within the PSD ranks in his resistance; he was joined, for example, by PSD Cultural Commission Deputy Chairman, Grigore Zanc.[107]

Positions displayed by Romania's historians in the ensuing debate were not a surprise either. The most militant on the rejectionist side was, of course, Buzatu. The only ethnic Romanian historian to come out clearly in favour of the ordinance was, again unsurprisingly, Andrei Pippidi. His spouse, political scientist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, pointed out that the ordinance was in itself insufficient. Public perceptions of Antonescu, she said, would change only if legislation is followed by a more critical debate of what the marshal actually did. 'From now on, it is the duty of liberal intellectuals to say that they have another opinion of Romania's past.'[108] Indeed, a public opinion poll carried by the daily *Ziua* among its readers in 2001 showed that less than one in four (24.59 %) were of the opinion that Antonescu had been a war criminal, and a large majority of over 75 % held the opposite opinion.[109] This is, by and large, precisely what historians *failed* to do, however, and as Mungiu-Pippidi hinted in the same interview, there were good reasons to suspect this would be so. 'Ceauşescu,' she said, had needed these intellectuals to 'show that his policy, independent from the West and from the East, was a national policy' and for this purpose he had used them,' but Ceauşescu is now dead and the groups are still here'.

In the ensuing debates, former party-subservient but nationalist-minded historians would seize the occasion to make clear their opposition. This, for example, was the case of university professor Mihail Retegan, who (as if he had ever raised his voice against

the party under the previous regime), said that he thought the days when the Communist regime was interfering with historical research had been left behind. This was similarly the case of the head of the Academy's Historical Section, Dan Berindei, who stated that Romania needs no legislation against Holocaust denial, because 'there has been no Holocaust in Romania. There have been some deportations to Transnistria. [Romania] was a anteroom of the Holocaust, but not [the place of the] Holocaust.'[110] Or, as Berindei would put it at the debate of the Romanian Academy, the experience was 'a wing of the phenomenon, that touched Romania as well'.[111] Florin Constantiniu, a correspondent member of the Academy, put on his habitual performance of 'objectivity' when, on the one had, he praised Antonescu for being 'the only politician in Romania's history' who attempted to restore the country's territorial integrity, while on the other hand deeming his policies towards the Jews as 'more than a crime – a mistake!'. On July 1st, at a symposium at the Bucharest Institute for Defence, Political, and Military History Studies, which I had the honour to attend, the historian complained about attempts to impose 'political correctness' and dictates from abroad, and wondered why historians, political scientists and politicians in general display such 'haste' towards Romania's 'Antonescu problem,' which, he claimed, would find its clarification and solution in due time. Constantiniu's criticism was common to several anti-ordinance postures. Though obviously driven by radically different motivations, the PRM or Şerban Suru, leader of the neo-Iron Guard in Romania, found themselves sharing the same boat with the Romanian Association for the Defence of Human Rights-Helsinki Committee, which issued a position paper on the ordinance. Gabriel Andreescu, a prominent defender of human rights in his country, emphasized in that position paper that the Emergency Ordinance 31 lacked any 'emergency' except for bowing to pressure from the West.[112] I must admit that at the symposium I was unable to refrain from asking Constantiniu whether waiting for 12 years – the time that has passed since the fall of the Communist regime – was being 'hasty'.

But historians habitually perceived to have been on the other side of the national-Communist Ceauşescu fence did not display any eagerness to support the ordinance either. Interviewed on Romanian Radio on 19 April, Dinu C. Giurescu said that 'because of geo-strategic, *not because of historical* reasons,' Antonescu's statues should be displayed in private, rather than in public space. However, he added, the time will come when 'that statue's merits and responsibilities will be reconsidered'.[113] Membership considerations, in other words, may prevail over monuments, but whether they can prevail over memory is another matter. Without knowing it, Giurescu was thus vindicating his peer Andrei Pippidi, who in the interview with Reuters observed that 'those defending Antonescu feel [...] admission of his role in the Holocaust would be humiliating for Romania.'

The reader should note that the PRM has been left out of this study's focus. There were good grounds to do so. Nothing the PRM said or did in connection with the ordinance was in any way surprising or unexpected. That Tudor declared he was ready to place in the 'private space' of his courtyard an Antonescu bust was part of his habitual provocative posturing, as indeed was his unveiling in Cluj of a bust of U.S. President

Woodrow Wilson, into which ceremony he unsuccessfully tried to lure U.S. Ambassador Michael Guest, or his announced intention to unveil a bust in Braşov of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yizthak Rabin.[114] At most, the Wilson and Rabin busts could be viewed as an extension of the negationist counter-offensive hitherto limited to making use of Holocaust terminology to refute the 'enemy's argument'. The linguistic war had thus been extended to the war waged over public space. Remarkably, the PRM also drew attention to the absence of similar legislation directed against Communist symbols and the denial of the Communist genocide.[115] Not only Andreescu, but also Pippidi, in the interview with Reuters, also did so. The author of these lines has already expressed his position over this contentious issue[116] and cannot but reiterate it in the briefest possible form: the PRM is right, even if for the wrong reasons! I only urge the reader to remember that *non est idem, si duo dicunt idem!*

But what about utilitarian anti-Semitism's prospects? I fear that this study's conclusion must be that precious little has changed in elite political culture in Romania in the twelve years that have passed since the overthrow of the former regime. What I had termed as 'simulated change' remains just as prominent a feature of that political culture as it was under the previous regime.[117] Nothing perhaps demonstrates better this simulative aspect than an event that registered almost parallel with the saga of Ordinance 31/2002. In an attempt to demonstrate to the Western eyes that extremism is on the wane, in early 2002 the ruling PSD accepted among its members two defectors from the ranks of the PRM parliamentarians. One of them was a former member of the Communist secret police; the other, Ilie Neacşu, was the former editor-in-chief of Romania's post-Communist most anti-Semitic weekly (typically called no less than *Europa*!) and a deputy chairman of the Marshal Antonescu League.[118]

Memory, it seems, can be constrained. But a constrained memory might, at best, display either cognitive dissonance or indulge in simulation. At worst, it will resist, bidding its time – an asset that collective memories are never short of. And that can hardly be said of memberships.

Notes

[1] 2 See Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Edited, Translated and with an Introduction by Lewis A. Coser), Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1992, particularly pp. 167-189.

[3] I am not qualified to elucidate the link between individual, historic and collective memory. For what they are worth, my thoughts were recently (1 July 2002) presented at a seminar in Bucharest: Memory, I said on that occasion, 'is not only about remembering. To remember is to recall the past. But memory is not only about the past. It is also about the present and about the future. Memory is instinctive. A child who does not remember that fire burns, would put its hand in the flame again and again. We instinctively remember the past in order to be able to function at present and in order to be able to cope with the future...But just as memory is instinctive, so is forgetting. If we could not function without learning from experience, it is no less true that we

cannot function if experience becomes obsessive. If we were to spend our lives in bemoaning personal, and above all collective traumas, we would become just as dysfunctional as human beings as we would be as walking tabulae rasae. It is hard to establish with certainty where the line between remembering and forgetting must be drawn. We know that we mourn in order to remember, but also in order to be able to forget. Mourning, including collective mourning, thus has a double healing function. It is, on one hand, directed at understanding what happened to ourselves or our kin, but at the same time it is directed towards enabling ourselves to survive. The trouble is that memory in general, and collective memory in particular, is also selective. We 'forget' what we do not like to remember, we eliminate from our psyche, including the collective psyche, what we wish it did not happen. Even when we are forced by evidence to recognize our guilt, we tend to deflect responsibility unto others.' Michael Shafir, 'The Holocaust-Gulag Post-Communist 'Competition': An Insurmountable Obstacle to Mutual Reconciliation?,' (paper presented at the international seminar 'Romania and the Holocaust: History and Contemporary Significance,' organized by the Institute for Political , Defense and Military History and the Goldstein-Goren Institute for Hebrew Studies, University of Bucharest, text in the Romanian language forthcoming in *Revista de istorie militară*, No. 5-6, 2002. Readers interested in the memory-forgetting-forgiving link should consult in particular Paul Ricoeur, *Memoria, istoria, uitarea*,Timişoara, Editura Amarcord, 2001, translated from the original *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2000, pp. 500-611.

[4] See Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, White Plains, NY, Row Peterson, 1957.

[5] Ricoeur, *Memoria, istoria, uitarea, op. cit*.

[6] Paris, Gallimard.

[7] Jean-Charles Szurek, Pentru o memorie democratică a trecuturilor traumatizante, (= For a Democratic Memory of Traumatizing Pasts), IN: *Colegiul Noua Europă, Istoria recentă în Europa: Obiecte de studiu, surse, metode*, Bucureşti, Lucrările simpozionului internaional organizat de Colegul Noua Europă), 7-8 aprilie 2000, pp. 53-54. [Emphasis in original.]

[8] Martin Malia, Judging Nazism and Communism, IN: *The National Interest*, Fall 2002, p. 69.

[9] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 52 and 98-127, respectively.

[10] See Andrei Pippidi, *Despre statui şi morminte: Pentru o teorie a istoriei simbolice* (= On Statues and Tombs: Towards a Theory of Historic Symbols), Iaşi, Polirom, 2000, particularly pp. 5-10.

[11] George Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power*, London, Hurst and Company, 2000, p. 74.

[12] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationa-lism*, London,Verso, 1991.

[13] Lucian Boia, *Jocul cu trecutul: Istoria între adevăr şi ficiune* (= The Game with the Past. History Between Truth and Fiction), Bucharest, Humanitas, 1998, p. 7.

[14] Jacques Rupnik, 'Revoluţie—restauraie,' (= Revolution—Restoration) IN: *Lettre internationale* (Romanian edition), no. 4, 1992/1993 (Winter), p.4.

[15] Pippidi, *Depre statui şi morminte*, pp. 8 and 22, respectively.

[16] Michael Shafir, 'Anti-semitism in Post-Communist East Central Europe: Its Whys and Hows,' paper presented at the international symposium 'Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis in Osteuropa nach 1990,' organized by the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Brno Masaryk University, Brno, 14-17 March 2002.

[17] Pippidi, *Despre statui şi morminte*, p.78.

[18] Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p.104.

[19] Schöpflin, *op.cit.*, p. 77-78.

[20] Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p.108.

[21] Michael Shafir, Marshal Antonescu's Post-Communist Rehabilitation: Cui Bono? IN: Randolph L. Braham (ed.), *The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews During the Antonescu Era*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 349-410.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 364. My analysis in that article was extensively confirmed (also in 1997) by Romanian historian Lucian Boia, in a book not yet marketed when I wrote the study. See his *Istorie şi mit în conştiina românească* (= History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness), Bucharest, Humanitas, pp. 75-76, 273, 277-8. For a subsequent analysis by Boia see his *România: ară de Frontieră a Europei* (= Romania: European Borderland), Bucharest, Humanitas, pp. 193-195, 214.

[23] In particular, Michael Shafir, Between Denial and 'Comparative Trivialization': Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe, *ACTA*, No. 19, 2002.

[24] Tony Judt, The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe, IN: István Deák, Jan T. Gross, Tony Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 309-310. The year of Antonescu's execution is, in fact, 1946.

[25] *Realitatea evreiască*, No. 49-50, 16 April-15 May 1997. [Emphasis mine.]

[26] See Radu Ioanid, Revisionism in the Post-Communist Romanian Political Culture—Attempts to Rehabilitate the Perpetrators of the Holocaust IN: Margot Levy (ed.), *Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in the Age of Genocide*, London, Macmillan, Vol. 1, pp. 813-832.

[27] See the interview with Balotă in *Apostrof* (Cluj), no. 11-12, 2000, which also published his letter to Constantinescu, dated 17 February 1997.

[28] *Realitatea evreiască*, no. 76, July 1998.

[29] For details, see Michael Shafir, 'Marshal Antonescu's PostCommunist Rehabilitation' pp. 358-361.

[30] *Adevărul*, 21 November 1997.

[31] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 10 November 1997.

[32] Cited in Ioanid, *Revisionism in the Post-Communist Romanian Political Culture*.

[33] See Lya Benjamin, Dreptul la convertire şi statutul evreilor convertii în perioada antonesciană (= The Right to Conversion and the Status of Converted Jews in the Antonescu Period), IN: *Studia et acta historiae iudeaorum romaniae* (Bucureşti: Editura Hasefer), Vol. 3, 1998, pp. 245-262 and Michael Shafir, Paradigme, parademonstraii, partrăznete, (III), (= Paradigmae, Pseudo-Demonstrations, Lighting Rods), *Sfera politicii,* Bucharest, no. 86, 2000, pp. 29-39.

[34] See Shafir, Marshal Antonescu's Post-Communist Rehabilitation, p. 357.

[35] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 17 November 1997.

[36] *ARPress*, 23 November 1997.

[37] *RFE/RL* Newsline, 27 October 1998.

[38] *Ibid.*, 18 January 2000.

[39] *România liberă*, 6 March 1997.

[40] *See RFE/RL Newsline*, 25 April 2001.

[41] William Totok, 'Discursul revizionist' (= The Revisionist Discourse), *Sfera* (supplement of the Bucharest monthly Sfera politicii), no. 1, pp. 26-32.

[42] Alexandru Paleologu, Stelian Tănase, *Sfidarea memoriei* (= Defying Memory), Bucureşti Editura Du Style, 1996, pp. 186-196.

[43] See Gabriel Andreescu, *Naţionalişti, anţinaionalişti: O polemică în publicistica românească* (= Nationalists, Anti-nationalists: A Polemical Debate in the Romanian Media), Iaşi, Polirom, 1996, pp. 25-69.

[44] In 1998, for example, in an interview with a daily published in Iaşi, he called for a 'short-term dictatorship' to overcome the 'foolish and selfish' ambitions of political parties, which, he said, are corrupted or encourage corruption and fail to place the 'national interest' at the head of their priority-list . See *România liberă*, 6 April 1998.

[45] Cited in Totok, *Discursul revizionist*, p. 32

[46] Cited in *ibid.*, p.29.

[47] *România literară*, 27 December 1995-9, January 1996.

[48] See Michael Shafir, The Man They Love to Hate: Norman Manea's 'Snail House' Between

Holocaust and Gulag, IN: *East European Jewish Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2000, pp. 60-81.

[49] See the interview with Manolescu in *Adevărul literar şi artistic*, No. 629, 13 August 2002.

[50] The reader should try comparing Manolescu's articles cited in Shafir, The Man They Love to Hate or the similarly-spirited 'G. M. Támas faă cu reaciunea' [G. M. Támas Confronts the Reactionaries] IN: *România literară*, No. 8, 28 February-6 March 2001, with the following articles which adopt precisely the opposite position: Cine l-a inventat pe Vadim? (= Who Invented Vadim?), IN: *ibid.*, no. 50, 20-26 December 2000; Despre revizuiri, (= On Revisions), IN: *ibid.*, no. 48, 6-12 December 2000; Cînd ne despart ideile, (= When Ideas Divide Us) *ibid.*, no. 34, 29 August-4 September 2001; and Apel către Europa, (= An Appeal to Europe), *ibid.*, No. 44, 7-13 November 2001.

[51] See Manolescu, Sfîrşitul unei ambiguităi (= The End of an Ambiguity), *ibid.*, No. 46, 21-27 November 2001.

[52] See *RFE/RL Newsline*, 17 July 2001. On Manolescu's less appealing positions see also George Voicu, Reacia de prestigiu (= A Reaction of Prestige), IN: *Sfera politicii*, Vol. 6, No. 63, 1998, pp. 57-62. For a French-language translation of this excellent essay see L'honeur nationale roumaine en question, IN: *Les Temps Modernes*, Vol. 54, No. 606, November-December 1999, pp. 142-152.

[53] *RFE/RL's Newsline,* 15 June 1999.

[54] *Ziua,* 22 October 1999.

[55] See the interviews with them in the weekly *22*, no. 48, 2-8 December 1997.

[56] *Ziua*, 29 November 1997.

[57] See Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, Fascisme et Communisme en Roumanie: enjeux et usages d'une comparaison, IN: Henry Rousso (ed.), *Stalinisme et nazisme: Histoire et mémoire comparées*, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 1999, pp. 201-246.

[58] For a discussion of the 2000 electoral outcome see Michael Shafir, The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 Elections in Romania: How Obvious is the Obvious?, IN: *The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2001, pp. 91-126. See also Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Politica după comunism* (= Politics After Communism), Bucharest, Humanitas, 2002, pp. 126-131.

[59] Michael Shafir, Marginalization or Mainstream? The Extreme Right in Post-Communist Romania IN: Paul Hainsworth (ed.), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, London, Pinter, 2000, p. 265.

[60] *Adevărul*, 12 October 2000.

[61] Horthy no doubt shares many traits with Antonescu, but there are certainly also important differences, not the least of which is the fact that there has never been a Hungarian 'Transnistria.' This may or may not explain the fact that in his Portugese exile, Horthy and his wife 'survived thanks mostly to the generosity of some Jewish friends,' as we learn from Istaván Deák. One should also mention that Horthy briefly halted deportations to Auschwitz in July 1944. While none of these clears Horthy of responsibility, he was a complex figure perhaps best described by Deák: 'He was neither a fascist nor a liberal; he was not a monster, but he was not a humanitarian either. He claimed to have been a lifelong anti-Semite; still, under his reign and despite the deportations, more Jews survived the Nazi terror, in sheer numbers, than in any other country within Hitler's Europe, except perhaps Romania.' István Deák, A Fatal Compromise? The Debate over Collaboration and Resistance in Hungary, IN: István Deák, Jan T. Gross, Tony Judt (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution*, pp. 55-56.

[62] See Pippidi, Despre statui şi morminte, pp. 241-242; Déak, A Fatal Compromise?, p. 73n.

[63] Shafir, Between Denial and 'Comparative Trivialization', pp. 35-36.

[64] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 22 January 2001.

[65] *Ibid.*, 26 June 2001. [Emphasis mine.]

[66] See Shafir, Marshal Antonescu's PostCommunist Rehabilitation, p. 357.

[67] There is a good discussion of 'duplicity' in Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling

Reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 13-18, 37-41 and passim. Unfortunately, it is also one that largely ignores my own pioneering work on this important aspect of Romanian political culture, antedating all other works mentioned in Kligman's impressive study. See Michael Shafir, Political Culture, Intellectual Dissent and Intellectual Consent: The Case of Romania, IN: *Orbis*, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Summer), 1983, pp. 393-421.

[68] *Mediafax* and *AP*, 1 June 2001.

[69] See the article in the daily *Azi*, 3 April 2000, which was highly critical of the Army's having allegedly failed to 'defend its dignity and honor'.

[70] See *RFE/RL Newsline*, 1 and 2 November 2001.

[71] *AP*, 3 June 2001 and *Mediafax*, 4 June 2001.

[72] *Romanian Radio* and *Mediafax*, 4 June 2001.

[73] *Romanian Television*, *Channel 1*, 5 June 2001.

[74] *Romanian Television*, *Channel 1*, 4 June 2001 and Mediafax, 4 June 2001.

[75] *Romanian Radio*, 6 July 2001.

[76] Smith declaration in the House of Representatives, 27 July 2002.

[77] See Mihail Ionescu, O epopee inutilă, IN: *Golgota Estului* (iulie 1942-martie 1944) (= The Golgota of the East, June 1942-March 1994), Coordinator Colonel Dr. Alexandru Duu, Bucharest, Editura Fundaiei Culturale Române, 2000, pp. 5-12. For an expanded version see Mihail Ionescu, Ion Antonescu în faa războiului asimetric: Greşeli de neiertat (= Ion Antonescu Faced with the Asymmetric War: Unforgivable Mistakes), IN: *Magazin istoric*, Vol. 36, no. 6 (423), June 2002, pp. 14-20.

[78] See Radu Ioanid, *The Sword of the Archangel*, Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1990 and *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu regime, 1940-1944*, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2000.

[79] For the 'combined announcement' see *Mediafax,* 18 March 2002. Although the ordinance had been approved five days earlier, in his initial message to the participants in the syllabus Prime Minister Adrian Nastase was still announcing an 'intention' to approve the ordinance, as did Culture and Cults Minister Răzvan Theordorescu.

[80] See *RFE/RL Newsline*, 31 October, 2 November 2001; *Cotidianul and Curentul*, 5 November 2001.

[81] *Romanian Television*, 17 July 2001.

[82] *Mediafax*, 18 March 2002.

[83] *România liberă*, 27 February 2002.

[84] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 19 March 2002; *Cotidianul*, 19 March 2002; *Monitorul oficial al României*, 28 March 2002.

[85] *Romanian Radio*, 22 and 23 March 2003.

[86] For a discussion of the 'Comparative Trivialization' notion see Shafir, Between Denial and 'Comparative Trivialization,', pp. 60-75.

[87] *Adevărul*, 26 March 2002. [Emphasis mine.]

[88] *Ibid*., 29-30 June 2002.

[89] *Cotidianul*, 28 May 2002.

[90] *Mediafax*, 29 June 2002.

[91] *Ibid.*, 18 March 2002.

[92] *România mare*, no. 612, 5 April 2002.

[93] *Mediafax*, 29 June 2002. For a photo of the covered Antonescu bust see *România mare*, no. 628, 26 July 2002.

[94] *Jurnalul naional*, 2 July 2002.

[95] *Mediafax*, 29 March and 15 April, 2002; William Totok, Cazul Antonescu (=The Antonescu Case), IN: *Focus Vest*, Timişoara, no. 27, 5-11 July 2002.

[96] *Mediafax*, 1 August 2002; *România mare*, no. 632, 23 August 2002 (transcript of interview with PRM leader Tudor and Funar on the extreme nationalist television channel OTV). The Antonescu statue saga in Cluj is in itself remarkable. After several failed attempts to have the town council (on which he does not have a majority) approve the statue, in 1999 Funar managed to do so by 'bribing' municipal councilors belonging to the opposition CDR to let his pet project come through in exchange of erecting statues to Iuliu Maniu and Ion C. Bratianu as well. The two were leaders of the National Peasant PNL, respectively, and their successor formations were the two main parties of the CDR. Their leaderships were silent on the 'bargain' and only Péter Eckstein Kovács, who represented the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania in the then-ruling coalition government, protested the council's decision (see *RFE/RL Newsline*, 1 and 8 November 1999). The decision was appealed by the local prefect and after many subsequent developments, the hearings on prefect's complaint were transferred to a Iaşi tribunal, where they were still pending when the ordinance was issued (*ibid*., 3 April 2000).

[97] Pippidi, Despre statui şi morminte, p. 8.

[98] *Mediafax*, 31 July 2002.

[99] *Jurnalul naional*, 2 July 2002 and 1 August 2002. For the PRM protests after the Oradea municipal council changed its initial decision see *România mare*, no. 634, 6 September 2002.

[100] For the debates in the Human Rights Commission see *Mediafax*, 9 April 2002; for the debates in the Defense Commission, *Cotidianul*, 15 April 2202.

[101] *Mediafax*, 17 April 2002.

[102] *Mediafax*, 5 June 2002.

[103] For a discussion see Shafir, Between Denial and 'Comparative Trivialization', p. 52.

[104] For Theodorescu's argument see Romanian TV's First Channel and Mediafax, 8 May 2002; *Mediafax*, 27 May 2002; Rompres, 28 June 2002.

[105] See Carol Iancu, *Evreii din România de la excludere la emancipare (1866-1919)* (= The Jews in Romania from Exclusion to Emancipation (1866-1919)), Bucharest: Hasefer, 1996; and Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle*, 1918-1930, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995.

[106] *Mediafax*, 26 July 2002.

[107] See *Cotidianul*, 26 March 2002 and *Curierul naional*, 3 April 2002.

[108] See Gabriel Andreescu, Necesitatea amendării Ordonanei de urgenă nr. 31 privind organizaiile şi simbolurile cu caracter fascist, rasist sau xenofob (=The Necessity of Amending Ordinance 31 on Organizations and Symbols of a Fascist, Racist or Xenophobic Character) IN: *Revista română de drepturile omului* no. 23, 2002, pp. 8-19.

[109] See his interview with Reuters, 6 May 2002.

[110] *RFE/ RL Newsline*, 26 June 2001.

[111] *Jurnalul naional*, 8 May 2002.

[112] *Rompres*, 28 June 2002.

[113] For the PRM see the declarations of Mihai Lupoi and Mihai Ungheanu, *Romanian Radio*, 26 March and 16 April 2002 and Buzatu's speech at the Romanian Academy session in *România mare*, nos. 625-630, 5 July through 9 August 2002; for Suru see *România mare*, No. 618, 17 May 2002; for the Association for the Defense of Human Rights-Helsinki Committee see Andreescu, *op. cit*.

[114] *Romanian Radio*, 14 April 2002. [Emphasis mine.]

[115] *Mediafax*, 24 May 2002 and *România mare*, nos. 610,611,627, 22 March, 29 March and 12 July 2002, respectively.

[116] See, among others, Buzatu's speech at the Romanian Academy Session, *op. cit.*

[117] See Shafir, Between Denial and 'Comparative Trivialization'. *op. cit.* pp. 72-75.

[118] Shafir, Romania. *Politics, Economics and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated Change*, London, 1985.

[119] See Andrei Corbea, Gustul social-democraiei originale (= The Taste of Original Social-Democracy) IN: *Observator cultural*, 106, 5 March-11 March 2002.

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Restitution of Jewish Property in Eastern Europe

Is there a connection between property restoration in Eastern Europe and the attitude towards Jews? These topics seem to be completely different but in fact the realization of one purely economic process – the restoration of possessions expropriated by totalitarian regimes (Communist and Nazi) – depends largely on the society's attitude towards the original owners. Even more, restitution of the possessions of minority groups could create new attitudes in post-Communist societies.

Although restitution as a means of remedy for past injustices is often examined as the last element of the process of reparation – following medical and psychological treatment, prosecution of the perpetrators and the collaborators, raising awareness of society's moral responsibility, etc. – it has symbolic and material importance to the identity of the groups formerly repressed. Especially in Eastern Europe, the symbolic importance concerns restitution of synagogues, schools, clubs, culture institutions, hospitals, etc., which restore the identity and the tradition of the community.

The material side of restitution is important because a minority persecuted during two totalitarian regimes (Nazi and Communist) does not possess the same funds as the majority, who enjoy the support of the State. So, during the period of democratic transition, restitution could play a role in granting the reintegration of the Jewish minority in the new democratic society.

Restitution is also a fundamental means for the prevention of future Human Rights violations.

The Extent of Restitution in Eastern European Legislation

In the euphoria following the fall of Communist rule, the Eastern European States showed a willingness to restore all possessions expropriated under Communism to the original owners, and thus to restore the previous situation. But the reality was more complex.

First, Eastern European States, anxious to remedy the most recent violations of human rights, limited restitution to the nationalizations exercised during the Communist regime, which excluded 'the nationalizations of immediate post-war years, notably

effecting German possessions (often confiscated from Jewish owners)'.[1] Once opened, the wound of Communist injustices revealed more deep-seated problems.[2]

Some of the properties expropriated during the Second World War by pro-Nazi governments, instead of being restored to their original owners, were placed under State control. Thus, injustices, caused by another type of totalitarian regime, also reappeared and asked to be repaired.

In spite of these revelations, East European governments hesitated to request material reparations for violations made by the totalitarian regimes before Communism. Why this hesitation?

On one hand, it is true that the fall of Communist rule opened the book of Human Rights violations made under this regime and the initial desire was to repair these abuses. But on the other hand, due to propaganda and Communist censorship, East European countries did not know much of the violations made during the Second World war, and almost nothing of the atrocities of the Holocaust. If we knew of concentration camps, the official version held that these were aimed at holding the enemies of Nazism, and thus, they did not aim only at the extermination of the Jews. The Jewish tragedy was generally seen 'as a part of an overall European catastrophe.'[3] In this situation of ignorance of the past, more recent abuses dominated and victims of Communism did not understand why they had to undergo competition with the victims of another period when all had suffered.

In the early 90's a political and social will for reparation of Nazi-regime crimes was absent in Eastern Europe. Competition regarding restitution provoked severe economic problems, doubtless due to the fact that it often concerns profitable properties. Also, the lack of knowledge on factors regarding the illegal expropriations before Communism slowed down the process of material repair.

The tendency observed in Eastern European countries was to privilege individuals above minority groups as such during restitution process.[4] In certain states the legislator explicitly underlined that only physical persons were entitled to restitution,[5] or that restitution of properties belonging to religious communities or national minority groups cannot be claimed under the general laws regulating restitution.[6] In other states both physical and legal persons were entitled for restitution but the general restitution laws did not contain special provisions concerning religious or minority groups[7]. Also, the dominant opinion remained that everyone suffered under Communism and any privileges granted to a group during the restitution process would only contribute to new injustices.

Thus, Czechoslovakia (before its dissolution) had intended to restore possessions nationalized or expropriated after 25 February 1948, a date from which the Communists obtained total control in Parliament.[8] After many hesitancies, the Czech Republic recently adopted a law aiming to repair certain injustices relative to property[9] caused by the Holocaust, which includes the possibility of restoring possessions of Jewish communities and organizations, expropriated during the period from 23 September 1938 until 8 May 1945. Nevertheless, deprivations undergone after the Second World war (1945-1948) which concerned 'the collaborators and the traitors ' of the Nazi period, did not give

rights to restitution because they had been exercised by a justifiable government through measures provided by law.[10]

Hungary resolved the problem of restitution limits through the jurisprudence of its Constitutional Court, which, in its decision of 3 September 1991[11] judged that the law on partial compensation for damages caused by the State on citizens' property[12] violates the principle of equality by limiting its field of application only to Communist expropriations – those made after 8 June 1949. The Court considered the deprivations that took place before this date, although made by another regime, had caused the same type of damages and must be also indemnified. Further to this case law a new date, which includes expropriations made during the Second World War (i.e., from 1 May 1939), was fixed.[13]

In spite of the rather progressive side of the Hungarian Constitutional court's decision, unresolved questions remain. For example, Jewish properties expropriated in 1938 are still not included for compensation.[14]

Due to its particularly difficult WWII history, Poland is the Eastern European country that has been the slowest in resolving the questions of restitution and compensation for private property illegally expropriated. More than 10 years after the fall of Communism, no law in this sense has been adopted.[15] The most recent legislative project foresees restitution in kind or a compensation equal to 50 % of the value of the property expropriated by the Communist regime during the period 1944-1962.[16] The Polish delay can be explained by the relentless political debates related to the rather complex problem of Nazi expropriations as well as to the possessions of the Germans expelled after the Second World War. Because of the extermination of the majority of the more than 3,300,000 Jews in Poland there are a very large number of heirless properties[17] owned by the State or by private persons.

Bulgarian legislation provided restitution of the possessions nationalized by the Communist regime. Possessions expropriated before the Second World War (by the pro-fascist regime) were restored to their owners as well as possessions that had been nationalized by the Communist regime. At the same time Bulgaria adopted a special Regulation of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers on restitution of property of the Consistory of Jews in Bulgaria.[18] However, due to the complex regime of restitution for municipal property (the municipality has to make a proposition to the Ministry of finances which authorizes restitution), there are still unresolved cases. Another problem is put by the difficulty faced by religious groups in proving their legal continuity after Communism, a period during which they had been suspended.[19]

Restitution provided by the Macedonian Law on Denationalisation[20] concerns property confiscated after the 2nd of August 1944, in other worlds during Communism. The Law contains special provisions concerning the properties of Jews from Macedonia who have left their properties thru forceful deportation into fascist camps and who have not survived the Holocaust,[21] but instead of true restitution the aim of this disposition is to transfer the expropriated properties to the Fund of Holocaust of Macedonian Jews

which will serve for the construction of a House of Holocaust of Macedonian Jews.[22]

The 1991 Slovenian Law of Denationalization allowed the possibility of restitution of expropriated properties to physical persons or to the Jewish community but the problem of heirless property remained open. As in other Eastern European countries there were also difficulties concerning the transfer of more profitable properties.

At the moment Rumania[23] and Albania[24] avoid confronting their Second World War pasts and limit their restitutions to expropriations of the Communist period. These countries still do not have a special legislation on restitution of the possessions belonging to minority and religious groups. The existing laws exclude these entities amongst the holders of restitution.[25]

Restitution of Foreign Property in Eastern European Legislation

Another problem, which shows the lack of willingness for restitution of all Jewish properties, is that the Eastern European States seem to be reluctant in receiving the participation of foreign physical or moral persons to the process of restitution.[26] Because of the complications of identification, but especially to protect the real-estate patrimony in the hands of their nationals, some of these countries granted the right of restitution only to their own citizens.[27] Thus, the circle of beneficiaries of this right narrows due to the exclusion of non-citizens and former Jewish owners who emigrated during the War (and their heirs). Generally, holders with foreign citizenship are seen on one side as people who are going to export the national capital[28] and from other side as 'not deserving' reparation because they suffered less from injustices during Communism.[29]

The East European governments argued that '*public interest*' was related only to the population living in the country and that the purpose of social reform after the collapse of Communism was to re-establish private property, to develop the market economy and to allow citizens to improve their level of life. Another major reason for the exclusion of foreigners from restitution was that this process could create obligations on behalf of the State for '*prompt, just and adequate*'[30] reparation in case of posterior deprivation. Given the examples of past nationalizations and conscious of their economic and social instability, as well as of the impossibility to satisfy all claims for restitution or for just compensation in cases of future nationalizations or expropriations, Eastern European states preferred to protect themselves against future foreigners' claims.[31]

The legislations of Eastern European States regulating the process of restitution confirm the above-mentioned tendency. The majority of East European Laws underline the requirement of citizenship for persons claiming restitution.

According to the reservation made during the ratification of the Protocol 1 of the ECHR, the Bulgarian legislator provided in article 29 of the Law on the property: 'Foreigners and foreign moral persons cannot acquire the right of property on the ground.' This ban did not apply to cases of succession. Nonetheless, persons who acquired a right to property on the basis of a legal succession were obliged to transfer it within three years after the opening of the inheritance.[32]

A modification in favour of foreigners was made in paragraph two of the same article, which granted foreign individuals and legal persons the right to acquire property in buildings, as well as limited real rights on buildings themselves in Bulgaria, as long as there were no limitations provided by law.

On 5 July 2002 the Croatian lawmakers finally changed the Law of 1996 on Restitution and Compensation of Property Taken During the Time of the Yugoslav Communist Government. The new provisions allow for compensation to be granted not only to former owners who had Croatian citizenship at the time the 1996 law was adopted, but also to persons who obtained it subsequently, and even to foreigners, under certain conditions: '*a) the existence of appropriate bilateral agreements or treaties between Croatia and the foreign claimant's country; b) the indication of the exact time and method under which the property was expropriated; and c) whether or not the claimant is considered to have been compensated by virtue of previous bilateral treaties or agreements.*'[33]

The Estonian law on agrarian reform[34] provides in its § 5:

> The following have right to claim return of or compensation for land: 1) natural persons whose land was unlawfully expropriated if they were citizens of the Republic of Estonia on 16 June 1940 or if they resided permanently in the territory of the Republic of Estonia on the date of entry into force of the Principles (20 June 1991).

So citizens of the ex-USSR, who did not obtain Estonian citizenship, are automatically excluded from restitution.[35]

Engaged with the question of whether the exclusion from restitution for those persons who were not Estonian citizens at the time of the nationalization violated the right of inheritance, and whether Estonians heirs of 'non-citizens' could claim restitution, the Constitutional Review Chamber admitted that the question of succession seemed to be secondary to the definition of the holders of the right to restitution.

We find a similar limitation in the Law on extra judicial rehabilitation of Czechoslovakia.[36] *Its section 3, art. 1 stipulated:*

> The 'entitled person' is a physical person, whose possession became the property of the state under circumstances outlined in section six of this law, providing that such persons are citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and have their place of permanent residence in this country.

By its Ruling No. 29/1996 of 9.02.1996 the Czech Constitutional Court overruled the condition of permanent place of residence, but the requirement of nationality remains still valid.

Subsequent to the debates on the exclusion of the foreigners from restitution, Slovakia has quite recently adopted a modification of the law on the extra judicial rehabilitation.[37] The legislator widens the circle of the holders of restitution rights by including the Slovak citizens who live at present in the region of Southern Slovakia, annexed to Hungary just before the Second World War, or in the territories which during the war formed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

The Romanian legislation related to restitution required that the applicant must be a Romanian citizen or at least have already introduced a request to obtain Romanian citizenship.[38]

The Macedonian Law on Denationalization limits even more severely the circle of holders entitled to right of restitution. This Law particularly states that an applicant for restitution must be a person who was a citizen of Republic of Macedonia on the date of this Law coming into force.[39] Thus any foreigners without Macedonian citizenship are without recourse in obtaining their possessions.

The question of discrimination on the basis of nationality was raised many times before the Eastern European national jurisdictions, which generally admit that the Laws should not create conditions of disparity. The Lithuanian Constitutional court considers that the legislative rules concerning restitution are identical for all applicants:

> The legislator while defining the subjects which are eligible for restoration of their rights of ownership have chosen clear legal criteria: subjects eligible for restoration of the rights of ownership to the property must possess the citizenship of Lithuania and a document certifying to that and be permanent residents of Lithuania. The Law does not deny the citizens of Lithuania residing abroad the possibility to take part in the process of restoration of the rights of ownership, thus there is no ground to maintain that this group of citizens is subjected to discrimination pertaining to the restoration of the rights of ownership. The Law treats them in the same manner as the citizens of Lithuania residing therein. The same conditions are set forth to all the citizens of Lithuania seeking to restore their rights of ownership to the existing real property.[40]

The problem of the exclusion of foreigners from the Eastern European restitution process forces a large number of Jewish applicants, who have excluded from the process of restitution because of their nationality, to present their case before international jurisdictions and especially before the UN Committee of Human Rights, where they can hope to receive a positive answer.

Thus, in Brok communication,[41] the Committee on Human Rights had to pronounce on facts provoked by the injustices caused during the Second World War. The possessions of the applicant were expropriated in 1940 and 1941 by the German authorities because of his Jewish background and in 1942 were sold to a private company. After the war, in 1946, the expropriated properties were restored for some months to the applicant but the decision was annulled. After the fall of Communism the applicant asked for restitution of his possessions but his demand was rejected with the explanation that his/ possessions were nationalized before 1948 (before the arrival of Communism). In reviewing the situation, the Committee on Human Rights noted that, even if the case is about a nationalization made during the period when the Decree Benes was in force, the German authorities had initially expropriated the applicant's possessions. For these reasons, the Committee on Human Rights concluded that there was a violation of article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[42]

Restitution and Its Impact on Attitudes Towards Jews

In spite of the initial hesitation to include expropriations executed by regimes before Communism among those giving right to restitution or to compensation, Eastern European States often provide concrete rules aiming at repairing the violations of rights of Jewish minority.[43]

Indeed, the problem of the extent of restitution as a means to remedy the injustices is in itself extremely complex. It deals with economic, legal, moral, diplomatic questions, etc. Perceived initially as a typically East European and mostly economic phenomenon, aimed at transforming state-owned property and restoring the situation before Communism, restitution seems to be of European and even international importance today. This process showed rapidly that without a Human Rights dimension it is impossible for it to be realized promptly, and that it is closely connected to the common European past and present. The East European restitution joined the European countries' efforts for a re-examination of the Second World War past, for moral and material reparation and a reinforced historical education.

Often, Western democracies haven't shown any greater willingness to transfer the property of profitable possessions. Let us quote here the case of Germany, which still tries to avoid restitution of Jewish property expropriated during the 30s,[44] or of Austria, which finally decided in 2002 to pay the country's Jewish community for communal property stolen or destroyed during the Nazi era.[45] In the East as in the West the process seems long because it is not just economic but also connected with the awareness of the moral responsibility for past injustices.

We can observe that there is a diversity of resolutions to restitution problems in the Eastern European countries because of their different past experiences, different levels of anti-Semitism and different economic priorities.

Often Eastern European governments seem to have a positive vision towards Jewish property restitution because of the current Jewish influence in the USA. Thus, they hope to create financial opportunities for their countries.[46] But at the same time traditional anti-Semitism in portions of East-European countries, the ignorance of the history of the Holocaust, and the vision that under Communism everyone was a victim, created an opposition for the real transfer of Jewish properties.

There is also a willingness to turn the page of the past and to privilege privatisation – a process that is often delayed by restitution claims.

In many cases Jewish properties are possessed by municipalities and in cases concerning profitable buildings, the majority opinion is rarely favourable regarding restitution.

We should not forget also the link made in Eastern European countries between Jews and Communism. Because of the large number of Jews in Marxist groups and in leadership positions in the Bolshevik revolution, the rejection of Communism is often

linked with a rejection of the Jewish minority. In a situation where people don't know the truth about the Holocaust, this rejection combined with the new anti-Semitism, disseminated in Europe, contradicts the possibility of reparation for Human Rights violations towards Jews.

This problem is not insignificant. After fifty years of discrimination and persecution of religious minorities, the Jewish minority included, restitution could play a fundamental role in the identity of these peoples and their reinstatement into social and cultural life. The measures of restitution of the possessions of these groups or the attempt to create a 'positive discrimination' may help them resume their real place in a new democratic society. These measures cannot be considered as discriminatory with regard to the rest of the population. Especially, since the future Protocol 12 of the ECHR explicitly aims measures of 'positive discrimination' as justifying unequal treatment.[47] There are two aspects which we should not ignore: the symbolic importance of the restitution of synagogues, schools, clubs, culture institutions, hospitals, etc., which restore the identity and the tradition of the community, and the material one. A persecuted minority will not have the same funds as the majority, which possess the State's help. So, during the period of democratic transition, restitution could play a role in granting the fulfilment of the Jewish and other religious minorities.

The anti-Semitic attitude in Eastern Europe is closely related to the ignorance of Holocaust history, which blocks restitution and creates opposition regarding the Jewish minority evolution. Thus, when there is a competition between victims, the majority and the governments prefer to remedy the more recent injustices.

So, one of the most important steps (in the long term, not in the short term as political or economic pressure for the prevention of future anti-Semitic attitudes) for facilitating the development of the restitution process should be to strengthen Holocaust education. By providing information on past anti-Semitic attitudes as a cause for Holocaust atrocities in each country, a moral responsibility would be engaged; one that could help Eastern European societies to understand the importance of restitution as a means of reparation. This heightened understanding could then play its real role in the development of the Jewish minority group's identity in Eastern Europe.

Notes

[1] Lavigne, M., *L'Europe de l'Est. Du plan au marché*, Editions Liris, Paris,1992, p. 146.

[2] Pogany, I., Restitution of Former Jewish-Owned Property and related Schemes of Compensation in Hungary, European Public Law, 1998, Vol. 4, p. 212: 'From an ethical (or even logical) standpoint, claims that *only* the wrongs committed during the Communist era should be corrected, or that these deserve priority over other claims, are difficult to sustain. Comparable, or worse, human rights violations were perpetrated by pre-Communist administrations in the region, whether in the immediate post-war-period, during the war years or, in some cases, even earlier'.

[3] Braham, R.L., Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in the Politics of East Central Europe, IN: *Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Columbia

University Press, 1994, p.13.

[4] Czech Law on extra-judicial rehabilitation of 21.02.1991; Romanian Law No 10 of 8.02.2001 on restitution of property nationalised during the period 1945- 1989.

[5] Slovenian Law on denationalisation, RS/I 27-1094/1991.

[6] Romanian Law No 10 of 8.02.2001 on restitution of property nationalised during the period 1945- 1989.

[7] Czech Law on Extra-judicial Rehabilitation of 21.02.1991; Bulgarian Law on restoration and usage of agricultural lands, *State Journal*, No. 17/1991.

[8] Law on Extra-judicial Rehabilitation, 21.02.1991; Earle, J. S., Frydman, R., Rapaczynski, A., Turkevitz, J., CEU Press, Budapest, London, New York, 1994, p. 55.

[9] Law No. 212/2000, to mitigate certain property-related injustices caused by the Holocaust and to amend Act No 243/1992 to regulate certain issues relating to Act No. 229/1991 regulating the ownership of land and other agricultural property as amended by Act No. 93/1992 as amended The Parliament has passed the following Act of the Czech Republic, 23 June 2000.

[10] Cepl, V., A Note on restitution pf Property in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia, IN: Kritz, N., *Transitional Justice, How Emerging Democracies Recon with Former Regimes*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1995, t. II, p. 582.

[11] Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision No 28/91(IV.3) AB, 3.09.1991.

[12] Hungarian Law on partial compensation for the damages caused by the State on citizens' property, Law No XXV of 26.06.1991.

[13] A new Hungarian Law on partial compensation for the damages caused by the State on citizens' property from 1.05.1939 until 8.06.1949 was adopted on 7.04.1992 (Law No 24/92).

[14] Pogany I., *Restitution of Former Jewish-Owned Property and related Schemes of Compensation in Hungary*, European Public Law, 1998, Vol. 4, p. 220.

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[16] Golden, J.D., Senate Throws Weight behind Restitution Bill. A vote last week in the Senate, capped weeks of intense national debate on the property restitution issue, IN: *Warsaw Business Journal*, 30.01.2001.

[17] Zweig, R.W, Reparations Then and Now, (Paper presented to the research seminar of the Institute for Advanced Holocaust Studies at Yad Vashem, March 2000).

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[20] Macedonian Law on Denationalization, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia N0 43/2000.

[21] Macedonian Law on Denationalization, art. 66.

[22] Macedonian Law on Denationalization, art. 68 and 69.

[23] Romanian Law No 10 of 8.02.2001 on restitution of property nationalised during the period 1945- 1989.

[24] *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol 10 No 4, Fall 2001, http://www.nyu.edu/eecr.

[25] Handbook on property restitution in Romania: 'Restitution cannot be claimed under Law no.10/2001 for the properties that belonged to religious communities or national minority

groups. These organizations will be entitled to file restitution claims under future legislation specially dedicated'. http://www.roembus.org/english/communities/case/property_restitution.htm.

[26] Labaronne, D., Les privatisations à l'Est, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[27] Estonia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania.

[28] Cepl, V., A Note on restitution pf Property in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia, IN: Kritz, N., *Transitional justice, How emerging democracies recon with former regimes,* United States Institute of peace Press, Washington D.C., 1995,vol. II, p. 584.

[29] Barkan, E., *The Guilt of Nations, Restitution and negotiating historical injustices*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2000, p.128.

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[34] Estonian Law on agrarian reform of 30.04.1996, Estonian legislation in Translation, Legal Acts of Estonia, Estonian Translation and Legislative Support Centre, 1996.

[35] *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol 4, Summer 1995, p. 9, http://www.nyu.edu/eecr.

[36] Czech Law on extra-judicial rehabilitation of 21.02.1991.

[37] Czechoslovak Law on extra-judicial rehabilitation of 21.02.1991, modified on 21.02.2002.

[38] Romanian Law 169/1997 on modification of Law No 18/1991 of 19.02.1991 on restitution of agricultural ground, http://www.senat.ro; Romanian Law No 10 of 8.02.2001 on restitution of property nationalised during the period 1945- 1989.

[39] Macedonian Law on Denationalization, Official Gazette 43/2000, art. 13.

[40] Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Case No 25/94, Decision of 20.06.1995, http://www.lrkt.lt.

[41] Committee of Human Rights, Brok v. the Czech Republic, communication No 774/1997, Decision of 15.01.2002.

[42] Committee of Human Rights, Brok v. the Czech Republic, communication No 774/1997, par. 7.4 : 'In the Committee's view this discloses a discriminatory treatment of the author, compared to those individuals whose property was confiscated by Nazi authorities without being subjected, immediately after the war, to Czech nationalization and who, therefore, could benefit from the laws of 1991 and 1994'.

[43] Eizenstat, St., Restitution of Communal and Private Property in Central and Eastern Europe, IN: *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol 6, Number 2/3, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 50-52.

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hasen/.

[45] Austria to make payments, *JTA Breaking News*, 22.04.2002.

[46] Barkan, E., *The Guilt of Nations, Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2000, p. 14.

[47] According to § 16 of the Explanatory Report of the Protocol 12 to the ECHR the measures 'taken to promote a full and actual equality' are not forbidden 'by the principle of non discrimination, as far as they answer an objective and reasonable justification'.

ABSTRACTS

Ivo Goldstein (Zagreb)
Types of Anti-Semitism in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia (1918 – 2000)

Due to the neglect of research, not much is known about anti-Semitism in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Recently, the situation has completely changed and there is now interest in the subject.

The author provides a comprehensive list of existing literature. Describing the political events in Yugoslavia in the period from 1918 – 2000, he demonstrates the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda and describes various sources of anti-Semitism: the church, and the Nazi nationalist ideology. During the communist period, outbursts of anti-Zionism evolved into a specific kind of anti-Semitism.

A specific version of anti-Semitism is historical revisionism, minimizing the culpability of the Ustasha. A less obvious, but nevertheless dangerous aspect of anti-Semitism is insincere philo-Semitism. The author comes to the conclusion that presently, anti-Semitism does not endanger the Jewish communities in former Yugoslavia. Their greater enemy is the low standard of living, insincere philo-Semitism and a constant threat that the local Jewish population may be manipulated and used for propaganda goals.

Oto Luthar and Irena Šumi (Ljubljana)
Living in Metaphor: Jews and Anti-Semitism in Slovenia

The aim of the authors of this article is to provide a broad-ranging analysis of how and why in Slovenia (and the historic Slovenian lands in the past), Jews were persistently typified as persons who victimize others, are morally unworthy of sympathy, and whose presence constitutes a problem that calls for solutions. In other words, the authors are addressing the question of why Jews in Slovenia never got a chance for integration, but remained the archetypal Others or even served as the metaphor of Otherness.

While the 'Jewish danger' is no doubt a social construct, it remains a matter of exploration exactly how this construct came into being and how it was sustained. There is very little evidence of any local conditions of friction or conflict with the majority population. Rather, the Anti-Jewish sentiments were ubiquitous, vague, and diffuse. In the Slovenian case, a hostile disposition toward Jews can be found among people who have never had any contact with them, who, to the best of their knowledge, have never even seen a living Jew, and in localities where Jews had been expelled for more than three centuries (from early 16th century to the second half of the 19th century).

In order to explain Anti-Semitism in Slovenia, therefore, historiographic, theoretical and literary critics' sources need be examined. Likewise, to account for the developments after 1989 in Slovenia, the authors compare some of their data with the Anti-Semitism in

neighboring countries. The authors argue along with Ronald J. Berger that '... the Jew has remained a social type construed as compromising and defying the order of things', 'the prototype and arch-pattern of all nonconformity, heterodoxy, anomaly and aberration'; a point similarly made also by Zygmunt Bauman. Finally, the results from an opinion survey designed specifically for this study are presented.

Vladimir Paunovsky (Sofia)
Anti-Semitism in Bulgaria – Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

The author gives a broad picture of the relations between Bulgarians and Jews through the centuries since these two peoples met on Bulgarian soil. Although the Jews suffered in certain periods due to Christian religious intolerance and prejudices, in general, in comparison with neighboring Balkan countries, their situation was more tolerable. The author follows in great detail the persecution of Jews and the publication of anti-Semitic literature in Bulgaria. Special attention is given to the events of WWII, the introduction of anti-Semitic laws in Bulgaria and the salvation of Bulgarian Jews by the Bulgarian society from total annihilation.

Panayiota Andrianopoulou (Athens)
The Existence of Absence. Jewish Presence in Veroia through the Memories and Narratives of Christian Inhabitants

Elderly Christian inhabitants of Veroia, a town in Northern Greece wherein most of the Jewish population perished in the Holocaust, were asked of their memories concerning their former Jewish neighbors.

The author discovered that the image of the Jew is mainly built up of stereotypes and religious prejudices projected on individuals. The socializing framework of Greeks and Jews, strictly defined in space and time, consisted of professional contacts, of neighborhood relations, and childhood friendships. The interviews revealed that the rule was not that of constant and interactive personal relations. Such limited and superficial contacts gave place to ignorance or, at the least, vague Christian ideas concerning the Jews.

Béla Rásky (Budapest)
A Story Differently Told, Remembered and Constructed: Jews and Anti-Semitism in 20th Century Hungary

Since 1848, Hungarian Jews underwent a process of voluntary Magyarisation. The history of the success (or even failure, depending on viewpoint) of assimilation, the rejection of

recent questioning of the assimilationist narrative as well as the reasons for anti-Semitism in contemporary Hungary, but especially on the problem how integration worked or failed, cannot he written without trying to find an answer to the question of how assimilation and exclusion were perceived and reinterpreted in the course of the twentieth century. Jewishness in today's Hungary follows the Western European model allowing for identity patterns that can be diversely coded in terms of multi-culturalism, ethnicity, and spiritually. Despite the brutal shock that the supporters of assimilation experienced between 1920 – 1044, the majority of contemporary Hungarian Jews subscribe to the assimilationist model, albeit with some reservations. Anti-Semitic tendencies in the contemporary Hungarian society nevertheless persist.

Hildrun Glass (München)
Romanian Jews in the Early Years of Communist Rule. Notes on the Myth of 'Jewish Communism'

To this day, the myth of 'Jewish communism' is a part of Romania's public discourse. It is still propagated in other states of the former Eastern Bloc as well. Various forms of the myth center around two stereotypes: 'the Jews' are responsible for the communist dictatorship, and they profited most from it.

The author describes the policies toward the Jewish population of Romania of the Romanian Communist Party during the first years of Communist rule. She shows that contrary to the myth, the attitude of the Romanian Jews towards the Communist regime was ambiguous and the influence of Zionist ideas in Jewish masses rather strong.

Michael Shafir (Prague)
Memory, Memorials and Membership: Romanian Utilitarian Anti-Semitism and Marshall Antonescu

The author describes recent active attempts of nationalist Romanian forces to revise historical facts on the behavior of Marshal Antonescu during WWII and the endeavors to establish Antonescu's cult praising him as a national hero. Connected with it is the desire on the part of such forces to deny that Holocaust took place in Romania, for which Antonescu bears direct responsibility. Calling such actions of Romanian nationalists 'utilitarian anti-Semitism', the author describes in considerable detail relevant facts, such as the naming of streets after Marshal Antonescu, the erection of monuments to him, the making and withdrawing of controversial statements on the Romanian state's responsibility for the Holocaust, etc. As Romania is entering the European Union, Western pressure for the time being remains instrumental for keeping similar forces and actions under control. However, the author's prognosis for the future is far from optimistic.

Mariana Karadjova (Geneva)
Restitution of Jewish Property in Eastern Europe.

The author describes the current legislation on the restitution of Jewish property and shows the problems connected to the return of property to the Jews. One of the restrictive clauses of the legislation in several East European countries is the prerequisite that only citizens of the state in question have the right to restitution. This legal provision excludes many Jews who emigrated after WWII. Also, there is lack of desire on the municipal level to return to their former owners the most profitable properties.
The author concludes that one of the most important steps to facilitate the restitution process is the strengthening of Holocaust education in East European countries.

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